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Kannon Shanmugam on the Legitimacy of the Supreme Court
A prominent appellate practitioner responds to recent attacks on the justices and the Court.
Political attacks on the Supreme Court and individual justices are increasingly commonplace. Those who disagree with the court's rulings are not content with criticizing the Court's holdings, rationales, and reasoning. They increasingly target the Court itself, and question the integrity of the justices.
The Supreme Court bar, by and large, has been relatively quiet in the face of these criticisms. Last week, however, noted appellate practitioner Kannon Shanmugam delivered remarks at Duke Law School in defense of the Supreme Court's legitimacy. His remarks are notable, and have attracted attention (as in this WSJ editorial). [The whole speech is available here.]
Here is a taste:
I have been reluctant to give formal speeches about the law in general or the Supreme Court in particular. You see, I have always thought of myself as a practicing lawyer, not a pundit, and a country lawyer at that—the kid who improbably went from a trailer park in Kansas to a corner office on K Street. As a lawyer, my job is to play in the game; I leave the task of color commentary to others.
But today, I am breaking that habit to address the recent criticisms of the Supreme Court's legitimacy. I am doing so for a simple reason: because I revere the Supreme Court. I had the fortune of a lifetime to clerk at the Court for one of the greatest Justices of this generation or any other, Antonin Scalia. Since then, I have devoted my professional life to the Court, having spent the last 20 years arguing cases there. My wife and I even got engaged on the Court's front steps. And I firmly believe that, for all the challenges it faces, our Supreme Court is the finest high court in the world—a model for other countries to follow.
Perhaps for that reason, I have found the recent attacks on the Court to be dispiriting. At the risk of giving away the punch line to my remarks, I believe that the criticisms of the Court's legitimacy are unfounded. But more than that, I believe that attacks on the Court's legitimacy are dangerous—undermining public confidence in the Court and imperiling the rule of law. Finally, I believe that critics of the current Court would be better served engaging with the Court's work on the merits.
Now, I am aware that, in defending the Court, I will inevitably be subject to criticism myself: specifically, the criticism that I am kowtowing to the Court before which I practice. I hope that my track record refutes that criticism. I have never testified for or otherwise endorsed a Supreme Court nominee; in fact, with one exception for a longtime colleague, I have never signed a letter supporting a judicial nominee at any level. And I am at a stage of my career where I have little to gain personally from weighing in on these issues. But if I am criticized, so be it. I believe that those of us who practice regularly before the Court, and who thus have a unique familiarity with the Court and its work, should speak up when we believe the Court is being unfairly attacked.
As Shanmugam notes, attacks on the Court's legitimacy have potentially far reaching effects.
the greatest danger the attacks present is to the rule of law itself. The phrase "rule of law" has rather lost its meaning, with both sides in the political debate often using it simply as a shorthand for decisions with which they agree. But what the "rule of law" truly connotes is that we live in a society where all of us adhere to the law, including judicial decisions. Justice Breyer has frequently spoken about how remarkable it was that, when the Supreme Court effectively resolved the 2000 presidential election in Bush v. Gore, everyone immediately agreed to abide by it. And when I was first asked about whether the Supreme Court was "legitimate"—on a panel at NYU almost exactly two years ago—I expressed skepticism that there could ever come a time when elected officials or citizens would refuse to obey a Supreme Court decision.
But now, I am less confident. Over the last two years, we have seen the President criticizing the Court, in the wake of adverse decisions, in increasingly strident terms. I believe we are not so far from a President saying, in the manner of Andrew Jackson, "John Roberts has made his decision; now let him enforce it." And if you are unsure about that, ask yourself this question: if the Court ever has to resolve another presidential election, how confident are you that either side would simply acquiesce in the Court's decision?
And it's not just a question of presidential elections. One could imagine presidential defiance of Court decisions on a wide range of subjects. And it is perilous (and naive) to assume that any future defiance of a Court order would come from a progressive president resisting a conservative court.
The Court is hardly above criticism. Indeed, many of its decisions are quite deserving of criticism. Yet there is an important difference between saying the Court is wrong and claiming it is illegitimate.
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Al Gore simply acquiesced in Bush v. Gore.
I’d argue the SC agreed to take Bush v. Gore precisely because the parties involved were clearly signaling that they viewed it as a legal issue that they would resolve by going to court. They decided because they were asked to decide and both sides brought lawyers and arguments.
I think the justices avoid things like ordering the tide to recede.
They obviously took the case because enough of them wanted Bush to win. O’Connor in particular was reportedly furious when the election seemed to have favored Gore, because she wanted to retire, and wanted a Republican president when she did.
According to Scalia, “The counting of votes that are of questionable legality does in my view threaten irreparable harm to petitioner Bush, and to the country, by casting a cloud upon what he claims to be the legitimacy of his election.” I would say that the corrupt Supreme Court decision cast far more doubt on the legitimacy of Bush’s election than a manual recount of undervotes ordered by the state Supreme Court (who would be expected to be the arbiter of the legality of any votes) would, as did the stay immediately deciding that the recount could not take place.
Cool story, but after Bush won she did not indeed retire during that term. She didn’t even announce her retirement until July 2005, well after the following election. Reality doesn’t really seem to line up with your apocryphal tale.
It was indeed reported by the Wall Street Journal, and that she didn’t want to confirm that report by retiring in Bush’s first term, with the consequent criticism of her part in handing Bush the 2000 election, hardly rebuts it.
And? Lots of hot gossip gets reported in a variety of rags.
That’s a cute effort to make it non-falsifiable, but at the end of the day your pivot now suggests that her supposed zeal about the composition of the Court was trumped by her ego over supposedly validating a hit piece in a newspaper article. None of which lines up with any objective evidence of Justice O’Connor’s overall character that I’m aware of.
Given what surrounded RBG near the end of her life, and subsequently Breyer and now Sotomayor, talk of a justice’s retirement should always be treated with skepticism, even when it’s interest attributed to him/her. Pressure to retire campaigns didn’t start with RBG.
The Wall Street Journal (excluding its opinion page) has a good journalistic reputation. Given the relative rarity with which incumbent presidents are defeated, Gore winning might easily have meant she would have to wait 8 years instead of 4 years and that may have influenced her.
She waited until Bush had been elected legitimately in 2004.
It’s hard to see how snarky hindsight repackaged as a crystal ball constitutes a serious response.
This perfectly encapsulates the bad faith argumentation of the left.
Stolen elections and all.
You’d be lying, though? You’d know this isn’t true because they reached into a state law case that was being handled by the Florida Supreme Court. There wasn’t any non-corrupt reason not to do that.
Man who devotes life to institution says institution is awesome actually and fuck you for saying otherwise.
Sure. Now where is your substantive argument?
Oh.
Saying the messenger has a major credibility problem with advancing the message is a substantive criticism.
No, it is literally an ad hominem.
Just like it was ad hominem to point out that Phillip Morris had an interest in publishing studies showing how healthy cigarettes are.
This is also how we conduct trials too. Objection ad hominem! Is a very common objection that is always sustained whenever someone tries to impeach the credibility of a witness.
I’d still like to see something more substantive than, “Why should I listen to your argument? You have motives for making it!”
You can’t demand that arguments be made against interest to even be worth listening to!
I mean the motivation of the person making the claim is often the most important point. Finding out someone is a jail-house snitch who got a favorable plea deal to testify against the defendant is usually the more important part of the testimony compared to the confession they supposedly heard.
Exactly.
That’s not an argument about facts. It means you don’t have any facts to back up your argument. Pound the table if you want, but don’t pretend you are pounding the facts.
Even a jailhouse snitch is a fact which could be developed into a real argument. You haven’t, and you refuse to.
Kannon is giving a normative opinion about the court and he has a material and emotional interest in us adopting his view. Him saying it’s dangerous to call the court illegitimate isn’t actually a fact. Just his opinion that he has strong motivations to have.
Sure, motives matter for testimony, unless it’s somebody testifying against Trump.
They don’t matter for arguments, because arguments don’t ask you to believe them on faith, they advance reasons for believing them, that can be evaluated apart from the source of the argument.
“Over the last two years, we have seen the President criticizing the Court, in the wake of adverse decisions, in increasingly strident terms.”
This is a factual claim. Is it true? That’s what somebody responding to an argument would ask, not if the guy saying it has motives. Everybody’s got motives.
They actually matter for arguments even more! “Everyone should think the Supreme Court is great and people shouldn’t undermine it” is a lot less compelling coming from a guy whose career depends on the Supreme Court 1) liking him 2) being a respected institution.
It’s like listening to a lobbyist for Western Union in 2003 talk about how useful the telegraph is.
This is ludicrous. Essentially you’re arguing that only arguments against interest are worthy of being evaluated on their own merits. As soon as somebody benefits from their argument being true, you can dismiss it without a hearing.
Do I really have to point out that you never apply this standard to arguments you agree with?
Brett… an argument can be relevant without having to be dispositive.
“‘Everyone should think the Supreme Court is great and people shouldn’t undermine it’ is a lot less compelling coming from a guy whose career depends on the Supreme Court 1) liking him 2) being a respected institution.”
How so? I mean, I wouldn’t find it particularly compelling from either source, I’d ask him why he thought that and evaluate the response.
This is a factual claim.
But not an argument. Even if true, it hardly proves anything. Maybe the court’s loss of legitimacy is not a result of the criticism. Maybe it’s a result of its decisions, and its cavalier approach to its ethical obligations.
And maybe the court and its sycophants should quit whining when it is criticized in the same manner as other public officialsare routinely criticized.
No. It’s not literally ad hominem.
If a former lawyer who had been disbarred for stealing money from a client were to write a treatise on legal ethics, he should not expect to be taken seriously, even if every word he wrote was spot on. Yes, it is the logical fallacy of ad hominem, but he still wouldn’t be taken seriously.
Likewise, following the priestly pedophile scandals, hardly anyone continues to take the Catholic church seriously when it talks about sexual ethics.
Same principle applies here. The message may be perfectly fine, but there is something to be said for choosing your messenger.
Lawyers in particular shouldn’t have any objection to attacking the messenger. Undermining credibility of witnesses, including experts, is a key part of litigation.
Let’s apply your own ethics then, shall we?
You’re seriously arguing that we should follow the examples set by lieyers whose entire careers are built on leiyering?
“You’re seriously arguing that we should follow the examples set by lieyers whose entire careers are built on leiyering?”
So you agree? We shouldn’t follow the example of Supreme Court litigators like Kannon and the Supreme Court itself.
Besides which, the point of attacking a witness’s credibility is to attack his witnessing, not his arguments.
You fail at even being a good lieyer, if you can’t tell the difference.
Did I do that right, attack your credibility in true lieyer fashion? I’m trying to learn from a master lieyer.
“Besides which, the point of attacking a witness’s credibility is to attack his witnessing, not his arguments.”
This isn’t true actually. Expert witnesses make arguments about what certain data means and lawyers attack their credibility, often by pointing to their compensation of history of testimony in other cases.
I guess I might take such a lawyer seriously, if he was honest about his own mistakes. The possibility that he was aiming to minimize or excuse his own conduct would work against him being taken seriously, though, so it might limit what he could say in order to be taken seriously.
But the unethical lawyer has made arguments. If he’s such a sorry source, his arguments should be easy to rebut. That you have to fall back on insulting his ethics means you can’t rebut his actual arguments, or won’t. It does not mean his arguments are false.
I didn’t say that I personally might not accept the validity of his arguments; merely that in general he’s not going to be taken seriously. He’ll be hooted off the stage amid a chorus of “Look who’s talking.” Because whether you think it’s a good idea or not, law is a field in which credibility is everything.
“Yet there is an important difference between saying the Court is wrong and claiming it is illegitimate.”
Correct. The former is ineffective and useless and the latter is not.
Telling the court “you’re wrong” is meaningless when they can’t be held accountable for wrongness and the people best positioned to do constantly praise the integrity and brilliance of the justices. “I disagree with X decision by brilliant jurist Y” isn’t criticism in any meaningful sense. It’s like disagreeing on movies or food.
By contrast, “you’re illegitimate” actually might give the justices and other political actors pause. Ultimately the court can only exercise political power by public consent. If enough people think the court is corrupt or not reflecting public sentiment then it loses its authority. It’s a reminder that their power is not to be taken for granted. They are our servants not our overlords. Whatever you call the American polity, a democracy, liberal democracy, republic, constitutional republic, democratic-republic, etc., no institution gets legitimacy simply by claiming it. It needs to be earned, and failure to respond to public criticism effectively, or worse getting defensive and haughty about it, is a legitimacy crisis of their own making.
not reflecting public sentiment
Which public sentiment would that be? The court only hears cases because there is a dispute, and a difficult one that hasn’t been resolved despite the earlier attempts of several other bodies (courts, legislators, institutions).
Is that what they do? Because it seems like they take cases to upend settled expectations brought by people who are often in a small minority who don’t like the resolution reached by the elected branches or lower courts.
That’s certainly not true. Their “Republican Presidents can commit all the crimes they want” opinion was taken out of order because they wanted to interfere in the election.
The problem, though, is attacking the court’s legitimacy because you think it’s wrong, and not because there is a reasonable basis for questioning its legitimacy. That is harmful on two levels.
First, it damages an institution that is an important check on the increasingly irresponsible and polarized political branches. As Shanmugam notes, in the event of a political crisis such as a disputed election, we might much prefer that the Supreme Court have the institutional gravitas to step in. Who knows, such a crisis might even give us a new perspective on whether hunting trips and lucrative book deals are the apocalyptic events we thought they were.
Second, there is the boy-who-cried-wolf problem. If you attack the legitimacy of the court every time a justice’s spouse flies a flag you don’t like, a little credibility is lost each time. By the time a genuine institutional crisis comes along, everyone has long since stopped listening to you.
I suspect the performative post-Dobbs scrutiny of the Court’s ethics practices will have the opposite long-term effect of that intended. Partisan attacks on various justices’ ethics will become commonplace, they will largely be tuned out by whichever side isn’t making them, and the court will have even less incentive to pursue genuinely worthwhile incremental reform.
“First, it damages an institution that is an important check on the increasingly irresponsible and polarized political branches.”
I think the court is as polarized and irresponsible as any of the “political branches.”
“As Shanmugam notes, in the event of a political crisis such as a disputed election, we might much prefer that the Supreme Court have the institutional gravitas to step in.”
I actually don’t prefer that. People with zero political accountability shouldn’t be settling questions like that. No matter how much fake gravitas they manufacture for themselves.
Your last paragraph kind of proves the point that they have a legitimacy problem. The fact they simply tune out criticism and decide whether to reform themselves is highly problematic and will cause other political actors to do it for them once the public tires of this game. They’re part of a constitutional system, not its overlords.
The problem, though, is attacking the court’s legitimacy because you think it’s wrong, and not because there is a reasonable basis for questioning its legitimacy.
Yes. Simply being wrong is not “illegitimate,” which is a different matter. Now, the Supreme Court can be very wrong. And, that could warrant criticism. But, it’s different than “legitimacy” alone.
OTOH, if there is a “reasonable basis” to question legitimacy, it is reasonable to question legitimacy.
a political crisis such as a disputed election
First, the disputed election regularly is going to be a political question, not something the Court should address.
Second, if it lacks suitable “gravitas” (so we are back to the very dispute — is the criticism now being made appropriate), it will have a problem to settle even those disputes it does have a role in deciding.
A binding ethical code, for instance, can help give them the “gravitas” and respect necessary to do their job in that case.
attack the legitimacy of the court every time a justice’s spouse flies a flag you don’t like
OTOH, there are times when there is a valid call to criticize.
The Alito thing was not a one-off. The “wolf” calling works both ways. For instance, certain VC contributors over and over again provide a one-sided defense of conservative justices they like.
performative post-Dobbs scrutiny
Or, it is a valid response to ethical problems and includes some reforms (such as an inspector general) raised by Democrats and sometimes Republicans before Dobbs.
This reply has a certain neutral patina that is not convincing.
I’m not so sure. Being “wrong” on certain issues can lead to a legitimacy problem when there isn’t a practical way to hold them accountable or correct the decisions.
That’s possible. The two things are generally separate.
I think it also is a somewhat different problem.
Dobbs v. Jackson, for instance, to me was very wrong. Part of what bothers people is how it was done. The leaking of the opinion factors in there. It was “illegitimate” in a way different from Bowers v. Hardwick (granting it was a bad decision).
I think the wrongness is usually tied to the illegitimacy. Bush v Gore was wrong because it was illegitimate. Dobbs was wrong because it was illegitimate. The Trump cases were wrong because they were illegitimate.
Justice Breyer has frequently spoken about how remarkable it was that, when the Supreme Court effectively resolved the 2000 presidential election in Bush v. Gore, everyone immediately agreed to abide by it.
Conservatives will appeal to Breyer, who they disagree with regularly when it suits them. Breyer provides a sort of “Just So” history of the Supreme Court that favors its view of itself as a neutral final arbiter. Gerard Magliocca’s “Andrew Jackson and the Constitution: The Rise and Fall of Generation Regimes” also challenges Breyer’s summary of the Cherokee Cases.
[GM also explained how there was nothing to “enforce” in Worcester v. Georgia. The real issue was an earlier case where the Supreme Court told the state to hold up an execution & it simply ignored them.]
Bush v. Gore involved a limited question though it had wider implications. For instance, there was no obligation for Gore to tell the senators to not join with the House challengers to even have a hearing on the question. A single senator could have done that. The case to do so was much more serious than in 2004 when a senator did challenge along with some House members.
Breyer’s wider desire was not just having everyone “abide” by it. He wanted the result to be accepted without much grumbling at all.
There is no need for that. Roe v. Wade, for instance, was strongly (if IMHO wrongly) opposed for decades. Major political figures argued it was patently wrong and even illegitimate.
Other cases had a stronger sentiment. For instance, police departments de facto ignore certain procedural requirements. Schools did not follow the prayer rulings of the 1960s. Brown was not the only case subject to nullification.
[This sort of thing is more troubling.]
And, that isn’t even what is at stake here. Strong opposition is too much for some.
https://x.com/joshchafetz/status/1838318620973351121?s=46&t=swfuX8A13L7H9PAYSakPtA
This is a good point, and I think the SCOTUS litigators with the most cases are better viewed as lobbyists than lawyers. They’re practically all former staffers of the institution with lots of personal connection to it. They are able to use that connection and their credibility with the institution to push forward their client’s legal and policy vision. Just like lobbyists.
Both Trump v. United States, 603 U.S. ___, 144 S. Ct. 2312 (2024), and Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000), are execrable, partisan hack decisions. Each does for jurisprudence what Christian Szell did for dentistry. Trump, however, carries the potential for greater long term harm (although the survivors of hundreds of thousands of dead Iraqis would likely disagree).
Any self-proclaimed “originalist” who nevertheless embraces the Trump decision (including the six black robed wardheelers who ruled in Trump’s favor) is a fool and a liar.
Shorter NG:
“I don’t like Trump v US or Bush v Gore”
Because they were decided the way they were due to corruption.
People have a right and a duty to debate the court’s legitimacy.
The idea that such questions are dangerous implies that, if you have an argument that the court is illegitimate, you should keep it to yourself for fear that you will wrongly convince others that the court is illegitimate. That can’t be right. If there are convincing arguments that the court is illegitimate, people are right to treat it as such.
IOW, our confidence in the court’s legitimacy should come from the fact that people are constantly questioning it, not because people are afraid to question it.
“But more than that, I believe that attacks on the Court’s legitimacy are dangerous—undermining public confidence in the Court and imperiling the rule of law.”
Sounds like he doesn’t have much faith in the counterarguments.
Really, a Scalia clerk to defend the most corrupt court ever? Do you idiots understand how the rest of us see you?
The best way to improve the legitimacy of the court would be by impeaching one or two illegitimate justices.
Sotomayor, Kagen, or Jackson?
This Court’s legitimacy problem is self-created, not imposed on the Court by badly-motivated outsiders.
Examples of Court self-harm include: behavior by justices which looks too much like bribe taking; the appearance of reversals of confirmation hearing testimony; political shenanigans over appointments, which led to the present lopsided partisan division on the Court; published statements, and public conduct, by justices which suggest partisan political motivation; inexplicable failures to recuse over the appearance of conflict of interest; apparently accurate published accounts of close relations between some justices and dark money political operatives; ongoing apparently successful campaigns by parties interested in issues before the Court, to socialize with some justices, with which the justices have apparently cooperated; inaction in response to clamor for enforceable ethical standards; published concurrences which can reasonably appear to be solicitations for cases to enable partisan policy making; unprecedented anonymous leaks to the public from inside the Court, which suggest strongly that the justices themselves disagree on the question of the Court’s continuing legitimacy. All that before you even consider the outrage of the Trump criminal immunity decision.
No previous Court has ever made itself so variously and persistently vulnerable to legitimacy challenge.
Looming ahead is possibility of a repeat of Bush v. Gore. The question whether this Court can afford two such decisions without blowing its legitimacy to tatters is one so daunting it makes this OP look anticipatory, and highly suspect.
None of these things actually happened, but you do you.
Blank-minded denial isn’t even evidence of consciousness, let alone anything else.
Stephen:
a good summing up !
Left out: falsified financial reports, belatedly corrected, multiple times. Which when you think about it, means at least some of the falsifications had to be deliberate efforts at concealment.
Most of that list is just saying the same thing over and over in slightly different ways. (Others are things that the Court didn’t do at all, like “political shenanigans over appointments.” (Not saying they didn’t happen; I’m saying that the Court didn’t do them.))
On the contrary, many of the things on that list are separate instances of the same kind of self-harm. If you listed each of a dozen separate murders someone committed, it wouldn’t be a counter to say “that’s just listing the same thing [murder} over and over in slightly different ways [like listing who was murdered]”. Specifically, one could say listing the Bush v Gore and the Trump immunity case (and various other partisan decisions) is saying the same thing in slightly different ways, but the pattern of partisan decision making is bolstered by multiple examples.
Ideally, we would like Supreme Court justices who would react to being appointed by political shenanigans to act in some way to negate the political shenanigans (being scrupulously impartial in all decisions would be the lowest bar). A Supreme Court justice appointed as Gorsuch was but who resigned when the bad actors who engaged in the political shenanigans no longer had the power to repeat the shenanigans would be a principled saint who would of course never be nominated to the Supreme Court. But it’s still a fair criticism that someone knowingly accepted a benefit that was acquired illegitimately by someone else.
Tell me how they’re supposed to take bribes without it looking like bribe taking. Thomas was pre-bribed by Richard Mellon Scaife who financed an organized, paid smear campaign against his sexual harassment victim.
Aside from the pompous false modesty (anytime someone describes himself as a “country lawyer” I experience reverse peristalsis) it is a conflict of interest for Mr. Shanmugam to opine on this issue, and odd that Prof. Adler seems unaware of it.
I think that the two decisions which favored Trump this term — the A14S3 case and the immunity case — were awful, terrible, horrible. And, as with every term, there were some other decisions I disliked. But I think attacking the legitimacy of the Supreme Court based on these decisions ultimately does Trump’s work for him. Trump benefits from the lack of institutions. His strategy for gaining power is to delegitimize everyone and everything that stands in his way, from Congress to the media to the courts to the rest of the executive branch, to science, and of course to truth itself. It might be cathartic for liberals to attack SCOTUS and its members, but it is harmful in the long run without even being beneficial in the short run.
Ignoring the terrible decisions that seem to reflect partisan corruption gives the Supreme Court undeserved legitimacy, though. Granting them legitimacy, particularly in the immunity decision, just fuels the pretense that Donald Trump will have somehow been exonerated, followed by baseless claims that the charges were another “hoax”.
” attacking the legitimacy of the Supreme Court based on these decisions ultimately does Trump’s work for him”
I want to protect the integrity of the courts. I think court reform, as it has for the Catholic Church [not meant to be a Catholic justice dig] over the centuries, can help that integrity.
Liberals are not just nihilistically attacking the Supreme Court. They are arguing there needs to be reforms to protect the court system itself. One lawyer in comments (who might not be a “liberal”) regarding their support for some sort of ethics reform cited this.
I also don’t think it helps overall just to ignore certain legitimacy problems with certain rulings. For instance, not showing up to hand down an unsigned slipshod 14A, sec. 3 ruling reeked in my opinion. This is true even if we want to brush it under the rug.
Just ignoring problems for fear of legitimacy is counterproductive. It will just encourage more skullduggery & a failure to properly respond in the push/pull system we have.
I don’t think the idea here is that criticism is merely some sort of “catharsis.” Also, I question if there won’t be any “short-term” benefit. Criticism already pressured the Supreme Court to formulate ethical guidelines. It also pressured justices to do certain things, including Thomas releasing more information.
Public criticism will encourage further actions, including possible reforms [there is a myriad of options, some even that Prof. Blackman supports]. It can also have electoral effects.