The Volokh Conspiracy

Mostly law professors | Sometimes contrarian | Often libertarian | Always independent | Est. 2002

The Volokh Conspiracy

Religion and the Law

Washington May Permit Nudity-Focused Businesses "to Set Eentry Requirements Based on Genitalia"

|

Billy Binion (Reason) reports:

The Washington State Human Rights Commission (WSHRC) voted last month to permit businesses to set entry requirements based on genitalia when nudity is a core part of the operation—thus allowing, say, an all-female nude establishment to reject customers with male genitals without having to fear anti-discrimination enforcement from the state.

This is not a sentence you necessarily see every day. But it is the latest plot twist related to the legal odyssey that is Olympus Spa v. Armstrong, a case concerning a nude spa that has been embroiled in a yearslong, ever-crescendoing fight with the state after it declined to admit a preoperative transgender woman to its location in Lynnwood, Washington….

"In the limited circumstance where a business requires nudity as a central purpose of the business," the addition reads, "such business may maintain a rule that entry to spaces where nudity is required be based on genital characteristics." After the vote, the executive director was to work with the Office of the Attorney General to officially file the rule….

The [underlying Olympus Spa] story, while niche, has elicited some strong reactions. "This is a case about swinging dicks," wrote Judge Lawrence VanDyke of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit in March. "You may think that swinging dicks shouldn't appear in a judicial opinion. You're not wrong. But as much as you might understandably be shocked and displeased to merely encounter that phrase in this opinion, I hope we all can agree that it is far more jarring for the unsuspecting and exposed women at Olympus Spa—some as young as thirteen—to be visually assaulted by the real thing."

Much worth reading in full.

The Virginia Bar Shows More Sense than the Williamsburg Commonwealth Attorney

Williamsburg authorities may believe letting a young child walk to a pond is a criminal offense, but it is no obstacle to practicing law.

|

Readers may recall the story of Karyann Parkinson, the Williamsburg mother (and law student) who was criminally prosecuted for letting her young child walk to a neighborhood pond to collect goose feathers. As I recounted in The Free Press, Parkinson was convicted of contributing to the delinquency of a minor, a first-degree misdemeanor in Virginia, because the authorities thought her child was too young to take a walk. The judge sentenced her to six-months in jail, but suspended the sentence. An appeal is pending.

As a consequence of her conviction, Parkinson was added to Virginia's Child Abuse and Neglect Registry, where she will be listed for the next seven years. Parkinson also feared that the conviction could prevent her from practicing law.

Prosecutors brought the charges against Parkinson while she was preparing to take the Virginia Bar exam, and her conviction came while her character and fitness application was under review. It is common to place character and fitness evaluations on hold pending the outcome of legal or disciplinary proceedings, and Parkinson initially received a communication to that effect.

Upon review of the details of Parkinson's case, however, the Virginia Board of Bar Examiners concluded that nothing alleged against Parkinson cast doubt on her character and fitness to practice law in the Commonwealth of Virginia, and her application was approved. The Williamsburg Commonwealth Attorney should take note.

While the Virginia Bar authorities recognized that Parkinson's actions were not the sort of thing that should prevent bar admission, the Williamsburg Commonwealth Attorney apparently believes that Parkinson's actions were worth criminal prosecution--with all that entails. In this case, that meant police officers had to spend half a day of paid time (if not time and a half) sitting in a courthouse when they could have been out on the street responding to community needs. They will do it again in February when a court will hear Parkinson's appeal (which will take the form of a de novo jury trial, given how Virginia handles such cases).  Williamsburg and James City County are reasonably safe communities, but is this really the best way to allocate law enforcement resources?

No doubt some prosecutions for child endangerment are motivated for a concern about a child's safety, but it is hard to credit such a justification here. The Commonwealth Attorney's office waited two weeks to file charges after the initial incident, but not because it was gathering evidence or conducting any sort of investigation. Rather, as one of the police officers testified at trial, it was because Parkinson was pregnant, so they thought it was reasonable to wait. (Yet she was still charged before giving birth, natch.) As I noted in my Free Press piece, it is hard not to conclude Parkinson's real offense was being insufficiently obsequious to the authorities.

Upon review, the Virginia Board of Bar Examiners realized that Parkinson's actions did not justify delaying (let alone preventing) her admission to the Virginia Bar. With more time to consider the case (and the outrage it has engendered) perhaps the Williamsburg Commonwealth Attorney should reconsider the continued prosecution of Parkinson for what was, at worst, a debatable parenting choice. Confessing error and asking the court to vacate the conviction would seem to be a better use of tax dollars and public resources than continuing to pursue this case.

Free Speech

School Board Member Seeks "Better Sense of How" Church "Approaches Issues of Diversity, Equity, and Inclusion Around Their Messaging" …

"around some key issues relevant to marginalized communities," including as to "the Church's views on same-sex marriage, '[a]ccess to safe and affordable abortion,' '[a]ccess to gender affirming medical care,' '[c]onversion therapy for LGBTQIA+ individuals (youth and adults),' and '[i]nclusive sexual education and access to birth control for youth.'"

|

This happened when the board was deciding whether to allow a long-term lease of space on weekends to a church, pursuant to a policy that allowed such leases for community groups generally. And, a federal court held Friday, this violated the First Amendment. Some excerpts from the long opinion in Pines Church v. Hermon School Dep't, by Chief Judge Lance Walker (D. Me.):

Plaintiff Matt Gioia moved his family from Colorado to Maine in the summer of 2020 to start a new church. Gioia was born in Waterville, Maine, and lived in Guilford, Maine until he graduated high school and joined the military at seventeen years old. Initially, Gioia's church—The Pines Church—gathered at his home. In March of 2021, The Pines Church began holding Sunday morning services at a movie theater in Orono, Maine, pursuant to a month-to-month lease arrangement. As the Church grew, Gioia began to look for a new space that could accommodate a larger group.

Gioia sought space from the Hermon School Department, which generally opens up its facilities to various groups:

This policy provides that "[s]chool facilities should be made available for appropriate community use when such facilities are not required for their primary purposes: the instruction of students and related school activities." The policy distinguishes between "occasional or short-term use of school facilities," which "shall be authorized by the school principal," and "long-term rental or lease," which "shall be authorized by the Hermon School Committee upon the recommendation of the Superintendent of Schools."

But the Hermon School Committee (which consisted of "Committee Chair Jesse Keith, Vice Chair Karen Shorey, Stephanie Oiler, Haily Keezer, and Christopher McLaughlin") denied the Church's request for a year-long or six-month lease, allowing only a month-to-month lease (which appeared to be inadequate for the church, given its need for a stable meeting location). Here's part of the summary of the facts, based on the bench trial that the court held:

The next day [after a hearing], a former committee member emailed Keith and Shorey to share her belief "that it is not in our communities [sic] best interest to lease one of our school facilities to any religious organization," warning that "[t]here is a quiet movement in our country by some conservative religious groups who are actively working to soften the boundaries between church/state, starting with our schools" and that granting the Church a lease would lead to "a slippery slope." She wondered how the Hermon School Department would have to respond to a similar request from "an Imam who wants to open a mosque," in light of the "precedent" set by a lease to The Pines Church.

Her email concluded with unintended irony: "There's a reason why the founding fathers wrote the constitution the way they did." Keith and Shorey denied at trial that this email influenced their decision-making with respect to the Church's lease request, which I find implausible in light of the trial record….

McLaughlin reached out to [HSD Superintendent Micah] Grant and explained that he "had a few additional questions" for Gioia:

Read More

Free Speech

No Pseudonymity in Ex-Associate's Sexual Assault Claim Against Major Law Firm

"Permitting Doe to proceed pseudonymously while the Firm defends itself publicly, particularly where there seems to be material factual disputes between the parties, presents an unfair asymmetry that also weighs against anonymity ...."

|

From Judge W. Scott Hardy in Doe v. Blank Rome LLP, the opinion was issued under seal in May, but just unsealed last week (at my behest):

Plaintiff is an attorney who filed a detailed, 197-paragraph Complaint under the pseudonym "Jane Doe" against Defendant Blank Rome LLP …, her former employer, alleging claims for sex discrimination, hostile work environment, and retaliation pursuant to Title VII …. Her claims arise from the Firm's purported failure to respond appropriately after Doe allegedly was sexually assaulted by another associate attorney, identified in the Complaint as "Associate A," while they and others were socializing at the home of a Firm partner on a Saturday evening after leaving a graduation party hosted by another partner of the Firm. The Complaint details Doe's professional background, including where she attended law school, when she began her employment at the Firm, and the type of law she practiced while at the Firm.

Doe's Complaint similarly details Associate A's professional background, including his law school and year of graduation, and the names of his prior law firms. The Complaint does not identify Doe by her own name, nor does it identify by name "Associate A" or any other attorney at the Firm. The only person identified by name in the Complaint is the Firm's Chief Human Resource Officer, who is named 24 times….

The court noted the strong presumption in favor of parties litigating in their own names, and concludes this presumption wasn't rebutted here:

A mere showing of embarrassment or economic harm is not enough [to justify pseudonymity]. Rather, there must be a showing of both: (1) fear of severe harm, and (2) that the fear of severe harm is reasonable. When a litigant sufficiently alleges that he or she has a reasonable fear of severe harm from litigating without a pseudonym, the Third Circuit instructs that "district courts should balance the plaintiff's interest and fear against the public's strong interest in an open litigation process." {"[T]he Court is sympathetic to Plaintiff's concerns, and understands that, unfortunately, victims of sexual harassment and assault often face ridicule and further harassment when they file lawsuits or otherwise publicly disclose their allegations, especially in the internet age. However, these concerns, while certainly reasonable, are not sufficient to outweigh the public's right to access court proceedings."} …

It also expressed its concern about one-sided pseudonymity (a concern that some courts weigh heavily and others don't, as this article lays out in detail):

Doe is not the only party exposed to public humiliation and reputational harm. The Firm itself and its chief human resource officer have been identified publicly in the Complaint (and other current or former Firm attorneys have been described with sufficient identifying indicia in the Complaint to be identified by implication). Permitting Doe to proceed pseudonymously while the Firm defends itself publicly, particularly where there seems to be material factual disputes between the parties, presents an unfair asymmetry that also weighs against anonymity ….

And it noted,

Read More

Is Current Second Amendment Jurisprudence Premised Upon a "Misquote"?

A New York Times article attempting to discredit Justice Scalia's Heller opinion misfires.

|

This past week, the New York Times published an article by Mike McIntire and Eli Murray alleging that a "pivotal legal test" for determining whether gun control laws are constitutional is "based on a misquote." Yet it appears it is the NYT's reporters who misfired.

Here is the article's basic claim:

When the Supreme Court begins weighing the constitutionality of assault-weapons bans next month, the justices will be guided by the court's own precedent: a landmark ruling that such restrictions are allowed only if a firearm is both "dangerous and unusual."

For nearly two decades, judges across the country have invoked this language to strike down gun-control laws. It is a pivotal legal test.

It is also based on a misquote.

Justice Antonin Scalia, writing for the majority in the 2008 case, District of Columbia v. Heller, attributed the "dangerous and unusual" language to Sir William Blackstone, an 18th-century English jurist whose writings became the basis for much of American law.

But in his seminal 1769 treatise, "Commentaries on the Laws of England," Blackstone referred to weapons that were "dangerous or unusual," suggesting that a gun did not need to be both in order to be restricted.

But is there actually an error in the opinion? Here is the paragraph from Heller in which the alleged misquotation occurs, with the allegedly offending sentence underlined:

Read More

How "Anti-Zionism" Is Creating Zionists

If being Jewish makes one a "Zio," then one must oppose Anti-Zionism if one opposes Anti-Semitism

|

Joseph Bottum in the Wall Street Journal explains how "Anti-Zionism" turned him into a Zionist.

I am a Zionist because on the ground, activist anti-Zionism is becoming indistinguishable from antisemitism. Whatever linguistic differences exist, whatever distinctions activists say they hold, the metonymy that glides from shouting against Israel to violence against Jews is too easy, too well-greased, for public figures to refuse blame for the rhetoric that allows it. Jews who own restaurants labeled "zio" and "disgusting humans" in Philadelphia, a Jewish center's mural painted over with "Zionism is not welcome" in California, a synagogue's signs defaced with initials for the slogan "All Zionists Are Bastards" in Maryland—the tropes of anti-Zionism slip quickly into the tropes of antisemitism. . . .

I have come to full-blown Zionism—because that is the most coherent way to oppose the activists, left and right, who aim at something profoundly antithetical to the American spirit. "It is now no more that toleration is spoken of, as if it was by the indulgence of one class of people, that another enjoyed the exercise of their inherent natural rights," George Washington wrote in 1790 to a Jewish congregation. "For happily the Government of the United States, which gives to bigotry no sanction, to persecution no assistance requires only that they who live under its protection should demean themselves as good citizens, in giving it on all occasions their effectual support."

This doesn't mean uncritical agreement with everything the government of Israel does. It means that our current forms of activist anti-Zionism would make the U.S. a place wildly different from the one Washington envisioned. . . .

As long as we have a social politics in which antisemitism wears the cloak of anti-Zionism, the duty of Americans is clear: When Jews are targeted as Jews, the solidarity the moment requires from the rest of us is standing up as Zionists.

The Mayflower Extract

Wrapping up the NLC and trying to get home after a groundstop.

|

The 2026 Federalist Society Convention is a wrap. I have attended every NLC since I was a 1L in 2006 (except for the cancelled COVID year). At each convention, the focus is a bit different but the overall takeaway is similar. There is a healthy a mix of timeless topics and topical topics, with an infusion of the political landscape of the day. It is very hard to capture the essence of a convention by watching some or even all of the panels, as so much business transpires in the hallways and at the bars.

I think much of the press coverage failed in attempt to to consolidate a very broad movement into a few paragraphs. For example, CNN blared "After blue wave, Federalist Society is ready to move on from Trump." Really? Secretary of State Marco Rubio delivered the Olson Lecture, White House Counsel Will Scharf had a fireside chat, White House Advisor May Mailman discussed over-regulation, and Gene Hamilton favored restrictive immigration policy on behalf of America First Legal Foundation. Plus there were other members of the administration from the EPA and OLP.

I think there are a range of opinions about how the conservative legal movement should respond to the current political situation. I don't think anyone actually knows exactly what to do. The midterm election, of course, was the elephant in the room. I offered my take here. A lot can happen over the next two years.

I'm flummoxed by the uproar about the commemorative coins celebrating Calais, Slaughter, and other decision. These were in fact generational wins at the Supreme Court. Justice Scalia established overruling Humphrey's Executor as a founding principle of FedSoc. Since the 1980s, conservatives--including John Roberts--have seen the Voting Rights Act as violating the Constitution. And West Virginia v. B.P.J. was such an obvious outcome--except perhaps at CNN. Plus, this was the swaggiest NLC I've ever been to. There was an entire room to pick up FedSoc swag. The coins were a nice touch.

Perhaps the biggest disruption at the convention was the groundstop. My flight home Saturday evening was cancelled, as were many others. I was able to get a room at the Mayflower for another day. Fortunately, one of the few remaining perks of United status is priority rebooking during "irregular operations." I was originally scheduled to fly home Sunday evening around 7:30 p.m. The United App has a new feature that lets you be on standby for up to three flights at once without losing your confirmed seat. United will send you a text notifying you that a seat opened up on an earlier flight, and you have twenty minutes to accept it. I was able to jump from the 7:30 p.m. flight to the 12:50 p.m. flight. A few hours later, I was given a chance to jump from the 12:50 p.m. flight to the 10:58 a.m. flight. For both of these flights, I was number one on the standby list. Around 5:00 a.m., I was offered the chance to move to the 8:20 a.m. flight, but I was sleeping and missed the window. The system worked very well. And without my status, I doubt I would have been able to get the earlier flight. As things turned out, the 12:50 p.m. flight was cancelled. I will get home today.

Free Speech

Border Search of Immigration Lawyer's Phone Was Likely Unconstitutional Retaliation for Lawyer's Speech

|

From Judge Allison Burroughs (D. Mass.) Friday in Lattarulo v. Mullin:

Andrew Lattarulo is an immigration lawyer and part owner of the law firm Georges Cote LLP, which represents "thousands of clients in active immigration proceedings." Lattarulo also runs a popular Instagram account featuring videos of himself discussing "know-your-rights information about U.S. immigration matters," which regularly "amasses hundreds of thousands of views." Georges Cote is currently being investigated by Homeland Security Investigations ("HSI"), the investigative arm of the Department of Homeland Security ("DHS"), for employing individuals without a legal right to work in the United States.

Audai Cote, "the registered agent and individual in charge of I-9 compliance" at the firm, was served with a Notice of Inspection on September 8, 2025. Unlike Lattarulo, "Cote is not an immigration attorney—he focuses on personal injury." The firm responded on September 12, 2025, and the government sent Cote a Notice of Suspect Documents on September 25, 2025. The firm was given ten days to attempt to verify the identity and work authorization of the employees named in the Notice of Suspect Documents.

In late September 2025, while the HSI investigation proceeded, both Lattarulo and Cote travelled from Boston to Aruba for a weekend trip. On September 27, 2025, Cote arrived back at Logan Airport from Aruba without issue. Lattarulo made the same journey the following day, September 28, 2025. Lattarulo passed through customs preclearance in Aruba before boarding a flight to Boston.

When his flight arrived at Logan Airport, three U.S. Customs and Border Protection ("CBP") agents and one HSI officer stopped Lattarulo as he got off the plane. The agents seized his cell phone without a warrant and then downloaded a complete copy of the data stored on the phone. Eight days later, they returned the cell phone via overnight delivery.

The seized cell phone data is currently in a format that is not readable or reviewable, but the government intends to convert the data to an accessible format and search it if the Court permits. The data includes confidential information, including privileged attorney-client communications related to Lattarulo's clients. {The Government was clear that any search of the contents of the phone would utilize a taint team to protect privileged information.} …

The court held that Lattarulo was likely correct on his claim that the search was unconstitutional retaliation for his speech, and therefore granted "a preliminary injunction enjoining Defendants from accessing the data obtained from the phone before this action is resolved":

Read More

Immigration

Supreme Court Will Review Case Challenging Donald Trump's "Invasion" Executive Order

Trump claims illegal migration and drug smuggling across the southern border qualify as an "invasion" giving him the power to suspend virtually all legal migration through that border.

|

AI-Generated Image. (AI-generated image.)

 

Yesterday, the Supreme Court decided to review Mullin v. RAICES, a case challenging the legality of Donald Trump's January 2025 "invasion" executive order, which bars virtually all legal migration across the southern border. Trump relies on the Guarantee Clause of Article IV, Section 4 of the Constitution, which states that "The United States shall guarantee to every State in this Union a Republican Form of Government, and shall protect each of them against Invasion." The administration claims that illegal migration, drug smuggling, and supposed "public health" risks  qualify as an "invasion" under the Guarantee Clause, thereby authorizing the president to suspend legal migration indefinitely.

The Trump administration's position on this issue is badly wrong, and has dangerous implications. In my article, "Immigration is Not Invasion" I provide a comprehensive overview of the many reasons why "invasion" - as that term is used in the Constitution and the AEA - must be a military attack, not illegal migration, drug smuggling, or other similar activity. As James Madison put it, "invasion is an operation of war." I provided a shorter overview of the invasion order and its dangerous implications in a 2025 Just Security article.

I also go over the dire implications of adopting a broad definition of invasion. Among other things, it would allow the federal government to suspend the writ of habeas corpus (and thereby detain people - including US citizens - without due process) at any time. It would also give state governments the power to "engage in war" against neighboring foreign countries at virtually any time, even without congressional authorization. And there is much more.  This case has major implications that go beyond immigration, and threaten the civil liberties of US citizens, as well as recent migrants.

The Supreme Court could potentially rule against Trump on statutory grounds, without reaching the issue of the definition of "invasion" in the Constitution. That is what the district court and the DC Circuit did. Alternatively, the Court could rule that the president has purely statutory authority to bar these migrants. But if it rejects these statutory arguments, or at least does so in large part, it will have to reach the "invasion" issue. If the justices do reach that issue, it is vital that the reject the administration's position.

There are also a number of procedural issues in the case (primarily involving the scope of the remedy), which I will not attempt to go over here.

This case should not be confused with the related ongoing litigation over the legality of Trump's invocation of the Alien Enemies Act of 1798. The AEA can only be used to detain and deport migrants when there is a declared war, an "invasion," or a "predatory incursion." There, too, the Trump administration claims illegal migration and drug smuggling qualify as an "invasion," and there too it is wrong to do so (on which see  Part III of my article, my amicus brief in the Fifth Circuit AEA case, which I coauthored on behalf of the Brennan Center, the Cato Institute, and others). As detailed in my article, it is highly likely that "invasion" has the same meaning in the AEA and in the four places where that term is used in the Constitution, enacted just a few years earlier.

I will likely have more to say about this case in future posts and other writings. Stay tuned!

UPDATE: I have made minor additions to this post.

Tariffs

Our Amicus Brief in Case Challenging Trump's Section 338 Tariffs Against Canada

The Cato Institute and I filed an amicus brief explaining why the tariffs violate statutory requirements, and also run afoul of the major questions and nondelegation doctrines.

|

President Donald Trump rips a paper in half, with the U.S. flag on one side and the Canadian flag on the other.
Illustration: Midjourney

Yesterday, the Cato Institute and I filed an amicus brief before the US Court of International Trade, in Gellert Global Corp. v. Trump, the first case challenging Donald Trump's massive 50% Section 338 tariffs against Canadian imports. The plaintiff is represented by the Liberty Justice Center, the public interest law firm I worked with on the case challenging the massive tariffs Trump imposed under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA). That case resulted in the tariffs' invalidation by the Supreme Court earlier this year.

I previously wrote about the Section 338 tariffs and why they are harmful and illegal in an article in The Dispatch, and a paper for the Montreal Economic Institute.

We are grateful to Daniel Cannistra and others at Crowell & Moring for their invaluable pro bono assistance in helping draft and submit the brief on very short notice. Here is a summary of our key arguments, which should soon be posted at the Cato website:

This brief explains why Section 338 of the Tariff Act of 1930 cannot be used to impose the tariffs enacted by Defendants, and why doing so violates the major questions and nondelegation doctrines.

The Court should strike down the Section 338 duties for three reasons. First, Section 338 requires that any tariffs imposed be in response to discriminatory trade restrictions enacted by foreign trading partners, and that those tariffs "offset" the barriers imposed by those countries. The Section 338 tariffs imposed by the Trump administration violate both of these requirements. In addition, Section 338 has been superseded by later statutes and is no longer operative.

Second, the major questions doctrine forecloses interpreting Section 338 to permit the President to impose extraordinary import taxes whenever another country imposes any trade restrictions or declines to purchase American goods. to "speak clearly" when it assigns to the executive "decisions of vast 'economic and political significance.'" The sweeping power claimed by the administration in this case undeniably raises a major question, and it is at the very least unclear that Section 338 actually grants such vast authority.

Third, stripping the statute's qualitative conditions of operative force violates the nondelegation doctrine, which constrains delegation of legislative power to the executive. An extremely high rate ceiling of 50 percent cannot substitute for clear legislative limiting how and when tariffs can be imposed.

Cato and I (together with Prof. Michael McConnell) also recently submitted an amicus brief in litigation challenging Trump's massive Section 301 tariffs.

Immigration

Our Amicus Brief in the First Circuit $100,000 H-1B Visa Fee Case

It is on behalf of the Cato Institute and myself.

|

NA

On Thursday, the Cato Institute and I filed an amicus brief in the US Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, in support of California and other states challenging the Trump Administration's imposition of a $100,000 fee on applications for H-1B visas (which are used by tech firms, research institutions, and other organizations to hire immigrant workers and researchers with various specialized skills).

The district court ruling in this case invalidated the $100,000 fee on the grounds that the executive had illegally usurped Congress' power to impose taxes. It relied heavily on the Supreme Court's recent decision in Learning Resources, Inc. v. Trump, the tariff case I helped litigate. A second federal district court later invalidated the fee on other grounds.

We are very grateful to Deno Hemonas and Philip Wilkinson of Wilson Sonsini Goodrich Rosati, who worked with me on the brief, pro bono. Stanford Law School Prof. and former federal judge Michael McConnell, also worked with us on the brief. He is one of the nation's leading experts on executive power, a prominent conservative originalist constitutional law scholar, and was our lead counsel in the Supreme Court phase of the IEEPA tariff case.

Here is a summary of our arguments:

As the Supreme Court emphasized in its recent decisions striking down Donald Trump's Massive IEEPA tariffs, "the Framers gave Congress alone access to the pockets of the people." Learning Resources, Inc. v. Trump, 607 U.S. 229, 241 (2026)  The tax power was, as Alexander Hamilton explained, "the most important of the authorities proposed to be conferred upon the Union." Just months ago, the Supreme Court in Learning Resources applied those fundamental principles to hold that the President may not use a general grant of authority to "regulate … importation" to impose tariffs, because the power to "regulate" is not the power to tax and Congress did not clearly delegate its taxing power.  This case asks whether the same President—by imposing a tax of his own devising on the entry of noncitizens and calling it a "restriction" on entry—may accomplish by a different label what Learning Resources forbade.

The exaction here is a tax.  Its "defining feature" is that it raises revenue. Learning Resources, 607 U.S. at 241. It is neither a mere fee contributing to the costs of operating the program nor a penalty. The power to "restrict" entry is not the power to "tax" entry.  To limit or qualify entry says nothing about charging for it, and the Government can identify no statute in which the words "restrict" or "restriction" confer tax authority.

The Immigration and Nationality Act  contains express, detailed provisions for fees and payments, setting each amount and specifying how the funds are collected and spent.  This confirms the absence of a generalized, unlimited discretionary presidential taxing power.  Congress does not "hide elephants in mouseholes," and this case involves a very large elephant.  Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass'ns, 531 U.S. 457, 468 (2001). In more than a century, no President has used Section 212(f) or Section 215(a) of the INA to raise revenue, a point the Government does not dispute.  As the Supreme Court held in Learning Resources, that absence is "strong evidence" the power does not exist.

In addition, the government's interpretation of the relevant statutes violates the major questions doctrine, which requires Congress to speak clearly when delegating power over a major economic or political issue to the executive.  The power to impose unlimited taxes on any visa holders or immigrants entering into the United States is undoubtedly a major one. If, nonetheless, the court concludes that Congress did somehow grant the government the sweeping power it claims, it would violate the constitutional nondelegation doctrine, which constrains delegations of legislative power to the executive.

I have previously criticized the $100,000 H-1B fee on both legal and policy grounds here, here, and here.

 

More