The Volokh Conspiracy

Mostly law professors | Sometimes contrarian | Often libertarian | Always independent | Est. 2002

The Volokh Conspiracy

Politics

Happy Saturnalia

Another year of the the Volokh Conspiracy tradition of marking the occasion of this ancient Roman holiday.

|

NA

Today is Saturnalia, an ancient Roman holiday with a long tradition here at the Volokh Conspiracy. Admittedly, it's tradition only in so far as I have put up a post about it almost every December 17 since 2006. But, by internet standards, that's a truly ancient tradition, indeed!

The Encyclopedia Romana has a helpful description of Saturnalia:

During the holiday, restrictions were relaxed and the social order inverted. Gambling was allowed in public. Slaves were permitted to use dice and did not have to work. . . Within the family, a Lord of Misrule was chosen. Slaves were treated as equals, allowed to wear their masters' clothing, and be waited on at meal time in remembrance of an earlier golden age thought to have been ushered in by the god. In the Saturnalia, Lucian relates that "During My week the serious is barred; no business allowed. Drinking, noise and games and dice, appointing of kings and feasting of slaves, singing naked, clapping of frenzied hands, an occasional ducking of corked faces in icy water—such are the functions over which I preside."

As in most years, we have no shortage of strong candidates for the position of Lord of Misrule. But the current occupant of the White House has a particularly compelling claim to the title.

Happy Saturnalia to all the friends, Romans, and Volokh Conspiracy readers out there!

NOTE: Most of this post is adopted from previous Saturnalia posts.

China

Trump's Attempt to Deport Chinese Dissident Guan Heng is Part of an Awful Pattern

The administration has sought to deport numerous dissenters back to their oppressors.

|

Guan Heng pictured on a background with images about immigration and detainment camps
Guan Heng. (Illustration: Adani Samat Photo: guanguanofficial/Youtube)

 

The Trump Administration's effort to deport Chinese dissident Guan Heng has rightly drawn widespread outrage and condemnation. Guan is a hero for his exposure of the Chinese government's oppression and persecution of the Uyghur minority, and he faces near-certain imprisonment or death if he is deported to China, or to Uganda (a Chinese-aligned state to which the Trump administration may be trying to send him). Legally, he has an rock-solid case for asylum.

Sadly, the effort to deport Guan is part of a broader pattern of Trump administration efforts to deport dissidents and victims of persecution back to the regimes that oppress them. These policies now include deporting Russian dissidents back to Vladimir Putin's brutal dictatorship, refugees who fled oppression in Cuba and Venezuela, Iranian Christians who fled persecution by that country's radical Islamist regime, and Afghans who fled the Taliban (including many who aided the US during the war). Such policies are obviously cruel and unjust. They are also strategically counterproductive.

A policy that essentially aids anti-American regimes in their persecution of dissidents undermines our position in the international war of ideas between these governments' ideologies and ours, and deters future would-be dissidents and allies from working against those governments or aiding us. This isn't making America Great Again. It's making us simultaneously evil and stupid.

Jewish Plaintiffs in Establishment Clause Cases

|

I was doing some research on Establishment Clause cases, and noticed the plaintiffs in several leading cases were Jewish. I'm sure I'm missing others.

In Braunfeld v. Brown (1961), Abraham Braunfeld and the other plaintiffs were "member[s] of the Orthodox Jewish faith, which requires the closing of their places of business and a total abstention from all manner of work from nightfall each Friday until nightfall each Saturday."

In Engel v. Vitale (1962), Steven Engel was described as a "devout Reform Jew."

In Flast v. Cohen (1968), the lead plaintiff was Florence Flast. Several sources indicated he was Jewish, but nothing definitive. The other plaintiffs were Albert Shanker, Helen D. Henkin, Frank Abrams, C. Irving Dwork, Florine Levin. I would surmise that at least some of these plaintiffs were Jewish as well. Cohen, the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare, was Jewish.

In Lee v. Weisman (1992), student Deborah Weisman was Jewish, and objected to a graduation message delivered by Rabbi Leslie Gutterman, of Temple Beth El in Providence.

In Elk Grove Unified School District v. Newdow (2004), Michael Newdow's mother was "Jewish but secular."

In Town of Greece v. Galloway (2014), Susan Galloway was Jewish.

In Lemon v. Kurtzman (1971), Alton Lemon, the lead plaintiff was not Jewish, but the respondent, David Kurtzman, the Superintendent of Public Instruction, was Jewish.

Update: I found a detailed article that provides a somewhat critical analysis of Jews and the Establishment Clause. Here is a snippet:

Pfeffer and the leading Jewish organizations were gratified by the decisions in McCollum, Torcaso, Engel, and Schempp. These decisions did much more than change the law. They theoretically redefined, in educational institutions throughout America, the place of Christian values and traditions in American culture. Gregg Ivers describes the Engel and Schempp decisions "as the moral equivalent of a dagger through the heart of the traditional Christian values so long embodied in the American civic and religious cultural milieu."268 The alienation and discomfort that Jews had felt on American soil since 1654 were now officially redeemed. The time had come for the nation to journey on a new, secular expressway.

Not all Jews greeted these Court decisions with a spirit of triumph. One Jewish resident of Los Angeles sent Pfeffer the following message: "I feel that because of you and your ilk, in all the civilized nations of the world the most despised, spat upon, hated and shunned person is the Jew."269 Another warned him: "You are getting we [sic] the Jews in a terrible mess, keep it up and we shall all again be persecuted."270 A Christian responded in a similar fashion: "Your motives seem small, petty and personal."271

L. Scott Smith, The Secularization of America's Public Culture: Jews and the Establishment Clause, 32 U. La Verne L. Rev. 257, 293 (2011)

Free Speech

Free Speech Unmuted: Does the First Amendment Protect Supposedly "Addictive" Algorithms?, with Matthew Lawrence

|

Can the government regulate social media features because they are "addictive"? Jane Bambauer and I talk with Emory Law professor Matthew Lawrence about whether features like infinite scroll, personalized feeds, "near-miss" reward patterns, and dopamine-driven engagement tactics are comparable to gambling or even drug addiction—and whether that means the government can step in. The conversation digs into current lawsuits, whether there's a constitutionally significant difference between content and design, how addiction is defined in law and neuroscience, and what First Amendment limits exist when regulating digital platforms. A smart, fast-moving discussion for anyone curious about the future of free speech, tech regulation, and the psychology behind our screens.

Our past episodes:

Read More

Search and Seizure

Suspicion That Man Fiddling with Phone Might Be "Filming School Children" Doesn't Justify Detention by Police

"To hold otherwise would allow police officers to demand identification from anyone near a school while using a smartphone—parents taking first-day-of-school videos, a grandparent trying to pull up directions while in the school drop-off line, or dog walkers holding their phone near their chest."

|

From Judge Daniel Crabtree's opinion yesterday in Alea v. Ptacek (D. Kan.):

Plaintiff Galicano Alea was walking his dog on a sidewalk adjacent to a public middle school. He was fiddling with his phone to adjust his music selection. But to defendant Julian Garcia, a police officer, it appeared that plaintiff was filming school children. So, he detained plaintiff and demanded identification. Plaintiff refused. Officer Garcia eventually released plaintiff, who continued his walk. Still on school property, plaintiff then encountered a second officer, defendant Scott Ptacek. Officer Ptacek detained plaintiff and demanded identification. When plaintiff refused, Officer Ptacek arrested him for interference with a law enforcement officer. Six months later, prosecuting authorities dismissed all charges against plaintiff. Plaintiff now has sued the officers for violating his Fourth Amendment rights….

Though plaintiff's conduct arguably appeared creepy, Officer Garcia, lacking reasonable suspicion, lacked a lawful basis for the detention. And Officer Ptacek lacked a lawful basis to arrest plaintiff for refusing identification. To hold otherwise would allow police officers to demand identification from anyone near a school while using a smartphone—parents taking first-day-of-school videos, a grandparent trying to pull up directions while in the school drop-off line, or dog walkers holding their phone near their chest….

[D]efendants offer just one crime to support their reasonable-suspicion position: reckless stalking as defined by Kan. Stat. Ann. § 21-5427(a)(1) …:

Recklessly engaging in a course of conduct targeted at a specific person which would cause a reasonable person in the circumstances of the targeted person to fear for such person's safety, or the safety of a member of such person's immediate family and the targeted person is actually placed in such fear[.]

Defendants identify three factors they contend supported reasonable suspicion: the weekend reports about someone photographing children at pools and parks; plaintiff walking near the school during drop-off hours; and plaintiff ostensibly filming children. The court considers each fact, in turn, below, then considers all three of them together….

Read More

Evidence

Self-Represented Litigants Can't Be Denied Right to Object to Witness Testimony

|

From Beslow v. Jason, decided yesterday by the Virginia Court of Appeals by Judge Daniel Ortiz, joined by Judges Randolph Beales and Vernida Chaney; the underlying dispute was whether to let a stepmother adopt her husband's child, over the other mother's objection:

At trial, both parties testified to their fitness as parents and the interests of the child. On direct examination, the Beslows [the stepmother] asked Jason [the mother] about her relationship with the child. The Beslows objected when Jason testified that the child said the Beslows would not let her talk to Jason anymore.

The trial court overruled the objection because Jason was answering the Beslows' question, then prohibited the Beslows from making objections as non-attorneys. Jason then explained that she was opposed to the petition for adoption, alleging Shamila was abusive. The Beslows again objected to Jason's testimony as hearsay. The trial court overruled the objection, and reminded the Beslows, "I told you a little while ago that because you're not counsel you're not able to object to evidence." Jason later introduced into evidence pictures of herself and the child, a call log showing calls she made to Vernon's cell phone for her weekly telephone visitation, whether the calls were answered or missed, and text messages the child sent her.

The guardian ad litem noted that the child had been successful at school and enjoyed living with the Beslows. The Beslows enrolled the child in multiple activities and tried to help the child regulate her emotions, which were complicated by ADHD and the presentation of autism. Shamila volunteered at the child's school, helped with a field trip, and ensured that the child attended appointments, practices, and school.

The trial court found that Jason had not abandoned the seven-year-old child and consistently sought custody, and there was no evidence that she could not care for the child financially or otherwise. It further found that the Beslows attempted to limit Jason's visitation with the child, but that they provided a suitable home for the child, and the adoption would not affect physical custody. Based on those findings, the trial court ruled that Jason's withholding of her consent to the adoption was not contrary to the best interests of the child, and denied the petition for adoption….

Read More

Free Speech

Ex-FBI Agents Suing Over Allegedly Retaliatory Firings Can Sue Pseudonymously

|

From Chief Judge James Boasberg (D.D.C.) Monday in Does v. Patel:

Plaintiffs are twelve former FBI Special Agents who allege that they were summarily dismissed from the FBI in September 2025 in retaliation for actions they took five years ago to de-escalate civil unrest in downtown Washington, D.C., following the death of George Floyd. Asserting that the terminations violated their First and Fifth Amendment rights, they seek declaratory and injunctive relief, including reinstatement, expungement of personnel records, and backpay.

They now move to proceed pseudonymously, contending that public identification would expose them and their families to immediate risk of doxing, harassment, and physical harm and would also significantly impair their ability to perform sensitive law-enforcement work if reinstated. The Court will grant the Motion, subject to any further consideration by the United States District Judge to whom this case is randomly assigned.

Read More

Free Speech

N.Y. Synagogue Allowed to Fire Teacher for Anti-Zionist Blog Post

|

Map of statutory private employee speech protections throughout the country.

 

[1.] The First Amendment applies only to the government, and thus doesn't limit private employers from firing employees based on their speech. But many states have statutes that do impose such limitations, as the map above suggests. (For more on this, see my  Private Employees' Speech and Political Activity: Statutory Protection Against Employer Retaliation and Should the Law Limit Private-Employer-Imposed Speech Restrictions? articles.)

Some of these statutes broadly protect a wide range of employee speech. Others protect particular forms of election-related activity: New York, for instance, bans employers from firing employees for campaigning for a candidate or raising funds for a candidate, party, or political advocacy group.

But New York also bans employers from firing employees for off-the-job "legal recreational activities," defined as

any lawful, leisure-time activity, for which the employee receives no compensation and which is generally engaged in for recreational purposes, including but not limited to sports, games, hobbies, exercise, reading and the viewing of television, movies and similar material.

There is also an exception for activity that "creates a material conflict of interest related to the employer's trade secrets, proprietary information or other proprietary or business interest."

Does blogging, Tweeting, etc. qualify as "recreational activities," much as "reading and the viewing of television, movies and similar material" qualifies? In yesterday's Sander v. Westchester Reform Temple, the N.Y. high court (in a majority opinion by Judge Caitlin Halligan for five of the seven judges) notes the issue but doesn't resolve it:

Read More

Trump v. Slaughter was Trump v. United States Redux

But what does "conclusive and preclusive" actually mean?

|

Since Trump v. United States was decided, I have remained uncertain how the case would fit into the constitutional canon. It was unlikely that a former President would be indicted for actions taken while he was in office. How would this case interact with other aspects of the Supreme Court's separation of powers jurisprudence?

Trump v. Slaughter provides an answer. During oral argument, there was an extended discussion of the "conclusive and preclusive" standard. That phrase appears more than thirty times in the transcript! Indeed, I'm not even sure how Slaughter would have been argued without Trump v. United States. Then again, if Trump had come out the other way, we likely would not have a President Trump, and Rebecca Kelly Slaughter would still be working at the FTC.

Solicitor General Sauer repeatedly invoked Trump v. United States. For example, Sauer said the President's removal power was "conclusive and preclusive, so any review of arguably bad reasons for the President to remove an executive officer would be subject to the political process." He maintained that removal is not "subject to judicial review and certainly not subject to statutes regulating that."

Amit Agarwal, counsel for Slaughter, also favorably cited the immunity decision several times. Agarwal was pressed on which executive agencies could be converted into five-member commissions. His answer, given in various ways, turned on the "conclusive and preclusive" standard. For example, Agarwal told Chief Justices Roberts:

I think it's probably a pretty small universe in terms of the numbers that could be wholesale transformed [into commissions] as they are currently constituted. Why? Because it appears that the vast majority of executive departments wield at least some powers that this Court would deem to be conclusive and preclusive, including under the standard that this Court enunciated in Trump.

However, Agarwal couldn't quite pin down how much "conclusive and preclusive" powers would prevent Congress from converting an agency into a commission.

JUSTICE GORSUCH: I want to know where the threshold of preclusive and conclusive comes in. . . . Is it a mere scintilla? . . .  So long as one person in the agency's exercising conclusive and preclusive, whatever that means, that's enough?

MR. AGARWAL: Yeah. So it's enough to have a separation of powers. And I wouldn't just say a person. I would say a principal officer. It's enough to generate a separation-of-powers problem.

Later, Justice Alito returned to the scintilla point, and Agarwal seemed to backtrack, though I am not certain:

ALITO: Okay. I thought . . . you said a mere scintilla would not be enough. But now you say a mere scintilla would be enough to cause a problem.

AGARWAL: I may have misspoken before, Justice Alito, and if I did, I apologize. But our position is that if a multi-member agency is vested with the President's conclusive and preclusive powers and it is insulated from at-will presidential approval --supervision, that is a separation-of-powers problem.

So what does "conclusive and preclusive" actually mean? Here is the key passage from Trump v. United States, which borrowed from Justice Jackson's Youngstown concurrence:

Read More

The Lower Court Revolt Continues in Boston

Judge Brian Murphy will likely be reversed by SCOTUS a third time in the same case.

|

In September, my Civitas Outlook column chronicled the failed lower court revolt. I focused on several cases where federal judges, mostly in Boston, disregarded rulings from the Supreme Court's emergency dockets. Some of these judges maintained that they still did not know that these rulings were precedential. I would have thought Justice Gorsuch's concurrence in NIH v. APHA settled the matter. He wrote, "when this Court issues a decision, it constitutes a precedent that commands respect in lower courts." Gorsuch added that "This Court's precedents, however, cannot be so easily circumvented." But judges still are resisting.

Judge Wynn of the Fourth Circuit, who is able to read election results, is unable to read the emergency docket.

"They're leaving the circuit courts, the district courts out in limbo," said Judge James Wynn, an Obama appointee, during oral arguments in a case about the Department of Government Efficiency employees' access to Social Security data. "We're out here flailing. … I'm not criticizing the justices. They're using a vehicle that's there, but they are telling us nothing. They could easily just give us direction and we would follow it."

"They cannot get amnesia in the future because they didn't write an opinion on it. Write an opinion," Wynn said. "We need to understand why you did it. We judges would just love to hear your reasoning as to why you rule that way. It makes our job easier. We will follow the law. We will follow the Supreme Court, but we'd like to know what it is we are following."

Speaking of amnesia, Judge Wynn is unable to remember why he decided to rescind his senior status.

Judge Brian Murphy, another judge in Boston, has also missed the memo. Indeed, Judge Murphy has already been stayed by SCOTUS twice in the same case. As I explained in September:

The first line of cases involves the executive branch's power to deport. Department of Homeland Security v. D.V.D. considered whether the government could deport certain aliens to South Sudan, which is known as a "third country." Right on cue, a federal judge in Boston blocked the removals. As a result, federal immigration officials were forced to hold the aliens at a military base in the African nation of Djoubti, because the judge ordered them to stay put. On June 23, the Supreme Court reversed the lower court's ruling, allowing the deportations to proceed. Justices Sotomayor, Kagan, and Jackson dissented. Yet, remarkably, the lower court didn't get the memo. Mere hours after the Supreme Court ruled, the Boston judge declared that another one of his earlier rulings "remain[ed] in full force and effect" notwithstanding the Supreme Court's order. Indeed, the judge cited Justice Sotomayor's dissent as authority.

The Department of Justice filed an unusual "motion for clarification" with the Supreme Court. The filing stated that the Boston judge's ruling was "a lawless act of defiance that, once again, disrupts sensitive diplomatic relations and slams the brakes on the Executive's lawful efforts to effectuate third-country removals." On July 3, the Supreme Court reversed this lower court, again. Most judges can go their entire career without a single ruling reaching the Supreme Court. However, this judge was reversed by the Supreme Court twice within a span of two weeks. The Supreme Court recognized that the lower court may have "failed to give effect to an order of this Court." But the Court assumed that the lower court would "now conform its order to our previous" ruling. Even Justice Kagan felt compelled to speak up. She did "not see how a district court can compel compliance with an order that this Court has stayed." It shouldn't take two Supreme Court orders for a Boston judge to figure out how to proceed. But this case is not an anomaly.

A benchslap from Justice Kagan didn't even leave a mark.

Fast forward to today. Judge Murphy held a hearing to decide this case on the merits. And he still maintains that the Supreme Court has told him nothing about the case.

"I can't read anything into what the Supreme Court told me," Murphy said, responding to a government attorney's citation to the high court's exhortation that their emergency docket rulings demand respect from lower courts.

"They didn't tell me anything," Murphy said. "I don't know why the Supreme Court issued a stay because in the decision by the Supreme Court I didn't get any information about why."

Murphy added:

"Murphy said that despite the lack of reasoning in the Supreme Court's order, he was "not going to try to circle around that," and he suggested that any decision he issues at this stage of the case would be subject to at least a temporary stay."

Has any judge ever been reversed by the Supreme Court three times in a single case? Third time's the charm!

Certainly the judges of the First Circuit must be pulling their hair out. Just this week, three Biden appointees had to reverse Judge Talwani, who once again found that defunding Planned Parenthood was unconstitutional. As Ed Whelan put it, "Three Biden appointees overturn Judge Talwani—and spare Supreme Court the burden of having to do so."

What is going on in Boston? Is there something in the water?

Roe as Humphrey's Executor, Casey as Morrison, and Dobbs as Slaughter

Casey attempted to save Roe by rewriting it, but that compromise ultimately collapsed in Dobbs. Morrison attempted to save Humphrey's Executor by rewriting it, but that compromise will (likely) collapse in Slaughter.

|

The Supreme Court's abortion jurisprudence can be plotted as three primary points: Roe v. Wade, Planned Parenthood v. Casey, and Dobbs v. Jackson Women's Health Organization. The line between these precedents was not straight. Indeed, Casey effectively rewrote Roe; Casey abandoned Roe's trimester framework; Casey found that the state has "legitimate interests" from the outset of pregnancy to protect both the health of the woman and the life of the fetus; Casey abandoned Roe's application of strict scrutiny to protect the "fundamental" right to abortion. In dissent, Justice Scalia rebuked the majority for preaching fidelity to stare decisis while rewriting precedent. He famously wrote, "I confess never to have heard of this new, keep-what-you-want-and-throw-away-the-rest version." Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter tried to "call[] the contending sides of a national controversy to end their national division by accepting a common mandate rooted in the Constitution." But these judges of wisdom grossly erred in their judgment. Casey did little to settle the contentious debates over abortion. And in Dobbs, the Supreme Court at last extricated the judiciary from this conflict.

There are parallels between the three primary abortion cases and the three primary removal power cases: Humphrey's Executor, Morrison v. Olson, and now Slaughter. Humphrey's Executor established a rule with no basis in the Constitution that shifted power from the executive branch to the legislative branch. In much the same way, Roe v. Wade established a rule with no basis in the Constitution that shifted power in a different direction--from the popular branches to the judiciary. As Justice Gorsuch quipped in Slaughter, the Court invented "quasi" things. And just like Casey rewrote Roe, Chief Justice Rehnquist, recognizing how problematic Humphrey's Executor was, had to rewrite the precedent to save it. Like in Casey, decided several years later, Justice Scalia pointed out the Morrison majority failed to adhere to stare decisis. Scalia quipped, "Humphrey's Executor is swept into the dustbin of repudiated constitutional principles," but he would not "grieve for the shoddy treatment given today to Humphrey's Executor, which, after all, accorded the same indignity (with much less justification)" to Myers v. United States.  During oral argument in Slaughter, John Sauer explained that Morrison "gutted and refurbished" Humphrey's Executor, and "repudiated correctly the idea that there are these quasi-judicial and quasi-legislative powers that are outside the executive power." For decades, Casey was been under relentless attack. And for much the same time, Morrison has faced similar pressure. Humphrey's Executor still comes as a wolf, or as John Sauer explained, the Fenris. And since the Morrison compromise cannot hold, Humphrey's Executor should, and likely will be reversed in Slaughter

There are some further parallels. Humphrey's Executor shifted power from the executive branch to the legislative branch. Morrison v. Olson upheld most of that shift, but purported to place some limits. Roe v. Wade shifted power from the popular branches to the judiciary. Casey upheld most of that shift, but purported to place some limits. Both Humphrey's Executor and Roe v. Wade distorted political accountability, by moving power away from those who are charged with exercising that power: the executive surrendered their executive power to "independent" agencies, and the states surrendered their police power to the courts. 

There are also some differences.Ted Olson did not ask the Supreme Court to overrule Humphrey's Executor in Morrison v. Olson, though the United States asked the Court to overrule Roe in Casey. In both Morrison and Casey, Justice Scalia pointed out that the Court felt compelled to rewrite a decaying precedent as a means of saving it. In Slaughter, the executive branch has squarely asked the Court to overrule Humphrey's Executor. Solicitor General Sauer accurately described Humphrey's Executor as a "decaying husk with bold and particularly dangerous pretensions," that has been "thoroughly" eroded by Morrison, as well as Trump v. United States (more on that case in a future post.).

Morrison v. Olson is not directly at issue in Slaughter, but any decision overruling Humphrey's Executor will vindicate Justice Scalia, whom Sauer rightly called "one of the greatest jurists in the history of the Court." And if Humphrey's Executor is overruled, I do not think the independent counsel statute could ever be resurrected, and the special counsel regulations likely would not stand.

Are There Fourth Amendment Rights in Google Search Terms?

A noteworthy decision, even if there's no majority opinion.

|

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court handed down its long-awaited ruling in Commonwealth v. Kurtz today, on whether there are Fourth Amendment rights in Google search terms.  Among the seven Justices, three took on that question and said no, the Fourth Amendment and the state constitution do not apply.  (One Justice said that she would say no if she had to reach it, but she didn't have to reach it, so she would not take a position.)

In the case, the police were trying to find out who committed a sexual assault of a person known in the opinion by her initials, "K.M." Police figured that whoever committed this crime may have googled K.M.'s name or address before committing the crime.  Investigators obtained what is known as a "reverse keyword search warrant," asking for Google to hand over the I.P. address of whoever may have googled the name or address of the victim shortly before the crime.  Google responded that someone at a particular I.P. address had conducted two searches for K.M.'s address a few hours before the attack.  The I.P. address was in use at the home of the defendant, Kurtz.  The police had not suspected Kurtz in the crime, but they started to watch Kurtz closely, obtained a DNA sample, and found a DNA match from the crime.

Kurtz challenged the warrant, arguing that it was not based on probable cause.  The government responded that whether the warrant was valid or not was irrelevant, as there are no Fourth Amendment rights in search terms.  The first issue in Kurtz was whether the traditional third-party doctrine applies, under which you don't have Fourth Amendment rights in information you share with others, or whether search terms are protected by the Fourth Amendment under the  exception to the third party doctrine carved out in Carpenter v. United States(2018) applied instead.

Writing for a total of three of the seven Justices, Justice Wecht agreed with the government that the third-party doctrine applies and that search terms are not covered by the exception to that doctrine carved out by Carpenter:

Resolution of the central question in this case—whether a person has an expectation of privacy in his or her unprotected internet searches—rests upon whether such actions are governed by Carpenter's "narrow" rejection of the third-party doctrine, or fall instead under the traditional third-party doctrine. The Court's deviation from the traditional doctrine in Carpenter in large part was predicated upon the inextricable relationship between the contemporary person and his or her device. Because the Court considered mobile devices to be "indispensable to participation in modern society," the Carpenter Court held that their use in public is an unavoidable part of modern life. As such, the Court held, a person does not make a voluntary choice to place CSLI generated by cell phone use into the hands of third parties. Rather, such transmission happens automatically.

Read More

Parental Rights

Mother's Telling Children She Thinks Thor Actor Chris Hemworth Is Their "Spiritual Father" Didn't Preclude Award of Custody to Her

"There was also evidence presented regarding Liza's alleged delusional thinking and hallucinations. Eli testified that Liza told him Kenneth was his physical father, but actor Chris Hemsworth was his spiritual father. Eli also testified that for years Liza had talked about having another daughter someday, whom she would name Phoebe, and Hemsworth would be the father. Brigham testified that Liza told him she believed Hemsworth was the children's father." Plus unschooling, unbathing, and more.

|

A short excerpt from the long opinion in Trent v. Trent, decided today by Nebraska Court of Appeals Judge Michael Pirtle, joined by Judges Lawrence Welch and PaTricia Freeman; the court affirmed the trial court's grant of custody to the mother (Liza):

Kenneth and Liza were married in June 2004 in the state of Washington. The parties had six children: Kyryi, born in 2005; Eli, born in 2006; Lailah, born in 2007; Levi, born in 2009, Brigham, born in 2011; and Cal, born in 2013….

Although Kenneth lists multiple reasons in his two assignments of error as to why Liza should not be awarded custody, he only specifically argues a few of them. Kenneth first argues that Liza had neglected the children's education by using the unschooling method to home school the children. {The method is an unstructured, child-driven education process where the children decide what to study and develop their own study strategies. There are no grades and no tests.} {During the divorce proceedings, Kenneth asked that the children be required to take independent testing to determine where they stood in their peer group with regard to their education. Liza testified that all the children, except Levi, tested either equivalent to or above their respective peer group. Kenneth would not admit at trial that with the exception of Levi, all of the children scored at least consistent with their peer group. He stated, "That's not how I read the test results."}

However, the court awarded the parties joint legal custody on the issue of education and gave Kenneth final decision-making authority as to home schooling or public/private school attendance. Therefore, the court essentially resolved Kenneth's concern regarding the children's education.

Kenneth next argues Liza should not have custody because of her parenting approach to personal hygiene, as well as the unkept condition of her home. Regarding hygiene, there was evidence that the children do not bathe in the traditional sense that most people do. The children do not shower or take baths on a regular basis, but, rather, they spot clean themselves and only bathe when they are dirty or have body odor. Similarly, the children do not brush their teeth on a daily basis, but, rather, only when they feel their teeth are dirty.

Regarding the condition of Liza's home, [court-ordered family counselor Theodore] DeLaet noted from his home visit that Liza's dining room had essentially been converted into a rabbit pen, Lailah's room also had a rabbit pen and stained carpet, and Cal's room smelled of body odor. Liza also pointed out various home repairs that needed to be made, but she could not afford them. DeLaet also observed that Liza and the children did not interact as a family during his visit.

Read More

Copyright

Franklin the Turtle Sues in the Court of Federal Claims for a Reasonable Licensing Fee (Well, Not Yet)

|

There's been some talk about whether the Administration's use of Franklin the Turtle in various memes (e.g., "Franklin Becomes a Deportation Judge," shown above) is copyright infringement. My sense is that it probably would be: It uses a copyrighted character, and it likely isn't a fair use, despite its noncommercial character.

To oversimplify vastly, use of a work to make fun of the work itself (or to otherwise comment on it) generally tends to be fair use, see Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music (1994): You just can't have an effective parody or commentary on a work without including enough of the underlying work. But use of a work to comment on something else, even in a humorous way, generally tends not to be fair use. See, e.g., Dr. Seuss Enterprises v. Penguin Books (9th Cir. 1997). The question for parody fair use purposes is generally whether the use is "reasonably necessary to achieve the user's new purpose" and "'needs to mimic [the] original to make its point,'" see Andy Warhol Foundation v. Goldsmith (2023); that seems not to be so here. To be sure, the fair use inquiry is notoriously mushy, so it's hard to predict for certain; but that's my best guess.

At the same time, even if this is an infringement and not a fair use, the usual panoply of copyright remedies that would normally be available—including injunctions, potentially massive statutory damages, and potential attorney fees—will be largely unavailable. A federal statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1498(b), provides that the exclusive remedies for this are just actual damages (or, if the owner elects, the minimum statutory damages, which will likely be $750), and that the plaintiff has to sue in the Court of Federal Claims to get them. No injunctions; no recovery of attorney fees or costs. And actual damages would likely just be a reasonable license fee:

Read More

More
Make a donation today! No thanks
Yes! I want to put my money where your mouth is! Not interested
I’ll donate to Reason right now! No thanks
My donation today will help Reason push back! Not today
Yes, I’ll donate to Reason today! No thanks
Yes, I’ll support Reason today! No thanks
Yes, I’ll donate to Reason today! No thanks
Yes, I’ll donate to Reason today! No thanks
Yes, I’ll donate to Reason today! No thanks
Yes, I’ll donate to Reason today! No thanks
Yes, I’ll donate to Reason today! No thanks
Yes, I’ll donate to Reason today! No thanks