The Volokh Conspiracy

Mostly law professors | Sometimes contrarian | Often libertarian | Always independent | Est. 2002

The Volokh Conspiracy

Free Speech

School District Superintendent Sought Gag Order Against Critic

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From yesterday's opinion in Cozad v. Ohio Elections Commission, decided by the Ohio Court of Appeals:

In September 2019, John M. Stafford, an elector and resident of the Bellbrook-Sugarcreek School District, filed with the commission a complaint against Citizens for Bellbrook-Sugarcreek Schools—a political action committee formed to promote the passage of a tax levy on the May 2019 primary and special elections ballot—its treasurer, Andy Lowrey, and its campaign chair, [Douglas] Cozad, who is also the Superintendent of the Bellbrook-Sugarcreek School District. Stafford alleged that the political action committee had violated Ohio election laws by failing to disclose in its campaign finance filings the value of in-kind contributions it had received from the school district…. [F]ollowing its preliminary review of Stafford's complaint, the commission concluded that there was probable cause, and scheduled the matter for a hearing.

In December 2019, several months before the scheduled hearing on Stafford's complaint, Cozad filed with the commission a motion for a protective order, pursuant to Civ.R. 26(C). Ostensibly to protect himself and the other respondents from annoyance, embarrassment, and oppression, Cozad requested an order broadly prohibiting Stafford from:

(1.) Issuing any public comments about this action in any form whatsoever, including, but not limited to social media (e.g. Facebook);

(2.) Disseminating, disclosing or commenting to the public any information, documents or other things gleaned through discovery or from subpoenas issued to third-parties;

(3.) Disseminating, disclosing or commenting to the public any information, documents or testimony from any depositions; and

(4.) Directly or indirectly attempting to influence the Ohio Elections Commission or public opinion regarding this action through any public comments, including, but not limited to, the use of social media (e.g. Facebook).

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Politics

"The Worst Behavior This Court Has Ever Observed of a … Litigant"

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That's what Judge Liles Burke's opinion in Germany v. Slater (that's Germany the person, not the Federal Republic) promises:

Over the past 17 years, this judicial officer has served as a municipal judge, a state district judge, a state appellate judge, and, now as a United States district judge. What follows is a description of the worst behavior this Court has ever observed of a pro se litigant, or for that matter, any litigant.

Does it deliver? You be the judge.

Racism in Uniform Birth Record States Until 1989

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Here's a little tidbit that didn't make it into Classified.

For uniform birth record states:

Prior to 1989, for statistical purposes, classification of the child's race or national origin was based on the race or national origin of the parents. When both parents were not of the same race or national origin, rules had been established for coding various combinations. If only one parent was white, the child was assigned the race of the other parent. If neither parent was white, the child was assigned the race of the father…

So if your father was white and your mom was black, you were tallied as black on your birth record. However, if your father was Asian and your mom was black, you were classified as Asian. Amazing (and appalling) that this was the law in many states until 1989!

Self-Defense

When Can Defendant Pleading Self-Defense Introduce Evidence of Alleged Attacker's Past Violent Acts?

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From People v. Guerra, decided today by New York's high court:

We are asked once again to discard the rule recognized in People v. Rodawald (N.Y. 1904) and People v. Miller (N.Y. 1976) that "preclud[es] the admission of prior violent acts of victims in cases where a claim of justification is made" unless the defendant was aware of the specific acts at the time of the assault. We decline to do so.

Defendant stabbed the victim in the chest with a small knife, causing life-threatening injuries. At trial, the court determined that defendant was entitled to raise a justification defense. Defendant sought to introduce evidence of the specific violent conduct underlying four of the victim's prior youthful offender adjudications to prove that the victim was the initial aggressor with respect to deadly physical force. Supreme Court, in accordance with Miller, prohibited the jury from considering that evidence for that purpose….

"Youthful Offender status provides youth four key benefits: relief from [a] record of a criminal conviction, reduced sentences, privacy from public release of the youth's name pending the Youthful Offender determination on misdemeanor offenses only, and confidentiality of the Youthful Offender record." Youthful offender designations are given to those who have "a real likelihood of turning their lives around," and the protection gives these individuals "the opportunity for a fresh start, without a criminal record." Given these policy concerns, we see no reason to revisit the Miller rule in this case.

{[Under the dissent's proposed rule, a] defendant accused of murdering a 17–year–old could, if the victim happened to have a prior Youthful Offender determination, offer direct evidence of specific conduct committed by the victim as a child to show the killing was justified. Our exclusion of such evidence is neither "archaic," "obsolete," nor "out of step with other jurisdictions." To the contrary, defendant seeks to offer evidence of prior bad acts that would not be admissible under the Federal Rules of Evidence [404] or in nearly any state that has adopted those rules.}

Defendant's additional challenge to the constitutionality of the Miller rule is without merit.

Judge Rowan Wilson, joined by Judge Jenny Rivera, dissented; the dissent is long, but here are some excerpts:

Imagine for a moment that you are a juror in a criminal case. On trial is a young man with no history of violence. He is charged with stabbing another young man, one who on four prior occasions has, without provocation, assaulted and beaten up strangers. The defendant says he stabbed the victim with a penknife attached to his keys because the other man wielded a broken beer bottle as a weapon, hit him and was attempting to cut him with the beer bottle. The victim says he never had a beer bottle, never threatened the defendant, and it was the defendant who pulled out a knife and stabbed him following a minute of name-calling back and forth.

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Such Discovery Behavior Is Downright … Satanic

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From Judge Angel [sic] Kelley's order today in The Satanic Temple, Inc. v. City of Boston (D. Mass.):

Following a status conference regarding the parties' dispute on the status of discovery, the Court resolves it with an order that discovery is officially closed. "The [C]ourt has broad power to control discovery." "In particular, courts have discretion to tailor discovery to the circumstances of the case at hand and to adjust the timing of discovery."

Plaintiff, The Satanic Temple, Inc. ("TST") filed this case against the City of Boston ("the City") on January 20, 2021, challenging the constitutionality of the City's legislative prayer selection process. Fact discovery was set to close on October 26, 2022. Initially, the parties contemplated 15 depositions per side to accommodate the 13 city councilors.

At the outset of discovery, TST sought to depose on Election Day, then-City Councilor Michelle Wu, who was a candidate in the Boston mayoral race, rather than the other city councilors named in the complaint. The Court granted the City's emergency motion to quash the subpoena for Election Day, November 2, 2021, entered a protective order, and awarded attorney's fees, due to TST's politically motivated publicity stunts to harass then-Councilor Wu, on one of the most important days of her career.

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Blast From the Past: Solicitor General Clement's Brief on Nationwide Injunctions and the APA

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In Summers v. Earth Island Institute, decided in 2009, the U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari with four questions presented. Number four has acute relevance today: "Whether the court of appeals erred in affirming the nationwide injunction issued by the district court." The Court didn't reach that question, however, because of its resolution of the other questions presented. But the Solicitor General's office did file a brief that addressed this question, with Paul Clement as the counsel of record. This brief is worth reintroducing to the discussion of the national injunction and the APA--especially now that there is such a lively scholarly debate about whether the APA codifies or creates a "universal vacatur" remedy.

(For new entrants into that debate on the APA, see this piece by Jonathan Adler, arguing no at the Notice & Comment blog of the Yale Journal on Regulation; and this piece for a Notre Dame Law review symposium by Ronald Levin, which argues that the APA is a framework statute, and its evolution is supposed to be guided by the courts, and the post-APA development of universal vacatur is one such salutary evolution.)

Here is the relevant section of the SG's brief in Summers v. Earth Island Institute:

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Vaccine mandates

J.M. Smucker Is Not a State Actor

The Sixth Circuit rejects a suit against the jam maker for requiring employees to get the jab.

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Like many private employers, the J.M. Smucker Company required its employees to get vaccinated against Covid-19. Some of Smucker's employees did not like this policy, believed Smucker should have allowed for a broader religious exemption for the requirement, and filed suit. The problem with their suit, however, is they sought to raise constitutional claims against J.M. Smucker, and Smucker is not a state actor.

Chief Judge Jeffrey Sutton of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit wrote for a unanimous panel in Ciraci v. J.M. Smucker Co. His opinion begins:

Four employees of the J.M. Smucker Company sought religious exemptions from the company's vaccine requirements. When the company refused, they filed this free exercise claim under the First Amendment against Smucker's. Constitutional guarantees conventionally apply only to entities that exercise sovereign power, such as federal, state, or local governments, and, in some other instances, tribal governments. Smucker's may be a big company. But it is not a sovereign. Even so, did Smucker's become a federal actor—did it exercise sovereign power?—for purposes of this free-exercise claim when it sold products to the federal government and when it imposed the vaccine mandate because the federal government required it to do so as a federal contractor? No, as the district court correctly held.

And here is how Chief Judge Sutton summarized the court's conclusions about why employees could not raise constitutional claims against a private company.

When Smucker's denied the claimants' request for a religious exemption, did it do so as a state actor? Not in our view. Smucker's does not perform a traditional, exclusive public function; it has not acted jointly with the government or entwined itself with it; and the government did not compel it to deny anyone an exemption. That Smucker's acted in compliance with a federal law and that Smucker's served as a federal contractor—the only facts alleged in the claimants' complaint—do not by themselves make the company a government actor.

Constitutions simultaneously empower and constrain. At the same time that they authorize various branches of government to exercise sovereign power, they limit that power in lots of ways, including through election requirements, tenure provisions, process-based requirements for making laws, and, most relevant for today, explicit constraints on the exercise of power. The first eight provisions of the Bill of Rights offer the most prominent example of constraints on government. Whether it is the Bill of Rights in general or the First Amendment in particular, these constraints typically protect citizens from the government, not from each other. Manhattan Comm. Access Corp. v. Halleck, 139 S. Ct. 1921, 1928 (2019). It is the rare federal constitutional guarantee—the prohibition on involuntary servitude counts as a glaring exception, see U.S. Const. amend. XIII—that regulates solely private conduct.

Things could scarcely be otherwise with respect to most constitutional constraints. Take the Speech Clause. It forbids viewpoint-based limitations on speech, but private publications like the New York Times or Wall Street Journal may favor certain viewpoints or speakers. Miami Herald Pub. Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 258 (1974). The Free Exercise Clause likewise forbids discrimination based on religion, but the Catholic Church need not pick rabbis or imams to run its seminaries. Our Lady of Guadalupe Sch. v. Morrissey-Berru, 140 S. Ct. 2049, 2055 (2020). And so on and so forth. Applying ordinary First Amendment rules beyond the government would warp traditional principles of ordered liberty—impairing individual liberty and offering little order in return.

By way of contrast, many federal statutes regulate private conduct and some even protect certain values that the Free Exercise Clause protects. The claimants, for example, could have separately filed a claim under Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act, Pub. L. 88-352, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. It bars private employers from discriminating against employees based on their faith, among other protected categories. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a). The claimants, notably, filed complaints with the EEOC under Title VII. At the same time, the claimants could have sued the federal government, which created the vaccine mandate for federal contractors. But they did not, requiring us to determine whether Smucker's counts as a government actor.

In holding the constitutional line between constraining government and constraining private entities, the federal courts ask whether "the specific conduct of which [a] plaintiff complains" is "fairly attributable" to the government. Am. Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Sullivan, 526 U.S. 40, 51 (1999); see Blum v. Yaretsky, 457 U.S. 991, 1004 (1982). Two sets of principles guide our answer. The first turns on the aggregated answers to three inquiries. Does the private company's conduct involve a traditionally exclusive governmental function? Halleck, 139 S. Ct. at 1928–29. Is that conduct "entwined with" government decisions or fairly attributable to the government based on a close "nexus" between the state and the challenged conduct? . . .  Has the government compelled the company's action? . . . . The second cuts across all three inquiries and serves as something of a safe harbor. So long as a private company's actions turn on compliance with a state or federal law, that does not by itself make the company a state actor.

Religion and the Law

Ordinary Meaning as Last Resort

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I appreciate this opportunity to guest blog on the Volokh Conspiracy about my latest article, posted on SSRN a few weeks ago, entitled Ordinary Meaning as Last Resort: The Meaning of "Undue Hardship" in Title VII. This is the first of two posts and will focus on the first half of the article, where I clarify textualist doctrine and refine textualist methodology. Tomorrow's post will focus on applying this clarification and refinement to a pending U.S. Supreme Court case—Groff v. DeJoy—to show that most everyone has missed the meaning of "undue hardship" in Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act.

The Problem with Ordinary Meaning on Steroids

The presumption of ordinary meaning may be textualism's most fundamental principle. It is nearly two centuries old. Professor Bill Eskridge refers to "the primacy of the ordinary meaning rule" and argues that ordinary meaning is the "linchpin of statutory interpretation." Or as Justice Kavanaugh put it, "follow[ing] ordinary meaning" is "Statutory Interpretation 101." Cases applying the doctrine usually present determining the ordinary meaning of a statutory term as the first step—and often the last step—of interpretation.

But a too robust presumption creates tension with a counter presumption of textualism: "when Congress employs a term of art, it presumably knows and adopts the cluster of ideas that were attached to each borrowed word in the body of learning from which it was taken." Such terms of art can come from science, business, other industry, or most commonly, the law. On that last example, as the Court has also recognized for two centuries, "if a word is obviously transplanted from another legal source, … it brings the old soil with it."

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Civil Procedure

No Jurisdiction in Federal Court Over Saudi Activist's Claims Against Alleged Hackers for UAE Government

"Plaintiff's allegations of political retaliation and torture are highly concerning. Nevertheless, this Court is bound by jurisdictional limits and grants Defendants' Motion to Dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction."

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From Alhathloul v. Darkmatter Group, decided today by Judge Karin Immergut (D. Or.):

Plaintiff {a Saudi human rights activist and leader of the movement to promote the rights of women and girls in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia} brings three federal claims against Defendants, based on allegations that Defendants hacked Plaintiff's iPhone, surveilled her movements, and exfiltrated her confidential communications for use against her by the security services of the United Arab Emirates ("UAE"). According to Plaintiff, Defendants' actions led to her arrest by the UAE security services and rendition to Saudi Arabia, where Plaintiff states that she was detained, imprisoned, and tortured. Plaintiff's allegations of political retaliation and torture are highly concerning. Nevertheless, this Court is bound by jurisdictional limits and grants Defendants' Motion to Dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction….

Defendants argue Plaintiff alleges no jurisdictionally significant connection between Defendants, the present litigation, and the United States, save for the fact that certain text messages allegedly sent by Defendant DarkMatter from a foreign location passed through U.S. servers on their way to Plaintiff's phone abroad. Plaintiff counters that Defendants contacts with the United States are jurisdictionally significant because Defendants caused Apple's U.S. servers to transmit malicious code to Plaintiff's phone.

For the following reasons, this Court concludes that it cannot exercise personal jurisdiction over Defendants….

If this Court were to base its determination of where the tortious conduct took place on the location where the Defendants sent the message, that location would be outside of the forum. Conversely, if this Court were to base its determination of where the tortious conduct took place on the location "that contain[ed] the hardware manipulated by the defendant to commit the tort," that location would also be outside of the forum, because the "computer … manipulated … to commit the tort" was Plaintiff's phone, not Apple's servers.

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Self-Defense

North Dakota Constitution Likely Secures a Right to Life- and Health-Preserving Abortions

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From today's North Dakota Supreme Court decision in Wrigley v. Romanick, written by Chief Justice Jon Jensen, joined by Justices Daniel Crothers and Lisa Fair McEvers, and by District Judge Daniel Narum, sitting by designation (in place of Justice Douglas Bahr, who was recused):

[W]e conclude RRWC has a substantial likelihood in establishing there is a fundamental right for a woman to obtain an abortion in instances where it is necessary to preserve her life or health. We need go no further here to determine whether there are fundamental rights broader in scope.

"Our overriding objective is to give effect to the intent and purpose of the people adopting the constitutional statement." To accomplish this we must construe the constitution in light of the contemporaneous history existing at and prior to the adoption of the constitutional provision.

North Dakota Constitution article I, section 1 was enacted in 1889 when North Dakota was admitted as a state to the Union. Section 1 provides, in part, "[a]ll individuals are by nature equally free and independent and have certain inalienable rights, among which are those of enjoying and defending life and liberty; acquiring, possessing and protecting property and reputation; pursuing and obtaining safety and happiness[.]" N.D. Const. art. I, § 1. The North Dakota Constitution explicitly provides all citizens of North Dakota the right of enjoying and defending life and pursuing and obtaining safety. These rights implicitly include the right to obtain an abortion to preserve the woman's life or health.

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Two Colorado Federal Judges Start Providing Summaries of Opinions for Pro Se Litigants

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Colorado Politics (Michael Karlik) reports:

A second federal judge in Colorado appears to have adopted the practice of summarizing her decisions in plain English for people who represent themselves before the court.

U.S. District Court Judge Charlotte N. Sweeney, a 2022 appointee of President Joe Biden, recently issued multiple written orders in cases where the plaintiffs are "pro se," meaning without an attorney.

In a departure from usual protocols, Sweeney added a separate section explaining what she was doing using non-legal language….

Colorado Politics previously reported on the adoption of pro se summaries by another member of the federal bench, U.S. Magistrate Judge Maritza Dominguez Braswell….

A sample, from Washington v. Bennion:

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The Stanford Disruption: Who Should be Apologizing to Whom?

There have been too few apologies for what transpired, not too many.

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Over the weekend, Stanford Law School (SLS) Dean Jenny Martinez and Stanford President Marc Tessier-Lavigne apologized to Judge Kyle Duncan for the disruption of an event at which he was invited to speak at the law school. Some progressive groups and commentators objected to the apology, and suggested Dean Martinez should apologize to them. So who should be apologizing to whom?

Let's step back for a minute and think about the role of an apology. The purpose of an apology is to acknowledge and accept accountability for one's own actions (or inaction). It is about recognizing that one did not behave as one should and owning up to it. Whether or not one should apologize has nothing to do with whether the person mistreated is worthy of an apology. It's about you, not about them.

If you mistreat a bad person, you should apologize to them. If it was in response to something they did, perhaps they should apologize to you too. That "they did it first" or "they did it too" is not an excuse (as we should have all learned in grade school). We should each be responsible and accountable for our own conduct. And if two sides of a dispute both did wrong, then both should apologize.

How does this apply to the dust up at SLS? First, I think it indicates that it was perfectly appropriate for the Dean and President to apologize to Judge Duncan. The school did not adhere to and enforce its own speech policy, and as a consequence Judge Duncan was not treated the way an invited speaker should be. The apology acknowledges this, and that's good. But that should not be the end of it.

More than to Judge Duncan, an apology is owed to the student Federalist Society chapter and those who attended the event in the hopes of hearing Judge Duncan's remarks. Dean Martinez and President Tessier-Lavigne (and the SLS administrators who sat idly by as the event was disrupted) should apologize to these students because it is these students—as members of the Stanford academic community—who were the primary victims of the school's failure to adhere to its own policy.

As the text of Stanford's policy makes clear, the intended beneficiaries of the policy are members of the Stanford academic community (though it extends to "all individuals"), and it is the members of that community who are hurt most when the policy is not abided by. Consistent with Stanford's policy, all student groups should be able to plan events at which they discuss issues of interest to their members, free of disruption from others. If the school fails to ensure these rights are protected, those in charge should apologize for that. As of yet, they have not done so.

The apparent failure of Stanford's leadership to apologize to the organizers and audience of the event suggests they do not fully understand what was so bad about last week's events. Further, by apologizing to Judge Duncan but not to the students, the Dean and President have created the impression that they care more about the Judge's prominence and stature than they do about their own students and the principles underlying the policy. That's bad on multiple levels and I hope it is corrected.

And what about Judge Duncan? As various video clips and the full audio of the event make clear, Judge Duncan also misbehaved. He lost his cool. Both at the event and in at least one subsequent interview, he said things that were wholly inappropriate. However much he was provoked, Judge Duncan did not exhibit the temperament and demeanor we should expect from a federal judge, and not just at the event. Student misconduct at the event may explain why he responded rudely and dismissively to some questions, but it does not excuse it (and certainly cannot explain some of his comments in subsequent interviews). It was okay for Judge Duncan to be angry – I would certainly be mad if this happened to me – but it was not okay for him to act on his anger the way that he did. Thus he too should apologize. Again, that others misbehaved does not excuse one's own misbehavior. By any reasonable standard, Judge Duncan said things a judge should not say, and he should own up to it.

Lots of regrettable things were said and done last week at SLS. There have not been too many apologies for what happened. There have been too few.

UPDATE: Judge Duncan has published an op-ed about in the Wall Street Journal, "My Struggle Session at Stanford Law School." The article provides his perspective on what happened before, during, and after the event. It closes with the following:

I have been criticized in the media for getting angry at the protesters. It's true I called them "appalling idiots," "bullies" and "hypocrites." They are, and I won't apologize for saying so. Sometimes anger is the proper response to vicious behavior.

Whether or not Judge Duncan had this post in mind when he wrote that paragraph, I think it confuses two points: 1) whether it was reasonable (or even proper) for Judge Duncan to be angry; and 2) whether it was proper to act out of anger as he did. As I wrote in the original post: "It was okay for Judge Duncan to be angry – I would certainly be mad if this happened to me – but it was not okay for him to act on his anger the way that he did." Anger may be an explanation, but it is not an excuse, and even if one thinks their anger is justified, that does not mean they should not apologize for acting out of anger.

I will also confess that I hold Judge Duncan to a higher standard than I do the Stanford students, as he is an Article III judge. We properly hold judges to a higher standard of behavior because of their role, and thus we properly expect judges to show contrition for acting out when we might not have any such expectation of others who engaged in similar conduct.

Free Speech

How Should Law Schools Handle Protests at Student Events?

It may be too late for Stanford Law School, but it's not too late for other institutions of higher learning.

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As readers doubtless know, last week, student protestors disrupted a lecture by Judge Kyle Duncan of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit at Stanford Law School (SLS). Judge Duncan had been invited to deliver remarks by the SLS chapter of the Federalist Society, and although the chapter is a recognized student organization at SLS, it was not able to proceed with the event as planned. David Lat has provided the most comprehensive account of the event and the fallout, and has also published audio of the entire event. (Some have suggested SLS has video of the entire event as well. If so, I hope it is released for purposes transparency and accontability.)

As SLS Dean Jenny Martinex and Stanford President Marc Tessier-Lavigne have acknowledged, school administrators did not handle the situation well. But what should SLS have done? What should other schools do if they are concerned about disruptive protests at events? Having been involved with such questions at my own university, I think the answer is simple and straight forward: 1) Have a policy; 2) Inform people about the policy; 3) Enforce the policy. If the goal is facilitating the expression of diverse viewpoints and avoiding disruptions, all three steps are necessary.

First, have a policy. This is one thing Stanford did right. It has a policy which broadly protects free expression but also clearly prohibits actions that disrupt public events. Among other things, it provides that:

It is a violation of University policy for a member of the faculty, staff, or student body to:

Prevent or disrupt the effective carrying out of a University function or approved activity, such as lectures, . . . and public events. . . .

This was a scheduled public event (indeed, a lecture) by a university-recognized student group.

The policy is good because, among other things, it ensures that members of the university community will not be punished or sanctioned for the viewpoints they express, but also makes clear that all groups--whether Outlaw or FedSoc--has the same right to organize and host events without undue interference. In order for all student groups to have the ability to present their views and explore ideas of interest to their members, all groups must have the same ability to hold their own events without interference.

It is one thing to have a policy. It is another to have it observed. To accomplish this it is important that a university both inform people of the content of the policy and to enforce the policy. I emphasize both because the aim of the policy is to protect free expression and prevent disruptions, and informing people of the policy is one way to discourage violations. Relying solely on post hoc enforcement, while sometimes necessary, is the most prudent and effective way to ensure a policy is followed.

In practice I thnk this means that it is often a good idea for a university representative -- an administrator or tenured faculty member -- to announce the policy before the start of an event at which there may be a disruption, so that attendees are on notice of what will and will not be tolerated. In my experience, such an announcement often helps channel protest in more productive directions.

When I was an undergraduate at Yale, a group invited a notoriously anti-semitic representative of the Nation of Islam to speak at Yale Law School. Many students and other members of the univeristy community were outraged, and some called on Dean Guido Calabresi to block the event. Dean Calabresi rightly refused. Instead, he explained that he would join the protestors outside of the venue in protest before the event, and then he would go in to hear the speaker, listen politely, and (if given the opportunity) ask pointed questions. This was a good approach. Dean Calabresi made clear to those in his community who felt threatened by the speaker that he shared their concerns, but he also demonstrated that such concerns did not justify disrupting the event or preventing the audience from hearing and engaging with the speaker, even though the speaker was presenting a hateful message.

Similarly, if university administrators get word of a potential disruption, they can also take proactive steps to channel or guide would-be protesters toward forms of protest that will not run afoul of the rules, such as picketing or leafletting outside of an event, holding up signs that do not obstruct the audience's view, or holding a counter-event. After all, the aim is to prevent disruptions and (I would think) to avoid punishing students unnecessarily. (Of course, if some students wish to engage in civil disobedience, so be it, but civil disobedience typically involves a willingness to accept the consequences.)

If a university has a clear policy, and if a university informs members of the community of the policy so as to put them on notice, I then think it is appropriate for the university to enforce that policy. Violations of university speech polices are often violations of the school's student code of conduct, and should be treated as such. (The Stanford policy expressly anticipates this.) But this does not mean the policies should be enforced in a punitive fashion. Particularly in law schools, student codes of conduct are intended to help acclimate students to the norms of the profession they plan to enter. We expect our students to comply, but we also make (or, at least, should make) an effort to educate students about why the various conduct standards are important.

One complicating factor about what occurred at SLS is that multiple law school administrators were in the room during the disruptions and did nothing to inform students that they were violating Stanford's policy, let alone to enforce it. This muddies the waters a bit because I think some students could fairly argue that this sent a signal that their conduct was okay, and would perhaps make it unfair to impose punitive punishments on them. This is something SLS administrators will have to consider.

Going forward, however, I would think the school should make clear that future disruptions will face serious punishments, including at least the sort of formal censure that law students would be required to disclose as part of the character and fitness process for state bars. Whether or not students understood the contours of Stanford's policy before, they are clearly on notice now.

So, to sum up, schools should 1) have a clear policy; 2) inform people about the policy; and 3) enforce the policy. All three steps are important if the goal is protecting speech, avoiding disruptions of events, and unnecessarily punishing students for seeking to make their voices heard.

DeBoer: Of Course You Know What Woke Means

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Excellent substack column by Freddie deBoer, and a great rebuke to those who tendentiously claim that "woke" is a racially tinged slur:

[I]t's absurd that so many people pretend not to know what woke means, and the problem could be easily solved if people who support woke politics would adopt a name for others to use. No to woke, no to identity politics, no to political correctness, fine: PICK SOMETHING…

Woke is defined by several consistent attributes. Woke is

    1. Academic - the terminology of woke politics is an academic terminology, which is unsurprising given its origins in humanities departments of elite universities. Central to woke discourse is the substitution of older and less complicated versions of socially liberal perspectives with more willfully complex academic versions. So civil rights are out, "anti-racism" is in….
    2. Immaterial - woke politics are overwhelmingly concerned with the linguistic, the symbolic, and the emotional to the detriment of the material, the economic, and the real. Woke politics are famously obsessive about language, developing literal language policies that are endlessly long and exacting….
    3. Structural in analysis, individual in action - the woke perspective is one that tends to see the world's problems as structural in nature rather than the product of individual actors or actions. Sometimes the problems are misdiagnosed or exaggerated, but the structural focus is beneficial….
    4. Emotionalist - "emotionalist" rather than emotional, meaning not necessarily inappropriately emotional but concerned fundamentally with emotions as the currency of politics. In woke circles, political problems are regularly diagnosed as a matter of the wrong emotions being inspired in someone….
    5. Fatalistic - woke politics tend towards extreme fatalism regarding solutions and the possibility of gradual positive political change. Institutions are all corrupt and bigoted, so institutions cannot prompt change. Most people are irredeemably racist, and so the masses cannot create a just society….
    6. Insistent that all political questions are easy - woke people speak and act as though there are no hard political questions and no such thing as a moral dilemma. Everything is obvious if you've only done the reading and done the work, which woke people assure you they did long ago….
    7. Possessed of belief in the superior virtue of the oppressed….
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