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The Supreme Court's Decision Overruling Chevron is Important - But Less so than You Might Think
It won't end the administrative state or even significantly reduce the amount of federal regulation. But it's still a valuable step towards protecting the rule of law and curbing executive power.
Today's Supreme Court decision in Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo overturns the important 1984 precedent of Chevron v. Natural Resources Defense Council, which required federal judges to defer to administrative agencies' interpretations of federal laws, so long as Congress has not addressed the issue in question, and the agency's view is "reasonable." It's an important reversal, and I think the Court was right to do it. Chief Justice John Roberts' majority opinion lays out a compelling critique of Chevron, including explaining why it should not be retained out of respect for precedent. But, contrary to the hopes of some and fears of others, today's ruling will not end the administrative state or even greatly reduce the amount of federal regulation.
I summarized some key reasons why in a post written last year when the Court decided to hear Loper Bright:
While I would be happy to see Chevron overturned, I am skeptical of claims it will make a huge difference to the future of federal regulation. I explained why in two previous posts, (see here and here). To briefly summarize, my reasons for skepticism are 1) we often forget that the US had a large and powerful federal administrative state even before Chevron was decided in 1984, 2) states that have abolished Chevron-like judicial deference to administrative agencies (or never had it in the first place) don't seem to have significantly weaker executive agencies or significantly lower levels of regulation, as a result, 3) a great deal of informal judicial deference to agencies is likely to continue, even in the absence of Chevron, and 4) Chevron sometimes protects deregulatory policies as well as those that increase regulation (it also sometimes protects various right-wing policies that increase regulation, in an age where pro-regulation "national conservatives" are increasingly influential on the right); the Chevron decision itself protected a relatively deregulatory environmental policy by the Reagan administration.
In addition, as Chief Justice John Roberts notes in his majority opinion, the Supreme Court had previously issued a series of decisions significantly limiting Chevron, creating "a byzantine set of preconditions and exceptions" restricting the range of situations where agencies get deference. Those rulings don't seem to have led to any major reduction in the overall prevalence of federal regulation, though they did constrain some types of agency actions.
Overruling Chevron doesn't even completely eliminate all precedent requiring judicial deference to agencies. As Justice Elena Kagan notes in her dissent, there is still Skidmore deference:
[T]he majority makes clear that what is usually called Skidmore deference continues to apply. See ante, at 16–17. Under that decision, agency interpretations "constitute a
body of experience and informed judgment" that may be "entitled to respect." Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U. S. 134, 140 (1944). If the majority thinks that the same judges who argue today about where "ambiguity" resides… are not going to argue tomorrow about what "respect" requires, I fear it will be gravely disappointed.
Like Fredo Corleone, federal agencies are smart and they want respect!
And federal judges will still often want to give it to them, especially in cases that aren't ideologically charged. Justice Kagan is right that the degree of "respect" required by Skidmore is often far from completely clear.
Despite the likely limited scope of its impact, I still think today's ruling is a valuable step. While it won't lead to large-scale deregulation, it can help strengthen the rule of law. It could also limit the aggrandizement of power by the executive. Liberals who lament Chevron's demise may be happier about it if Donald Trump returns to power and his appointees try to use statutory ambiguities to advance his ends.
A traditional rationale for Chevron is that courts should defer to agencies in situations where there are statutory ambiguities because the agencies have superior expertise. Justice Kagan repeatedly invokes expertise in her dissent.
Sometimes agencies really do have relevant specialized expertise. But expertise is far from the only factor influencing agency decisions. Partisan and ideological agendas also have a big impact.
If Trump returns to power, do left-liberal Chevron fans believe his appointees will scrupulously "follow the science" when they interpret statutes? Or will they have a political agenda that will usually trump (pun intended!) science when the two conflict? The answer seems pretty obvious, at least to me.
The same question can be posed in reverse to the dwindling band of conservative defenders of Chevron. Even if they think GOP administrations will "follow the science," they probably don't have equal confidence in Democratic ones.
Partisan and ideological bias aside, many issues handled by agencies are simply impossible to resolve through technical expertise alone. They also involve questions of values. And even the most expert of government planners have severe limits to their knowledge, which is one reason why it's usually best to rely on markets, which aggregate information better than planners do.
In sum, Chevron's demise doesn't entail that of the regulatory state. Far from it. But it's still a useful step forward.
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"It won't end the administrative state or even significantly reduce the amount of federal regulation."
Yeah. Going to be hard to do that with 330 million people and all.
Stop trying to scare people with Trump. We support government over here in Biden-land & that reasonably entails administrative agency discretion. The courts will only go so far to restrain the clusterf of Trump winning. To the extent they will, this opinion won't do much to help one way or the other.
God blessed us with this Supreme Court! And thank you for President Trump's selections.
Show me on the doll where the Orange man touched you.
I am relieved to hear from many sources that this ruling that “conservatives” and our illustrious corporate community have wanted for forty years really doesn’t do anything anyway. I’ll bet they all feel real silly now for all the slobber and riches they spent in chasing this result all these decades. Now I’m struck with this vague feeling that I read similar commentary post-Dobbs. But maybe not.
The problem that I have with a lot of the Court's recent moves on the administrative state is not with what, theoretically, they are establishing - clearer limits on executive authority, less "deference" to agency judgment on what the laws permit or require, and so on - but rather on the dysfunction that is likely to result, when Congress fails to step up to the role designated for them.
Many of these recent decisions follow this pattern. The EPA can't regulate pollution from sources that flow into half of our rivers. The EPA can't regulate carbon emissions with plans that are carefully designed to minimize the burden of adopting new technologies. The EPA can't develop a uniform, multi-state plan for dealing with ozone precursors unless it somehow addresses every possible permutation of non-compliance with its plan.
Congress could step in and update the statutes. They could come in and decide that carbon dioxide is not a "pollutant." They could give the EPA tools that reflect decades of experience fighting pollution, rather than the ones they came up with in the 1970s, like carbon credit trading or more holistic approaches to pollution reduction that focus less on specific substances and more on updating plants past their prime. They could come back and address the shortcomings of the EPA's ability to regulate our water resources. Congress could expand or contract the EPA's power in any way it might deem politically worthy.
But we all know it won't. So, where the President once had some authority to step into the gaps left by congressional inaction, we'll now have a set of binding law whose directions are left unarticulated and implementation is up to - who, exactly? The courts?
I don't understand how this is better for the rule of law. We have a law that prohibits carbon dioxide pollution but no actual regulation of it, as attempt after attempt to restrict carbon pollution is thrown out by the courts. The EPA has concluded that we need to do more about ozone pollution across state lines but it'll be years before it has a plan.
And all at a time where post-favor "gratuities" are now fully permitted under federal law! Tell me we're not a failed state.
In a normal, healthy, adaptable system, if there is a power vacuum, it gets filled. But with “originalism” and the convenient invocation of “separation of powers”, it doesn’t. It is folly to expect our present Congress to fill the gap that the overturning of Chevron creates. The result is a dysfunctional government, not addressing the "general welfare", which is o.k. with the mindless argument many have that “government is not the solution, it’s the problem”.
I'm not a lawyer and don't even play one on the Interwebs. But hoping someone can clarify how this way of dealing with administrative law is different from what Hayek called 'rechtsstaat'.
It seems to me that rechtsstaat would have judicial oversight of an admin state - from the judicial branch rather than from inside the exec branch. But the remit would be very different - more protective of individual citizens rather than merely interpreting legislation. And the admin courts actually would have the sort of knowledge where in its absence courts simply defer.
Am I just not understanding this rechtsstaat approach to administrative law?
JFree — If you want to understand it, I think I can explain it. There is a point where a power to say, "No, no, no, no, a thousand times, no," verges over to overwhelm and encompass every power to say, "yes."
To make that happen has been this Court's goal. The modern reality is an administrative state. Despite rhetoric to the contrary, this Supreme Court's goal is not to reverse that. It is, instead, to make itself into an unappealable and uncontrollable power at the apex of that reality.
Many agencies don't even defer to their own expertise. i.e. the technical side of their decisions is reverse-engineered to fit their political objectives. The vision of agencies driven to ideal decisions by neutral experts is a fiction of progressive dogma.
CAfellow — Customarily, "political objectives," is a working term for the constitutional notion of political constraint. That worked well for a long time. It will not continue to work with a supremely empowered, but politically unaccountable, body at liberty to dictate the political objectives.
Sure, political goals and constraints are legitimate and ultimately the only source of authority to perform regulation. To rely on a notion of disinterested experts is to pretend otherwise.
To rely on a notion of unaccountable judges instead of experts is to assure otherwise.
Actually, the experienced professionals who run specialized agencies are, in fact, smart. And federal judges, as we have seen, might be smart in legal matters, but aren't trained professionals with years of experience in engineering, biology, environmental science . . . To put the Fredo clip in sounds like the kind of sophomoric argumentation we expect from Josh, but not from you.
I think your perspective may be influenced more by federal than state or local experience. Some genuine experts do rotate in and out of many federal agencies, and there are some staff who qualify. This occurs less at the state or local level. And even the federal agencies make their share of boneheaded plays and biased analyses. The best case for both agency leadership and federal judges is that both tend to be smart and experienced generalists who can sort through explanations from outside experts and make some sense of the results.
Federal judges are a mixed lot, and their expertise is not ideal for the specialized subject matter of administrative agencies.
Agency heads come and go. Agencies have congressional and executive oversight. No institution will be free from mistakes. As a whole, however, agency personnel are more skilled at it.
As to the states, we are talking 50 states and a bunch of agencies. Experts are there too.
Judges have life tenure. Any oversight they have are limited. Subpoenas also work a lot more for agency oversight.
Actually we have seen that they are not, in fact, smart. They are no better than they judges reviewing their rulings. And on top of that, they are highly partisan bureaucrats trying to violate citizens rights.
They are better than judges in understanding the complexities of agency decision-making. Someone like Justice Scalia, for instance, granted his limitations in deciding complex scientific questions.
The typical bureaucrat is there to do their job in often mandate and technical tasks. The reach of specific personnel can also be quite limited. Certain judges, especially these days, are much more likely to be partisans that threaten rights.
No government official is free from mistakes. Thus, there is judicial review present. Nonetheless, judges should understand their limitations. Conservatives sent that message regularly when it was something like the police on the beat or something.
But it's still a valuable step towards protecting the rule of law and curbing executive power.
Explain where policy to curb executive power is any legitimate part of the Court's powers. Sure, if executive power, taken case by case, turns up an occasional case where the executive transgresses constitutional constraints, it is the duty of the Court to say so. But how can it be the Court's prerogative to say anything pursuant to a policy goal to contract executive power overall, or, for that matter, to enlarge it overall. Those are questions of political philosophy which have no place in the Court's deliberations.
While I basically liked Chevron, I think I can explain what Ilya was saying. Executive agencies, the theory is, tend to take an expansive view of the powers delegated to them by the legislative branch. Thus, if the courts resolve ambiguities with respect to the scope of administrative schemes in favor of the interpretations advanced by the agency, the long-term result is likely to be, in most cases, an expansion of the powers of executive agencies. Those who dislike Chevron would argue that courts are better equipped than the agency to impartially determine the power that was delegated by the Legislative branch, without injecting any policy preferences, and that this will in most cases curb excesses of power taken on by executive agencies. Under this view, the court is simply acting as a neutral arbiter determining Congressional intent, with no consideration of policy goals.
It’s where the Constitution says that “legislative power is vested in Congress” not the executive. Come on man.
Mission creep. It's endemic in federal agencies, but is a frequent problem in all organizations, public and private.
So what? Why is unaccountable mission creep in the Supreme Court preferable to politically accountable mission creep in administrative agencies? Why are Court precedents which can last for decades or centuries better for accountability than administrative policies which can change with every election?
But is it really "curbing executive power", or is it transferring power from employees of the executive branch, who can be fired or replaced at the pleasure of their elected boss, to judges, who cannot, and who (usually) have no expertise or experience setting policy - policy which often concerns highly technical, specialized matters? Like, the difference between nitrogen oxides (a class or combination of air-pollutant gases), and nitrous oxide (laughing-gas), which apparently puzzles Mr.Justice Neil Gorsuch?
Appointed heads of agencies can be replaced at will, but the vast number of executive agency employees can't be. And those are the people with radical agendas and the power to make them happen. Recall that JFK said dealing with the federal bureaucracy was like trying to nail jelly to a wall. And it's only gotten worse since then.
What is stopping executive agency employees from being replaced at will.
They're often union.
Somin — If Trump returns to power, do left-liberal Chevron fans believe his appointees will scrupulously "follow the science" when they interpret statutes? Or will they have a political agenda that will usually trump (pun intended!) science when the two conflict? The answer seems pretty obvious, at least to me.
All the more reason to leave Chevron in place. If Trump's return to office is the peril which threatens policy-making abuses, then voters have the remedy in their own hands. If a Court's policy-making abuses are the peril, the voters get no say.