The Volokh Conspiracy

Mostly law professors | Sometimes contrarian | Often libertarian | Always independent | Est. 2002

The Volokh Conspiracy

Tariffs

Liberty Justice Center Files Lawsuit Challenging Trump's Section 122 Tariffs

LJC is the group with which I worked on the IEEPA tariff case decided by the Supreme Court.

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Today, the Liberty Justice Center filed, Burlap and Barrel, Inc. v. Trump, a lawsuit challenging Donald Trump's massive new Section 122 tariffs. LJC is the same group that I worked with on V.O.S. Selections v. Trump, the IEEPA tariff case decided by the Supreme Court last month. I am not one of the attorneys on this new case. But I completely support it and its objectives. This case is the second challenging the Section 122 tariffs, following one filed by 24 state governments, last week.

The LJC complaint is available here. Here is an excerpt from LJC's description of the new case:

On March 9, 2026, the Liberty Justice Center filed a lawsuit in the U.S. Court of International Trade challenging President Trump's attempt to reimpose broad global tariffs under Section 122 of the Trade Act of 1974, following the Supreme Court's landmark decision striking down the prior tariff regime imposed under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA).

After the Supreme Court held that the IEEPA does not authorize the President to impose tariffs, the administration announced a new plan: a global tariff beginning at 10 percent imposed under Section 122, and justified as a response to alleged "fundamental international payments problems" and "large and serious United States balance‑of‑payments deficits."

But the United States is not facing such a crisis. Section 122 was designed to address short‑term, balance‑of‑payments emergencies in a fixed‑exchange‑rate world—not to impose sweeping tariffs on nearly all imports based on long-standing trade deficits.

More fundamentally, the Constitution gives Congress—not the President—the power to impose tariffs and taxes. The Supreme Court reemphasized this principle in the case that included V.O.S. Selections, Inc. v. Trump, holding that the President cannot rely on broad statutory language to claim sweeping tariff authority that Congress never clearly granted.

By attempting to stretch Section 122 into a catch‑all tariff power, the administration is once again bypassing Congress and placing the burden of unlawful tariffs on American small businesses and consumers.

LJC's clients here are businesses that import goods subject to the new tariffs, and therefore undeniably have standing to challenge them.

In a recent Boston Globe article, I explained why the enormous Section 122 tariffs are illegal. In addition to going beyond the statutory text, they also run afoul of the "major questions" doctrine, and nondelegation limits on Congress' power to delegate its authority to the executive:

The three conservative justices in the majority in [the IEEPA] decision cited…. the "major questions doctrine," which requires Congress to "speak clearly" when authorizing the executive branch to make "decisions of vast economic and political significance."

They concluded that IEEPA did not clearly grant the president sweeping tariff authority. But the same is true of Section 122. At the very least, it is far from clear that it authorizes the president to impose 15 percent tariffs on goods from virtually every nation in the world, in a situation vastly different from that which inspired the law. And the effects of Trump's Section 122 tariffs would be large enough to qualify as a "major question." Within 150 days, the tariffs would impose some $30 billion in taxes on American businesses and inflict serious damage on the economy by raising prices and disrupting production in industries that depend on imports…..

Justice Neil Gorsuch's concurring opinion in the IEEPA case also relied on the nondelegation doctrine, which limits the extent to which Congress can delegate its authority to executive discretion. The limits of delegation are far from clear. But the Supreme Court held last year that a delegation of authority to impose taxes or fees must have a "floor" and a "ceiling" and that the degree of "guidance" required from Congress is greater "when an agency action will 'affect the entire national economy' than when it addresses a narrow, technical issue." The power to impose 15 percent tariffs — the highest tariffs since the disastrous Smoot-Hawley tariffs that exacerbated the Great Depression — is unquestionably one that affects the "entire national economy." And Trump's permissive interpretation of the law would let him impose those rates at almost any time.

Section 122 does limit tariff rates to 15 percent, creating a ceiling. But in that same ruling last year, the court emphasized that even a fixed numerical ceiling is not constraining enough if it leaves the executive with what amounts to "boundless power." The power to start a Great Depression-like trade war at will surely qualifies as such.

The LJC complaint raises the major questions and nondelegation issues more clearly and fully than that filed by the states. I am glad to see these issues will be considered.

Open Thread

Auto-post somehow failed today, so I've manually posted this. Enjoy as usual!

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Free Speech

Alleged Threats Against Alleged Groomers / Sex Traffickers of Minors Don't Justify Sealing of Personal Information / Pseudonymity

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First, the backstory from Courthouse News Service [Monique Merrill] about an earlier decision in the case denying the defendants' motion to dismiss:

A YouTuber must face claims that he groomed and assaulted two underage fans, a federal judge ruled on Wednesday.

James Jackson, known online by the name "Onision," and his spouse Lucas Jackson, known online as "Laineybot" or "Kai," did not convince a federal judge to dismiss claims brought by former fans who accused the couple of violating sex trafficking and minor abuse laws by enticing them across state lines and coercing them into commercial sex acts.

Regina Alonso and a plaintiff identified under the pseudonym Sarah sued the YouTubers in 2023, accusing the two of using their YouTube page to solicit explicit photos from them while they were underage and sexually assaulting Sarah while she was a minor.

Now, Friday's decision in Alonso v. Jackson by Judge John Chun (W.D. Wash.) about the sealing / pseudonymity questions:

Plaintiffs bring various claims against Defendants James and Lucas Jackson relating to alleged grooming and sex trafficking when Plaintiffs were minors.

Defendants move for an order … redacting and sealing "all past and future personal identifying information (PII)" appearing on the docket and accessible via PACER, including their home address, phone number, email addresses, last names, and household details" … [and] permitting them to proceed pseudonymously by using only their first names ….

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Free Speech

Lawsuit Over Cancellation of April 2024 Pro-Palestine Protest at U Texas Can Go Forward

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From Heilrayne v. Univ. of Texas at Austin, decided Jan. 27 by Judge David Ezra (W.D. Tex.) but just recently posted on Westlaw:

On April 23, 2024, the PSC [Palestine Solidarity Committee] at UT posted a notice on their Instagram account describing a protest for the following day. The notice advertised a walk-out of class, a meeting at Greg Plaza, and a "march to occupy the lawn." The post stated: "In the footsteps of our comrades at Columbia SJP, Rutgers-New Brunswick, Yale, and countless others across the nation, we will be establishing THE POPULAR UNIVERSITY FOR GAZA and demanding our administration divest from death." On April 24, the PSC posted again with a proposed schedule of events, including a walk-out of class, a guest speaker, two teach-ins, an art workshop, and study and food breaks, with the final event scheduled for 7:00 p.m.

In response, UT preemptively cancelled the event by sending notices to PSC student representatives, with one such notice dated April 23, 2024, and four others dated April 24, 2024. In those notices, UT states its reasons for cancellation as follows:

The Palestine Solidarity Committee student organization's event "Popular University for Gaza," which is planned for tomorrow, has declared intent to violate our policies and rules, and disrupt our campus operations. Such disruptions are never allowed and are especially damaging while our students prepare for the end of the semester and final exams. For these reasons, this event may not proceed as planned.

However, Plaintiffs allege such notice was not communicated to the broader student body or public until the protest was underway, at which time UT released its Event Cancellation Notice, dated April 23, 2024, to the press….

Plaintiffs were arrested and also subject to probation or deferred suspension as university discipline. They sued, claiming this violated the First and Fourth Amendments. The court concluded that plaintiffs had adequately alleged that the April 24 protest was canceled based on its viewpoint:

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Free Speech

Philosophy Prof, Discussion of Adult-Child Sex Bans, and the First Amendment

SUNY Fredonia philosophy professor had been barred from campus over podcast questioning illegality and immorality of adult-child sexual contact; a federal court has just allowed his First Amendment claim to go forward.

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From Kershnar v. Kolison, decided Friday by Judge Lawrence Vilardo (W.D.N.Y.):

Among the many topics he studies, [SUNY Fredonia philosophy professor Stephen] Kershnar is especially interested in the "moral and legal issues implicated by sexual conduct [between] adolescents and children." His scholarship questions "whether, as a moral matter, adult-child sex is always wrong, and why we should criminalize it" even though he believes that "as a legal matter, [it] should always be criminalized." "Kershnar argues that it is important that the arguments favoring criminalization of [adult-child sex] be scrutinized so that they are defensible, [because] 'if incorrect reasons are given recognition in support of morally legitimate laws,' like those against [adult-child sex], 'then th[o]se reasons may … be used to support morally illegitimate' laws."

Kershnar elaborated on these views during two podcast appearances. In December 2020, he appeared on an episode of Unregistered—a podcast hosted by an Occidental College professor—to discuss "the traditional philosophical justifications of age[-]of[-]consent laws in the United States." During that episode, he said that "it[ i]s not obvious to [him] why" adult-child sex is always "unlawful because … humans are designed by evolution to begin reproduction below the age of 18."

A little more than a year later, on January 30, 2022, Kershnar appeared on Brain in a Vat, a podcast described as "thought experiments and conversations with philosophers." During that appearance, Kershnar said:

Imagine that an adult male wants to have sex with a 12-year-old girl. Imagine that she's a willing participant. A very standard, very widely held view is that there's something deeply wrong about this, and it's wrong independent of being criminalized. It's not obvious to me that it is in fact wrong.

Similarly, in response to a question about "whether… [,] in an attempt to find a threshold of consent," a one-year-old could ever consent to sexual activity with an adult, Kershnar said:

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Free Speech

Court Upholds New York's Limits on Unauthorized Practice of Law

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From Upsolve, Inc. v. James, decided Friday by Judge Lewis Kaplan (S.D.N.Y.) (for the earlier decision reaching the opposite result, see this post):

The nonprofit Upsolve, Inc., wishes to train non-lawyers like the Rev. John Udo-Okon to provide free legal advice to consumers facing debt-collection lawsuits. But that conduct would violate New York's prohibition on the practice of law by anyone other than a licensed attorney. The question in this case is whether Upsolve and the Rev. Udo-Okon have a First Amendment right to engage in their proposed course of conduct notwithstanding the state's licensing law. For the reasons that follow, they do not….

In earlier proceedings, Judge Paul A. Crotty granted plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction. In finding that plaintiffs were likely to prevail on their free-speech claim, Judge Crotty held that the UPL Rules were a content-based regulation of speech that likely could not survive strict scrutiny….

In September 2025, the Second Circuit vacated the preliminary injunction. The court agreed with Judge Crotty that, as applied to "convey[ing] … legal advice to a client," the UPL Rules regulate speech. But it held that the UPL Rules are content neutral and therefore subject to only intermediate scrutiny. The court remanded for reconsideration of plaintiffs' entitlement to preliminary injunctive relief under that lower standard….

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AI in Court

Federal Government Lawyer's Filings Appear to Include "Fabricated Quotations and Misstatements of Case Holdings"

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From Magistrate Judge Robert Numbers (E.D.N.C.) Monday in Fivehouse v. U.S. Dep't of Defense; the government's lawyer has been a member of the bar for almost 30 years, and has worked in the U.S. Attorney's office since 2009 (according to an article in Bloomberg Law by Ben Penn):

The conduct at issue includes:

1. The inclusion of fabricated quotations and misstatements of case holdings in Defendants' response to Fivehouse's motion to supplement the administrative record (D.E. 86), including citations to Ohio Valley Environmental Coalition v. Aracoma Coal Co., 556 F.3d 177 (4th Cir. 2009), Dow AgroSciences, LLC v. National Marine Fisheries Service, 637 F.3d 259 (4th Cir. 2011), and Sierra Club v. United States Department of the Interior, 899 F.3d 260 (4th Cir. 2018).

2. The inclusion of a fabricated quotation in Defendants' response opposing Fivehouse's motion concerning compliance with Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 16 (D.E. 79), citing South Carolina Health & Human Services Finance Commission v. Sullivan, 915 F.2d 129, 130 (4th Cir. 1990).

3. The inclusion of a fabricated quotation in Defendants' response opposing Fivehouse's motion asking the court to take judicial notice of certain matters (D.E. 80), citing South Carolina Health & Human Services Finance Commission v. Sullivan, 915 F.2d 129, 130 (4th Cir. 1990).

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AI in Court

California Appeals Court Upholds Trial Court Order That Cited Hallucinated Cases

The nonexistent cases were first introduced by opposing counsel, but the appellant's lawyer didn't spot the error at the trial court, and submitted a proposed order to the trial court that cited those cases. That, the appeals court held, meant that appellant forfeited the right to challenge the decision.

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In Torres Campos v. Munoz, decided Thursday by the California Court of Appeal (Justice Martin Buchanan, joined by Justices Joan Irion and Truc Do), an ex-husband (Torres) had asked for shared custody and visitation rights to the family dog (Kyra, for the curious). The ex-wife (Munoz) was represented for free by her cousin (Bonar).

Bonar began by writing a letter declining Torres's request, citing two cases that ultimately proved to be nonexistent. When Torres went to court, Bonar filed an opposition with an attached declaration by Munoz, which cited one of the fictional cases. Torres's lawyer filed a reply declaration saying nothing about the case being fictional.

"The parties stipulated to have a court commissioner act as a temporary judge to hear the matter." That commissioner "made no visitation orders and directed Torres's counsel to submit a formal order after hearing"; that formal order was apparently supposed to be based on what went on at the hearing. (Requiring parties to submit such proposed orders summarizing the court's decision is pretty common in some trial court proceedings.) Then,

Torres's counsel submitted a proposed Findings and Order After Hearing, which the court approved as conforming to its oral ruling. The order cited the fictional Twigg and Teegarden cases as follows:

"The Court notes the follow[ing] cases: Marriage of Twigg (1984) 34 Cal.3d 926 and Marriage of Teegarden (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 1572 [(Teegarden)], in which the Court has to take the well-being and stability of the parties involved when deciding pet visitation and custody. Based on the testimony of Ms. Munoz and her mental state as it relates to the parties['] relationship, the Court finds it is not in the best interests of the parties['] mental stability for them to continue to interact with each other, and thus denies pet Custody.

"The Court further finds there is not a substantial relationship between Petitioner and the dog, Kyra, based on the lack of visitation in the past year."

Torres appealed, and in a motion before the briefs were filed, Bonar again cited the nonexistent cases. Only after that did Torres's lawyer "point[] out for the first time that the Twigg and Teegarden authorities cited in the court's order and in Munoz's opposition to the first motion to reinstate the appeal did not exist and were 'invented case law.'"

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Climate Change

Previewing Suncor Energy v. Boulder County

A Federalist Society forum on the first big case of OT 2026.

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Earlier today I participated in a Federalist Society Forum on the major climate change case on the docket for OT 2026: Suncor Energy v. Boulder County, a case I previewed here.

Joining me in the discussion were West Virginia Solicitor General Michael Williams and O.H. Skinner of the Alliance for Consumers. Annie Donaldson Talley of Luther Strange & Associates  moderated. Video below.

 

For those interested, here are my prior posts on this subject:

Politics

Short Circuit: An inexhaustive weekly compendium of rulings from the federal courts of appeal

Lies, damned lies, and statutes of limitations.

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Please enjoy the latest edition of Short Circuit, a weekly feature written by a bunch of people at the Institute for Justice.

Friends, we invite you to a stellar little event we're hosting on "The Other Declarations of 1776." As part of the nationwide celebration of 250 Years of America, we're partnering with the Liberty & Law Center at Scalia Law School for an examination of the various declarations of rights that the new states adopted in 1776. It's Friday, April 10 in Arlington, Va. Register here! And, if you want to learn more about The Other Declarations in the meantime, check out the latest blog post in our series, this week focusing on Maryland.

New on the Short Circuit podcast: A judicially engaged judge grants habeas when faced with a masked Fourth Amendment.

  1. The head of NYC schools' food services division co-owns a beef-importing business with executives from a company that supplies the schools with chicken. Second Circuit (unpublished): And since the chicken company executives upped his ownership stake in the beef business in exchange for letting some suspect chicken slide, lots of convictions on lots of counts affirmed all around.   Read More

Politics

The Fifth Circuit and the Louisiana 10 Commandments Law

The en banc court pushes pause--for now

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For the past year or so, those of us who follow the Religion Clauses have been waiting to see what courts would do with Louisiana's Ten Commandments law in Roake v. Brumley. Now we have an answer—though not a final one. A couple of weeks ago, sitting en banc, the Fifth Circuit vacated an earlier panel decision and dismissed the case on ripeness grounds. It's a technical ruling (though sticklers may dispute that ripeness is merely "technical"), but it's also revealing, because it shows that whether schools may display the Decalogue will depend on how the practice actually operates in context.

Here's the background. In 2024, Louisiana enacted a statute requiring every public school classroom to display the Ten Commandments. The law specifies the text to be used and requires a statement describing the Commandments' historical role in American education, but it leaves the details largely to local school authorities.

Parents filed a pre-enforcement challenge in federal court. They argued the displays would violate the Establishment Clause under Stone v. Graham, the Supreme Court's 1980 decision striking down a similar Kentucky requirement. The district court agreed and issued a preliminary injunction, and a Fifth Circuit panel affirmed. The panel reasoned that lower courts remain bound by Stone unless and until the Supreme Court overrules it.

In its ruling, the en banc Fifth Circuit declined to reach the constitutional question. Because no school district had yet implemented the law—no posters are on classroom walls yet—the court held that the dispute was premature. In effect, the court said, we need to see how this actually works in practice before we can decide whether the displays violate the Establishment Clause.

This ruling sidesteps a deeper doctrinal question. The Stone Court relied heavily on the Lemon framework, particularly the idea that government may not act with the purpose of promoting religion. The Stone Court also emphasized the special features of the public-school setting: students are a captive audience and especially susceptible to state-sponsored religious influence.

But the Court's more recent Establishment Clause cases have moved in a different direction. In Kennedy v. Bremerton School District (2022), a school prayer case, the Court rejected the Lemon framework and instructed courts instead to look to the nation's "history and tradition," though the Kennedy Court also emphasized coercion—whether students are pressured to participate in religious exercise—as a central constitutional concern.

The difficulty is this: the Supreme Court has not overruled Stone, but it has abandoned the doctrinal foundation on which Stone rests. Lower courts are left reading the tea leaves. The Fifth Circuit panel resolved the tension one way—follow Stone until the Supreme Court says otherwise. The en banc court found a different solution. It avoided the merits altogether and ruled the case unripe until concrete facts exist.

That ripeness holding is technical (there's that word again), but I think it's analytically significant. It suggests that context will matter a great deal under the Court's newer approach. Details such as the age of the students, the way the display is presented, and whether it is integrated into instruction will all shape the constitutional analysis.

Sooner or later, a school district will implement the Louisiana statute. When it does, litigation will resume—this time with an actual record. Courts will then have to confront the central question directly: Is Stone still good law after Kennedy?

I discuss the Fifth Circuit's en banc decision in more detail in a short Legal Spirits podcast episode, which you can listen to here.

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