The Volokh Conspiracy
Mostly law professors | Sometimes contrarian | Often libertarian | Always independent
Today in Supreme Court History: May 14, 1973
5/14/1973: Frontiero v. Richardson decided.
Editor's Note: We invite comments and request that they be civil and on-topic. We do not moderate or assume any responsibility for comments, which are owned by the readers who post them. Comments do not represent the views of Reason.com or Reason Foundation. We reserve the right to delete any comment for any reason at any time. Comments may only be edited within 5 minutes of posting. Report abuses.
Please
to post comments
Boren
struck down an Oklahoma law that allowed women to purchase 3.2% beer at 18, but not men until 21.
To which I say 3 things
1) I don't live in Oklahoma, they want that , great
2) What if one of those men declares he's trans, really a woman
3) When it came to drafting women there was a similar argument.
The Supreme Court can't mean there is no difference between young womand and young men
Women are mature faster
By this law woman don't have to drink just with men
a group could get liquor and have a hen fest
All the Libertarians on here say they are against any law that restricts drinking buthey let their guard down on this. Yeah okay as long as they are the same age.
IT's the lack of first principles on here that sinks Libertrarianism
Re: Frontiero v. Richardson
From the decision:
"Although the legislative history of these statutes sheds virtually no light on the purposes underlying the differential treatment accorded male and female members, [Footnote 6] a majority of the three-judge District Court surmised that Congress might reasonably have concluded that, since the husband in our society is generally the 'breadwinner' in the family -- and the wife typically the 'dependent" partner' -- 'it would be more economical to require married female members claiming husbands to prove actual dependency than to extend the presumption of dependency to such members.'"
Where is any legal basis in the District Court's decision?
Isn't that the common law process, that judges "discover" common law and don't just interpret legislation?
Frontiero v. Richardson was decided 8-1, with Rehnquist merely saying he agreed with the District Court ruling.
Rehnquist's approach would have been acceptable in earlier years when less concern was given to sexual classifications. Society and the law, however, had developed by the early 1970s.
The majority split on the reasoning. Brennan for four justices (Marshall, Douglas, White) would have applied strict scrutiny (akin to race) for sexual classifications.
The other four justices did not think that was necessary. They felt the law was unreasonable under Reed v. Reed, which relied on a lower standard. Brennan later received a majority in Craig v. Boren for an intermediate position, which was strengthened somewhat over time.
The ERA was pending. The use of heightened scrutiny as well as protection for women in other cases (including pregnant teachers) and men too (multiple sex discrimination cases involved men; unwed fathers also received protection) lessened the need.
The opinions, however, did not go as far as the ERA's text would imply. No strict scrutiny. Various cases upheld sex classifications, including some cases involving different rules for fathers and paternity. Pregnancy classifications were not generally deemed sex classifications.
The failure of the ERA provided more discretion and time to develop the law.
Justice Powell said in his concurring opinion (joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justice Blackmun):
There is another, and I find compelling, reason for deferring a general categorizing of sex classifications as invoking the strictest test of judicial scrutiny. The Equal Rights Amendment, which if adopted will resolve the substance of this precise question, has been approved by the Congress and submitted for ratification by the States. If this Amendment is duly adopted, it will represent the will of the people accomplished in the manner prescribed by the Constitution. By acting prematurely and unnecessarily, as I view it, the Court has assumed a decisional responsibility at the very time when state legislatures, functioning within the traditional democratic process, are debating the proposed Amendment. It seems to me that this reaching out to pre-empt by judicial action a major political decision which is currently in process of resolution does not reflect appropriate respect for duly prescribed legislative processes.
These three Justices said that strict scrutiny should not be applied because the ERA would do so and so the People and the States would decide if that standard should apply to sex-/gender-based government classifications. This suggests that the ERA ironically prevented strict scrutiny from being the standard for such classifications.
From captcrisis.com
Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (decided May 14, 1973): gender is a “suspect class” so any discrimination is subject to “strict scrutiny” (Air Force treated married males and married females differently as to housing and medical benefits)
Major League Baseball Players Ass’n v. Garvey, 532 U.S. 504 (decided May 14, 2001): The Padres did not offer Steve Garvey a contract extension for 1988 and 1989. He demanded arbitration per the MLB agreement, alleging collusion with other teams (looking at his stats, his last useful year was 1986, and the Padres saved him from late-career humiliations like what Steve Carlton was going through at the time). The arbitrator ruled against him despite a self-incriminating letter written by Ballard Smith (Padres president), he appealed, and the Circuit Court vacated the award as “industrial justice” and sent it back to arbitration. The Court holds that it is not the business of the courts to review an arbitration award on the merits, even when the arbitrator’s factfinding is “improvident and even silly”, and restores the award. (An arbitrator’s decision is called an “award” even when he rules against the claimant.)
United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648 (decided May 14, 1984): Young attorney, inexperienced in criminal matters, given only 25 days to prepare for complex $9.4 million mail fraud trial involving four years of government investigation and thousands of documents, and with some witnesses still not tracked down. Yet the Court does not find “ineffective assistance of counsel”.
McCoy v. Louisiana, 584 U.S. 414 (decided May 14, 2018): Experienced attorney strategically decided to admit his client committed murders and pursue mental instability defense despite defendant’s repeated insistence that he didn’t do it. This was ineffective assistance of counsel.
Murphy v. NCAA, 584 U.S. 453 (decided May 14, 2018): federal government has no power under the Constitution to regulate state sponsorship or operation of sports gambling (invalidating the Professional and Amateur Sports Protection Act)
Byrd v. United States, 584 U.S. 395 (decided May 14, 2018): evidence of heroin found in rented car after warrantless search suppressed because driver who was not listed by renter as an authorized driver but who was driving with her permission was entitled to Fourth Amendment expectation of privacy
Dahda v. United States, 584 U.S. 395 (decided May 14, 2018): District Court warrant that improperly authorized some wiretaps outside the District’s jurisdiction was still valid as to those within
United States v. Sanchez-Gomez, 584 U.S. 381 (decided May 14, 2018): challenge to District Court policy permitting gratuitous use of full body restraints on defendants attending nonjury proceedings was not a “functional class action” and therefore dismissed as moot when challengers’ criminal cases were resolved
Looking at recent appellate decisions, ineffective assistance of counsel claims can be categorized into three: the regular one, where Strickland two-prong test is used; the (not-)Cronic one, where prejudice is assumed (I've only seen this successfully used when the defendant alleged the counsel's failure to appeal); and McCoy, which was premised not on the theory that the assistance of counsel be effective, but that the counsel must assist, not substitute, the defendant.
Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (decided May 14, 1973): gender is a “suspect class” so any discrimination is subject to “strict scrutiny” (Air Force treated married males and married females differently as to housing and medical benefits)
There was no agreement on what standard should apply to sex or gender based government distinctions. Three years later, in Craig v. Boren, the Court agreed on intermediate scrutiny.
Murphy v. NCAA, 584 U.S. 453 (decided May 14, 2018): federal government has no power under the Constitution to regulate state sponsorship or operation of sports gambling (invalidating the Professional and Amateur Sports Protection Act)
Congress can regulate sports gambling via its Commerce Clause authority. What the PASPA did was prohibit the States, except for Nevada, from legalizing sports gambling. The Court ruled this violated the anti-commandeering doctrine, which is based on the 10th Amendment.
Been absent for a few days, I'm just busy. Here are some of the cases for May 11, 12, and 14 (May 13 cases were all boring).
Theft Case (Third Petty Bench, decided May 11, 1954): Defendant's marriage with U.S. corporal, without acquisition of US citizenship, does not divest court of criminal jurisdiction
Business Negligence Causing Death Case (First Petty Bench, decided May 11, 1988): Victim's negligence in seeking unauthorized practice of medicine does not bar conviction of chiropractor for "treating" patient with cold using junk medicine (such as dehydrating patient)
Food Sanitation Act Case (Second Petty Bench, decided May 11, 1990): Beef not from slaughterhouse cannot be used as food regardless of cause of death
Claim for Right to Reimbursement Case (Third Petty Bench, decided May 12, 1964): Why do Japanese people use seals instead of signing? This ruling is part of why - under the "two-step presumption", established in this decision, a seal stamped on a document creates a rebuttable presumption that 1) the owner of the seal stamped it (the first step) and 2) the document is authentic (the second step).
Road Traffic Act Case (Second Petty Bench, decided May 12, 1980): Indictment dismissed for failure to serve still tolls statute of limitation
Quasi-Rape Case (First Petty Bench, decided May 12, 2021): Factual inquiry at appellate court, even if consisting only of questioning defendant (who remained silent), is sufficient to reverse acquittal and convict defendant (i.e. not Article 400 error) ("quasi-rape" is a pre-2017 offense for raping an intoxicated victim)
Robbery Causing Injury Case (Second Petty Bench, decided May 14, 1949): No sentence reduction when a fugitive turns in voluntarily; only when the offense was not yet discovered or suspect not known
Arson, Extortion Case (Grand Bench, decided May 14, 1952): Juvenile's confession of arson more than seven months after initial arrest was constitutionally inadmissible as being made "after prolonged arrest or detention" because the pretrial detention for a separate extortion charge, to which the juvenile admitted, was unnecessary
Rape Case (First Petty Bench, decided May 14, 1959): Another pre-2017 rape offense case. Before that amendment, rape charge required a complaint by the victim. Does the victim's recorded police statement suffice? Court says yes.
Citizen Suit Case (Second Petty Bench, decided May 14, 2021): Governor's attendance at orchestra performance, co-sponsored by the prefectural government, is part of official duty; dismisses citizen suit to recover expenses allegedly paid from taxpayer money