Supreme Court Rejects Red State Attempt to Sue Blue States Over Climate Suits

Justice Thomas dissents from the Court's continued unwillingness to hear bills of complaint filed under the Court's original jurisdiction.

This morning the Supreme Court denied a motion filed by several states to file a bill of complaint against other states for filing state-law-based lawsuits against fossil fuel energy companies. As has become tradition, Justice Thomas (joined by Justice Alito) dissented from the Court's refusal to grant the motion and consider the complaint on the merits.

In Alabama v. California, a red state coalition led by Alabama was seeking Supreme Court intervention to quash lawsuits filed by some blue state attorneys general against fossil fuel companies alleging their actions were actionable under state law. For reasons I've explained before (and address at the tail end of this draft symposium essay), the red state complaints are without merit, particularly in this posture. The idea that one state can sue another for merely filing a lawsuit in state court is quite outlandish. But it is nonetheless problematic that the Supreme Court is so dismissive of state filings seeking to invoke the Court's original jurisdiction. The better course would have been for the Court to grant the petition and then reject the claim on the merits.

Here is Justice Thomas's dissent.

The Court once again denies leave to file a complaint in a suit between States. Alabama and 18 other States moved for leave to file a complaint against California, Connecticut, Minnesota, New Jersey, and Rhode Island. The plaintiff States allege that the defendant States are attempting to "dictate interstate energy policy" through the aggressive use of state-law tort suits. Bill of Complaint 1–3. On the plaintiff States' account, these suits seek to "impos[e] ruinous liability and coercive remedies on energy companies . . . based on out-of-state conduct with out-of-state effects," for the purpose of placing a "global carbon tax on the traditional energy industry." Id., at 1–2. The plaintiff States contend that this practice violates the horizontal separation of powers, the Federal Government's exclusive authority over interstate emissions, and the Commerce Clause. I would grant the plaintiff States leave to proceed.

As I have previously explained, the Court's assumption that it has "discretion to decline review" in suits between States is "suspect" at best. Arizona v. California, 589 U. S. ___, ___ (2020) (opinion dissenting from denial of motion for leave to file complaint) (slip op., at 1); accord, Nebraska v. Colorado, 577 U. S. 1211, 1211–1213 (2016) (same). "The Constitution establishes our original jurisdiction in mandatory terms." Arizona, 589 U. S., at ___ (opinion of THOMAS, J.) (slip op., at 1). Article III states that, "[i]n all Cases . . . in which a State shall be [a] Party, the supreme Court shall have original jurisdiction." §2, cl. 2 (emphasis added). And, Congress has made our original jurisdiction "exclusive" in "all controversies between two or more States." 28 U. S. C. §1251(a). Given our "virtually unflagging obligation . . . to exercise the jurisdiction given" to us, our jurisdiction in thi context would seem to be compulsory. Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U. S. 800, 817 (1976).

Yet, the Court routinely "decline[s] to exercise its exclusive original jurisdiction in state-versus-state cases." Texas v. California, 593 U. S. ___, ___ (ALITO, J., dissenting from denial of motion for leave to file complaint) (slip op., at 6) (collecting cases). It has done so as part of a broader policy of making only "sparing use" of our original jurisdiction, wherein we restrict our review to "appropriate" cases. Illinois v. Milwaukee, 406 U. S. 91, 93–94 (1972).

This discretionary approach is a modern invention that the Court has never persuasively justified. See Texas, 593 U. S., at ___–___ (opinion of ALITO, J.) (slip op., at 3–6) (chronicling history). For example, in Ohio v. Wyandotte Chemicals Corp., 401 U. S. 493 (1971), the Court admitted that "it may initially have been contemplated that this Court would always exercise its original jurisdiction when properly called upon to do so." Id., at 497. But, the Court declared, "changes in the American legal system" and the "development of American society" had rendered the mandatory exercise of original jurisdiction "untenable, as a practical matter." Ibid. Wyandotte was a case falling under our nonexclusive original jurisdiction, but the Court has made the same judgment with respect to our exclusive original jurisdiction, including in cases between States: Limiting our exercise of original jurisdiction is necessary, the Court has claimed, "'so that our increasing duties with the appellate docket will not suffer.'" Arizona v. New Mexico, 425 U. S. 794, 797 (1976) (per curiam) (quoting Illinois, 406 U. S., at 93–94).

In my view, such prudential decisions are not ours to make. The Constitution and Congress have set the bounds of our original jurisdiction. Those parameters should be conclusive: "We have no more right to decline the exercise of jurisdiction which is given, than to usurp that which is not given." Cohens v. Virginia, 6 Wheat. 264, 404 (1821) (Marshall, C. J., for the Court).

The Court's reluctance to accept jurisdiction in cases between the States is also troubling because this Court is the only court that can hear such cases. "If this Court does not exercise jurisdiction over a controversy between two States, then the complaining State has no judicial forum in which to seek relief." Nebraska, 577 U. S., at 1212 (opinion of THOMAS, J.). Accordingly, the Court today leaves the 19 plaintiff States without any legal means of vindicating their claims against the 5 defendant States.

We should revisit this discretionary approach. Our exclusive original jurisdiction over suits between States reflects a determination by the Framers and by Congress about the need "to open and keep open the highest court of the nation" for such suits, in recognition of the "rank and dignity" of the States. Ames v. Kansas ex rel. Johnston, 111 U. S. 449, 464 (1884); see Texas, 593 U. S., at ___ (opinion of ALITO, J.) (slip op., at 7). Yet, this Court has—essentially for policy reasons—assumed a power to summarily turn away suits between States. The Court today exercises that power to reject a suit involving nearly half the States in the Nation, which alleges serious constitutional violations. Because I would at least allow the plaintiff States to file their complaint, I respectfully dissent from the Court's denial of leave to file.

Comments

[Please, Daivd, Seek Help]

I am not sure i understand the mandatory original jurisdiction argument. In a world where the court is forced at gunpoint to take every interstate dispute, it could opt to decide the merits question without argument, issue a one sentence opinion granting summary judgment to defendants without explanation, and then tack on a one sentence disclaimer that the case is not to be seen as precedential (ala Bush /Gore). Surely that constitutes completion of the court's duty under mandatory jurisdiction. But this process is identical in outcome and meaning to simply declining to hear the case.

Or suppose the AG of one state -- say Rhode Island without loss of generality -- decides he hates the Supreme Court and wishes to drain them of resources and so sues every other state every day with no articulated cause and the AG gives a public statement where he says "The Supreme Court has no authority to declare me vexatious". Clearly there's no argument that mandatory original jurisdiction requires the court to brief and argue all of these cases and produce a lengthy written opinion rather than summarily denying them with the stroke of a pen. Clearly the court would not be issuing hundreds of opinions pleading Congress to give it relief.

Given these scenarios, what difference does it make if the court summarily rules for defendants without explanation or precedent; or instead simply declines to take the case? They are identical in outcome. The dissent could argue that clarity on the merits would be useful and the court shirks a legal norm blah blah blah. But why argue this actually speaks to mandatory jurisdiction when it's six in one and half a dozen in the other?

Nothing in the constitution mandates a particular shape to opinions or a particular process through which they were arrived at.

[MaddogEngineer]

What difference, at this point, does it make?

Probably because Thomas takes seriously what the Constitution says. And I assume it violates legal obligations of original jurisdiction not to accept a case before dismissing it, but that itself may be contestable. He periodically expresses frustration that the Court behaves in ways it shouldn't, ducking obligations because it's accepting them is politically inconvenient, only can do this because there is no higher power to admonish/correct it and so can get away with it. I suppose one could put this in the same grievance category as ignoring the privileges and immunities clause as the source of many individual rights.

I further assume this could have implications down the road with original jurisdiction and standing controversies.

[apedad]

"Probably because Thomas takes seriously what the Constitution says."

Can't wait to see how Thomas rules on Trump cases where, (Art 2, Section 3), " . . . he (President) shall take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed."

[Brett Bellmore]

Has that ever been enforced against ANY President, in court?

[apedad]

How about you Google it this time and let us know.

[MaddogEngineer]

Area person who declares that judicial rulings he agrees are correctly following the Constitution thinks judges who often make rulings he disagrees with are not following the Constitution.

I know, I know, you guys so excited about MAGA crapping all over ACB for not "supporting Trump", that it distracted you from the truth that originalist judges are not as outcome/result based in their decisions like you all are.

That of course won't stop you of accusing Republican appointees from implementing a nefarious agenda, when it's the Democrat appointees that never ever vote against their philosophical interests in the big cases. Never. It's why MAGA calls ACB a failure, in a long string of failures, for not behaving like the lib justices.

[Please, Daivd, Seek Help]

Right, but, Thomas' complaint is satisfied by the procedurally different but functionally identical release of a ruling that says "We take the case. We find for defendants. We decline to express a reasoning." instead of "We don't take the case, which is equivalent to finding for defendants." It can't possibly be the case that the constitution mandates one sentence rather than the other.

[A Japanese Student]

Mandatory jurisdiction is only meaningful in cases where the Court does have a jurisdiction. Here, the plaintiff States likely have not shown why they have Article III standing. Because the decision is unappealable, there is no reason to hear the case and produce records/decisions useful for appellate review.

[David Nieporent]

Rulings set precedents. A decision "The putative plaintiff states lack standing" is precedential (even if not binding on future SCOTUSes) whereas simply declining to accept the case is not.

[JoeFromtheBronx]

SCOTUS explaining itself other than "The motion for leave to file a bill of complaint is denied" might have provided some clarity.

[Brett Bellmore]

I sometimes think the entire federal government is a gigantic exercise in demonstrating how bad an idea it is to let anybody in government decide their own workload.

[Sarcastr0]

…I kinda get it for SCOTUs but how exactly do you think the federal government works?

[Area Man]

I don’t understand why Congress doesn’t just give the district courts concurrent jurisdiction in state-versus-state cases like it does with every other original-jurisdiction category.

[A Woman of No Importance]

Because the Constitution explicitly says the Supreme Court has exclusive jurisdiction. Which to my mind is a pretty good reason why the Supreme Court should be taking these cases on the merits; if one state wants to sue another, the Supreme Court is pretty much the only game in town.

[A Japanese Student]

The Constitution does not require that the jurisdiction be exclusive. In some circumstances non-State parties can sue another State (as opposed to, say, officer or agency of a State). These go to the district courts despite being a case "in which a State shall be Party".

[Drewski]

(redundant reply)

[Area Man]

As Japanese Student points out, the Constitution does not make the Court’s original jurisdiction exclusive. Thus, 28 U.S.C. § 1251(a)—original and exclusive jurisdiction of state-versus-state cases—could be extended to (b)—original but nonexclusive. I don’t understand the purpose of not providing the states a guaranteed forum against other states the same way the federal government is given a forum against states.

And even assuming the Court doesn’t have to take state-versus-state cases, I also don’t understand why the Court doesn’t just take them and have a special master handle them. It wouldn’t take up too much of the Court’s time to review the decisions of the special masters—especially since they apparently have a bunch of extra time to write concurrences and dissents to denial of certiorari every other time they hand down orders.

[A Japanese Student]

It's all fun and games until a party demands a jury trial. (Yes, there are causes of action that can be invoked by private plaintiffs against States and allow jury trial.)

[MaddogEngineer]

I would assume this is because, much like the emergency docket, the Court prefers to have the fully developed record that usually happens when a case comes up through a circuit court of appeals.

Of course, since the Court does not have exclusive constitutional jurisdiction, it can pick and choose which cases it allows to proceed. Or tolerate those for which there is not concurrent jurisdiction, that are strictly matters of law. Not sure. It seems like the (state) original jurisdiction it hears, first via a special master, are water rights and boundary cases.

[Area Man]

“[T]he Court prefers to have the fully developed record that usually happens when a case comes up through a circuit court of appeals.”

But state-versus-state cases will never come up through the courts of appeal because the Court has exclusive jurisdiction over them. That’s what the special masters are for in the state-versus-state cases they do take. Since the states have no other forum in those cases, I don’t see why the Court doesn’t just take the cases and appoint special masters to find facts and offer opinions that the Court could then adopt, modify, or reject.

[David Nieporent]

I also don’t understand why the Court doesn’t just take them and have a special master handle them. It wouldn’t take up too much of the Court’s time to review the decisions of the special masters

I mean, they do do that, for legitimate lawsuits like boundary disputes or water rights. But the role of a special master is do the fact-finding that SCOTUS doesn't want to deal with. That's not what cases like the one we're discussing are about, and a special master would solve nothing.

[Area Man]

“That's not what cases like the one we're discussing are about, and a special master would solve nothing.”

It would, though, because it would give the states a forum for their disputes and would essentially be a trial with fact findings and legal conclusions that the Court could then review.

[David Nieporent]

A case like the one we're discussing doesn't require any fact-finding — it's going to be decided at the motion to dismiss stage — and a special master's proposed "conclusions of law" would be reviewed de novo anyway, making that a pointless step that would save SCOTUS no work.

[MatthewSlyfield]

"Because the Constitution explicitly says the Supreme Court has exclusive jurisdiction. "

1. as others as pointed out, the constitution says nothing about the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction is exclusive.
2. It's not just state vs state. The constitution says that the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction extends to all cases where "a state" singular is a party. In other words, their original jurisdiction would encompass a private individual suing a state.

[A Woman of No Importance]

Sorry, I disagree with all of you. There is a legal doctrine, the Latin name for which is escaping me at the moment, that means to say one thing is to exclude everything else. The Constitution says the Supreme Court shall have original jurisdiction of actions between states. It does NOT say the Supreme Court plus any inferior courts Congress establishes shall have original jurisdiction over lawsuits between states.

Of course, unless and until one state sues another in district court we're not going to know whether I'm right.

[David Nieporent]

You're thinking of expressio unius est exclusio alterius, but I don't think there's any way to get from that to there.

[Area Man]

So, no one accepts that interpretation, including, most importantly, Congress, as evidenced by the fact that the other original-jurisdiction categories outlined in the Constitution are heard concurrently by the lower courts. Thus, the question remains, why didn’t (or why doesn’t) Congress give the lower courts concurrent jurisdiction to decide state-versus-state cases? It’s a weird exception, especially since the Supreme Court doesn’t always agree to hear those cases.

[JoeFromtheBronx]

Amy Howe provided some background:

https://amylhowe.com/2025/03/10/supreme-court-takes-up-challenge-to-colorado-ban-on-conversion-therapy/

(general wrap-up)

The Republican-led states came to the Supreme Court last spring, seeking permission to file their lawsuit in the Supreme Court. The states sought to rely on the court’s original jurisdiction – that is, its limited power under the Constitution to hear a dispute for the first time, rather than as an appeal from state or lower federal courts.

In October, the justices asked the federal government for its views on whether the dispute should move forward in the Supreme Court. In a brief filed in December, Elizabeth Prelogar – the U.S. solicitor general during the Biden administration – urged the court to turn down the Republican-led states’ bid and allow the disputes to play out in the state courts instead.

Prelogar contended (among other things) that the states did not have a legal right to sue, known as standing, to bring their case. Noting that the state-court lawsuits that the Republican-led states seek to halt “are still in their early stages,” she argued that any connection between the state-court suits and an injury to the Republican-led states or their citizens is too speculative to support a lawsuit. “The most that can be said,” she reasoned, “is that a state court ‘might’ find the private companies liable” in state court. “But even then,” she wrote, “those directly affected would be the private companies, not the” Republican-led states or their citizens.

Again, it might have been useful -- more so than in most run of the mill cases where they silently reject a claim -- for SCOTUS to at least briefly explain their decision.

[SRG2]

Thus Thomas: "As I have previously explained"

Hahahaha

[Drewski]

I wish I could laugh with you, but I'm deeply worried that within a couple of years Thomas will be able to copy-and-paste his old dissents into majority opinions.

[SRG2]

Fair point.

[Daddyhill]

What would happen if red states sued blue states, or vice-versa, for permitting or prohibiting abortion? Didn't this Court overturn Roe and determine that abortion is a political issue to be managed by the States? Surgical and medical abortions definitely have interstate implications, and so does energy management. So energy policy, like abortion, should be left to the States as primarily a political matter.

[A Japanese Student]

The interstate (and international) implication of energy policy is far expansive than abortion. Obviously we cannot build a glass dome that would keep greenhouse gases confined inside one State. In addition, things like natural gas, nuclear fuel, water (from rivers), come from interstate (and foreign) sources. All but three States connect to interstate power grids. This is much more significant than "this abortion pill crossed a state line".

The idea of having a national energy policy itself isn't bad. That said, I do agree that Supreme Court's original jurisdiction is not a mechanism to set national policies.