The Volokh Conspiracy
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Judge O'Connor Rules that the Boeing 737 MAX Crashes Victims' Families Represent Protected "Crime Victims" and Can Seek Boeing's Prosecution
"In sum, but for Boeing’s criminal conspiracy to defraud the FAA, 346 people would not have lost their lives in the crashes."
Late Friday afternoon, Judge Reed O'Connor of the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Texas ruled that families whose relatives were killed in two Boeing 737 MAX crashes represented "crime victims" under the Crime Victims' Rights Act (CVRA). And because the Justice Department never conferred with the families before reaching the secret deferred prosecution deal with Boeing, the Department violated the CVRA. Judge O'Connor ordered further proceedings on the appropriate remedy for the Department's violations of law. As the lead attorney representing the families, I will argue that the appropriate remedy (among others) is to rescind the provision in Boeing's deal barring its prosecution for lying to the FAA--lies that, as the judge has ruled, killed 346 people.
While news reports have already flashed the headline about the judge's important ruling, many of the details and legal pleadings are difficult to find. This post summarizes the case, with links to important documents.
As I blogged about previously, this case arises from the Justice Department secretly negotiating a deferred prosecution agreement (DPA) with Boeing concerning its crimes connected to the two Boeing 737 MAX crashes. Both crashes were caused by a new part Boeing built into the 737 MAX--a software system called the Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System (MCAS). Tragically, in the two crashes, MCAS improperly activated and drove the planes down. On October 28, 2018, Lion Air Flight 610 crashed shortly after takeoff into the Java Sea, killing all 189 passengers and crew on board. A little more than four months later, on March 10, 2019, Ethiopian Airlines Flight 302 suffered the same fate, also crashing shortly after takeoff and killing all 157 passengers and crew.
After the two crashes, the Justice Department began investigating whether Boeing had lied to the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) about the new MCAS system. For the first six months of the investigation, Boeing frustrated the Department's efforts to uncover what happened. But ultimately, the Justice Department learned that Boeing test pilots had concealed from the FAA how MCAS operated. The reason for the deception was to secure less onerous training requirements for pilots transitioning to fly the MAX from other older 737 models. These less-rigorous training requirements enabled Boeing to earn millions of dollars when selling the plane; as a selling point, Boeing had promised its airline customers that additional flight simulator training would not be required for pilots already qualified to fly the 737 MAX's predecessors.
The Justice Department and Boeing began negotiating how to resolve the criminal charges. While those negotiations were going on, the families of those who died reached out to the Justice Department to be involved in the negotiations. The Justice Department's Victims' Rights Ombudsman told the families--falsely--that no criminal investigation was on-going.
Ultimately, the Justice Department and Boeing secretly reached a deal, under which Boeing would be charged with the crime of conspiring to lie to the FAA. Boeing admitted the allegations, but would not enter a guilty plea to the charge. Instead, prosecution of the crime would be deferred for three years. If Boeing complied with its obligations under the agreement, at the end of the three-year period, the charges would be dismissed. Boeing also agreed to pay $1.7 billion to its airline customers and $500 million to the crashes victims' families. It also agreed to pay a fine of $243 million.
The agreement was reached in secret negotiations between the Justice Department and Boeing. On January 7, 2021, the deal between Boeing and the Justice Department was filed with Judge O'Connor in the Northern District of Texas. It was swiftly criticized as being one of the worst plea agreements in history. Critics pointed out that the $1.7 billion payment to customers was something that Boeing was already contractually obligated to do; the amount was included in the DPA to inflate the apparent amount of the settlement. Moreover, the agreement contained an unprecedent provision in which the Justice Department stated (without explanation) that "the misconduct was neither pervasive across the organization, nor undertaken by a large number of employees, nor facilitated by senior mismanagement."
But in my view, the Boeing DPA's worst feature was that it was negotiated without participation by the victims' families. In the federal criminal justice system, the CVRA requires prosecutors to afford to crime victims the reasonable right to confer with them about a case and also timely notice of any deferred prosecution agreement. In a case involving the death of a crime victim, a surviving family member can step into a case to assert the rights of the person killed. The families should have been involved in negotiating such a far-reaching agreement. Instead, the families learned about the deal only through Twitter and Facebook reports.
In December 2021, I filed a motion alleging that the Justice Department violated its CVRA obligations to fifteen families whose family members were killed in the two crashes. I argued that because of that violation, the DPA was illegally concluded. I also filed a motion urging the district court to carefully scrutinize the proposed DPA and ensure that it held Boeing and its management accountable for their crimes. I also filed one last motion urging the district court to formally arraign Boeing and impose standard conditions of release on the company.
At this point, I contacted the Justice Department to see whether Attorney General Garland would support the victims' families. After a meeting with General Garland, however, the Justice Department filed a brief arguing that the families did not represent "crime victims" under the CVRA. In the Government's view, only the FAA was the victim of Boeing's conspiracy to conceal information about the MCAS. Boeing also responded, arguing that the district court was powerless to do anything about the deal that Boeing had reached with the Government.
In my reply brief, I worked through the requirements for "crime victim" status under the CVRA. The CVRA extends rights not only to those specifically named in the charging document but also to anyone "directly and proximately harmed" as the result of the crime. In this case, because Boeing's lies to the FAA led directly and proximately to the two crashes--and to the deaths of 346 passengers and crew members on board--the families represented crime victims under the CVRA. This assertion about the causal connection between Boeing's lies and the crashes was supported by a detailed proffer of facts that the families could prove at an evidentiary hearing.
I also filed a motion for disclosure of relevant information from the Justice Department's files that would support the families' position that they represented "crime victims." The motion argued that the families were entitled to such disclosure by analogy to the Brady disclosure rule that generally applies in criminal cases and by operation of the CVRA's provision requiring the Government to make its "best efforts" to see that the victims' rights are protected.
Several months later, the victims' families received valuable support from U.S. Senator Ted Cruz. In an amicus brief supporting the families, Senator Cruz explained his agreement that the families represented "crime victims":
Boeing engaged in criminal conduct that defrauded government regulators and left hundreds of people dead in preventable plane crashes. The government's professed handwringing about who is actually a "victim" here is belied by the entire settlement. This is not a mine-run fraud case where some low-level employee lied or committed a technical violation; it is a long-running conspiracy that directly led to some of the worst air travel disasters of the 21st century. The deferred prosecution agreement is therefore a landmark settlement and, among other things, requires Boeing to pay $500 million to those who lost family members in the two plane crashes, including the families that the Justice Department now argues aren't really victims at all. The government's position is simply nonsensical.
Senator Cruz also explained that he believed it was important for the district court to carefully scrutinize the provisions of the Boeing DPA to ensure that it complied with federal law, served the public interest, and protected the rights of crime victims.
Following an oral argument in Texas, in July 2022, Judge O'Connor ruled that the families could potentially prove "crime victim" status if they could establish the link between Boeing's conspiracy and the two crashes. Judge O'Connor explained that, with sufficient evidence, the families might be able to show that they were directly and proximately harmed by Boeing's conspiracy to defraud the FAA. Nothing in the families' contentions contradicted the DPA. Indeed, many of the families' contentions were supported by it. Judge O'Connor ordered an evidentiary hearing, at which the families could produce expert testimony in support of their position.
In August, I presented two expert witnesses to establish that, because of Boeing's lies, the two planes crashed. The transcripts from the two hearings can be found here and here. The testimony demonstrated "but for" causation between Boeing's conspiracy and the crashes--that is, "but for" Boeing's crime, the two planes would not have crashed. Specifically, the testimony established three links in a causal chain: (1) that if Boeing had not lied to the FAA, the FAA would have ordered full flight simulator training for American carriers on how pilots should respond to improper MCAS activation; (2) the FAA's flight simulator training requirements would have been followed by foreign carriers; and (3) flight simulator training would have permitted the pilots of the two doomed flights to have successfully landed the planes.
During the two evidentiary hearings, neither the Justice Department nor Boeing offered any contrary evidence to that from the families' experts.
Following the evidentiary hearing, I also filed a motion to supplement the record with new information that came from a September SEC filing against Boeing. The SEC filed a cease-and-desist order against Boeing (which Boeing did not contest) which contained an extensive factual recitation about how Boeing and its then-CEO Dennis Muilenburg mislead the general public (including investors in Boeing) about the safety of the 737 MAX aircraft in the time period after the Lion Air crash and before the Ethiopian airlines crash. The motion argued that this new information that Boeing's senior management knew (at least) two months before the Ethiopian Airlines crash about the inadequacy of its disclosures to the FAA demonstrated that the Government possessed significant information about Boeing's crimes that the Government had not disclosed to the families or to the district court.
On Friday, Judge O'Connor handed down his ruling that the crashes victims were crime victims. He explained that the families had proven both direct (that is, "but for") causation and proximate causation. Regarding but-for causation, the families had
established a direct chain of causation. Had Boeing not committed its crime, the FAA[] would have required … [flight simulator] training for operators of the 737 MAX and would have included information related to MCAS in relevant training materials. As a result, foreign regulators—including Indonesian and Ethiopian authorities—would have issued similar training certifications and instructional materials, having taken their [cue] from the world's leading authority on aviation standards, the FAA. And ultimately, foreign operators of the 737 MAX—including the pilots on Lion Air Flight 610 and Ethiopian Airlines Flight 302—would have received training adequate to respond to the MCAS activation that occurred on both aircrafts. In sum, but for Boeing's criminal conspiracy to defraud the FAA, 346 people would not have lost their lives in the crashes.
Regarding proximate causation, Judge O'Connor ruled that the crashes were a foreseeable consequence of lying to the FAA (citations to the record omitted):
[I]t is generally foreseeable that Boeing's deceiving the [FAA] which resulted in an improperly low level of differences training certification, would potentially cause a disaster. As noted above, reasonable laypeople could easily predict that inadequate pilot training might result in catastrophic airplane crashes, as it did here. And given the well-recognized global industry practice of foreign entities following the FAA's recommended guidance, it was generally foreseeable that Lion Air's and Ethiopian Airlines' pilots, would have been inadequately trained with respect to MCAS because of foreign regulators' reliance on the [FAA training requirements] certification and silence on MCAS in its [materials about training]. Not only was this outcome generally foreseeable, Boeing admitted as much [in an internal email]: "FAA is pretty powerful and most countries defer to what the FAA does[.]"
In light of these factual findings, Judge O'Connor granted the families' motion for findings that the Justice Department and Boeing negotiated the DPA in violation of the CVRA. As explained in the families' motion, the CVRA entitled the families the rights to: (1) reasonably confer with the Department about the DPA; (2) receive timely notice of the DPA before it was finalized; and (3) be treated with fairness during the process. As also explained in the motion, the Justice Department not only made no effort to confer with the families, it actually deceived them by falsely stating that the FBI was not conducting a criminal investigation into the two crashes.
In light of these rulings, Judge O'Connor concluded that he did not need to reach the families' motion for disclosure of information from the Government and to supplement the record with the SEC cease-and-desist order.
Judge O'Connor concluded his opinion by directing the families, the Justice Department, and Boeing to file a statement about further briefing on remedies by this Friday, October 28. In my earlier briefing on remedies, I requested (at least) the following actions from the court:
• As a remedy for Boeing's illegal behavior and the illegal agreement, an order directing the Government to meet and confer with the victims' families about its evidence against Boeing and its decision to grant Boeing immunity from further criminal prosecution;
• An order directing the Government to provide to the victims' families its documents and related evidence of Boeing's crimes;
• Exercising the Court's supervisory powers over the DPA;
• Requiring that Boeing appear for a public arraignment and that the victims be heard
concerning appropriate conditions of release during the term of the DPA;
• An order that the DPA's "immunity" provision be excised, permitting the victim families to exercise their CVRA right to confer with prosecutors about pursuing further criminal
prosecution of Boeing;
• An order that the victim families be permitted to confer with prosecutors about other ways to hold Boeing accountable for its crimes beyond the provisions in the existing DPA;
and
• A referral of the Government's illegal behavior in reaching the DPA to appropriate investigative authorities, including the House and Senate Committees with authority over the issue and the Department of Justice's Office of Professional Responsibility.
This case is important not only for the families of the Boeing 737 MAX crashes but also, more broadly, for the crime victims' rights movement. If successful, the families' challenge here will make clear that the Justice Department cannot ignore the CVRA's requirements to involve victims in negotiating plea arrangement and that, if the Department does ignore victims, appropriate remedies are available to enforce the CVRA.
Update: A few typos corrected from original post.
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Seems a fair and balanced analysis of the case and the ruling.
The docket and most of the interesting documents are on courtlistener: https://www.courtlistener.com/docket/29089563/united-states-v-the-boeing-company/
1. Congrats on the results (so far).
2. I know essentially nothing about this case, so my layperson's initial response (back when news of the settlement hit the mainstream media) was surprise and dismay at the secretive nature of the negotiations that had just taken place.
3. I am surprised at some of the procedural aspects of your clients' case. If I were designing the procedural steps, I would have formal stages, and any potential victims would have to step forward by these stages, "announce" themselves, and either be given almost immediate status (zero dispute that a rape accuser or burglary victim, etc, would get this status), or would be given a formal hearing on the matter. After the hearing, presumably, the judge would rule in one of three ways: "You get victim status." Or, "You do not qualify for victim status." Or, "You have not yet presented sufficient evidence to qualify. Therefore, denied for now. But you may resubmit this application if, during discovery or trial, you or this court finds additional evidence."
I don't like the idea of secret negotiations, although I admit that I see situations where they are helpful. But I think it's not terribly fair to allow for such negotiations under the theory of, "You have to include victims in this process. But we're not going to give each side a definitive list of who these victims are or are not, so any negotiated settlement might be vacated or vitiated by the court, after-the-fact, due to a lack of input from any victims who are later successfully qualified under this status."
Doesn't seem to be a legally-efficient way to run a railroad.
[p.s. Re the inclusion of Sen. Cruz's statement: "This is not a mine-run fraud case..." What does this mean, in English? I've never heard this expression in my 30-year legal career. A common term of art? A Texas term of art? Context tells me that it's likely something vaguely equivalent to "...a run-of-the-mill fraud case..." Yes? ]
Bruce Selya of the First Circuit Court of Appeals, known for his eccentric choice of vocabulary, likes "mine-run".
I took that "mine-run" phrase to refer to coal mines, for instance, somewhat notorious for careless workers to ignite built-up gases.
I followed the initial crashes and the mounting revelations about liars and their fraud, but did not know about the victims' rights angle. Good to know a little more justice is coming their way, although I wonder what the practical consequences might be. A little more money, a few liars in jail. I am surprised at including test pilots among the liars, unless it is chief pilots who have graduated to administration roles.
It wouldn't bother me much if Boeing went bankrupt from increased damages. New investors would buy the pieces and carry on pretty much undisturbed, old investors would lose their shirts and spark new lawsuits against old management, and a few rich liars would have to sell a few toys and take early and poorer retirement.
Also, as a technical addendum, I believe the changes were to newer bigger more efficient engines. The increased size meant the pylons had to be raised and angled upwards for ground clearance, which changed the flight characteristics and in turn required changes to the autopilots. It was these changed flight characteristics which Boeing denied, claiming pilots could transition with minimal retraining.
Or something like that. Been a while since I read of the initial lies.
That's part of it but the real problem was that MCAS was a fundamental departure from every single plane designed by Boeing previously.
OK, a little backstory. The primary difference between Boeing and Airbus is the role played by the computers in the handling of the aircraft. Whenever a control input is made by a pilot that conflicts with what the automated navigation expects in an Airbus the computer wins, unless it is overridden. Traditionally Boeing planes were the exact opposite' the pilot wins and an alarm is triggered.
Boeing's philosophy was always "The pilot knows best". MCAS, on the 737 MAX changed that to the Airbus approach, so a radical or unexpected control input gets countermanded.
In both incidents pilots on takeoff experienced wake turbulence and wind shear. Since they were so close still to the ground split second decisions and reactions based on their experience with previous 737 models resulted in the MCAS essentially intervening and flying the plane into the ground while the pilots struggled with what they believed were unresponsive or malfunctioning controls.
In both cases I'm sure they died thinking they had a catastrophic failure on their hands when in reality the plane was doing exactly what it was designed to do; they just had insufficient training to realize that and know what to do.
It would be akin to spending your life driving a Chevy Sprint, and be suddenly put behind the wheel of a new Corvette and being told "You got this, it's just a Chevy after all" and then plowing yourself into a tree on the next bend because you didn't know or understand the handling and power characteristics and differences.
I don't know where you're getting your information, but it's almost completely wrong. There is nothing in the crash reports for either of the accident aircraft about wake turbulence or wind shear. Wake turbulence is turbulence generated by the wingtip vortices of preceding aircraft, and pilots are trained to avoid it via flight path and departure time modifications. Wind shear is a phenomenon usually associated with convective activity, which was not mentioned in either of the crash reports.
http://knkt.dephub.go.id/knkt/ntsc_aviation/baru/2018%20-%20035%20-%20PK-LQP%20Final%20Report.pdf
https://www.faa.gov/foia/electronic_reading_room/boeing_reading_room/media/737_RTS_Summary.pdf
Further, Boeing's implementation of MCAS was flawed precisely because it left too much up to the pilots. An MCAS malfunction presents exactly like a stabilizer trim runaway, and Boeing expected the pilots to recognize it as such and react appropriately. The appropriate crew reaction is to remove power from the stab-trim motor using the CUTOUT switch, which prevents MCAS from moving the stabilizer, and trim the aircraft using the manual system. In fact, the crew that flew the Lion Air 610 aircraft prior to the crash flight experienced the same MCAS malfunction as the accident crew. On that flight the pilots responded as Boeing expected (they cut power to the stabilizer trim motor and trimmed the aircraft manually), and the aircraft landed safely.
The problem isn't MCAS--it's actually a decent engineering solution. The problem was twofold: 1) Boeing designed MCAS to rely on a single sensor, the failure of which resulted in unintended activation of the system, and 2) Boeing lied to everyone—including and most egregiously the pilots—about it. If airlines flying the MAX had been aware of the system and its possible failure modes then pilots could have been alerted to the need for review of and added training emphasis on recognizing stabilizer runaway and appropriate procedures to prevent loss of aircraft control.
This may be the most helpful comment I've read on this blog in the last 6 months.
Yes, it's essentially a synonym for ordinary or everyday - I assume the metaphor is "as ordinary as something you'd pull out of the ground" or something along those lines. It seems as conventional as run of the mill to me; it's certainly not a Texas-ism.
On your last point, it seems that a couple of decades ago the Supreme Court fecided among themselves that “run of the mill” was obsolete and started substituting “run of the mine.” We no longer have water-powered mills with runs, but we we still have water-carried mine tailings, so they must have thought it would be more current. Although I don’t think “mill run” was ever used, somehow “mine run” crept in as a shortened form.
Interesring. Another web site says run (as in product) of the mill referred to new mechanical mass production, and was applied to weaving mills first. While that kind of makes sense given it's meaning, switching to run of the mine doesn't.
Interesting. I had always interpreted based on what the dictionary still gives as the first meaning, mill race, with the implication of ever-present. The running stream of water is a constant background whether a watermill is grinding grain or not. But run of the mill as in factory implies mass-produced and common as distinct from couture, bespoke, or a special case.
There were two levels of the 737MAX aircraft. Both of the aircraft that crashed were the lower level type. The Ethiopian crash was believed to have been caused by a bird strike to the Angle of Attack sensor, resulting in the destruction of the sensor. This fed incorrect data to the MCAS system. The pilots didn't know how to turn off the system, leading to the crash.
I agree with Boeing being held accountable because they knowingly withheld information to the FAA. I'm not too sure about them being responsible for the deaths of the victims of the crashes. Both aircraft were operated by airlines outside of the US in countries that have their own aviation regulations. Looks to me like some lawyers trying to score a big liability payday.
This does not look like the usual money-grubbing parasites at work to me. The plea deal would have set aside money for victims without (as far as I can tell) limiting recovery to the setaside. The request here is to revoke the plea agreement as it was negotiated illegally. It is possible that principles are at work rather than greed.
Whats' the point? DOJ has a meeting and then makes a few cosmetic changes to the agreement? The court cannot make DOJ prosecute
Its a waste of time, only useful to enrich a former federal judge with an odd niche.
Hi Bob - One point of clarification: I am handling this case pro bono, because of the important crime victims' rights issues involved. As for whether it is a waste of time, others can judge. But I believe this case will lead (among other things) to federal prosecutors around the country involving crime victims (and in homicide cases, their families) more substantially in negotiating plea arrangements.
Hello Paul - thanks for engaging in the comments. As a pastor in a church that is opposed to the death penalty, and as someone who has a good friend whose father was a murder victim and is a supporter of anti-death penalty organizations, I often wonder about the role of families or victims in various cases. In the case of my friend's father (Bill Bosler) the family actively worked against the death penalty and one of Bill's daughters was threatened with jail if she testified during the victim impact part of things about how she had become an anti-death penalty activist as a result of the murder (and her own serious injuries during the crime.) To what extent should punishment for a crime depend on the political or religious views of the victim or their family members?
Hi Wolfefan - a complicated question. My general view on the topic is that victims and their family members should have input on what is appropriate punishment with prosecutors and courts - and that their views should be considered, along with other factors, in concluding the case. I know that is vague answer - but my focus is more on process than outcome.
Hi Paul - I appreciate your response, and once again, thanks for your participation in the thread. Conspirators used to do a lot more of it, and the blog was the better for it. Process is also a concern for me, particularly before a finding of guilt. It seems as if the participation of victims at an early stage requires an assumption that law enforcement has in fact identified the criminal, which isn't a particularly safe assumption. Even at the point where plea deals are being considered, many folks plead guilty to something not because they necessarily are guilty, but because they need or want to get back to their families, jobs, etc. It's a difficult area, and I don't know of a whole lot of people working in it. Thanks for what you do.
"and one of Bill’s daughters was threatened with jail if she testified during the victim impact part of things about how she had become an anti-death penalty activist as a result of the murder"
I'd love to hear more about this - how can someone face prosecution for testifying in court?
According to this article, she was threatened with contempt for attempting to circumvent the court's order limiting the subject matter of her testimony.
https://www.gainesville.com/story/news/2014/10/26/saving-the-life-of-your-dads-killer/31872896007/
That was my memory of things -thanks for finding the article! SueZann bought a Bible for Campbell and was hoping to be able to present it in person to him. The last time I was in touch with her or her family, which has been a few years, he was not yet willing to receive a visit from her. I don't know what the status is now.
So a pro death penalty person, which is to say pro death for the murderer, wants to murder someone. Nice.
Ouch, Bob.
If he's not getting paid, then the suit serves no purpose at all.
The whole statute is pure virtual signaling, in the long run families are worse off not letting go and moving on.
" If he’s not getting paid, then the suit serves no purpose at all. "
A lawyer unfamiliar with pro bono practice?
John,
Once the plea agreement became suspect and set aside, it opened the door for Civil Lawsuits against Boeing. That's why I made the statement about a "liability payday".
Your take is somewhat similar to the analysis that I received from an active 737 pilot and former f15 pilot. According to his analysis, the crashes were caused by a combination of the software, but more so lack of skill training and pilot error. His main point was that the crashes were not solely due to the software or the change in aerodymics of the 737max.
the cause of most plane crashes arent fully determined for several months to a few years. The software error/change in the 737 aerodynamics was determined as the cause of the crashes very early in the investigation, much earlier than most crash investigations. point being is likely much more complicated cause.
I am going to revise/ amend my comment somewhat - currentisguy as better explanation above
Some of you might find this interesting.
https://www.ntsb.gov/investigations/AccidentReports/Reports/ASR1901.pdf
"Boeing appear for a public arraignment"
Some poor VP gets to get harangued over something he or she had nothing to do with
"appropriate conditions of release"
Ankle monitor on every plane made?
As to "appropriate conditions of release" - my brief on the arraignment issue, linked in the post, covers this in some detail. But one of the key conditions of release that is missing right now is a standard order, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. sec. 3142(c)(1)(A) that Boeing not commit in additional crimes during the pendency of the deferred prosecution agreement. This no-new-crimes provision is important, because it permits additional criminal prosecution under 18 U.S.C. 3147 should Boeing commit any additional crimes during the DPA's pendency .
Paul, for those of us who do not do crim law; can you explain more about this?
If, say, a rapist, or counterfeiter, or drug dealer is released before trial, and she commits more crimes during this pendency, of course she can be, separately, prosecuted for those additional crimes. Yes?
If so, then what is the advantage of having this "Hey, you're agreeing to not commit more crimes during this release period!" provision? I guess that it would allow this one prosecution to tack on more crimes, as opposed to forcing a govt to do a separate prosecution. But are there other advantages or reasons to place importance on its inclusion? My (criminally-) inexperienced mind is not seeing them yet.
Two points on the additional crimes: (1) Yes, the additional crime can be pursued separately. But it is also a violation of the conditions of release, which means additional punishment can be imposed for that fact. (2) It is often easier to pursue an additional crime as a violation of a condition of release rather than as an entirely separate case.
In any event, Boeing as contrived to avoid standard conditions of release that are imposed on other federal defendants - and this is simply wrong.
The statute Prof. Cassell is referencing, 18 U.S.C. § 3147, imposes an additional penalty for a new crime committed while on release, in addition to the penalty that would be authorized by the conviction for the new crime alone.
Violating the conditions of release does not require proof beyond a reasonable doubt. It's a way to throw people in jail without having to actually go through the trouble of prosecuting them.
Section 3147 does indeed require a conviction for the second offense.
The notion is dismaying that the FAA—probably the most industry-captured regulatory body in the nation—is also the world's most respected authority on aviation regulation.
You could say much the same about the FDA.
Although why you are dismayed is rather curious. What part of ants always find the sugar did you not learn growing up?
The part about how that capacity among ants makes them especially trusted, and relied upon world-wide?
And no, you cannot begin to say the same about the FDA. If you think that, learn more about the FAA.
How this dispute came to be adjudicated in this part of Texas might be an interesting tale.
How this dispute came to be adjudicated in this part of Texas might be an interesting tale.
Is this procedure better than, worse than, or equivalent to the Texas Two-Step (the "divisive merger" method that relies on Texas law and is currently being attempted by Johnson & Johnson with respect to talc liability).
Seems like besides Boeing and the FAA the DOJ (which is wandering farther and farther from justice) deserves a big slap down in this affair. Isn't this the same type of thing that happened in the Jeffery Epstein plea deal from a decade or so ago?
Yup. To the layman, Boeing seems to have been unusually lucky in finding the DoJ in such a friendly and sympathetic mood.
There's plain lucky, very lucky, wowee lucky. And then there's Hillary's cattle futures lucky.
I'm sure this is completely irrelevant, but isn't Boeing a major federal contractor?
So, the federal judge decides that the federal agency that is specifically charged with preventing this sort of disaster has no culpability.
The way things go, the FAA will likely try to get more staff and budget from this.
Leviathans ice-cream cone licks itself.
The FAA is less interested in budget and staff than you suppose. If those could be used to serve any public interest (such as environmental concerns among airport neighbors, or safety adjustments which airlines might find irksome), the FAA would likely oppose them. It is always keen to increase airport capacity, however, so budget and staff for that purpose it welcomes.
The FAA has conflicting missions. One is to regulate aviation and the second is to promote it. Sometimes those missions conflict each other.
If there were justice, Dennis Muilenburg would be sharing a prison cell for a very long time with that corporate murderer Don Blankenship.
There are some highlevel folks at Boeing who should be in jail for a very long time.
I don't like the idea of corporations being charged with crimes. "Boeing" didn't lie to the FAA. Specific people working for Boeing did. Those specific people should be charged. If other people higher up in the company told those people to lie, those other people should also be charged.
I don't think crime victims should have the right to be involved with the prosecution. I do think they should be notified if the criminal is released - however, that's in the context of an actual person being incarcerated, not a corporation. It's not like Boeing is suddenly walking the streets and they weren't before.
I do not think you can make that assumption. It's one thing to say the FAA would have made a regulation; it's quite another to say a foreign government would then have made and enforced a similar regulation. A foreign government is sovereign and can do as it pleases regardless of what the FAA does. Going from lie -> FAA regulation -> foreign government regulation -> training -> accident is just one step too many for me.
Many countries have bilateral agreements with the US (like this one with Indonesia) that oblige them to trust FAA certification. It is in the interests of US-based manufacturers that they don't have to jump through those hoops in every country where they want to sell their products.
I don’t like the idea of corporations being charged with crimes.
Agree that tends to keep corporations out of the legal line of fire, and protects assets which might otherwise go to pay fines or court-ordered compensation to crime victims. Got any other reasons?
Thank you for this interesting post and, especially, its linked source materials.
Due process sometimes quite properly gets in the way of creative attempts to use issue preclusion very broadly. This struck me as one such, at first glance. So I began reading this very skeptically indeed, precisely because of concerns about how proximate a cause could be proved on behalf of the families and their injuries, and how common those causes were in all of the individual air crashes. I'm not sure if I'm in full agreement with you yet, but you've certainly gotten my attention, gained traction, and offered up a persuasive and concise summary of your work here. I may dip further into your briefing and hearing transcripts if time permits.
Paul - thanks for the exhaustive and interesting post.
Question for you: what became of Southwest’s role in the MAX/MCAS debacle? Southwest’s MAX deal is briefly mentioned in the linked proffer of facts as a strong incentive for Boeing to ensure training compatibility between MAX and NG models, but if I recall correctly, there was allegedly more robust coordination between Boeing and Southwest in how MCAS passed certification scrutiny, and as I always heard it, Boeing does very little to the 737 without consulting Southwest, the primary 737 customer and a major reason why the type has thrived for so many decades. Is Southwest in any kind of legal jeopardy related to the MAX, to your knowledge?
Technically Southwest has a claim against Boeing. If it is determined that Boeing falsified information to the FAA to obtain certification of the aircraft and if those crashes can be proven to have been preventable if Boeing had provided the correct information then Southwest can probably sue Boeing. The 737 MAX aircraft were grounded for over a year. Southwest was operating several of those planes and lost the use of them during the grounding.
Bravo!