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Biden Supreme Court Commission Issues Final Report
The report doesn't endorse court-packing or term limits. But it's generally more favorable to the latter than the former. It also provides valuable overview of a wide range of SCOTUS-related issues.

Earlier today, President Biden's Commission on the Supreme Court voted to approve its final report. Like the preliminary "discussion materials" issued in September (which I wrote about here), the Report does not endorse either court-packing or term limits for Supreme Court justices, but is generally more favorable to the latter than the former. Indeed, the Commission stops short of actually endorsing any reform proposals at all, with the possible exception of continuing the pandemic-era practice of providing public access to live audio of Supreme Court oral arguments.
Relative to the discussion materials, the final Report is somewhat less negative about court-packing. Chapter 2 provides a detailed overview of the arguments for and against "court expansion" (including a few that advocate increasing the size of the Court for reasons other than changing its ideological composition) and notes that "there is profound disagreement among Commissioners on these issues."
I think the Commission's summary of the case against court-packing (pp. 79-84) includes much stronger arguments than its overview of the case for it (pp. 74-79). But then again, I myself am a longtime opponent of the idea. Readers can judge the arguments in the report for themselves.
The report does reject arguments that court-packing is unconstitutional, such as that advanced in co-blogger Randy Barnett's testimony before the Commission (see also Joshua Braver's response to Randy here). The Commission's conclusion on this point reflects the dominant view among legal scholars, though Randy and Michael Rappaport have offered serious arguments on the other side. I wish they were right, but so far remain unpersuaded.
On term limits, the Report also provides a balanced overview of the case for and against. But like the preliminary discussion materials, it emphasizes the widespread support for this idea, contrasting it with the highly divisive nature of court-packing:
Among the proposals for reforming the Supreme Court, non-renewable limited terms—or "term limits"—for Supreme Court Justices have enjoyed considerable, bipartisan support. Advocacy groups, nonprofits, and membership organizations have expressed their support for term limits. In testimony before the Commission, a bipartisan group of experienced Supreme Court practitioners concluded that an eighteen-year non-renewable term "warrants serious consideration." Major think tanks and their leaders have also endorsed the concept, as have both liberal and conservative constitutional scholars. When the National Constitution Center organized separate groups of "conservative" scholars and "progressive" scholars to draft their own proposals for improving the Constitution, both groups concluded that Supreme Court Justices should be limited to eighteen-year terms. Yet other scholars and commentators have questioned the idea of altering the system of life tenure, which has been in place since the Constitution established the Supreme Court and the judicial power. [notes omitted].
The Report goes over a wide range of practical difficulties involved in designing a system of term limits, particularly the problem of how to transition from the status quo to the new system. Although I support term limits, I agree these are issues proponents have to deal with. The Report also points out that members of the Commission are divided over the issue of whether term limits require a constitutional amendment, or can be enacted by statute alone. In my view, a constitutional amendment is indeed necessary, and ending life tenure by statute would set a very dangerous precedent.
The Report goes over a wide range of other possible reforms to the Supreme Court, including jurisdiction-stripping, reforms to the "shadow docket," the possibility of creating a code of ethics for the Court, and much else. On all the issues it covers, the Report offers a helpful and detailed overview of a variety of reform proposals, and critiques thereof. It will be a great resource for scholars, legal commentators, and others interested in these issues!
What the Report will not do is generate any significant political momentum for major reform. Most obviously, the Commission's unwillingness to endorse court-packing puts paid to the idea that it was ever going to provide a boost to such plans. That's exactly what I and others predicted based on the Commission's composition (which included many court-packing skeptics).
I had hoped the Commission might instead provide a boost for term limits. But that, too, seems unlikely to happen. Although the Report is relatively favorable to the idea, it doesn't seem to have much momentum right now. Most notably, President Biden recently reiterated his opposition to the proposal.
I think both term limits and court-packing will remain a part of mainstream political debate for some time to come. But neither looks likely to get far in the near future.
Even if the Commission Report has little political impact, it's possible that the Supreme Court's declining popularity will give a boost to court-packing or other reforms. I assessed that possibility in October, and tentatively concluded it was unlikely to lead to court-packing anytime soon. I think the points I made remain valid, particularly 1) Biden and congressional Democrats clearly have other fish they prefer to fry instead, 2) there is no pro-packing majority in the current Congress, 3) the Court's unpopularity is at least partly offset by Biden's own, and 4) the Court's public standing might well bounce back, as has happened several times before in the last two decades.
Will things change if the Court overrules Roe v. Wade next year (as could well happen)? That's a topic I hope to take up in another post, when time permits. For now, I will conclude by emphasizing that Biden's Commission has produced a Report that is a valuable resource - but not one likely to galvanize action.
That outcome might even be what Biden had in mind all along. As I noted when Biden first broached the idea of a Supreme Court commission in October 2020, "[e]stablishing a commission is the kind of thing presidents tend to do when they do not want to prioritize a given issue." So far at least, Supreme Court reform has been noticeable by its absence from the President's list of priorities.
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I could support a constitutional amendment for term limits, if there is a lag of at least 4 years to allow the voters to weigh in on who they want to pick the justices. And the justices terms would initially have there terms expire in order of most senior first. That would be Thomas 1991-2026 35yrs, Breyer 1994-2028 34yrs, Roberts 2005-2030 25yrs, Alito 2006-2032 26 years, Sotomayor 2009-2034 25 years, Kagen 2010 2036 26 years, Goresuch 2017-2038 21 years, Kavenaugh 2018-2040 22 years, and Barrett 2020-2042 22 years.
I don’t really see a pattern in the expirations that would give either party a big disadvantage even though 3 of the first 4 term limited over the first 8 years are from GOP presidents, unless they lost a lot of elections in a row, and that seems to a fair consequence.
And it would probably be necessary either to have the Chief Justice either rotate with seniority, or have the President nominate a Chief Justice retires, either from the incumbent justices, or with the vacancy.
My own position is that term limits, or perhaps just an upper age limit, would be a desirable fix. Not to create regular opportunities for appointment, but just to deal with Justices whose bodies are kept running by modern medicine even as their minds fail to be adequate for the job anymore. But I suppose term limits would produce less gaming of nominee ages.
However, this does require an amendment, given that judges and justices have life tenure. I don't think that's consistent with forcing them to take senior status, it is life tenure as a working judge, not just as somebody who gets paid.
Such an amendment should kick in far enough out, 8-12 years, that nobody would now know the political impact. Or perhaps kick in for each seat as it is vacated by reason of retirement or death, so that each justice can continue to serve on the terms they were seated under.
Contra Kazinski, I'd pick the seat order of application randomly, by a bingo cage, if not by when existing justices retire, to deny anybody advance knowledge of the political impact. But his idea of having the Chief Justice be whoever has the most seniority is good.
An upper age limit just exacerbates the current malincentive to pick younger and younger nominees. Term limits make a lot more sense. If your appointments get 18 years no matter what (assuming Hillary Clinton doesn't smother them with a MyPillow, I mean), then there's less opportunity and less incentive to game the system, and it reduces the stakes of the nomination.
I did acknowledge that was a possibility, and argues in favor of strict rotation.
Not so sure about the every two year thing; Barring bad luck, this would result in the Court flipping every time a particular party got two Presidential terms in a row. That would be a bit of instability.
Though I suppose it would lower the motivation for Court packing, because you could effectively pack the Court just by getting 3 terms in a row.
I find it amusing that we're even entertaining the idea that this country could come together to pass a *constitutional amendment* with a straight face.
Term limits aren't happening, folks.
I could actually see them happening if the amendment were prospective enough.
I.e., nobody's going to give up their power currently, but, say, 16 years down the line? Sure, I could see it.
Conservatives prepare new push for constitutional convention
"SAN DIEGO — Conservative lawmakers will mount a new push to call a constitutional convention aimed at creating a balanced budget amendment and establishing term limits for members of Congress in an effort to rein in what they see as a runaway federal government.
State legislators meeting at the American Legislative Exchange Council’s policy conference here last week hope to use Article V of the Constitution, which allows state legislatures to call a convention to propose new amendments.
“It’s really the last line of defense that we have. Right now, the federal government’s run away. They’re not going to pull their own power back. They’re not going to restrict themselves. And so this Article V convention is really, in my opinion, is the last option that we have,” said Iowa state Rep. John Wills (R), the state’s House Speaker pro tempore who backs the convention."
Admittedly, I haven't read the entire report, but as I understand the term limit proposal from another article, the idea is to let each President, during his or her term (not sure if it's each term), nominate two justices.
I'm at something of a loss as to how this improves on the quality of the law; indeed, it seems more likely that it will turn the Supreme Court into Congress or at least a super-Circuit Court. While I haven't crunched the numbers, a quick scan of last term's decision reveal a number of unanimous (or near-unanimous) decisions vacating or reversing the lower courts. Therefore, it would seem there is "something" to having long -- and perhaps --unlimited terms on the Court . How do term limits improve the Court other than supposedly to placate those who, frankly, don't really seem to view the Court's job as applying the rule of law?
Unintended Consequences...
Let's suppose that two conservative justices are term-limited next year and that their replacements will be chosen by a liberal President and confirmed by a liberally controlled senate. Now suppose further that a controversial case (Think Roe) is ripe for consideration in the current term but it is being blocked until next year when the Court's make up changes... Couldn't happen? Really?
That's an excellent point. We could see lots of lower courts gaming the release of their decisions, lots of lawyers gaming when they file cases, and even legislatures timing their bills.
All of that already happens... there's legislature on the books that will become active the second Roe is overturned...
Even if the Commission Report has little political impact, it's possible that the Supreme Court's declining popularity will give a boost to court-packing or other reforms.
"Reforms" needs scare quotes, even if Prof. Somin is too polite to use them.
Not to mention, what is the problem with the Supreme Court's "declining popularity"--if that indeed is true. The law generally isn't popular, especially if you're on the receiving end (if you will) of it. Congress could make the Court a lot more popular by doing a legislature's job.
The thing is, the Court's 'declining popularity' isn't a cause for court packing, this kind of gets the causality backwards.
The left wants to pack the Court, it being popular gets in the way of this, so they set out to tear down it's reputation to make packing politically feasible.
Arthur? Arthur? Rev Kirkland...Where are you? 🙂
Oh well, so much for what Blackman said about it. Who would've thought he'd be so wrong. Certainly not me!
I think a lot of the issues can be addressed by modifying the Court's jurisdiction, which can be done by Congress.
I think we ought to refer to "good behavior tenure," not "life tenure." A judge can serve for life *if* (s)he doesn't do stuff like take bribes, get too close to a crooked financier, evade taxes, harass a subordinate and lie about it, etc., etc.
Well, sure, but that is just to say that judges aren't rendered immune to impeachment by that guarantee. It doesn't open a door for some alternate route of removal.
Term limits won't be seriously considered. No sitting Congress critter is going to risk having the people say that if it's good enough for the Court it's good enough for Congress.
Ilya Somin got this exactly right: "[e]stablishing a commission is the kind of thing presidents tend to do when they do not want to prioritize a given issue." I think Biden anticipated that the commission would give him a way to avoid taking any action on this.