The Volokh Conspiracy

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The Volokh Conspiracy

Civil Liberties

Martin Luther King on Civil Disobedience and Ethics of Resistance to State Authority

Contrary to a widespread misconception, King did not favor absolute nonviolence, nor does his reasoning always require practitioners of civil disobedience to accept punishment. But he also strongly opposed rioting.

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Martin Luther King, Jr. (NA)

 

Today is Martin Luther King Day. One of King's most important legacies was his advocacy of civil disobedience as a strategy for resisting injustice. In 2022, I wrote a Martin Luther King Day post addressing some common misperceptions about King's views on this topic. I built, in part, on a piece on King by Georgetown Prof. Jason Brennan, author of an important book on the morality of resistance to government power.

Contrary to popular perception, King did not categorically oppose all violent resistance to injustice. His views also don't imply that practitioners of civil disobedience have a categorical obligation to accept punishment. In the case of the US civil rights movement, he advocated both nonviolence and acceptance of punishment for primarily tactical reasons. But the reasons for doing so don't always hold true in other cases. On the other hand, King did strongly oppose rioting, on both moral and pragmatic grounds. And his reasoning does imply a strong presumption against violence, even if not a categorical bar.

A few excerpts from the 2022 post:

As Brennan points out, King believed that disobedience to unjust laws is often entirely justified, even when the laws in question were enacted by democratic governments…

I think King was right about this, and that, for many unjust laws, we have no obligation to obey. I outlined some of the reasons why in this 2014 piece about why most undocumented immigrants have no moral obligation to obey laws denying them the right to move to another country (see also follow-up post here). The same reasoning applies to many other unjust laws, at least those that inflict great harm on their victims….

Brennan is also right to note that, on King's view, justified disobedience to unjust laws may not always require accepting punishment. He favored such acceptance, in some cases, for largely tactical reasons….

Sometimes, the goal of disobedience is not to effect a change in law (which, may, for political reasons, be impossible at the time), but simply to prevent injustice in that particular case. For example, many of the people who violated the Fugitive Slave Acts in the 19th century did not turn themselves into the authorities and accept punishment. And they were entirely justified in so doing. Accepting punishment would, among other things, have impeded their efforts to help escaped slaves. At least for a long time, they had little hope of getting Congress to repeal the Fugitive Slave Acts. But they could and did help individual slaves escape their reach…..

At times, King seems to have endorsed a more categorical duty to accept punishment, as when he wrote that "One who breaks an unjust law must do so openly, lovingly, and with a willingness to accept the penalty." But that was in the context of writing about civil disobedience intended  "to arouse the conscience of the community over its injustice" and thereby facilitate reform….

Brennan also points out, contrary to much conventional wisdom, that King was not an advocate of absolute non-violence, but merely supported it as a strategy for the civil rights movement on tactical grounds….

While King was not, on principle, opposed to all violent resistance to injustice, it is important to emphasize that he did oppose violence targeting innocent civilians, including that caused by rioting. In 1968, he warned that "riots are socially destructive and self-defeating" and that, "[e]very time a riot develops, it helps George Wallace." He opposed the riots of his own time on both moral and instrumental grounds. While we cannot know for sure, it seems likely he would have felt the same way about the 2020 riots in the wake of the brutal killing of George Floyd by Minneapolis police….

The obvious criticism of views like King's is that many people may have poor judgment about which laws are unjust. For example, those who stormed the Capitol on January 6, 2021 likely believed that enforcement of the laws against doing so would be unjust, because (in their view) Donald Trump had a right to stay in power. Similarly, both left and right-wing terrorists often believe they are justified in violating laws against murder and assault.

But the risk that individual citizens may be mistaken about matters of justice has to be balanced against the danger that government can be wrong about such things, as well. Even in democratic societies, there is a long and awful history of the latter…..

Even when governments are acting unjustly, there should nonetheless—for reasons well-articulated by King's critique of riots—be a very strong presumption against violent action that might harm innocents. But the threshold for defensible peaceful disobedience is much lower.

King's pragmatic arguments for nonviolence and acceptance of punishment apply largely in the context of swaying public opinion in democratic societies. In such cases, peaceful moral suasion is often more likely to be effective than violence, and less likely to cause harm to innocent people.

This reasoning applies with much lesser force in authoritarian states. Dissidents living under brutal dictatorships, like those of China, Russia, or Iran, surely have no moral duty to accept punishment. And, if they have a good opportunity to overthrow the regime by force and replace it with a significantly better government, they may well be justified in seizing it.

As noted in my 2022 post, King's views don't definitively resolve these issues. He wasn't infallible, and even a great hero can sometimes go wrong. Some might also argue that King's views were sound in his time, but for some reason don't translate well to our own. But I think King's positions on these questions were in fact largely right. At the very least, they are more than worthy of our careful attention and consideration.

Free Speech

"Don't Cut the Rattle Off of the Rattlesnake—the Silence Is More Dangerous to You than to the Snake"

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Image by Robert F. Graboyes / Midjourney

 

I actually follow Justice Holmes in recognizing the potential benefits of speech restrictions. Among other things, while it's hard to estimate the likely consequences of any particular statement going forward, looking backward we can see that virtually every ideological crime (whether committed by a solo offender, a group, or a government) stemmed in part from some sort of political or religious speech. If only we could prevent that, without causing all sorts of other problems ….

My view, though, is that on balance attempts to restrict the expression of bad views generally do more harm than good; and the quote in the title expresses well one of the many forms of such harm. (The earliest use of the quote I found is from 2018, by Robert Graboyes, though I noticed it because of this more recent post of his.)

Remedies Casebook Revision: Behind the Scenes

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The next edition of Ames, Chafee, and Re on Remedies is off to the publisher (Foundation) for next fall, and I'm going to write a series of posts about the revision. Who is the audience for these posts? Well, I expect law students will be very interested in what goes into a casebook revision, especially given the cost of casebooks. Law professors who teach Remedies will be interested, as well as those who might teach Remedies soon. If you're a practicing lawyer and want to know what is on the cutting edge of remedies thinking, this will be of interest for you. (Think of it as CLE that's to the point but, alas, without credit.) If you're just interested in some of the philosophical choices behind casebooks--the tradeoffs between different models--then this may interest you as well. And if you wish you'd taken Remedies in law school, this is a plate of hors d'oeuvres that might whet your appetite to study it for yourself.

Let me start with a word or two about this casebook. It started in 1902 as Cases on Equity Jurisdiction by James Barr Ames, dean of Harvard Law School. It's had some illustrious authors, including Zechariah Chafee, Sidney Post Simpson, Edward Re, Ted Eisenberg, and Emily Sherwin. It was an equity book until 1982, when damages and restitution materials were added by Judge Re. Its current title--Ames, Chafee, and Re on Remedies--dates to 2012, when Professors Eisenberg and Sherwin became the editors. The upcoming edition will be the fourth edition under this name. And it's the third edition that I've been on.

There are lots of good remedies casebooks, with a number of different approaches. Instead of doing head-to-head comparisons, I'll highlight three things that distinguish this book. This will set the stage for the discussion of the revisions in the next post.

First, Ames, Chafee, and Re on Remedies is built on the premise that the law of equity matters today. That was an easy point to make when Dean Ames first published his equity book in 1902. Yet there were premature announcements of equity's demise in the late twentieth century. But now, in 2024, it is becoming increasingly difficult to deny the importance of equity to the work of the federal and state courts.

This point is abundantly clear from the U.S. Supreme Court's docket--about once a year for the last two decades there has been a case in which the Supreme Court has reaffirmed the importance of traditional equitable principles. Equity is relevant in many of the Supreme Court's standing cases (a point Ernie Young makes here). It's at the heart of the debate about the national injunction. And the Court just granted cert in another equity case, Starbucks Corp. v. McKinney. The law of equity is critical to Delaware's Court of Chancery, and thus to corporate law generally. And the explosion of scholarship on equity in the last five years--including the publication of Henry Smith's Equity as Meta-Law and the Notre Dame Law Review Symposium on federal equity--show that the trend is not abating.

So this casebook makes equity central to the subject of remedies. In chapter 1 there are notes and cases introducing equity. Then, after the sections of the book on damages and legal restitution, there are ten chapters on equitable remedies:

CHAPTER 9     The History of Equity

CHAPTER 10   General Principles Governing Equity

CHAPTER 11   Injunctions

CHAPTER 12   Measuring Injunctive Relief

CHAPTER 13   Accounting for Profits

CHAPTER 14   Constructive Trust and Other Proprietary Equitable Remedies

CHAPTER 15   Specific Performance of Contracts

CHAPTER 16   Equitable Rescission, Reformation, and Cancellation

CHAPTER 17   Equitable Compensation

CHAPTER 18   Equitable Defenses

Second, this book is 100% focused on teaching and learning. It is not a reference book, and will not be a good substitute for a treatise. This especially affects the choices about notes. They don't describe lots of permutations and qualifications for the doctrine. And you won't find citations to most of the great new remedies scholarship (to all who are writing that scholarship, sorry!). The center of attention is cases that are great for teaching and learning, with the notes as supporting cast that never steal the limelight.

Third, this book has a stronger private law orientation than many remedies casebooks. This can be seen in how the book starts--the chapters on damages come first, then the chapters on legal restitution, then the chapters on equity. That fits the conceptual primacy of damages, as well as their central role in contract and tort. This private law emphasis also shows up in how many of the doctrines are taught. Often a contract case is paired with a tort case, so students can see the same doctrine from two different angles, and get to see how the tort or contract setting makes a difference. There is a chapter called "Remedies Against the Government," including Bivens and desegregation. But this is a different approach from books that start with public law remedies.

I think both approaches are sound. But in my view public law remedies are built on what we might call "private law microfoundations." So it makes more sense to put the private law settings front and center. Remedies were first developed by courts of law and equity for cases in what we would now call tort and contract, and then those remedies were redeployed in public law settings. A student whose pedagogic progression tracks the doctrinal progression is going to be more attuned to how the translation of private law remedies to public law remedies brings new stress points and questions. And it's great preparation for vast swathes of litigation practice, from corporate law to personal injury to ERISA.

So what's in this revision? Stay tuned.

Free Speech

"Most Litigants Would Prefer Not to Have Their Medical Problems Published in the Public Records"

But that’s not adequate reason to allow them to litigate pseudonymously, a district court rules.

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From Friday's decision by Judge William Shubb (E.D. Cal.) in Beitzel & K.K. v. Becerra:

Plaintiff K.K. has filed a Motion to Proceed with Partial Anonymity. Plaintiff K.K. requests that she be able to proceed by her initials in all public filings in this case because the filing "will contain sensitive and personal information about her rare and severe medical conditions that she has disclosed to very few people, as well as the mental distress and suffering she has experienced relating to her medical conditions and the events underlying this case." Specifically, she does not want to disclose to the public her medical history of severe psoriasis, psoriatic arthritis, and arthritis mutilans, which would cause her "emotional distress, anxiety, embarrassment, and potential harassment." {Plaintiff K.K. also wishes to avoid disclosing details of her finances to the public.} She notes that her identity has already been disclosed to defendant and she only wishes to remain anonymous to the general public.

Allowing a party to proceed anonymously runs counter to the public's right of access to judicial proceedings. However, the Ninth Circuit has allowed parties to use pseudonyms "in the unusual case when nondisclosure of the party's identity is necessary to protect a person from harassment, injury, ridicule or personal embarrassment." In determining whether to allow a party to proceed anonymously, the court looks to whether "the party's need for anonymity outweighs prejudice to the opposing party and the public's interest in knowing the party's identity.

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Free Speech

Unsealed Arguments for Pseudonymity in Challenge to NYU Law Review's Race/Sex/Etc. Preferences

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I wrote in November about the court decision allowing the challenge to NYU Law Review's race, sex, sexual orientation, and gender identity preferences to proceed pseudonymously; Judge Victor Marrero allowed Doe to proceed pseudonymously, though "without prejudice to New York University's right to move the Court to direct Plaintiff to disclose his identity, or any other appropriate relief, once the Clerk of Court assigns this case to a District Judge." But the judge's order didn't give any reasons; and Doe's memorandum, which must have provided various reasons that did sway the judge (whether or not he endorsed them all), had been filed under seal.

With the help of UCLA law student Maria Cafferata, I filed a motion to unseal that memorandum, and on Thursday the judge granted it. It's an interesting and forceful argument, which I think some of our readers will agree with and still more will find interesting—it's signed by, among other lawyers, conservative star lawyer Jonathan Mitchell (as well as Gene Hamilton of America First Legal Foundation, Ronald Berutti of Murray-Nolan Berutti LLC, and Christopher Mills of Spero Law LLC) [UPDATE: just to be clear, as my comments following the long block quote below indicate, I disagree with much of the argument, but just thought it was well-crafted and worth passing along]:

Plaintiff John Doe, a first-year law student at New York University, should be permitted to proceed under pseudonym. This lawsuit pertains to his personal beliefs and characteristics, and he risks significant retaliation from the NYU Law Review, his peers, his professors, NYU administrators, and potential employers if his identity is exposed. NYU faces no prejudice from Doe's proceeding under a pseudonym, particularly at this early stage of litigation involving legal claims that do not focus on Doe's own facts or credibility. Likewise, the public has little interest in knowing which specific student challenged the NYU Law Review's generally applicable practices. Because the plaintiff's interest in remaining anonymous significantly outweighs any competing interests, the Court should grant the motion and permit Doe to proceed under pseudonym….

[1.] First, this litigation involves matters that are highly sensitive and of a personal nature. They pertain to Doe's personal characteristics — his race, sex, gender identity, and sexual orientation. See Doe #1 v. Syracuse University, No. 18-cv-0496, 2018 WL 7079489, at *4 (N.D.N.Y. Sept. 10, 2018), adopted, 2020 WL 2028285 (N.D.N.Y. Apr. 28, 2020) ("[C]laims involving sexual orientation … are examples of matters that qualify as being highly sensitive and of a personal nature.").

The claims also implicate Doe's personal beliefs in a matter of great controversy, particularly his belief that academic honors such as law-review members be awarded based on merit without any regard to an applicant's race, sex, gender identity, or sexual orientation. Cf. Doe v. Porter, 370 F.3d 558, 560 (6th Cir. 2004) ("This suit … forces Plaintiffs to reveal their beliefs about a particularly sensitive topic that could subject them to considerable harassment."); Doe v. Stegall, 653 F.2d 180, 185–86 (5th Cir. 1981) (permitting plaintiffs to proceed pseudonymously because the lawsuit revealed their unpopular personal beliefs); Choice, Inc. of Tex. v. Graham, 226 F.R.D. 545, 548 (E.D. La. 2005) (granting plaintiffs' motion to proceed pseudonymously after finding that they "made revelations about their personal beliefs").

Most people at NYU and at NYU Law School do not share Doe's beliefs. And there is no question how the University—including its professors and administrators—will respond to the plaintiff's lawsuit.

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New York's Civil Lawsuit Against Trump Is Unconstitutional

Trump has a constitutional right to do business in New York

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New York State Attorney General Letitia James' lawsuit against Donald Trump is unconstitutional and unfair. James is demanding that Trump, his business, his two oldest sons, and two business partners give back $370 million that she says they obtained through fraud. James wants to permanently ban Trump from running a business in New York State. And, she has obtained a ruling from the judge trying the case to place all of Trump's New York businesses in receivership and sold with Trump getting only the cash from a forced fire sale.  James' lawsuit alleges that Trump fraudulently inflated the value of his assets in annual net worth statements to banks to obtain savings on loan interest.  It must be noted at the outset that no bank has complained that Trump committed fraud and that James is charging Trump an enormous and unconstitutional penalty for what is essentially a victimless crime.

The New York State law, as it is being applied to Trump, raises the same due process of law problem as is raised by a classic politically motivated Bill of Attainder. Historically, a Bill of Attainder was a legislative act that singled out a politically unpopular person for punishment.  In Trump's case, a general and over-broad state law is being used against him in a hitherto unheard of way depriving him of property without due process of law.  And, everyone on both sides of the aisle knows that it is all because New York has a lot of people, especially in the Democratic Party, who hate Trump. The victimless crime that James has charged Trump with is basically that he is a liar, and she does not like his political views.  State Bills of Attainder are banned under Article I, Section 10 of the Constitution, and the Fifth Amendment provides that no person can be deprived of property without due process of law.

The Constitution does not allow banning people from running a business or putting all their assets in receivership and auctioning them off in a fire sale with the victim getting back the resulting cash.  I am not aware of any precedent that supports what James is doing.   The Constitution does not allow hitting Trump with a $370 million fine for a victimless crime, which almost certainly violates the Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment.  Putting Trump's assets in receivership and auctioning them off in a fire sale is a violation of the Fifth Amendment's Takings Clause for which Trump must at a minimum receive just compensation.  But, even then, private property can only be taken for "a public use", and there is no "public use" unless you hate Trump's politics and want to punish him as a result.  And, at that point, you must confront the Bill of Attainder prohibition once again.

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Politics

Employers' Talking "About Race—Any Race—With a Constant Drumbeat of Essentialist, Deterministic, and Negative Language" Risks Racial Harassment Liability

So a federal district court just held.

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An excerpt from De Piero v. Penn. State Univ., decided Thursday by Judge Wendy Beetlestone (E.D. Pa.) (there are also other legal theories that the court rejects, which you can see discussed in the full opinion):

{De Piero{, a white man,} [argues] that his department's discussions of "antiracism," "white supremacy," "white privilege," and other concepts relating to discussions of race on campus, all of which "repeatedly singl[ed] out and demean[ed] faculty members on the basis of race," subjected him to a hostile work environment.} De Piero … began working at Penn State Abington as a non-tenure-track Assistant Teaching Professor of English and Composition in 2018. Penn State Abington holds itself out as "the most diverse campus within" the Penn State system "and the only majority minority campus." …

Title VII (along with the PHRA and Section 1981) renders employers liable for harassment that is "sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of [the plaintiff's] employment and create an abusive working environment." … Whether a series of alleged incidents constitutes pervasive harassment is a circumstance-specific question: the "frequency of the discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether it is physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; and whether it unreasonably interferes with an employees work performance" are all relevant to whether the discrimination the employee suffered was sufficiently "severe" or "pervasive." …

[De Piero alleges that he] was obligated to attend conferences or trainings that discussed racial issues in essentialist and deterministic terms—ascribing negative traits to white people or white teachers without exception and as flowing inevitably from their race—in June 2020, October 2020, November 2020, January 2021, and October 2021. His Amended Complaint contains at least some discussion of the content of each such meeting [bullets added -EV]:

  • in June 2020, in the aftermath of the murder of George Floyd, "Wong [Assistant Vice Provost for Educational Equity] expressed her intention to cause Penn State's white faculty to 'feel the pain' that [he] endured;"
  • in a "breathing exercise," Wong told "White and non-Black people of color to hold [their breath] just a little longer—to feel the pain;" that October, Naydan, [Chair of the English Department and] De Piero's supervisor, co-led a professional development meeting on multiculturalism that included "supposed examples of 'racist' comments" where every hypothetical perpetrator was white;
  • the following month included an event called "Arts and Humanities as Activism," where De Piero alleges the facilitator "condemn[ed] white people for no other reason than they spoke or were simply present while being 'white,'" including by "condemn[ing] … 'white elites' and 'white self-interest;'"
  • Naydan endorsed that training's message repeatedly;
  • in January 2021, at an "antiracism pedagogy" meeting, Naydan spoke of race conscious grading;
  • and, finally, in October of that year, Naydan and her co-facilitator led another training, which included an excerpt that "accused white faculty" of "unwittingly reproduc[ing] racist discourses and practices in our classroom." It was, according to Naydan's co-facilitator, "about a group."

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Trans

Federal Court Upholds Biological-Sex-Based Access Rule for School Restrooms

Federal courts continue to be split on this question.

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From today's decision by Judge Jodi Dishman (W.D. Okla.) in Bridge v. Oklahoma State Dep't of Ed.:

"Physical differences between men and women … are enduring" and the "'two sexes are not fungible….'" United States v. Virginia (1996). In fact, "sex, like race and national origin, is an immutable characteristic …." Frontiero v. Richardson (1973) (plurality opinion). With these principles in mind, the Court tackles a question that has not yet been addressed by the Supreme Court of the United States or the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit: whether separating the use of male and female restrooms and changing areas in public schools based on a student's biological sex violates the Equal Protection Clause … or Title IX ….

{In Bostock v. Clayton County, Georgia, the Supreme Court held that an employer who fires an individual for being homosexual or transgender unconstitutionally discriminates against that person because of sex under Title VII. However, the Supreme Court also made clear that its opinion did "not purport to address bathrooms, locker rooms, or anything else of the kind."}

The court upheld Oklahoma's S.B. 615, which provides:

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Guns

Increasing Defendant's Sentence Based on Lawful Gun Possession Is Forbidden

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From Nelson v. State, decided today by the Florida Court of Appeal, in an opinion by Judge Jordan Pratt, joined by Judges Eric Eisnaugle and John Harris:

This appeal presents the question whether a trial court may rely on a defendant's lawful firearm possession in sentencing him. We conclude that it may not. Courts deprive defendants of due process when they rely on uncharged and unproven conduct during sentencing, and this principle holds especially true where the uncharged conduct is the lawful exercise of a constitutional right….

Defendant had been convicted of selling marijuana and related charges. Then,

At the sentencing hearing, the court entertained argument from both Nelson and the State, with Nelson urging the court to impose 36 months, and the State urging the court to impose 87.23 months. During its argument, the State presented two photos of firearms found in Nelson's home, noting that "a possible murder a couple of months ago that was probably related to the sale of cannabis" had occurred in Citrus County. However, the State did not argue that Nelson himself was in any way connected to the murder, and it conceded that it did not bring any firearm-related charges against him.

After hearing a brief rebuttal argument from Nelson's counsel, the court announced his sentence. The court applied the discretionary trafficking enhancement and sentenced Nelson to 87.23 months of incarceration on counts 1 and 2 (to run concurrently). Immediately after pronouncing this sentence, the court stated: "And what hurts you the most, Mr. Nelson, was … the photographs of the guns. They did not charge with those. I did not take that into account; but why you did this, I do not know." The court then imposed three-year sentences on the remaining felony counts, with the sentences to run concurrently with the concurrent 87.23-month sentences….

Impermissible, the court said:

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Endangered species

The Strange Disappearance of the Tumamoc Globeberry (Updated)

The Fish and Wildlife Service inexplicably removes a species from its tally of species "delisted" under the Endangered Species Act.

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(See Update Below)

It seems that a species that has been delisted as an endangered species has also been delisted from the official list of species that have been delisted. Here's the story (so far).

While working on my forthcoming symposium article evaluating the first fifty years of the Endangered Species Act (ESA), I looked at the number of species that have been designated as endangered or threatened species under the Act, as well as those that have been "delisted." Species are delisted either because they are no longer threatened or endangered (i.e. they have recovered), because they went extinct, or because they never should have been listed in the first place (perhaps due to a data error of some sort).

The Fish and Wildlife Service maintains data on species listing and delisting in its ECOS database.

I initially reviewed the data on ECOS in spring 2023, in preparation for a presentation. While reviewing and updating this data in the fall, however, I encountered a discrepancy. The number of species identified as "delisted" on ECOS seemed to come up short.

Reviewing the data on ECOS more carefully, I determined that the discrepancy was due to the removal of the Tumamoc globeberry (Tumamoca macdougalii). While the globeberry had been included in the list of delisted species as late as May 2023, it was no longer included in October. It's prior ECOS page is now blank. This is odd, for there is no reason the globeberry should not still be included as a delisted species.

As detailed elsewhere on the FWS website (and in the Federal Register), the globeberry was initially listed as an endangered species in 1986. In 1993, however, the globeberry was delisted because the FWS determined that the original data upon which the listing was based had been in error. (This sort of thing happens from time to time, as those species that are most endangered are often those about which less is known, and therefore it is understandable that data about such species may be inaccurate or incomplete.)

I contacted the FWS to find out why the globeberry was removed from the tally of delisted species on ECOS. While I have not yet received an official reply, one FWS staffer suggested that the globeberry may have been pulled from ECOS because the FWS is conducting a new status assessment for the globeberry, and there is some reason to believe it could be (re)listed under the ESA based upon more recent research.

I appreciate the update, but it seems to me that removing the globeberry from ECOS was an error. At present, the globeberry is a delisted species–it was once listed, and was subsequently delisted through the formal process provided for under the ESA. It may well be the case that, based upon new and more complete data, the globeberry should be (re)listed as threatened or endangered under the Act. But unless and until that happens, it remains a delisted species, and the FWS ECOS database should reflect that fact.

UPDATE: I have been informed by an FWS staffer that the Tumamoc Globeberry was inadvertently removed from the list of delisted species, and it has been restored to the ECOS database. Unfortunately, it now appears that multiple other species are now missing, such as the Braken Bat Cave meshweaver (delisted in 2000), and others are misclassified, such as the Snail darter, which was delisted because it has recovered, but is now listed in ECOS as "extinct." Time permitting, I will try to figure out what's going on with the ECOS data and sort it all out.

SECOND UPDATE (1/28/2024): The ECOS data appears to be restored. All 127 delisted species are included and appear to be properly characterized.

Free Speech

Lawsuit Over UC Santa Cruz's Diversity Statements Dismissed on Standing Grounds

The court concludes that, because the plaintiff hadn't applied to be hired, he didn't have standing to challenge the policy.

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From today's decision by Judge Edward Davila (N.D. Cal.) in Haltigan v. Drake:

Plaintiff John D. Haltigan brings this action against Defendants university officers to challenge the diversity, equity, and inclusion ("DEI") statements required from prospective faculty candidates by the University of California, Santa Cruz. Plaintiff contends that the University's DEI statement requirement and guidance violate First Amendment principles of academic freedom….

Plaintiff alleges that he "desires a position at the University" but that the DEI statement requirement makes his application futile, due to his views on "colorblind inclusivity," "viewpoint diversity," and "merit-based evaluation." Plaintiff further alleges that, if he were to apply for the July 2022 opening or any other openings at UC Santa Cruz, he would be "compelled to alter his behavior and either remain silent … or recant his views to conform to the dictates of the University administration." Plaintiff does not allege that he applied or prepared any application materials for the July 2022 opening….

As a general premise, there is a "long-established rule" that a plaintiff "lacks standing to challenge a rule or policy to which he has not submitted himself by actually applying for the desired benefit.'" Because the Complaint indisputably does not allege that Plaintiff "submitted himself by actually applying for the desired benefit," Plaintiff attempts to overcome this standing obstacle in three parts: (1) he invokes the "competitor standing" doctrine, which confers standing on a plaintiff that is "able and ready" to apply or compete; (2) he argues that First Amendment rights can be vindicated without engaging in or risking a challenged course of conduct; and (3) any application submitted would have been futile….

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Donald Trump

January 6 and Insurrection - a Response to Ross Douthat

On Douthat's reasoning, published in the NY Times, Confederate secession wasn't an insurrection either.

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Rioters outside the U.S. Capitol on January 6.
January 6, 2021 attack on the Capitol. (Probal Rashid/ZUMAPRESS/Newscom)

 

In an article published today, New York Times columnist Ross Douthat responds to my and others' arguments that the January 6, 2021 attack on the Capitol qualifies as an "insurrection" under Section 3 of the Fourteenth Amendment. To his credit Douthat recognizes that uprisings much smaller than the Civil War - including the Whiskey Rebellion and Adolf Hitler's 1923 Beer Hall Putsch " - meet a reasonable definition of insurrection." As I have pointed out previously, these cases featured violence on roughly the same scale as the January 6 attack.

But Douthat nonetheless claims such cases "are obviously different from Jan. 6":

[T]he 14th Amendment disqualifies anyone who engaged "in insurrection or rebellion against the same" — with "the same" referring back to "the Constitution of the United States" in the prior clause. This wording tracks with my own understanding: What transforms a political event from a violent riot or lawless mob (which Jan. 6 plainly was) to a genuinely insurrectionary event is the outright denial of the authority of the existing political order and the attempt to establish some alternative order in its place.

There is no question that this is what the Munich Beer Hall Putsch set out to do….

[T]here was no such equivalent declaration when the QAnon Shaman ascended to the Senate rostrum; no serious claim of military or political authority made on behalf of the assembled mob, no declaration of a dissolved Congress and a new Trumpist Reich. Had there been — had, say, one of Trump's aides rushed to the Capitol and announced that Congress was disbanded and that President Trump was declaring a state of emergency and would henceforth be ruling by fiat — then the riot would have been transformed into an insurrectionary coup d'état. But nothing like that happened: The riot did not culminate in an attempt to depose the Congress; it dissolved before lawful authority instead, remaining a mob until the end.

The problem with Douthat's reasoning is that it implies the Confederates who were the original targets of Section 3 weren't insurrectionists either! Far from rejecting the Constitution and "denying the authority of the existing political order," they argued the Constitution gave their states a legal right to secede, and that Abraham Lincoln and the federal government were the ones acting illegally. Moreover, they had a much better legal rationale for their position than Trump supporters for the utterly indefensible claim that their man was the true winner of the 2020 election. Violently attempting to block the constitutionally required transition of power to the winner of a presidential election is pretty obviously an insurrection against the Constitution - even if the perpetrators don't explicitly say so. I go into these points in greater detail in a post published in September.

Douthat's theory also has the absurd implication that people trying to seize power by force can escape disqualification under Section 3 so long as they claim - however implausibly - that they are actually following the Constitution and their opponents are the true lawbreakers. You don't have to be a constitutional lawyer to see why that's an implausible conclusion - one that would set a dangerous precedent.

 

Politics

Short Circuit: A Roundup of Recent Federal Court Decisions

Dishwashers, Nazi-looted art, and an ag-gag mixed bag.

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Please enjoy the latest edition of Short Circuit, a weekly feature written by a bunch of people at the Institute for Justice.

Next week, the Supreme Court will hear oral argument in an IJ case, DeVillier v. Texas, that asks the question: Do states have to comply with the Takings Clause? Or is it more of a guideline than an actual rule? Click here to learn more.

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Nationalism

Spanish Translation of "The Case Against Nationalism" Now Available

The Cato Institute has posted a Spanish-language version of the article I coauthored with Alex Nowrasteh.

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The Cato Institute has posted a Spanish-language translation of my article "The Case Against Nationalism," co-authored with Cato Institute scholar Alex Nowrasteh. If you're reading this post, you probably don't actually need the Spanish translation to read the article. You can simply read the original English version, published in National Affairs. But perhaps you have Spanish-speaking friends, relatives, or acquaintances who might be interested. If so, please consider forwarding them the link. Many of the points made in the article are of obvious relevance to both Latin American countries and the situation of Hispanics in the United States.

Both the Spanish translation and the English original are available for free at the links above. There are not behind any paywall.

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