The Volokh Conspiracy
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Today in Supreme Court History
Today in Supreme Court History: February 13, 2016
2/13/16: Justice Antonin Scalia died.
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Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 7 U.S. 267 (decided February 13, 1806): Out of this pedantic seed grew upwards of two hundred years of ridiculously wasteful procedural litigation. Marshall holds that federal court jurisdiction “between a citizen of a state and a citizen of another state”, under the Judiciary Act of 1789, means that in a diversity action every plaintiff must be from a different state from every defendant. The Constitution itself says only “between citizens of different states”, art. III, §2, and there’s nothing to stop Congress from undoing this decision by statute. The Court itself has noted that all Article III really requires is “minimal” diversity (just one plaintiff has to be from a different state from just one defendant); see 545 U.S. 546. A bill to totally abolish diversity jurisdiction passed the House of Representatives resoundingly in 1978 but failed in the Senate, defeated by the lawyers’ lobby. (Marshall later regretted this holding, see discussion at 43 U.S. 497, 555.)
Phillips v. Mound City Land & Water Ass’n, 124 U.S. 605 (decided February 13, 1888): no federal question presented by state court’s partitioning of land in Los Angeles according to its construction of laws of Mexico as they existed pre-conquest (conquest by the United States, that is)
United States v. Jung Ah Lung, 124 U.S. 621 (decided February 13, 1888): Chinese national in custody after not being allowed to land in San Francisco due to Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882 was permitted to bring habeas petition (habeas statute was then changed in 1891 to disallow immigrant petitions, see Dept. of Homeland Security v. Thuraissigiam, 2020)
Miller v. Pate, 386 U.S. 1 (decided February 13, 1967): convicted of rape/murder of eight-year-old girl based on his “bloody underpants” presented at trial but prosecutor knew it was just red paint; habeas granted and conviction vacated
Interstate Circuit v. United States, 306 U.S. 208 (decided February 13, 1939): This is one of many cases on whether motion picture distribution agreements violate antitrust laws. I mention it because of the wonderful sentence: “The production of weak evidence when strong is available can lead only to the conclusion that the strong would have been adverse.” Id. at 226. In my practice I never have read SCOTUS cases, but I quote this every chance I get.
The Class Action Fairness Act requires only minimal diversity for federal court jurisdiction for certain cases that meet a bunch of other criteria.
Yes. Otherwise you’d never have class actions in federal court. For the same reason, interpleader can be done with minimal diversity.
Not quite. You could/can if they involve federal question jurisdiction rather than diversity jurisdiction.
True.
Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 7 U.S. 267 (decided February 13, 1806): ... The Court itself has noted that all Article III really requires is “minimal” diversity (just one plaintiff has to be from a different state from just one defendant) ...
The Court noted this in State Farm Fire & Casualty Co. v. Tashire, 386 U. S. 523 (1967). Because "complete diversity" is the standard, the Court won't allow for "minimal diversity" except where Congress expressly says so.
Moved for threading purposes.
The importance of an unexpected death or resignation is one of the things that should be addressed by constitutional text and practice.
We have rules to handle the need to replace members of Congress. The 25th Amendment is the latest means used to address the disability and resignation of presidents.
There is nothing special in place regarding judges. I support term limits. I think it should be done by amendment. Some experts point to a way around that. Perhaps. Amendment would still be the best way. Of course, the last amendment that meant much was ratified over fifty years ago. (Insert usual snark about the ERA.)
A term limit amendment could address what happens if a justice or judge resigns before the end of the term. Also, I think an indefinite hold on the confirmation process should be addressed. I think at most six months should be allowed there.
"nothing special in place regarding judges."
Neither do we have such for cabinet officers or any other appointed posts.
You fill a court vacancy caused by death the same way as one caused by retirement.
Cabinet officials do not have the independence or the good behavior tenure that can span decades. The comparison is somewhat inapt.
More details on the outrageous Miller v. Pate case.
https://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Pages/casedetailpre1989.aspx?caseid=231
Bob from Ohio would have executed this innocent man.
I wasn't even alive at the time of the murder so I was unable to execute anyone.
Supreme Court Appellate Jurisdiction Case (Third Petty Bench, decided February 13, 2001): Requiring "petition to accept a final appeal" (i.e. certiorari) in civil case appeals does not violate the Constitution (with one exception: the Supreme Court appears to have constitutionally-mandated jurisdiction over Constitutional claims, but it doesn't change anything in practice)
Tokimeki Memorial Memory Card Case (Third Petty Bench, decided February 13, 2001): Video game authors' right to integrity (moral rights, separate from copyright) infringed by selling memory cards containing modified save data (no, this was not brought by Nintendo)
Securities and Exchange Act Case (Grand Bench, decided February 13, 2002): Property rights not violated by law allowing publicly-traded corporations to sue officers for profits from short-term purchase and sales without proof of actual insider trading
Meth in a Chocolate Can Case (First Petty Bench, decided February 13, 2012): Appellate court must state with particularity why district court's factual findings are unreasonable; lay judge panel (of 6 jurors and 3 judges) acquitted the defendant of meth smuggling (insufficient mens rea); appellate court reversed and convicted the defendant; Supreme Court once again reverses and acquits
I'm enjoying these summaries, not the least (and I am patting myself on the back here) because you are imitating my short-attention-span style.