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Guns

The Second Amendment and Foster Parents

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From a South Carolina Attorney General opinion issued last week:

Dear Representative Gilliam:
You seek our opinion "on a matter important to all South Carolinians, especially those among us who are serving as foster parents to the over 4,500 South Carolina youths in foster care." Specifically, your letter states:

… [o]ur concerns and answers to our questions [require resolution] so that these dedicated volunteers retain their Second Amendment right to keep and bear arms—uninfringed—while they provide their generous and valuable help to children in need.

It is my understanding that caseworkers and other officials with the South Carolina Department of Social Services [SCDSS] are prohibiting foster parents from adopting a foster child so long as any firearms are present in their home.

Our research has not found any state code requiring a complete deaccession of household firearms by foster parents who are considering adoption of a foster child. [The opinion then cites SCDSS regulations and policies that require foster parents to generally keep firearms "stored in an inoperative condition in a locked area inaccessible to children." -EV] …

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The Shortest SCOTUS Oral Argument In The Modern Era?

Coney Island Auto Parts, Inc. v. Burton was over in 37 minutes.

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Today I attended oral argument at the Supreme Court. The first case of the day was Coney Island Auto Parts, Inc. v. Burton. This was not exactly a high-profile dispute. I had assigned this case in my Supreme Court simulation class, but I had a personal interest in the dispute. My mom grew up in Seagate, Brooklyn, about three miles from the auto shop. And Daniel Ginzburg represented the petitioner. The solo practitioner from Freehold, New Jersey was making his debut before the Supreme Court. His office was about 30 miles from my childhood home in Staten Island. This case felt very homey for me.

The question presented was fun, but nerdy: "Whether Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(c)(1) imposes any time limit to set aside a void default judgment for lack of personal jurisdiction."

Ginzburg told Bloomberg Law that big firms offered to take over the case, but he decided to argue it himself:

He said he rejected big firms' offer to work with him on this case because he thought this one "had a shot, and I didn't want to give up the opportunity to argue before the Supreme Court."

"Ever since law school it was viewed as a big deal," Ginzburg said. He added he doesn't see his lack of experience as an issue in a case such as this one, which turns on few facts and a specific legal issue that "only a civil procedure geek would love."

Ginzburg did not even know his opposing counsel, Lisa Blatt, who has now argued 55 cases before the Supreme Court.

"I had no idea who she was," said Ginzburg, 45, whose job largely consists of financial services litigation and semi-frequent appearances at state and federal courts in New York and New Jersey.

The arguments were, well short. At the 18-minute mark, the bench became silent. Ginzburg said, "If there are no further questions…" Chief Justice Roberts looked around and said "Thank you counsel." There was no seriatim round for the Petitioner.

Lisa Blatt presented about 14 minute of argument. Again, the bench was silent. At the 33-minute mark, Blatt said "If there are no questions, we would ask that the decision below be affirmed." Roberts looked around, and Blatt sat down. Again, no seriatim round. The Chief Justice invited Ginzburg to give a rebuttal. He spoke for about 3 minutes, without questions and sat down.

All told, the argument stretched about 37 minutes. The case started at 10:03 a.m. and concluded at 10:40 a.m.

Was this the shortest SCOTUS argument in the modern era? (By modern era, I am referring to the post-COVID format.) Perhaps a runner-up might be Hain Celestial Group v. Palmquist, which was argued after Coney Island. That case lasted only 41 minutes. (I didn't stick around for the second case; I had a FedSoc talk at the GW chapter at noon.) Maybe everyone on the bench (and me) was more focused on the case that will be argued tomorrow: TARIFFS!

In Coney Island, it seemed clear enough that the Justices had decided that they were going to vote for the Respondent, and didn't feel the need to ask further questions. Ginzburg was prudent to sit down early. I don't think arguing further was going to help his cause.

If I had to predict, Justice Jackson will get the assignment. She was extremely active with the questions, and Blatt referenced her by name several times. Justice Alito seemed a bit plussed, and he might write a concurrence. Justice Kavanaugh didn't say a word.

There were a few funny points.

In this case, virtually all of the circuits adopted a rule favoring petitioner. Justice Alito observed "almost all the courts of appeals have decided this question against you." Blatt replied:

And I think just last term you ruled against a case I argued when all the courts had gone our way.

The entire court burst out laughing. Justice Thomas let out two huge belly laughs, and was bending back in his chair. He lost it.

Blatt also referred to a judgment issued by a "Court of Clowns."

And you could --and if it's concededly, you know, on its face, it's issued by the court of clowns -

( Laughter.)

MS. BLATT: --you have to give effect to the judgment based on res judicata. And I will say, if you have a court of clowns example, you could probably get rid of that under the independent action for gross injustice.

I don't think she was referring to the Ninth Circuit…

Free Speech

No Injunction in Defamation and Copyright Case Stemming from "Africatown International Design Competition"

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From Magistrate Judge Gray Borden's opinion Friday in Studiorotan LLC v. Howell (N.D. Ala.):

A team of researchers discovered the wreckage of the Clotilda, the last known slave ship in the United States, in 2018. The Clotilda "illegally brought enslaved individuals from Africa into Alabama around 1860, where the ship was scuttled and burned to hide evidence of illegal slave trading." Many of these slaves returned after the Civil War and founded Africatown near Mobile, Alabama….

Renee Kemp-Rotan, "an internationally regarded urban designer and master planner," operates Studiorotan. Defendant M.O.V.E. Gulf Coast CDC ("M.O.V.E.") "invited Studiorotan to Africatown and asked Studiorotan to be involved in a project that would bring many community-based, non-coordinated projects into a comprehensive plan, design and development for Africatown." In that vein, Studiorotan, M.O.V.E., and Defendant Vickii Howell developed a competition—the Africatown International Design Competition—"for professional architects to submit design boards and essays" related to the "Clotilda Discovery and furthering preservation and revitalization of the Africatown community."

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What I Expect from the Court's Upcoming Term

Why I'm (mildly) optimistic about the Court's confrontation with presidential power

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It has become commonplace to predict that the Supreme Court's current Term will be as consequential, for the Court and for the country, as any in living memory.  Across the board, the Administration has implemented dozens of policies that have been deemed unlawful – unauthorized by statute and/or unconstitutional – by lower courts.  Congress could do much to rein him in; as Madison[1] put it in Federalist 51, "the great security against a gradual concentration of the several powers in the same department, consists in giving to those who administer each department the necessary constitutional means and personal motives to resist encroachments of the others."  But Congress has, for reasons and in ways we need not go into here, appears to have abandoned all of its encroachment-resisting powers to the Executive branch.

That leaves the Judiciary.  The Supreme Court, having disposed of a number of procedural matters pertaining to the many legal challenges to Administration action currently flooding through the federal court system,[2] is soon to confront the merits of those challenges this Term, starting with the Tariff Cases (Trump v VOS Selections and Learning Resources v. Trump) on Nov. 5th and almost certain to include challenges to the birthright citizenship Executive Order, the Administration's federalization of the national guard to quell civil disturbances, the President's power to condition federal funding on various extra-statutory criteria of his own devising, the Administration's purported exercise of its powers under the Alien Enemies Act in its deportation program, and any number of other equally weighty matters.

Many friends, colleagues, and family members  - not to mention commentators and pundits - who are both deeply worried about the direction in which the Trump Administration is taking the country (as am I) and, more to the point for this blog post, deeply pessimistic about the Court's willingness to stand up to the President's authoritarian tendencies and to rein him in.

"The Court," they say, "has been giving the Administration one victory after another. It is clearly in Trump's pocket, willing to rubber-stamp whatever outrageous moves he makes."

I don't agree. I'm not among those who think the Court is in Trump's pocket, and I'm not merely hopeful but actually rather optimistic that, when confronted with the merits of the specific cases involving this Administration's penchant for lawlessness, the Court will push back against Presidential overreach. Read More

Environmentalism

In Search of a New Environmentalism -- Hayward Replies

Steven Hayward has the final word in the recent Law & Liberty Forum on the future of environmental policy.

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Last month, over at Law & Liberty, Steven Hayward initiated a conversation on the need for a "new environmentalism" and what it should look like. To close out the conversation, Hayward has responded to comments on his initial essay offered by Richard Morrison, Allan C. Carlson, and yours truly.

Hayward's whole responsive essay is worth a read, but I though I would highlight the portion that responds to my comments (and not just because it is flattering).

Jonathan Adler's contribution makes some of my arguments better than I do, which is no surprise, since I have two rules about anything Adler writes in this domain: 1) Never disagree or argue with Adler; 2) If you disagree with Adler, see Rule Number 1. There is one aspect of his reflections I want to amplify—the political malpractice of most conservatives and Republicans on environmental policy. He does not put it quite that bluntly, but I will. Back in 1970, National Review editorialized that "it would be political suicide to concede [the environment] to the Left." Allowing the environment to become a near-monopoly of the left hasn't quite been suicidal for conservatism, but it has been bad for … the environment.

Here, the nub of the problem is a non-sequitur unique to conservatives. It has become the default position to reason that because we dislike costly and centralized bureaucracy, environmental problems must therefore be phony, or even a "hoax." To be sure, many environmental problems have been overestimated or deliberately exaggerated, from acid rain, deforestation, soil erosion, resource depletion, bee colony collapse, various toxic threats, the population bomb, etc., but that does not mean they are phony or insignificant. And the environmental policy record of most Republican Administrations is quite good, only Republicans seem not to know this or how to talk about it (or usually both). The environment for Republicans is like national defense for Democrats—an issue they don't like, study, or make a policy priority.

As Hayward notes, there are occasional signs that some within the Republican Party recognize this problem, but there has yet been no sustained effort to provide a meaningful (let alone principled) alternative approach to environmental protection, and this a problem.

Climate Change

William Barr Discovers the Economics of Tort Law (and Misrepresents the Law Governing Interstate Pollution)

Another reply to the former attorney general on climate litigation that may end up in the Supreme Court.

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Last week, former Attorney General William P. Barr wrote an op-ed for the Wall Street Journal purporting to expose a nefarious effort to impose a carbon tax through tort litigation. His op-ed is part of a broad effort to convince the Supreme Court to grant certiorari in Suncor v. County Commissioners of Boulder County, a tort suit filed against fossil fuel companies seeking compensation for the costs of adapting to climate change.

Today, the WSJ published my letter to the editor replying to Barr's op-ed, in which I noted there is nothing scandalous in what Barr reports, and that his underlying legal claims are without merit. As readers may recall, I have sparred with Barr on this subject before (see here and here).

In his op-ed, Barr reports that an attorney who has supported and assisted the filing of state-law-based tort claims by state and local governments against fossil fuel companies noted on a Federalist Society teleforum that, if these suits are successful, they would impose a de facto carbon tax. Barr treats this a scandalous confession. It is nothing of the kind. It is, rather, what everyone understands about the nature of tort suits.

When torts suits against firms that manufacture or distribute a product are successful, the liable firms inevitably seek to pass those costs on to consumers in the form of higher prices. Supporters of tort reform assail this "tort tax" as a burden on consumers and entrepreneurs. Others view it as means of internalizing externalities and ensuring that consumers pay for the full costs of what they consume. Anyone who is surprised that this dynamic would recur in the context of climate litigation is simply not well-versed in the economics of tort law.

In his op-ed, Barr does not seek to argue that it would be inappropriate to hold fossil fuel companies responsible for the costs of climate change to local communities--costs that include the affects on infrastructure and climate adaptation efforts. Instead he tries to argue that such suits are preempted by federal law, and in the process makes a legal error.

Barr writes:

Can states regulate emissions that take place outside their borders?

More than a century of Supreme Court precedent indicates that the answer must be no. Disputes involving pollution that crosses state or international borders are the exclusive domain of federal law.

Barr is simply wrong on this point, and he should know it as I have corrected him on this point before. Under current law, suits seeking redress for harms caused by interstate pollution can be filed under state law; they are not "the exclusive domain of federal law."

As I have explained at length, the Supreme Court has held that federal common law suits over interstate pollution are displaced by federal pollution control statutes. This is because federal common law is disfavored and is deemed to be displaced once Congress enacts a relevant statute. Displacement is different from preemption. And the Supreme Court has also held, most explicitly in International Paper v. Ouellette that state law suits over interstate pollution are not preempted and may proceed, provided that courts apply the law of the upwind or upstream state.

In the case of climate change, there is nothing in the Clean Air Act that preempts state regulation or or litigation over greenhouse gases and the potential harms of climate change. Indeed, there is nothing in the CAA that was enacted with an eye toward preventing climate change at all. And with regard to the types of air pollutants upon which the CAA was focused--ozone precursors, particulates, etc.--the CAA contains a broad savings clause and does little little to preempt state regulation or litigation, save for select provisions focused on the regulation of certain products sold in interstate markets (such as automobiles). Congress could preempt such suits if it wanted to, but it has never done so.

There are serious arguments that the various climate suits should fail on traditional tort law grounds, perhaps because the chain of causation is too attenuated or too difficult to prove, or that there are constitutional limits on the scope of conduct that can be subject to liability in state courts consistent with Due Process and the Dormant Commerce Clause. And there may well be an argument that the Supreme Court should intervene should a state court award universal relief to a local jurisdiction for the accumulated effects of global greenhouse gas emissions that exceeds such limits. But these are not the claims that Barr is making. Rather he is asserting that federal law precludes state courts from even hearing these claims, and he is misstating the law in the process.

For a deeper dive into the debate over this question, I recommend this panel from last year, "A Debate on The Right — Climate Lawsuits and Federalism: What Is the Role of State Tort Law?", in which I debated several thoughtful commentators on this subject.

For more on the subject, here are my prior posts on climate-related tort litigation:

And here (again) is my longer paper on the subject.

Free Speech

Public School Teacher Lacks First Amendment Right to Put Foot-High Crucifix on Classroom Wall

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A short excerpt from today's >17K-word decision by Judge Sarah Russell (D. Conn.) in Arroyo-Castro v. Gasper:

The dispute centers around whether Ms. Castro [a New Britain schoolteacher] has the right to affix an approximately foot-high crucifix to the wall near the teacher's desk in a classroom of a public middle school….

The parties do not dispute that the crucifix display on the classroom wall is "speech" within the meaning of the First Amendment. At issue is whether the crucifix display is protected speech. When "a public employee speaks 'pursuant to [his or her] official duties,' … the Free Speech Clause generally will not shield the individual from an employer's control and discipline because that kind of speech is—for constitutional purposes at least—the government's own speech." Kennedy v. Bremerton Sch. Dist. (2022) (quoting Garcetti v. Ceballos (2006)). Here, Ms. Castro's job duties specifically included decorating the classroom walls to make the physical classroom environment conducive to student learning. Under these circumstances, based on the existing evidentiary record, I conclude that Ms. Castro acted pursuant to her official duties when she posted items on the classroom wall that students would see during instructional time.

The classroom wall decorations are thus speech pursuant to Ms. Castro's official duties and subject to the District's control. For these reasons, I conclude that Ms. Castro is unlikely to prevail on the merits of her free speech and free exercise claims and is not entitled to the extraordinary remedy of a preliminary injunction….

Recall that the First Amendment protects a government employee's speech from being restricted by the employer if

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Hoover Fellow Program: Up-to-5-Year Paid In-Residence Position for Aspiring Academics (Including Aspiring Legal Academics)

The deadline (Nov. 18) is approaching, so I thought I'd repost this.

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The Hoover Institution at Stanford University, where I'm now a Senior Fellow, has long offered up-to-5-year paid in-residence positions (with no teaching obligations) in various fields.

This year, we'll also be considering people who are interested in becoming legal academics. We expect the selection process to be highly competitive: The position is unusually generous, compared to other fellowships, in salary ($165K-230K/year plus a $20K housing allowance), potential length, and lack of teaching obligations.

To be realistically eligible, applicants should have clerkships, top grades, published law review articles, and plans for new articles. It seems likely that most applicants will be from the Usual Suspect academic feeder law schools, but I'm a UCLA law graduate myself, so I'm certainly open to top people from other schools as well. We have no particular preferences for any particular fields within law: We'll gladly consider people who want to work in business law, constitutional law, international law, criminal law, immigration law, and all sorts of other topics.

The application deadline is Nov. 18, and the details are at https://www.hoover.org/hoover-fellows-program. Note that there would be no obligation for people to stay the full five years (and probably an expectation that they would stay no more). If someone gets a tenure-track law school teaching position two or three years into the fellowship—which tends to be the norm in the law market—we would be delighted to see them take it.

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Politics

Journal of Free Speech Law: "Extramural Absolutism," by Deepa Das Acevedo

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This new article is here. The Introduction:

Free speech absolutism has seemingly had its day, inasmuch as scholarly and public (if not judicial) opinion are increasingly hostile to the idea that more speech is invariably better. Yet, within academia, a close cousin of free speech absolutism—a principle of university management that this Article calls extramural absolutism—remains alive and well. Many academics and their supporters still champion the idea behind this principle, which is that speech undertaken by professors who are acting in a personal capacity should invite few if any adverse employment consequences. Academic disagreement with the principle, when it arises, lies more in its application to specific incidents than with the principle itself.

But extramural absolutism is deeply unpopular outside academia as well as among many stakeholders inside the university community. This Article explains extramural absolutism's unpopularity and proposes a way forward. The problem, I argue, is not with extramural absolutism itself but with how it is presented and justified. The answer, moreover, is not to insist on distinguishing between speech that warrants protection and speech that does not: It is to acknowledge that academic labor and the way it is managed make a policy of extramural absolutism the only feasible approach.

Supporters of extramural absolutism have failed to be convincing for two reasons. First, they often imply that speech by academics merits an exceptional level of protection because academic speech is uniquely valuable to society. In this respect, they are like supporters of academic freedom writ large. "[T]he pursuit of truth without interference," argue William Tierney and Vicente Lechuga in their defense of academic freedom, "is in the best interest of society." Similarly, Matthew Finkin and Robert Post affirm the AAUP belief that universities are "instruments of the common good" and that the "roots of academic freedom" have "internal connections to emerging needs for knowledge and intellectual mastery."

These lines of commentary presume a shared belief that academic speech is uniquely valuable because expert knowledge and expert pedagogy are better than their opposites. That is, academic speech deserves special protection because it contributes more to societal well-being than do other types of speech or speakers: Academic speech informs, instructs, challenges, and clarifies in addition to expressing opinion.

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Free Speech

Second Annual Aspiring Free Speech Scholars Workshop

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Second Annual Aspiring Free Speech Scholars Workshop
jointly sponsored by the Sandra Day O'Connor College of Law (ASU)
and the Hoover Institution (Stanford University)

Are you a law student, judicial law clerk, lawyer, or beginning academic hoping to publish a journal article on free speech law? Would you like the opportunity to get advice about your draft from leading free speech scholars?

If so, send us your draft by Sunday, August 16, 2026. (This should still be a draft article, not an article that's already published or expected to be published within six months.) We plan to select the submissions that we think are particularly promising, and invite their authors to a workshop where they can present their papers and get helpful feedback on them. The workshop will be Saturday, October 24, 2026 (with dinner the night before) at the Sandra Day O'Connor College of Law in Phoenix, and we will inform the selected authors by Tuesday, September 8, 2026.

We have funds to pay for transportation and lodging for the selected authors' trips. Eligibility is limited to people who have so far published three or fewer law-related journal articles.

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"No Justice, No Peace" and True Threats

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[UPDATE: In retrospect I buried the lede here. On motion to dismiss, the court found that social media postings regarding a synagogue event did not violate the FACE act because they do not constitute a "true threat," because using the phrase "no Justice no peace" was not alleged to lead to violence.

As I point out at end of the post, the operative question under the FACE act at the motion to dismiss stage, at least arguably, is whether the posting in question sufficiently threatening to intimidate synagogue goers, and that seems a much closer question. The court did not address the First Amendment at all in its opinion, so the issue of "true threat," which is a First Amendment, not a FACE act doctrine, was not obviously present at this stage of the litigation.]

As Eugene noted previously, a federal district court dismissed a FACE act claim for threatening synagogue attendees against the Palestinian Youth Movement based on the following social post:

The PYM social media posts call on their supports to "STAND AGAINST SETTLER EXPANSION AT SUNDAY'S REAL ESTATE EVENT SELLING HOMES TO BUILD 'ANGLO NEIGHBORHOODS' IN PALESTINE." The post continues by describing the Aliyah Event as a "blatant example of land theft" perpetrated by "[r]acist settler expansionists." The posts finish with "FROM THE BELLY OF THE BEAST NO JUSTICE, NO PEACE."  Plaintiffs allege, "upon information and belief," that the phrase "belly of the beast" refers to a synagogue.

The court stated that the wording of this posting was too vague to constitute a true threat: "there are no allegations that phrases like 'no justice, no peace' or 'belly of the beast' have led to violence. Without that kind of context or history, there is no basis to infer that these posts are true threats."

I don't know what was alleged in the complaint, but I wonder if the relationship between the phrase "no justice, no peace" and violence is sufficiently attenuated that this issue was proper for disposal on the a motion to dismiss, where all factual allegations alleged by plaintiffs are presumed to be true.

On the one hand, "no justice, no peace" is often chanted at entirely peaceful rallies and in such contexts serves, as the court concluded, as advocacy of protest. On the other hand, the "no peace" half of the phrase does literally seem to call for violence, not merely protest, and it's not hard to find examples where this phrase was chanted just before or during violent riots. That's why you get headlines such as, 'No justice, no peace': 7 people shot amid downtown Louisville protests for Breonna Taylor.

Of course, the court is correct that it's likely that this slogan does not lead to violence, as opposed to being chanted by those already poised for violence.

The FACE Act makes it illegal "by force or threat of force or by physical obstruction, intentionally injures, intimidates or interferes with or attempts to injure, intimidate or interfere with any person lawfully exercising or seeking to exercise the First Amendment right of religious freedom at a place of religious worship."

So the right question, it seems to me, is not whether using the phrase "no justice, no peace," will likely lead to violence, but whether it constitutes a threat of force sufficient to intimidate reasonable worshippers.

My review of John Witt, The Radical Fund

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Originally posted at Balkinization for a symposium on John Witt, The Radical Fund: How a Band of Visionaries and a Million Dollars Upended America (Simon and Schuster, 2025).

John Fabian Witt's The Radical Fund masterfully reconstructs the history of the American Fund for Public Service, better known as the Garland Fund. The Fund embodied both the promise and the peril of radical philanthropy in the United States between World War I and World War II. Conceived by Roger Baldwin and financed by Charles Garland's relatively modest inheritance, the fund set out to support "pioneering enterprises" capable of advancing democracy and social justice (105–109). Yet the very inclusiveness that defined its mission proved to be its undoing. Its openness blurred essential distinctions between liberal reform and revolutionary activism, particularly the illiberal strains of the latter promoted by American Communists who followed secret directives from the USSR.

Witt portrays the fund's dual identity with care. Its experimental commitment to supporting every left-leaning cause was both its greatest strength and its central weakness. Baldwin, a founder of the ACLU and self-described "philosophical anarchist," viewed the fund as a "gamble in human nature," a bold experiment in social change. He and Garland believed that existing institutions were malleable and that private wealth could be redirected to benefit the working class and expand civil liberties (1–4).

Baldwin assembled an extraordinary and eclectic board that included jurists such as Felix Frankfurter, journalists like Freda Kirchwey, labor organizers such as Sidney Hillman and Elizabeth Gurley Flynn, and one Communist, William Z. Foster. The fund's early grants to the ACLU, the NAACP, and Brookwood Labor College reflected its founders' belief that progress could be achieved through education, litigation, and peaceful organizing. Baldwin described this as a "mixture of forces" spanning the full left-liberal spectrum of American politics (4).

The same inclusiveness that initially energized the fund soon produced deep internal tensions. Baldwin, though willing to include a Communist perspective, recognized the Party's tendency to dominate institutions and warned that "one Party member on the board was enough" (234). When Foster tried to send proxies to board meetings, they were turned away. As late as 1926, Baldwin sought to strengthen the anti-Communist faction within the board. In retaliation, the Party derided the fund as "counter-revolutionary" and mocked Baldwin and Socialist leader Norman Thomas as "a terrible bunch" (233–234).

Despite Baldwin's efforts, Communist influence proved difficult to contain. The fund's commitment to pluralism left it vulnerable to what the Party itself described as "boring from within" (234). By the mid-1920s, as liberal unions weakened under employer pressure, Baldwin feared that disciplined Communists might be the only radicals still capable of organizing workers effectively. The situation grew more complicated after Baldwin's 1927 visit to the USSR, where he succumbed to Soviet propaganda and wrote an absurdly glowing book called "Liberty Under the Soviets" before later resuming his criticism of Soviet repression.
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More

Recent Volokh Posts

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The Second Amendment and Foster Parents

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Today in Supreme Court History: November 5, 1917

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Open Thread

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The Shortest SCOTUS Oral Argument In The Modern Era?

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No Injunction in Defamation and Copyright Case Stemming from "Africatown International Design Competition"

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What I Expect from the Court's Upcoming Term

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Today in Supreme Court History: November 4, 1992

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In Search of a New Environmentalism -- Hayward Replies

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William Barr Discovers the Economics of Tort Law (and Misrepresents the Law Governing Interstate Pollution)

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Public School Teacher Lacks First Amendment Right to Put Foot-High Crucifix on Classroom Wall

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