The Volokh Conspiracy

Mostly law professors | Sometimes contrarian | Often libertarian | Always independent | Est. 2002

A whiskey distilling set up in front of the preamble to the United States Constitution — Illustration: Lex Villena; Ioannis Syrigos

Today, the Supreme Court decided to review the case of Department of Justice v. McNutt, which challenges a federal law banning home distilleries. The key question in the case is whether the law in question is justified by the combination of the tax power and the Necessary and Proper Clause (which gives Congress the power to make laws "necessary and proper" for executing other powers granted to the federal government). This is likely to be most important Supreme Court Necessary and Proper Clause decision since at least NFIB v. Sebelius (2012), which ruled that a "proper" power permissible under the Clause is one that is "ancillary" to the implementation of an enumerated power; it cannot be a "great, substantive and independent" power. This case is likely to further clarify the meaning of "proper," perhaps by explicating in more detail what counts as a "great…and independent" power.

In the lower court decision in this case, the Fifth Circuit ruled that the law is not "proper" and even that it isn't "necessary." There is also a Sixth Circuit decision that went the other way, thereby creating a circuit split.

As explained in my earlier posts on the Fifth and Sixth Circuit decisions (linked above), I think this law is not "proper," and I hope the Supreme Court strikes it down. I summarize the reasons why in my post on the Fifth Circuit ruling:

The Fifth Circuit… concludes that the law in question exceeds Congress' authority under the Necessary and Proper Clause, which grants the power to makes laws "necessary and proper" for carrying into execution other federal powers. I think the court is right that the law in question is not "proper." The Supreme Court, in NFIB v. Sebelius(2012), ruled that a "proper" power permissible under the Clause is one that is "ancillary" to the implementation of an enumerated power. It cannot be a "great, substantive and independent" power. See my analysis in this article. The power claimed here is clearly "great and independent." As Judge [Edith] Jones notes, "[u]nder the government's logic, Congress may criminalize nearly any at-home conduct only because it has the possibility of concealing taxable activity."

I elaborated further in the post criticizing the Sixth Circuit decision:

[T]he Sixth Circuit is badly wrong to conclude that the law is "proper." As explained in my earlier post, the Supreme Court, in NFIB v. Sebelius (2012), ruled that a "proper" power permissible under the Clause is one that is "ancillary" to the implementation of an enumerated power. It cannot be a "great, substantive and independent" power. The power to ban any home-based activity that might serve a substitute for taxable activity outside the home is clearly a "great and independent power." As Judge Edith Jones explains in the Fifth Circuit ruling, "[u]nder the government's logic, Congress may criminalize nearly any at-home conduct only because it has the possibility of concealing taxable activity."

The Sixth Circuit tries to address this point by claiming alcohol is somehow special….

This distinction between alcohol and all other commodities is totally arbitrary. The same reasoning could justify banning home production of anything else that is more easily taxed if produced outside the home. And there is a long history of home production of all kinds of other commodities taxed or severely regulated by the government, ranging from cigarettes to illegal drugs, to pornographic videos.

While Judge Edith Jones (author of the Fifth Circuit decision) is one of that circuit's most conservative judges, the ruling was also joined by liberal Obama appointee Judge James Graves. On the other hand, the Sixth Circuit decision was written by prominent conservative Judge Raymond Kethledge. We shall see if the Supreme Court also divides on this issue in a way that cuts across conventional ideological and jurisprudential lines.

As noted in my post on the Fifth Circuit case, I think Judge Jones is not persuasive in arguing that the home distillery ban isn't "necessary," as well as improper. That argument is unlikely to prevail under the Supreme Court's expansive definition of "necessary, " dating back to McCulloch v. Maryland (1819), where Chief Justice John Marshall famously ruled that "necessary" includes any measures that may be "useful" or "convenient" for implementing an enumerated power.

As also noted in my posts on the two lower court rulings, I think the government has a better argument that this law is authorized by the Supreme Court's badly misguide precedent on federal power under Commerce Clause (which grants Congress power to regulate interstate commerce). But the Supreme Court is apparently not going to review that issue. The question presented submitted to the Court in McNutt is limited to the Necessary and Proper Clause.

A quiz about three animal-related figures of legal speech (all of which had been mentioned on this blog in years past). Fill in the blanks, and provide the explanation the courts offer:

"A red ___ case."
"Presumptions may be looked on as the __ of the law."
"Judges are not like __."

Note that it's not enough that judges actually aren't like, say, eels; it has to be a preexisting legal phrase.

Give your answers in the comments. No fair peeking, Googling, or Clauding.

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Sophisticated clients develop comprehensive strategies to get a cert petition granted. BMG Rights Management (US) LLC v. Cyril E. Vetter was one of those cases. The question presented concerned limitations on the reversion of copyrights. Paul Clement was retained to represent many of the leading media companies. The Parties to the Proceeding were:

Petitioners are BMG Rights Management (US) LLC; Capitol CMG, Inc. (Parent Company Stock Ticker: UMG); Essential Music Publishing LLC (Parent Company Stock Ticker: SONY); and Warner-Tamerlane Publishing Corp (Parent Company NASDAQ Stock Ticker: WMG).

The Plaintiffs secured top-side amicus brief from heavy-hitters including Paramount (represented by Lisa Blatt), the Motion Picture Association of America, the Recording Industry Association of America, and more. Everything was lined up for a cert grant. Alas, there would be no quorum.

Today's order includes this entry:

Because the Court lacks a quorum, 28 U. S. C. §1, and since the qualified Justices are of the opinion that the case cannot be heard and determined at the next Term of the Court, the judgment is affirmed under 28 U. S. C. §2109, which provides that under these circumstances "the court shall enter its order affirming the judgment of the court from which the case was brought for review with the same effect as upon affirmance by an equally divided court." Justice Sotomayor, Justice Gorsuch, Justice Barrett, and Justice Jackson took no part in the consideration or decision of this petition.

The lower court judgment survives, and it is hard to imagine another case with the same parties would trigger a different outcome.

What happened here? I have to imagine that these four Justices, who all have lucrative book deals, recused because of either the parties identified, or the issue presented. Curiously, Justice Alito, who is a new publisher, did not step aside.

Going forward, these and other publishing companies need to be aware that they likely do not have a quorum for a cert grant. However, they stand a good chance of having a favorable lower-court judgment affirmed by a quorum-less court.

I've often wondered whether it makes actual good business sense to give lucrative book deals to the Justices. Do they really ever earn back the advance or is it just an interest-free loan? Well, now that media companies may no longer be able to bring cases to the Supreme Court, that value proposition has become far more difficult.

We've seen how significant Justice Alito's recusal was in Suncor. I think these media recusals may prove even more important to the business community. And while Justice Alito could divest those stocks, authors with book deals cannot cure the conflict.

Also in today's order is a cert grant in the racial preferences case from Montgomery County, Maryland. But the Court re-wrote the QP. Here is the Court's version:

The petition for a writ of certiorari is granted limited to the following question: Whether a plaintiff challenging a facially neutral admissions policy as racially discriminatory must establish that the targeted racial group suffered an aggregate disparate impact relative to its share of the applicant pool.

Here is the question framed in the petition:

Whether a plaintiff alleging that a school district implemented facially-neutral admissions criteria for a racially discriminatory purpose must show that the criteria produced a disparate impact on the targeted racial group before a court may consider evidence of discriminatory intent.

The Court dropped the reference to discriminatory intent and added a focus on "aggregate disparate impact." This case could now reflect an opportunity for the Trump Administration to advance its new policy concerning disparate impact.

That's part of libel plaintiff's argument(filed last week) for subpoenaing defendant's AI queries in Fontainebleau Florida Hotel, LLC v. Botach; the defendant is popularly known as Rabbi Shmuley Boteach. From the introduction:

The Court asked whether Botach's communications with AI platforms fall within the scope of "damages" discovery permitted by ECF No. 261, and specifically how those materials relate to malice and the statutory cap on punitive damages. Precedent from the United States Supreme Court and Eleventh Circuit, as well as Florida law, answers that question directly.

Under Fla. Stat. § 768.73(1)(c), the cap on punitive damages lifts entirely where the fact finder determines that "the defendant had a specific intent to harm the claimant" at the time of the injury. As discussed below, legions of cases from trial courts to the Supreme Court hold that post-defamation conduct is probative of whether defamatory statements were made with intent to harm. Specific intent is therefore not background color to the damages trial or damages discovery. Discovery into Botach's intent to harm Plaintiff is damages discovery, and the AI materials are the most direct evidence of that intent.

Botach did not merely publish an errant falsehood on a blog or make a heated statement in a debate. He methodically engineered his attacks—drafting, refining, and iterating for painful effect through the most potent technologies known to humankind. The prompts and chats are his mental state reduced to writing, and they are probative of damages.

And from the defendant's response:

AI in Court Free Speech Libel

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News accounts report that the Bend, Oregon school shooting Thursday was stopped in part by an armed civilian. From the N.Y. Times (Anna Griffin, Aaron West, Nicholas Bogel-Burroughs & Chelsia Rose Marcius):

A man in a red pickup truck was driving by and saw the teenager throw his shotgun over the fence and start to climb it, the police said. The driver "verbally confronted" the gunman, who paused to open fire at him, pelting the truck with shots….

Outside, Kaylub Giamanco, a father of two girls at the school, had seen the red pickup get shot while driving by on his lunch break. He swerved onto the sidewalk and ran inside.

He found the gunman wrestling with the teacher who tried to stop him and shot him several times with a .40-caliber handgun that had been legally secured in his truck, the police said. The suspect, who died, was carrying 44 more rounds of ammunition.

Readers might want to know: How often do civilians use guns to help stop shooters who pose ongoing threats to multiple people? (By "civilian," I mean here someone other than a police officer or a security guard; off-duty military members qualify for my purposes.)

Obviously, an exact count is hard to gather, and some cases will be ambiguous. Sometimes, it may not be clear whether the shooter was planning to keep attacking. Sometimes, it may not be clear, at least from press accounts, whether the defender succeeded in stopping the shooter (for instance, by scaring the shooter away). Sometimes a civilian and a security guard or a police officer might step in together. And sometimes news accounts may err. Any count is thus a judgment call, and also likely incomplete because not all incidents make the news.

Still, thanks to a Crime Prevention Research Center spreadsheet, I can say that in 2025 there appeared to have been at least a dozen such incidents. The CPRC report says there were 23; I went through the list, checked the linked news accounts, and tried to exclude ones that seemed just like one-on-one self-defense situations or matters where the defender seemed clearly unsuccessful. (One-on-one self-defense is of course worthy on its own, but it's not what I'm discussing here.) With those exclusions, and trying to be relatively conservative in what I counted, I ended up counting 12 to 14 such incidents in 2025, depending on how you evaluate some of the more ambiguous ones.

Guns Self-Defense

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10/19/1789: Chief Justice John Jay takes oath.

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The broader context, from Judge VanDyke's opinion dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc in Whitfield v. Mullin, joined by Judges Patrick Bumatay and Eric Tung; the question Judge VanDyke is confronting is when a Ninth Circuit precedent stops being binding on future panels because it's inconsistent with intervening Supreme Court precedent:

[T]his case illustrates (yet again) a more fundamental problem within our circuit: Miller v. Gammie's improper demand that our own circuit's precedent be privileged over the Supreme Court's more recent instructions unless our precedent is "clearly irreconcilable" with what the Supreme Court has subsequently told us. 335 F.3d 889, 893 (9th Cir. 2003). This prevents three-judge panels of our court from applying more recent Supreme Court authority whenever it is merely inconsistent with our own. The effect of this rule is both obvious and obviously wrong—we systematically hold the Supreme Court's instructions about the right answer to any number of legal questions in lower regard than our own wrong precedents….

The reality is that our en banc court is often unable or unwilling to fix things at odds with Supreme Court precedent. Sometimes, the obstacle is simply institutional inertia; the costs of en banc review make correction burdensome enough that erroneous precedent persists by default. We are a very busy court, and we can't be expected to take every case en banc that presents a legal issue where subsequent Supreme Court authority is inconsistent with, but not "clearly irreconcilable" with, our own.

But that is not the only problem with Miller's rule. The effect of that inverted rule is especially insidious (and no doubt intentional) when our precedent involves one of the many contested legal questions where our circuit's ideological commitments are at odds with what the Supreme Court has recently told us. In those instances, it is very unlikely a majority of our court would ever vote to take a case en banc to abandon the majority's own preferred doctrinal approach, even after the Supreme Court has undermined its foundation. Judge Reinhardt famously announced the Ninth Circuit's motto: the Supreme Court can't "catch 'em all."

Politics

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10/18/1960: Gomillion v. Lightfoot argued.

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On October 4, I published a post on "Libertarianism and Democracy," critiquing political philosopher Matt Zwolinski's earlier Liberalism.Org article on the same topic. Earlier today, I posted Matt's response to me. The present post is my rejoinder:

I would like to thank Matt for his interesting and insightful response. We agree on several key points, including that democracy is generally superior to authoritarianism, that libertarian critiques of democracy have great merit, and that - in much of the world - the most serious threats to liberty now come from the nationalist right, rather than the the political left. But we still differ on a few key points related to libertarianism and democracy.

The Nature of Libertarian Critiques of Democracy

Perhaps the most crucial disagreement is about the nature of libertarian critiques of democracy. Matt suggests that "[m]ost of what Ilya calls the libertarian critique of democracy is really a critique of big government." If so, libertarians can just focus on criticizing big government generally, while simultaneously extolling democracy.

There are indeed flaws of big government that arise regardless of whether it is democratic or authoritarian. But those outlined in my earlier Liberalism.Org article are in fact specific to democracy. They include tyranny of the majority, voter ignorance, and the tendency of democracy to create opportunities for illiberal forces to seize power and - in the worst case scenario - even destroy democracy itself. Tyranny of the majority is obviously a problem distinctive to democracy. The same goes for rational voter ignorance, which arises from the perverse incentive structure of individual voters, who have only an infinitesimally small chance of influencing electoral outcomes. And, while illiberal forces can and do seize power under authoritarian systems, the pathways democracies (usually involving the electoral process) create for them are distinctive.

Authoritarian systems have their own distinctive flaws, which are generally even worse. But the distinctive nature of democracy's flaws means they cannot simply be folded into a generic critique of big government. In addition, as noted in my response to Matt, these distinctive flaws of democracy are at the heart of many of today's most serious threats to liberty and justice in many democratic systems, including the threats posed by the nationalist right. Thus, it is important for libertarians to emphasize the nature and gravity of these weaknesses, and the value of our proposals for dealing them (which in many cases are different from and better than those advanced by other types of liberals). As emphasized in my earlier response, this is an area where libertarians often have a comparative advantage over other liberals. On the other hand, we generally do not have a comparative advantage when it comes to explaining why democracy is better than authoritarianism.

Along related lines, Matt suggests that libertarian critiques of the state aren't "an argument against democratic control of whatever the state does do." But once we recognize that democracy has significant distinctive flaws, there is actually a case for insulating some functions of government from democratic control. Obvious examples include the judiciary and monetary policy (unless we want to cut government out of the latter entirely, and adopt free banking). Indeed, even most non-libertarian liberals recognize that such insulation is desirable in some cases, most notably the courts.

The Problem of Libertarians Tempted by Authoritarianism

Matt argues that we should, nonetheless devote extensive energy to extolling democracy, because doing so is likely to have an impact on fellow libertarians who may otherwise be tempted to embrace authoritarianism. It is likely true that libertarians tempted in this way are more easily dissuaded by other libertarians than by non-libertarians. But such people are a tiny minority within an minority. Libertarians are a small group (probably around 5-10% of the US population or even less, depending on how you draw the line). Those sympathetic to authoritarianism are much fewer still. Thus, it makes little sense to devote more than a modest amount of time and effort to dealing with them, as opposed to addressing the much larger group of non-libertarian liberals who need to be more cognizant of the dangerous shortcomings of democracy.

Moreover, when we look at libertarians who have shifted to the "alt right" or otherwise become advocates of illiberal ideas, the problem in most cases is not excessive skepticism of democracy, but insufficient commitment to liberty - particularly, the liberty of people from different ethnic, racial, or religious backgrounds, that of migrants, and those with unconventional lifestyles. That is pretty obviously the case with Curtis Yarvin and Hans-Hermann Hoppe, both mentioned by Matt. The former's advocacy of a "post-liberal" ideology of repression (which is really based on pre-liberal models) is pretty obviously not the product of a man who thinks authoritarianism is a better way to protect liberty than democracy. Indeed, his concern is exactly the opposite (that democracy allows for way too much liberty). The same goes for Hoppe's advocacy of repression of immigrants, gays and lesbians, and people with various non-traditional lifestyles. Peter Thiel, the third case mentioned by Matt, is that of a person who has abandoned libertarianism for "national conservatism," an ideology focused on exalting the interests of ethnic and culture majorities and using the state to punish perceived "enemies." To the extent we want to focus on dissuading such people, it should be to reemphasize the value of liberty for all, not extolling the virtues of democracy. People who value democracy more than liberty are generally unlikely to become libertarians in the first place.

Two Smaller Issues

Matt and I also have a modest disagreement over whether there can be situations where some form of authoritarianism can be a lesser evil compared to democracy. I think such cases are extremely rare, but not nonexistent. Matt's position is less clear, and perhaps I misunderstand him. But he does seem to want to deny this possibility. In response to my examples of the allied occupations of Germany and Japan after World War II, he seems to think these don't really count because "those occupations were run by democracies answerable to their own voters, and they ended." But they were still cases where non-democratic government was imposed on a population, and that population itself did not have control over when and if it would end.

In these cases, a non-democratic occupation government was a lesser evil than immediate establishment of democracy, because of the highly illiberal nature of German and Japanese majority public opinion at the time. Similar circumstances can potentially arise in other countries. And, in some cases, a domestically generated authoritarian regime might still be a lesser evil than any democracy that is feasible at the time.

In some situations, the problem can be dealt with by limiting democracy, rather than abjuring it completely. For example, as noted in my earlier response, post-occupation West Germany long banned Nazis and communists from competing in elections, but otherwise committed to free electoral competition. But there could be situations where such constraints are not enough. Because such cases are highly unusual, this is not a particularly important disagreement. But it does have relevance in situations where we consider how to deal with a society where majority public opinion is deeply illiberal.

Finally - and least important - Matt differs with me about the use of the terms "libertarian" and "classical liberal," arguing that the former are more likely to be democracy-skeptics than the latter. We can, if we want, define the two terms in such a way that people we label with one are generally more suspicious of democracy than those we label with the other one. But that is not the way the terms are typically used. That said, different people use these terms in different ways. To my mind, they are mostly just alternative labels for the same general ideology. But I don't have much of a beef with people who prefer to use them differently than I do, so long as they make clear what they mean.

Ultimately, Matt and I agree on much more than we differ. But a few of the issues we differ have real significance. I am grateful for the opportunity to consider them.

On October 4, I published a post on "Libertarianism and Democracy," critiquing political philosopher Matt Zwolinski's earlier Liberalism.Org article on the same topic. Matt has written a response to me, which I have agreed to post at this site. The remaining paragraphs of this post were written by Matt Zwolinski, not me (Ilya Somin). I have posted a rejoinder to Matt's thoughtful response here.

Who Should Defend Democracy?

A reply to Ilya Somin

My recent Liberalism.org essay, "Democracy Belongs on the List," made the case that classical liberals should count democracy among their core commitments, alongside private property, free markets, and the rule of law. And it belongs there for the same reason. Like property rights and markets, democracy is a crucial way of keeping power in check.

Ilya Somin has written a generous and thoughtful reply to that piece. And I think he actually agrees with me more than the framing of his post might suggest. Ilya grants that democracies are generally freer and more prosperous than the alternatives, that democracy is "a valuable check on power," that libertarians should arguably stress these points "more often," and that "in much of the world today, right-wing nationalists pose a greater threat to libertarian values and priorities than the political left does." What's left mainly comes down to two questions: what counts as a libertarian critique of democracy, and whose job it is to defend democracy.

Before turning to those substantive issues, though, there's one terminological matter that's worth clearing up. Ilya says that nothing of significance hinges on whether we call our view "libertarian" or "classical liberal." And on most questions I'd agree. On this one, though, I think the difference matters. In The Individualists, John Tomasi and I draw a distinction between strict libertarians and classical liberals. The former group tends to treat liberty as a moral absolute and to derive their politics from a single overarching principle like the non-aggression axiom. Think Murray Rothbard or Ayn Rand. The latter treat liberty as a strong but defeasible presumption and are more empiricist and pluralistic in their approach to politics. Think Friedrich Hayek or Richard Epstein.

My sense is that these two camps within the broader "liberty movement" have taken pretty different stances toward democracy, with strict libertarians being much more critical than their classical liberal brethren. Even back in the 19th century, you could find Benjamin Tucker insisting that voting is always a form of aggression, and Lysander Spooner arguing that women "have just as good a right to make laws as men have, and no better: AND THAT IS JUST NO RIGHT AT ALL." Herbert Spencer was even willing to walk back his support of women's suffrage once he decided that women would probably use their vote to support bigger government. That's a pretty different take than anything you're likely to find in Ludwig von Mises or Friedrich Hayek (more on whom later), let alone in John Stuart Mill.

That brings us to the first of the two substantive issues under dispute. Ilya argues that recent events have made libertarian critiques of democracy more important than ever, and that the libertarian solutions to democracy's flaws are "primarily to limit and decentralize government power." I'm with him on that, but I don't think this settles, or even really addresses, the debate about democracy. Limiting and decentralizing government power is a claim about the scope of the state, about how much government should do. It's a principle that would apply to any government, whether democratic or not. And, crucially, it isn't an argument against democratic control of whatever the state does do.

That distinction was at the heart of my essay. Following Jacob Levy, I argued that classical liberals have let a perfectly sound critique of too much government slide into a skepticism about democracy itself, treating democracy, in Levy's words, "as if the contrast to 'democratic' were 'economic' rather than 'autocratic.'" One can be a radical about reducing the scope of the state and still insist that its agents must be answerable to the people they govern. Most of what Ilya calls the libertarian critique of democracy is really a critique of big government. That's an argument I largely agree with, as far as it goes. The trouble comes when we file it under the wrong heading. When we ourselves blur the line between critiques of state power and critiques of democracy, we shouldn't be surprised when people come away thinking libertarians are against democracy.

That brings me to comparative advantage, which is where I think Ilya's argument is most interesting but also most mistaken. Libertarians are a small minority, he says, and "we have no comparative advantage when it comes to extolling the virtues of democracy relative to authoritarianism. Other types of liberals can do this work just as well as we can, perhaps better." So we should stick to what we do best, which is analyzing democracy's flaws.

This argument might make sense in some contexts. But as a general principle, I think it misfires, and it misfires most badly when the audience is classical liberals and libertarians themselves. That, after all, is where the turn against democracy has actually happened. Hans-Hermann Hoppe's Democracy: The God That Failed argued that monarchy was preferable to democracy, and complained that "habitual democrats" had been tolerated rather than "isolated, excluded and expelled from civilization." Curtis Yarvin, who came to neoreaction by way of libertarianism, credits Hoppe with opening "a kind of door to the pre-revolutionary world" for him. And in 2009, Peter Thiel wrote in a Cato Institute publication that "I no longer believe that freedom and democracy are compatible." None of this follows from the libertarian critique of voter ignorance, and nothing Ilya has written points in this direction. But it grew in a movement where, as Janet Bufton recently put it in Liberal Currents, "even liberal libertarians were taught arguments about why democracy fails," and hardly anyone was making the case for democracy on libertarian terms. Any old liberal can explain to the public why democracy beats dictatorship. But a libertarian drifting toward Hoppe or Yarvin isn't going to listen to them. Only libertarians can tell libertarians that democracy is theirs.

So if democracy is a libertarian value, what kind of libertarian value is it? Ilya argues that democracy shouldn't be "a first-order libertarian priority, on par with liberty, constraining coercion, property rights, and increasing human happiness," because its value is instrumental rather than intrinsic. I agree that the value of democracy is instrumental. In that way, it's in precisely the same position as a number of items on the classical liberal list. Free trade, federalism, judicial review, and the rule of law are instrumental too. What I want to resist is the claim that because democracy is only instrumentally valuable it's therefore dispensable – something that can be traded away whenever we can imagine something better. What we can imagine, though, is a poor guide to what works. The better question, as David Schmidtz argues, is what has "an observable history of leading self-interested agents to act in ways that are useful and agreeable to the people around them," and by that test democracy has very few rivals.

Which leaves us with Hayek. Ilya defends Hayek's preference for "a liberal dictator to a democratic government lacking liberalism" as a claim about rare hypothetical cases, and suggests that transitional non-democratic rule "may be necessary" in places like Russia and China, citing the Allied occupations of Germany and Japan. But those occupations were run by democracies answerable to their own voters, and they ended. Russia and China, in contrast, have no outside power that could impose a transition and then hand power back. The only realistic candidate for transitional power in those countries is a domestic strongman, which is exactly the case Hayek had in front of him. Hayek wasn't musing about hypotheticals; he was talking about Chile.

Ultimately, Ilya and I want the same thing. We both advocate a form of libertarianism that resists concentrated power wherever it appears, including when it arrives through the ballot box. Where we differ is on the need to say out loud that democracy is one of the ways we resist it. I think we should, and I think libertarians are better placed to say it than anyone, since the people who most need to hear it are our own.

From a press release last month, just posted on Westlaw:

N.C. Detective Agency, a Durham-based security company, will pay $65,231 in compensatory damages and back pay, and take other corrective actions to voluntarily resolve a religious discrimination investigation by the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), the federal agency announced today.

The EEOC's investigation found reasonable cause to believe that an employee requested to be excused from work due to a Muslim religious holiday, but the request was denied. The company was aware of the employee's need for a religious accommodation but did not engage in the legally required interactive process, and instead terminated her in June 2025 when she did not report for duty.

And from another press release two weeks later, also just posted on Westlaw:

Reynolds IGA Foodliner, Inc., owner and operator of a chain of grocery stores, will pay $65,000 and provide other equitable relief to settle a religious discrimination and retaliation lawsuit filed by the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), the federal agency announced today.

According to the suit, shortly after she was hired as a deli clerk at the Piggly Wiggly store in Hazlehurst, Georgia, the employee requested Sundays off to observe her Sabbath. The employee's supervisor denied the request, claiming that, if the store gave the employee Sundays off, it would have to do the same for all other employees. The employee continued to request the accommodation, and the company fired her in January 2025.

More from the second press release:

Religion and the Law Law & Government

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Another winner in the case, thanks to IOCB Prague's decision.

So reports the N.Y. Times (Mark Arsenault) yesterday, discussing former MIT cellular biology professor David Sabatini's victory on the defamation claim (and defendant's loss on her harassment and retaliation counterclaim). More details:

[Sabatini] was forced out of his lab in 2021 after an internal Whitehead [Institute] investigation concluded he had a past sexual relationship with a younger and less experienced colleague, Kristin Knouse, over whom he had a career-influencing role. The investigation also found that his lab had maintained a sexualized atmosphere. Dr. Knouse said that the relationship was coerced.

But Dr. Sabatini denied his lab had an improper atmosphere. He maintained that his relationship with Dr. Knouse had been consensual and that Dr. Knouse had schemed to get him fired and disgraced after he became interested in another woman….

After he was pushed out of M.I.T. and the Whitehead, he had talks with New York University about a job. But N.Y.U. staff members and students protested in the streets against his hiring in 2022, and the university did not hire him.

In 2023, he was hired by the Institute of Organic Chemistry and Biochemistry, in Prague, and later opened a Boston-area branch of that institute….

According to the Boston Globe (Madyline Swearing, Bryan Hecht & Tonya Alanez), "In 2023, New York hedge fund billionaire Bill Ackman and an anonymous donor pledged $25 million over five years to help Sabatini get back into science." The Globe also reports that the jury consisted of "seven women and six men," for whatever that's worth.

Here's an excerpt of what Sabatini alleged (quoting a Massachusetts appellate decision in the case, later reversed as to Knouse's counterclaim by the Massachusetts high court):

Free Speech Libel Sexual Harassment

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10/17/1862: Justice David Davis takes oath.

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Cartoon criticizing Franklin D. Roosevelt's 1937 court-packing plan. (NA)

Georgetown law Professor Steve Vladeck is one of the leading critics of the conservative majority on the Supreme Court. But in an insightful recent post on his substack, he outlines key reasons why "court expansion" is a bad response to its flaws. The cure is likely to be worse than the disease:

[I]t seems to me that those who are fully onboard the expansion-or-bust train should have to do more than simply assert that having four new Democratic appointees on the Court in 2029 would be a self-evidently "good" thing. If nothing else, proponents of expansion should have to answer the following four questions:

How do we avoid touching off a race to the bottom, where each time one party controls the House, Senate, and presidency, it expands the Court to ensure an ideologically and politically sympathetic majority?

If a race to the bottom is unavoidable, how do we avoid further (and potentially fatal) erosion of public confidence in the Court—which will quite transparently be little more than a lever of power for whichever party last had such a trifecta?

If eroding public confidence in the Court is a feature, and not a bug, how do we insulate against the same erosion of public confidence in lower federal courts?

What is the case for why expansion is a better way to achieve the desired reforms than alternatives that would (or, at least, should) avoid many of these forward-looking concerns?

He adds that court-packing could easily "permanently undermine judicial review as an institution." The rest of his piece (which is behind a paywall) offers far from reassuring answers to these questions.

I have offered similar criticisms of court-packing in a long series of articles and blog posts, most recently in a June Lawfare article where I explained (among other things) why the Supreme Court's recent decision in Louisiana v. Callais doesn't justify packing, and in a July UnPopulist article critiquing a court-packing proposal advanced by Andy Craig. In these pieces, I explain why the Court's record of checking dangerous abuses of government power - though not without serious flaws - is considerably better than many critics claim. In addition, I argue that court-packing is likely to undermine effective judicial review - not only by the Supreme Court, but also by lower courts.

Like Vladeck, I think some of the issues that concern critics of the Court can be more effectively addressed in other ways. For example, in the Lawfare article, I explain how Congress can fix the flaws of the Callais decision by banning or restricting gerrymandering. It could also enact a binding ethics code for the justices. Justice Alito was wrong to suggest otherwise, back in 2023. That said, if your main goal is a sweeping reversal of much of the Court's recent jurisprudence, there may be no easy way to achieve that quickly without court-packing or something like it. I would argue that any benefits that might achieve are outweighed by the enormous costs of destroying judicial review.

In addition, if your objection to the Court's recent decisions is that they often don't do enough to constrain unconstitutional actions by other branches of government or by the states, court-packing is likely to make that problem worse, not better. Destroying judicial review won't enforce tighter constitutional constraints on the executive or bring back Roe v. Wade. To the contrary, it would largely destroy any hope of doing so.

In another recent piece, I assessed "non-packing" rationales for increasing the size of the Supreme Court. There, I argue that these rationales are mostly weak; and, to the extent they have merit, there are better ways to address them than an expansion that amounts to court-packing. I even outline possible ways to increase the size of the Court without creating an opportunity for court-packing (this would require allowing the party that doesn't hold the White House to pick some of the new justices).

Yesterday, in United States v. City of New York, yet another federal court ruled against the Trump administration in a sanctuary city case. "Sanctuary" jurisdictions are state and local governments that restrict their law enforcement agencies and other employees from assisting federal immigration enforcement and deportation efforts in various ways. In this case, Judge Reyes of the US District Court for the Eastern District of New York upheld New York City laws restricting local law enforcement information-sharing and other assistance to federal immigration enforcers.

The court ruled that federal law does not preempt these policies, and that if if it did, there would be a violation of the anti-commandeering requirements of the Tenth Amendment:

Even were the Court to find that the United States has standing and the challenged provisions are preempted—both answered in the negative above—United States' claims would still fail because the anticommandeering doctrine of the Tenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States precludes relief.

"The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people." U.S. Const. amend. X….

The United States argues it is "not seeking to compel participation in immigration enforcement … but rather to remove Defendants' express and implicit obstacles to the Executive's duty to carry out its immigration enforcement duties…." New York City replies "if accepted, [the United States' claims] would require the City to affirmatively assist the federal government in enforcing immigration laws in violation of the Tenth Amendment's anticommandeering doctrine…." New York City is correct, at least partially.

The United States seeks injunctive and declaratory relief to preempt the challenged provisions… If the challenged provisions were struck, while New York City would not be obligated to carry out federal immigration enforcement, they would be barred from prohibiting their agencies and employees from engaging in federal immigration enforcement by expending personnel, property, and other resources to (1) detain individuals and (2) implement inter-agency information-sharing, including disclosing personally identifiable information, all potentially in violation of state law. And of course, there is nothing within federal law that obligates states to participate in federal immigration enforcement or compels states to comply therewith.

The United States' preemption arguments amount to nothing more than a backdoor around the Tenth Amendment and rest on a false distinction between (a) compelling local governments' participation in federal immigration enforcement and (b) prohibiting local governments from dictating how their personnel and other resources may be utilized towards federal immigration enforcement….. "

The basic principle—that Congress cannot issue direct orders to state legislatures—applies" to commands for "affirmative action" and the imposition of "prohibitions." Murphy [v. NCAA], 584 U.S. at 455 (citation modified). If states cannot remain free to control their agencies and employees to resist federal immigration enforcement, which is within states' constitutional prerogatives, the Tenth Amendment anticommandeering doctrine means nothing.

This reasoning is correct. And it is notable that this ruling - like many others protecting sanctuary cities - relies heavily on the Supreme Court's 2018 anti-commandeering decision in Murphy v. NCAA, written by Justice Samuel Alito (probably the Court's most conservative justice), and joined by all the other conservatives then on the Court. In that case, the Court emphasized that the anti-commandeering doctrine bars Congress from dictating the actions of state and local legislatures, regardless of whether the dictation takes the form of an affirmative mandate, or a prohibition against legalizing or barring something under state law.

Judge Reyes also rejects the administration's argument under the "intergovernmental immunity" doctrine, which bars states and localities from directly regulating federal agencies or "discriminating" against them. Like the court in the recent case of United States v. New Jersey, he correctly emphasizes that there can be no discrimination when there is no other comparable activity that gets more favorable treatment under the sanctuary jurisdiction's policies:

"Differential treatment is critical to a discrimination-based intergovernmental immunity claim." New York, 814 F. Supp. 3d at 282….; "[A] comparator is necessary." New York, 810 F. Supp. 3d at 353. The United States discrimination claim fails for lack of a comparator.

The United States does not and cannot identify a similarly situated entity. State and local agencies and their officers do not enforce immigration law, nor do members of the public… As the United States concedes, the Federal Government holds the "exclusive charge of enforcing immigration law…." Not only are other federal law enforcement agencies with different charges differently situated, "[f]or a state law to unconstitutionally discriminate against the federal government, it must treat comparable classes of federal and non-federal employees differently, not different classes of federal employees." Illinois, 796 F. Supp. 3d at 534

I would add that, as I explained in a recent post, the entire antidiscrimination element of the intergovernmental immunity doctrine is dubious, and should probably be overturned by the Supreme Court:

[T]he whole doctrine of intergovernmental immunity strikes me as bogus, judge-made law. There is no provision in the Constitution requiring it. And the federal government is not some historically oppressed minority group protected by the antidiscrimination provisions Fourteenth Amendment. Where state and local governments are otherwise free to refuse to help the feds, that autonomy should not be forfeited merely because they choose to support potentially similar activities by state or local governments, or by the private sector. Obviously, a district court cannot refuse to obey Supreme Court precedent in this field. But I hope the Supreme Court might someday reevaluate that precedent.

This is just the most recent of a long line of defeats for Trump in sanctuary city cases, in both his first and second administration. Judge Reyes cites close to a dozen such cases over the last year alone. I summarized this jurisprudence more fully in a post covering three other recent sanctuary cases, last month:

In cases where the administration has tried to directly coerce states and localities into cooperating, courts have rightly ruled this violates the Supreme Court's "anti-commandeering" precedents, a series of decisions reached primarily by conservative justices, which hold that the federal government may not force state and local governments to help enforce federal law or carry out under federal purposes. In cases where Trump has sought to withhold federal funds from sanctuary jurisdictions, courts have (also rightly) ruled that the executive cannot impose conditions on federal grants that were not authorized by Congress and (in some cases) that the Trump conditions are unconstitutionally coercive. For my analyses of Trump II court decisions on these issues, see here, here, and here.

My 2019 Texas Law Review article surveying and assessing litigation arising from Trump's first-term attacks on sanctuary jurisdictions. There and in other writings, I also explain why immigration sanctuaries (and conservative gun sanctuaries) are beneficial, and help protect our constitutional system. See also my February 2026 Dispatch article, "In Defense of Sanctuary Cities," which provides an overview of these issues, and defends sanctuary jurisdictions on both constitutional and policy grounds.

Yesterday's ruling may be appealed. But if so, it is unlikely to be overturned.

Trump has posted a few rare wins in sanctuary cases with unusual facts, such as in the Contracts Clause case I analyzed in the September post. But, such cases are highly exceptional. And, as explained in the September post, the Contracts Clause decision has various flaws, and would not greatly impede sanctuary jurisdictions even if it survives on appeal.

Overall, Trump has been losing these kinds of cases so much that he might even get tired of losing.

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