The Volokh Conspiracy

Mostly law professors | Sometimes contrarian | Often libertarian | Always independent | Est. 2002

The Volokh Conspiracy

Criminal Law

"Reckless, to Be Sure. Stupid." "But Mere Reckless Stupidity Does Not a Malicious Federal Arsonist Make"

A court sets aside a federal arson conviction (which would have carried a "mandatory minimum sentence" of "seven years") for a fan's throwing flares at a soccer stadium and causing minor damage and a minor injury.

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From today's decision by Judge Roy Dalton (M.D. Fla.) in U.S. v. Ramirez Reyes:

In this arson case brought under 18 U.S.C. § 844(i), Ramirez was charged with maliciously damaging Inter&Co Stadium by throwing two flares during an Orlando City soccer match. The flares landed in the "Supporters Terrace" section of the stadium, where they burned for sixty seconds before going out. The flares caused discoloration of the aluminum bleachers and minor deterioration of the concrete floor. A four-year-old girl, E.Z., also sustained a superficial burn when one of the flares burned a hole in her jacket; medics at the stadium gave her an ice pack, and she recovered after applying burn gel at home for a few days.

No emergency response was requested, the match was not paused, and no one evacuated the stadium. After throwing the flares, Ramirez removed his hat and jacket, went back to his seat, and put the hat and jacket back on before exiting the stadium.

At trial, Ramirez moved for a judgment of acquittal ("JOA"), which the Court denied, and the jury then found Ramirez guilty of damaging the stadium and injuring E.Z. Ramirez now renews his JOA motion, seeks a new trial, and objects to the mandatory minimum sentence—seven years—as cruel and unusual under the Eighth Amendment. The Government opposes. The Court concludes that the Government's evidence was insufficient to prove that Ramirez had the requisite malicious intent….

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Drug Policy

No Preliminary Injunction Over Residents' Claim That S.F. Failed to Adequately Police Tenderloin Sidewalks

"[P]laintiffs have failed to respond to the City's evidence that changes in its policies have actually improved conditions in the Tenderloin such that Plaintiffs are no longer at risk of the harms they cited in their motion."

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From today's decision by Judge Jon Tigar (N.D. Cal.) in Roe v. City of S.F.:

Plaintiffs are residents and businesses that live and operate in the Tenderloin neighborhood in San Francisco. {Plaintiffs seek to enjoin the City from "directly or indirectly supplying fentanyl or methamphetamine-related drug paraphernalia to any individuals, groups, organization, or entities within the Tenderloin neighborhood and … from allowing City-funded contractors to furnish such paraphernalia to any individuals, groups, organizations, or entities in the Tenderloin." Plaintiffs contend that the City's "affirmative conduct" regarding harm reduction and housing attract drug addicts to the Tenderloin and that "violent, gang-affiliated drug dealers also converged on the neighborhood." Plaintiffs rest their request for preliminary injunction on their claims for private nuisance and public nuisance.} … Plaintiffs [also] allege claims for: (1) violation of the ADA; (2) violation of the Rehabilitation Act; (3) violation of California's Disabled Persons Act ("DPA"); … and [4] state-created danger under the Due Process Clause ….

The City argues that Plaintiffs have failed to establish standing because they have not shown that (1) the City's paraphernalia policies have increased drug use or other social ills in the Tenderloin or (2) that cessation of those policies would lead to a decrease. They also argue that the City has taken numerous "concrete steps" to abate drug use and maintain positive conditions in the Tenderloin since this case was filed. They note that Plaintiffs have failed to respond to the City's evidence that changes in its policies have actually improved conditions in the Tenderloin such that Plaintiffs are no longer at risk of the harms they cited in their motion. [City Filing] at 18 ("Photos of the area outside Plaintiffs' homes and businesses confirm the conditions alleged have abated to the extent they ever existed."). The City submit photographic evidence of these improvements, as well as testimony from some Plaintiffs conceding that conditions have improved such that they are no longer at risk of injury.

Thus, the City argues, Plaintiffs now base their request for injunction only on the theoretical possibility of future injury, which is insufficient. The City adds that "speculative fears" of future injuries are specifically not cognizable injuries for the purposes of private nuisance actions. The City also argues that Plaintiffs fail to establish the redressability element of standing as they cannot prove that enjoining the city from distributing drug-related supplies in the Tenderloin would resolve the drug usage, homelessness, and crime issues. Finally, the City argues that enjoining its policies could actually worsen conditions in the Tenderloin by forcing addicts to use shared or unsafe drug paraphernalia.

These arguments are both unrebutted and persuasive.

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Politics

Maryland Lawyer/Ex-Legislator Again Rebuffed in Attempt to Seal Alleged Libel

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From Bennett v. Brown, decided Friday by Judge Ellen Lipton Hollander (D. Md.):

The Bennetts, a married couple, own United, a federally licensed firearm business. The case is rooted in a civil enforcement action filed by defendants in the Circuit Court for Montgomery County, Maryland against plaintiffs and two other gun shops, accusing them of facilitating illegal firearm trafficking. See State v. Engage Armament LLC, C-15-CV-24-4781 ("Engage Case"). The allegations concerned, inter alia, plaintiffs' business transactions between 2020 and 2024 with an individual later convicted in federal court for "engaging in the business of dealing firearms without a license." On February 14, 2025, the Circuit Court for Montgomery County dismissed the Engage Case, with prejudice. {Defendants have appealed the dismissal, which is pending.} This suit followed on August 30, 2025….

In the proverbial "kitchen sink" approach, the Amended Complaint (ECF 35) contains nine counts. {The Amended Complaint is a quintessential example of shotgun pleading. Indeed, it seems as if counsel rifled through a hornbook and selected every conceivable claim. Such pleadings impose undue burdens on litigants and the judiciary.} Plaintiffs assert two claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983: "Malicious Investigation and Litigation," in violation of plaintiffs' rights under the Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution (Count I), and "Conspiracy To Deny Constitutional Rights," in violation of the Second, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution (Count II). Count III asserts a claim of Defamation, based in part on the Press Release. Count IV alleges "Interference with Second Amendment Firearm Rights in Violation of PLCAA," i.e., the Protection of Lawful Commerce in Arms Act …. Count V is titled "Interference with Business Right and Contract." Count VI asserts "Violation of Maryland Declaration of Rights," i.e., "Due Process Violations and Abuse of Process" pursuant to Articles 2, 5, 24, and 26 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights. Count VII alleges "False Light Invasion of Privacy." In Count VIII, plaintiffs lodge a claim for "Federal Civil Rico Violations" ("RICO") …. Count IX asserts a claim for "Invasion of Privacy."

The Press Release was issued by Maryland Attorney General Anthony G. Brown on September 3, 2024, and joined by Schwalb and Everytown Law. It announced the initiation of the Engage Case. According to the Press Release, United and two other gun shops "ignored clear warning signs" that they were facilitating the illegal trafficking of firearms by selling firearms to "a straw purchaser." The Press Release also claimed that the gun shops played a "role in fueling gun violence across the region." Moreover, the Press Release asserts that the Engage Case constitutes a "'warning to other [gun] dealers who put public safety at risk to make a profit[.]'"

The Press Release was included as an exhibit to the Complaint, and was filed under seal. Plaintiffs also filed a motion to seal the Press Release, as well as a supporting memorandum….

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Second Amendment Roundup: The Citizenship Clause Implicates the Second Amendment.

Aliens here unlawfully or on a nonimmigrant visa are prohibited from possession of firearms.

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On April 1, the Supreme Court will hear argument in Trump v. Barbara, concerning the meaning of the Citizenship Clause in the Fourteenth Amendment.  As I discussed here when the Court granted cert, there is a significant collateral issue at stake besides whether a birth certificate reflects citizenship.  That issue relates to whether a person may lawfully receive or possess firearms.

The Gun Control Act (GCA) makes it unlawful for "an alien" who "is illegally or unlawfully in the United States" or who (with certain exceptions) "has been admitted to the United States under a nonimmigrant visa" to receive or possess a firearm.  18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(5).  As elsewhere provided, "The term 'alien' means any person not a citizen or national of the United States."  8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(3).  The Fourteenth Amendment defines "citizens" as "persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof."  Is a person born here of illegal aliens or of temporary visitors on a nonimmigrant visa a non-citizen who does not have Second Amendment rights?

I filed an amicus curiae brief in the Barbara case on behalf of the Article III Project in support of the petitioners and reversal.  Although none of the briefs of the parties or amici (including mine) discuss the nexus between the Citizenship Clause and the Second Amendment, that issue looms in the background of who are citizens and thus who may lawfully possess firearms.

The federal appellate courts have consistently held that illegal aliens are subject to the federal gun ban because they are not protected by the Second Amendment.  Post-Rahimi, the Seventh Circuit held in U.S. v. Carbajal-Flores (2025): "Even if the plain text of the Second Amendment presumptively protects Carbajal-Flores because he falls within 'the people,' a long tradition exists of disarming individuals, like illegal aliens, who have not sworn allegiance to the sovereign."  As if to confirm his dangerousness, the defendant was apprehended firing shots at passing vehicles during the George Floyd riots.

Similarly, in U.S. v. Jimenez-Shilon (2022), the Eleventh Circuit skipped over the textual issue and found that under the history-tradition test, firearm ownership was limited to citizens.  While decided just before Bruen, the court relied only on what would become Bruen's text-history test and did not wander into tiers of scrutiny.

While the cases are rarer, it has also been held that aliens here under a nonimmigrant visa are not protected by the Second Amendment.  Noted U.S. v. Oghenebrume (M.D. La. 2025): "F-1 visas are held by those 'having a residence in a foreign country which he has no intention of abandoning,' who enter the United States 'temporarily and solely for the purpose of' education. Thus, on its face, the provision restricts aliens who have no intention of becoming a citizen and who have not declared allegiance to the United States."

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AI in Court

Former Fox Anchor Andrea Tantaros's Court Filings Contained Inaccurate Citations; Court Suspects AI Hallucinations

Tantaros is representing herself in a lawsuit against Fox and, among others, ex-Senator Scott Brown, alleging sexual harassment and other claims.

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From Friday's decision by Judge Sidney Stein (S.D.N.Y.) in Tantaros v. Fox News Network, LLC:

[B]oth Tantaros's opposition to Brown's motion to dismiss the complaint and her unauthorized sur-reply contain both inaccurate and non-existent citations to cases and statutes. After Brown's counsel notified Tantaros of citation issues in her opposition brief, Tantaros filed a "Notice of Correction of Citations" which purported to "immediately withdraw[] voluntarily" some but not all of the non-existent or inaccurate citations in her opposition to Brown's motion.

Troublingly, Tantaros nevertheless included inaccurate citations in her later-filed sur-reply. This pattern of behavior indicates that Tantaros has used artificial intelligence tools in preparing her filings but did not verify the accuracy of citations produced by those artificial intelligence tools before submitting them to the Court.

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Politics

Short Circuit: An inexhaustive weekly compendium of rulings from the federal courts of appeal

Permissible ingredients, mandatory detention, and burrowing mites.

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Please enjoy the latest edition of Short Circuit, a weekly feature written by a bunch of people at the Institute for Justice.

"Just two years ago, the Supreme Court reaffirmed that the Constitution promises you a timely and meaningful hearing before a neutral judge if police seize your property for civil forfeiture." But, says IJ Senior Director of Strategic Research Lisa Knepper, "modern civil forfeiture laws, as written and as practiced, frequently fail to deliver on that promise." And we've got the receipts to prove it. This week, IJ released Policing for Profit 4, the latest and greatest edition of our landmark research into the use and abuse of civil forfeiture across the country. The report contains all the latest data that you've come to expect, as well as a timely, meaningful, and unbelievably thorough (but accessible!) analysis of forfeiture statutes, procedures, and timelines across the states and the federal gov't.

New on the Short Circuit podcast: We bring on a team of experts to address that age-old, existential question: What's your favorite circuit?

New on the Unpublished Opinions podcast: We bring on a team of experts to address age-old, existential questions: What the Heck? And, why is Afroman so great? And, why is everyone talking about swinging dicks?

  1. Massachusetts provides special-education services to all students, but students enrolled in private schools by their parents—and only those students—are forbidden from receiving the services in their schools. Private-school families: But we have a fundamental right to choose private school, and it's unconstitutional to burden fundamental rights by conditioning public benefits on forgoing those rights. First Circuit: We think the Constitution only protects Free Exercise rights from this kind of burden, not other fundamental rights. Suit dismissed. (This is an IJ case.)
  2. Is a New York City law that revives otherwise time-barred civil claims based on gender-based violence preempted by a state law covering similar claims but with a different revival window? Second Circuit: This is a question better answered by the New York Court of Appeals. Question certified! Concurrence: The answer is clearly "yes," but I begrudgingly go along with the certification because a bunch of state courts are for some reason waiting for a federal court to answer this question of state law. Read More

Free Speech

Khan v. Yale University #TheyLied Case Dismissed Because of Plaintiff's "Egregious" Litigation Misconduct

Not the misconduct itself, but noted in the court's opinion as one of the items plaintiff had sought to withhold from discovery: "During a separate text conversation on May 11, 2018, Plaintiff texted Mr. Roe: 'If I had 5 dollars for every gender, I would have 5 dollars coz women are objects.'"

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This is the case in which the Connecticut Supreme Court held that an accuser's allegations in college disciplinary proceedings are not absolutely privileged against defamation claims in a future lawsuit. But today, Judge Kari Dooley (D. Conn.) dismissed that libel lawsuit (Khan v. Yale Univ.); here's most of the conclusion to that long opinion, which follows a detailed recitation of various misconduct:

As to the document production, while the Court agrees that the production of over 70,000 pages of largely irrelevant materials has all the hallmarks of a classic "document dump," the Court does not, on the present record, infer that it was Plaintiff's intent to forestall impending depositions or the conclusion of discovery. It certainly had that effect, and such an effect was absolutely predictable, but the misconduct was in the production itself of largely unresponsive and irrelevant documents.

The indirect publication of Jane Doe's name through precisely the same method found by this Court to be egregious and intentional is shocking. It appears that Plaintiff will not be deterred. Notably, he did not seek reconsideration of this Court's decision or findings [requiring that he not disclose the name -EV], he simply chose to ignore them. And with respect to the instant motion, he merely reiterates the arguments the Court has already rejected.

The inaccurate and false sworn Interrogatory responses reveal that Plaintiff will withhold damaging information in discovery so as to increase the likelihood of his success on the merits. As discussed above, it is clear his lawyer knew nothing of the sexual misconduct claims made against Plaintiff by women other than Jane Doe and simply relied upon Plaintiff's self-report. When questioned by the defense, Plaintiff's counsel confirmed that he had checked with Plaintiff about any other complaints. Nothing. And as discussed above, the Court finds his claim to have interpreted the Interrogatory as applying only to claims that resulted in criminal charges as straining credulity beyond its breaking point.

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Free Speech

Ex-FBI-Agents Alleging They Were Fired for Working on "Arctic Frost" Can Proceed Pseudonymously

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From Chief Judge James Boasberg (D.D.C.) yesterday in Does 1 & 2 v. Patel:

Plaintiffs are two former Federal Bureau of Investigation Special Agents who allege that they were summarily dismissed from the FBI in October and November 2025 in retaliation for their assignment to "Arctic Frost," a federal investigation into a suspected conspiracy to overturn the results of the 2020 Presidential Election. Asserting that the terminations violated their First and Fifth Amendment rights, they seek declaratory and injunctive relief, including reinstatement and expungement of their personnel records. They now move to proceed pseudonymously, contending that public identification would expose them and their families to immediate risk of doxing, harassment, and physical harm and would also significantly impair their ability to perform sensitive law-enforcement work if reinstated.

The Court will grant the Motion, subject to any further consideration by the United States District Judge to whom this case is randomly assigned. See [Local Civil Rule] 40.7(f) (providing that Chief Judge shall "hear and determine … motion[s] to file a pseudonymous complaint")….

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Free Speech

Sealed Charges Doesn't Mean Unmentionable-in-Court-Filings Charges

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From yesterday's decision by Magistrate Judge Jacqueline M. DeLuca (D. Neb.) in Wilson v. Noshirvan:

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(f) permits the Court to "strike from a pleading an insufficient defense or any redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter." Rule 12(f) is "permissive" and grants the Court liberal discretion when ruling on a motion to strike.

Striking is an extreme measure and courts view motions to strike with disfavor. The purpose of a Rule 12(f) motion to strike is to "minimize delay, prejudice, and confusion." When abused, Rule 12(f) can multiply proceedings, causing unnecessary disputes and delays. Given this, Rule 12(f) motions will not be granted without a "showing of prejudicial harm." "A motion to strike a defense will be denied if the defense is sufficient as a matter of law or if it fairly presents a question of law or fact which the court ought to hear."

Plaintiff moves to strike the entirety of paragraph 58 in Defendant's Amended Answer. Paragraph 58 provides:

Plaintiff's action is frivolous under Neb. Rev. Stat. §25-824. Under Nebraska law, a frivolous action is defined as "a legal position wholly without merit, that is, without rational argument based on law and evidence to support a litigant's position in the lawsuit." Trausch v. Hagemeier, 313 Neb. 538. Plaintiff allegations of "materially false statements" are either true, opinion, falsely characterized by Plaintiff or wholly irrelevant to the alleged causes of action. For example, Plaintiff claims Defendant falsely labeled him as a three-time sex offender despite only two sex offender convictions in Nebraska. However, Defendant affirmatively alleges that Plaintiff was also charged for a sexual offense in Iowa. Plaintiff alleges false assertions of child endangerment and fraudulent behavior on the part of Plaintiff. However, Defendant affirmatively alleges there are opinions derived from observations of Plaintiff's conduct. Plaintiff alleges defamatory use of the term pedophile. However, Defendant affirmatively alleges that the term was used colloquially as an opinion derived from observations of Plaintiff's conduct and criminal history.

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Free Speech

Court Upholds Injunction Against Disclosing Information Learned from Discarded City Documents

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From City of Scranton v. Coyne, decided Tuesday by the Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court, Judge Mary Hannah Leavitt, joined by Judges Michael H. Wojcik and Lori A. Dumas:

Coyne discovered boxes of personnel records labeled "Shred 2033," that had been placed outside the rear entrance of City Hall. The boxes contained the personnel files of former employees that included their names, dates of birth, social security numbers, addresses, phone numbers and other personal information. Coyne took pictures of the contents of the personnel files and made a video to document his discovery. After Coyne contacted the police, he and an officer carried the boxes into City Hall.

At the April 30, 2024, City Council meeting, Coyne informed councilmembers that there had been a data breach by the City. That same day, the City Solicitor sent Coyne a letter instructing him not to disclose any information obtained from the personnel files and to destroy all photographs of the file contents.

At a City Council meeting of October 8, 2024, Coyne disclosed the name of one former City employee from the personnel files. He further stated that he would continue to name the other former employees until the City notified all of them that their personnel records had been subject to "exposure."

On October 15, 2024, the City filed a complaint seeking injunctive relief. The complaint alleged that Coyne had examined and photographed property belonging to the City that had been mistakenly placed outside for recycling pickup. The City property consisted of boxes of personnel files of former City employees, containing their names, social security numbers, personal contact information, dates of birth, health information, and disciplinary actions. The boxes had been marked with a date for record destruction of 2033.

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