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Department of Transportation Lacks the Authority to Require States to Set Greenhouse Gas Reduction Targets for Highways
A district court concludes that the Department of Transportation lacks the authority to force states to try and reduce greenhouse gas emissions associated with highway use.
A federal district court in Texas has concluded that the Department of Transportation (DOT) exceeded its statutory authority when it adopted a rule establishing a greenhouse gas (GHG) performance measure for federally funded highways. Under the rule, states were required to measure highway-related greenhouse gas emission, set targets for GHG emission reductions, and track progress toward such targets. The state of Texas objected to the rule and filed suit.
This rule has a long history. The DOT first adopted a GHG performance measure for highways in 2016, at the end of the Obama Administration. The Trump Administration rescinded this rule in 2018, concluding the DOT lacked authority to adopt a GHG-based performance measure under the relevant statute and was bad policy. After President Biden took office, the DOT reversed course again, proposing a revised GHG highway performance measure in 2022 and finalizing the rule in 2023.
Once the rule was promulgated, Texas promptly filed suit, arguing that the rule exceeded the scope of DOT's statutory authority, is arbitrary and capricious, and violates the federal government's spending power. Last month, Judge Wesley Hendrix sided with Texas, solely on statutory interpretation grounds.
Judge Hendrix summarizes his opinion in Texas v. USDOT as follows:
A federal administrative agency cannot act without congressional authorization. Here, the Federal Highway Administration created a rule requiring the states to measure, report, and set declining targets for the amount of carbon dioxide emitted by vehicles using the interstate and national-highway systems. For authority, the agency relied on 23 U.S.C. § 150(c)(3), which permits it to create measures to assess pavement conditions, bridge conditions, and "the performance of the Interstate System . . . [and] the National Highway System." Texas sued, alleging that the agency lacked authority to enact the rule. Given the statutory text's plain language and context, the Court agrees. The relevant definitions and related performance measures make clear that "performance of the Interstate/National Highway Systems" focuses on the infrastructure's effectiveness in facilitating travel, commerce, and national defense—not environmental outputs of vehicles using the systems. Moreover, the DOT's expansive interpretation is undermined by the fact that adopting it would render other statutory provisions superfluous. Additionally, Section 150(c)(3)'s performance measures only exist to carry out Section 119's National Highway Performance Program, which also distinguishes between the highway system's performance and environmental impact. Thus, the Court concludes that the rule was unauthorized.
While Texas sought to buttress its arguments with the Major Questions Doctrine, the court saw no need to do anything more than conduct a traditional statutory analysis, albeit one that relies upon the foundational premise that agencies only have that authority affirmatively delegate to them (a premise I have encouraged; e.g. here and here). As Judge Hendrix explained in a footnote: "because the statutory language itself makes clear that the DOT lacked authorization to promulgate the 2023 Rule, the Court need not resolve whether the issue presented constitutes a 'major question.'"
Texas also argued that insofar as the Department of Transportation sought to impose unrelated conditions on the receipt of highway money, it could raise constitutional concerns (an issue I discussed in this article with Nathaniel Stewart), but again Judge Hendrix saw need to reach that issue.
Judge Hendrix also ordered a nationwide vacatur of the Department of Transportation's rule, as he was required to due under Fifth Circuit precedent. As I have noted before, I think this is an improper reading of the Administrative Procedure Act, but Fifth Circuit precedent is more binding on a federal district court in Texas than is my opinion. Rather than saying anything about how the Department of Transportation should act elsewhere, Judge Hendrix should have simply held that the DOT's regulation is unenforceable against Texas and allow DOT to determine whether it wants to acquiesce elsewhere.
I assume DOT will appeal.
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"the rule exceeded the scope of (the agency's )statutory authority, is arbitrary and capricious, and violates the federal government's spending power" is the guiding principle of the Biden administration.
Pity that the OP doesn't take a view on who is right.
(Anticipating the unavoidable responses, I think GHG reduction targets are good policy, but that the US version of federalism is ridiculous. So I don't mind something like this being struck down. Of course, I claim no expertise on this specific case.)
It seems like a straightforward violation of the anti-commandeering principle. If the DOT thinks this is an important thing to manage, it should do so itself. The states don't have particular expertise that would make their state-specific measurements or targets better than a uniform approach defined at the federal level.
Anti-commandeering principle doesn't apply to optional funding, though.
I guess it's a good thing that your opinion about US federalism is of no consequence.
I've been reliably informed recently that opposition to our constitutional system of governance is a bad thing. Especially bad for American citizens, which is not you, so we can safely discount your take here.
Another reason to deny the DOT the power it claims is the delegation of emissions regulation to a different agency.
A federal administrative agency cannot act without congressional authorization. Here, the Federal Highway Administration created a rule requiring the states to measure, report, and set declining targets for the amount of carbon dioxide emitted by vehicles using the interstate and national-highway systems. For authority, the agency relied on 23 U.S.C. § 150(c)(3), which permits it to create measures to assess pavement conditions, bridge conditions, and "the performance of the Interstate System . . .
Under the progressives theory of statutory interpretation, the government can do what it wants unless specifically barred by statute.
Conservatives theory of statutory interpretation, the government can only do what is authorized by statute.
Under the progressives theory of statutory interpretation, the government can do what it wants unless specifically barred by statute.
Conservatives theory of statutory interpretation, the government can only do what is authorized by statute.
I'm glad we're having a conversation that doesn't involve the use of straw men.
But seriously, there is a substantial majority in Congress to do something about climate change, except when the time comes to actually say something in public or vote. And so Congress acquiesces in overreach by the President, and you end up with policies that go back and forth wildly depending on who is in the White House.
That has been touted as a feature, not a bug. Allowing Congress to hide over regulations AKA "taking the politics out of it", is a good thing!
Until it isn't, of course.
What Martinned described is very much not taking the politics out of it.
I don't think anyone argues overreach beyond the enabling statute is a feature of the administrative state.
The substantial majority in Congress who wish to worship the goddess carbon wouldn't remain in Congress if they did anything.
If a substantial majority in Congress wants to do something about climate change, then that substantial majority can pass a law to that effect–subject to the constitutional authority that would allow such congressional action of course.
A theoretical substantial majority is not authorization for a regulatory agency to do something it is not otherwise already authorized by law to do. A personal belief in such a substantial majority is not a valid argument to make for such regulatory action.
There is certainly a reason why this substantial majority has not acted: because the practical consequences of such actions would be unpopular with the electorate. That’s why the secretary of transportation recent analogy to cell phones replacing landlines (for a ICE to EV transition) was so dumb. If something is truly “popular”, there isn’t any need to mandate it.
And I don't see government bureaucracies eliminating landlines...
Prof. Adler, one minor change, 3rd to last para, last sentence:
" . . . but again Judge Hendrix saw NO need to reach that issue."
And . . . "Judge Hendrix also ordered a nationwide vacatur of the Department of Transportation's rule, as he was required to DO [not due] under Fifth Circuit precedent."
I am absolutely open to the idea that the DoT lacks jurisdiction.
But 23 U.S. Code § 150(b)(6) seem directly on point to me:
"National goals and performance management measures...
(6) Environmental sustainability.—
To enhance the performance of the transportation system while protecting and enhancing the natural environment."
That was the DOT's argument that the court dismissed, finding that the environmental issues in 150(b)(6) don't inform "performance" in 150(c)(3)(A)(ii)(IV) and (V).
As I understand the argument, it is that the phrasing "enhance the performance [...] while protecting [...] the natural environment" implies that performance and the environment are in tension with one another and so one can't include the other.
Thanks - I was being lazy and should have read the opinion; doing so now.
But 150(b) doesn’t grant DOT any powers; it’s just a general statement of “goals.” 150(c)(3) is the grant of powers, and it doesn’t say anything about climate change.
Those goals carry the force of law. I have a hard time seeing them as not touching on the scope of 'standards for States to use in developing and operating bridge and pavement management systems.'
But yeah, this stuff gets complicated and there's no doubt a larger national scheme on this that I'm not tracking.
And I want to be clear I don't think the court is flat unreasonable, I just at the moment am not convinced.
Just pass a law that says "promote the general welfare." Or "do good stuff."
One weird trick to get rid of separation of powers FAST! Federalists HATE him . . .
1. General welfare is not usually used for regulations, but for spending.
2. This here is a discussion of what the law *is* not what you think it ought to be. So yell about Supreme Court precedent on your own thread.
The law *is* that all legislative powers of the federal government are vested in Congress.
It's kind of a weird way to go about it. Highways and greenhouse gas reductions are kinda self-contradictory, unless maybe you're using them as part of a national public transport infrastructure. Maybe if they focused on that instead?
Combining contradictory goals is pretty necessary if you want to find an intelligent compromise between them.
E.g. highway performance and safety are contradictory too. You could build roads cheaper and move more traffic if you made them narrower and windier and skipped installing guardrails, and eliminated speed limits, at the cost of some more deaths. How do you trade off goals against one another if you don't contemplate them together?
Using the highways as part of a national public transport infrastructure would be the compromise.
"Rather than saying anything about how the Department of Transportation should act elsewhere, Judge Hendrix should have simply held that the DOT's regulation is unenforceable against Texas and allow DOT to determine whether it wants to acquiesce elsewhere."
Let me summarize, to understand my concern with this position. We have a federal agency in which a federal district court has ruled that has exceeded its authority under the law. Under this scheme, why would an agency not just keep suggesting this type of regulation and wait for the court process to complete and get what they want in the meantime? What is the downside?
"lacks the authority to force states to try and reduce"
"to try and.." is a bad habit in writing. When you find it, attempt to rewrite it.