The Volokh Conspiracy

Mostly law professors | Sometimes contrarian | Often libertarian | Always independent | Est. 2002

The Volokh Conspiracy

Free Speech

Prof. Rick Hasen Criticizes Buckley v. Valeo

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A nice counterpoint to the Buckley v. Valeo at 50 symposium that we're cohosting, from Prof. Rick Hasen (UCLA) at Slate; an excerpt, though the whole thing is worth reading:

Whether or not money is the root of all evil, the root of our current American oligarchy is a single Supreme Court case. That Supreme Court decision, Buckley v. Valeo, happens to turn 50 years old this week. It's Buckley, and not the often-excoriated 2010 Roberts court decision in Citizens United v. FEC, that created the conditions for the ultrawealthy to transform their vastly unequal economic power into lopsided political power, and for a billionaire like Elon Musk to contribute a staggering $291 million to help elect Republican candidates, including Donald Trump, in 2024. It is going to take a constitutional amendment or Supreme Court reform to make things right again—and there's a realistic chance that the current Supreme Court soon makes things worse, not better—but reform is unlikely because of the power of the very moneyed interests who benefit from the Buckley-created system….

The First Amendment concerns voiced by Buckley's challengers were real and the 1974 law was too draconian. In the middle of the Buckley litigation, an advertisement appeared in the Washington Post criticizing Ford for his pardon of Nixon and his choice of Nelson Rockefeller as vice president. As campaign finance expert Herbert Alexander described it, the political advertisement headlined "Would You Elect Ex-Congressman Ford President?" "urged Republicans, Democrats, and independents to oppose Ford and convince him to withdraw as a candidate." The ad cost $2,368.80, in violation of FECA's $1,000 individual spending limit. It was a technical violation of the law, but not a fair one. There was also a concern that challengers need more money than incumbents, who already had name recognition and other benefits like free publicity from being in office, and so limiting campaign contributions and spending was in the self-interests of the members of Congress who passed the law.

But whether or not parts of the 1974 FECA went too far, the court was wrong to say that independent spending could never corrupt or create the appearance of corruption, or that there could be no limit in spending by the ultrawealthy. And the results in recent years have been disastrous. As I explained last year at Slate, Musk is not alone among billionaires spending big money:

In the 2024 elections, the top six donors supporting or opposing federal candidates each reported contributing at least $100 million, according to data compiled by OpenSecrets. Those donors—Musk ($291.5 million), Timothy Mellon ($197 million), Miriam Adelson ($148.3 million), Richard and Elizabeth Uihlein ($143.5 million), Ken Griffin ($108.4 million), and Jeffrey and Janine Yass ($101.1 million)—all exclusively supported Donald Trump and other Republican candidates (with the exception of the Yasses, who gave a nominal $1,500 contribution on the Democratic side). The biggest donor on the liberal side was former New York City mayor and publisher Michael Bloomberg, who gave $64.3 million total, with all but $1 million going to the Democratic side….

In Defense of Justice Alito

Ben Aguiñaga, a former law clerk, responds to the gross media smears of Justice Alito.

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The media does not fairly cover the conservative Supreme Court justices. But it is not enough to criticize their written opinions. Rather, pundits feel compelled to opine on how the Justices feel. Case in point is a recent headline from Joan Biskupic, titled "Samuel Alito keeps getting his way. So why does he seem so unhappy?" Does Biskupic have any evidence that Alito is unhappy? Did she talk to the Justice or his clerks? No, Biskupic apparently no longer has access to that sort of actual information. Instead, she based her conclusions on the Justice's facial expression on the bench. These are actual passages from a CNN article:

Alito's aggravation is regularly on display in the courtroom, too. . . .

In the courtroom, even the little things can visibly irk Alito. He often grimaces and rolls his eyes. . . .

Other justices laughed. They appear accustomed to his unguarded irritability.

Of course, these sorts of claims usually go uncontested. There is zero upside to the Justice defending himself, especially from an unfavorable media.

Fortunately, one of Alito's recent clerks has taken steps to respond. Ben Aguiñaga, the Louisiana Solicitor General, wrote a piece titled "I worked for Justice Alito. What I saw up close shatters the media smear." (I met Ben a decade ago when he was clerking for then-Justice Don Willett.)

As they say, read the entire thing. A few things stand out. First, Ben smashes this false notion that Alito is a curmudgeon.

One of the memorable parts of any clerkship is the chance to eat lunch with your judge or justice and discuss anything but work. Some jurists prefer a fancy lunch out on the town. Not Justice Alito. My fondest memories are those lunches we had around a chambers table — the clerks with box lunches or maybe a to-go plate from the cafeteria, and the justice with a bowl of Campbell's soup that he had just warmed in a microwave. The justice is famously introverted, and so, it was not uncommon for the clerks to run away with the conversation as the justice's spoon clinked against his bowl of soup. The justice was not disengaged; he was waiting for the right moment to strike with the driest humor known to Washington. He did not need to spend precious time with us at lunch — he had more important things to do. And yet he sacrificed anyway.

The Justice is an introvert to be sure, but when he chooses to speak, he chimes in perfectly with just the right sense of humor. My suspicion is that Justice Alito has little interest in engaging with elitist reporters, so they simply never see his funny side.

Second, Ben echoes a message I've heard from many Alito clerks over the years. The Justices does not actually need the clerks. He could do all the work himself. And when he asks the clerks to do work, he does so sheepishly.

Some jurists are reputed to be harsh taskmasters. Not Justice Alito. Not only did he lighten our loads at all costs, but he also never raised his voice or directed displeasure toward us. That is not because we were perfect — one time I had to apologize for turning in a memo a day late, but he did not bat an eye. To the contrary, the justice took every opportunity he could to encourage us. I remember one particularly long memo battle that we fought and won. He could have walked off with the victory. But instead, he took time to give me a thoughtful thank you note for my assistance.

I've heard some horror stories from other chambers about Justices who expect their clerks to be on call 24x7. And when a clerk messes up, the Justice does far more than bat an eye. Again, the false narratives about Justice Alito being harsh on the bench do not match the reality of how the Justice interacts with others.

Third, Ben responds directly to the Biskupic-led charge of unhappiness:

All this is why obsessive depictions of Justice Alito as "aggrieved" and "unhappy" in the media are personal to me. He is nothing like the caricature erected by those pining for clicks and likes at his expense. And it is a disservice to the justice and to the Supreme Court as an institution to perpetuate a false "aggrievement" narrative that, at this point, is exhausted from being copied and pasted too many times.

The Justice Alito I know is kind, humble, thoughtful and selfless. I know because he believed in me — and I am a better man because of his example.

I don't think Justice Alito's value is fully understood. Justices Scalia and Thomas have built up significant fan bases, in part because of their gregariousness and outgoingness. But Justice Alito is a constant and stable force for conservative jurisprudence.

Students sometimes ask me who my favorite Justice is. That question is like asking me to pick a favorite child. I love them for different reasons. I sometimes answer the question with a baseball analogy. Justice Scalia scored the most runs, with a combination of walks, base hits, home runs, and stolen bases. Justice Thomas has the most home runs, but as he always swings for the fences, he sometimes strikes out. Justice Alito has the highest on-base percentage. He does not always cross home plate or or knock it out of the park, but he consistently get on base, and almost never strikes out.

Free Speech

"James L. Buckley: The Man and His Principles," by Roger Pilon

A friend profiles Buckley himself, a public servant who spent his life defending constitutional first principles.

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From an Institute for Free Speech symposium on the 50th anniversary of Buckley, which I've been cross-posting; this is by Roger Pilon, senior fellow in constitutional studies at the Cato Institute, founding director emeritus of Cato's Robert A. Levy Center for Constitutional Studies, and founding publisher emeritus of the Cato Supreme Court Review:

Ten years ago, the Brooklyn Law School held a symposium to commemorate the 40th anniversary of Buckley v. Valeo, featuring Dean Nicholas W. Allard, the ACLU's legendary Ira Glasser, and the eponymous James L. Buckley himself, then a senior judge on the D.C. Circuit. Expressing his delight at being part of the commemoration, Judge Buckley noted that the decision had assured him "a measure of immortality." Immortality indeed! Here we are again, a decade later and half a century after Buckley was decided, and we're still talking about the case.

Let me open on a personal note. My wife Juliana and I have had the good fortune to know Judge Buckley—or Jim, as he insisted, and as I will do hereinafter to avoid confusing the man with the case. Especially after he moved back to Washington late in life, near us, we were often able to dine together. Long before that, however, as a Columbia University undergraduate, I was a volunteer in his improbable 1970 campaign to become New York's junior senator, running as a third-party candidate on the Conservative Party line.

But it was not until 1976, when Juliana and I were completing our doctorates at the University of Chicago, that we would first meet the senator at the storied Ford v. Reagan Republican National Convention, where we were alternate delegates pledged to Reagan. Two years earlier, you see, Jim had inserted in the Congressional Record Juliana's New Guard article, "Against Ideology," which drew from Alexander Solzhenitsyn's Gulag Archipelago. When we happened upon Jim at the convention and introduced ourselves, he responded, "Oh so you're Juliana Pilon!" Ever the epitome of modesty, that was Jim.

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Takings

More Historical Evidence Showing that the Public Use Clause of the Fifth Amendment Does Not Allow Takings that Transfer Property to Private Parties

Harvard law Prof. Maureen Brady uncovers relevant evidence from late-nineteenth century state constitutional conventions.

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The Supreme Court's controversial 5-4 ruling in Kelo v. City of New London (2005), held that private "economic development" is enough to satisfy the Fifth Amendment requirement that the government can only condemn property for a "public use." In so doing, it rekindled a longstanding debate over whether takings that transfer property to private parties violate the public use requirement. Harvard law Professor Maureen "Molly" Brady - one of the nation's leading property and takings scholars - has uncovered additional new evidence on this topic. And it counts against the decision reached in Kelo.

In an insightful post at the Brennan Center State Court Report, and an article for the recent Yale Journal on Regulation symposium on the 20th anniversary of Kelo (which I co-edited), Brady assesses debates over public use in late-nineteenth century state constitutional conventions, mostly in western states. She finds that several western states included specific provisions in their new state constitutions authorizing the use of eminent domain for some private purposes, such as drainage and mining. But, importantly, they did so explicitly, specifically outlining these categories as exceptions to the general requirement that takings must be for a "public use."

While Brady does not quite fully draw the connection, the fact that these private-use takings had to be explicitly authorized indicates that most delegates to these state constitutional conventions did not believe that a standard authorization of takings for "public use" was sufficient to allow condemnations for transfer to private parties, so long as the latter might benefit the public in some way (the  interpretation eventually adopted by the federal Supreme Court in its terribly reasoned decision in Berman v. Parker (1954) and reiterated in Kelo). Rather, they assumed that "public use" only allowed condemnation for publicly owned projects, with the possible exception of private owners who have a legal duty to serve the entire public (such as public utilities).

This evidence is relevant to the interpretation of the federal Public Use Clause because many originalists argue that the relevant period for understanding the original meaning of the Bill of Rights as applied to state and local governments, is that around 1868, when the Fourteenth Amendment was enacted, thereby "incorporating" the Bill of Rights against the states. The state constitutional conventions Brady analyzes mostly occurred within a few years of 1868, and therefore illuminate understandings of the meaning of "public use" during this period.

One might wonder why state constitutional framers enacted provisions allowing for takings that were banned by the federal Fifth Amendment. One likely reason is that, during this period, the Supreme Court had not yet ruled that the Fifth Amendment (or the rest of the Bill of Rights) had indeed been incorporated against the states. It did not do so until well into the twentieth century, a history discussed in Chapter 2 of my book The Grasping Hand: Kelo v. City of New London and the Limits of Eminent Domain,

In The Grasping HandI also cover a wide range of other evidence of the meaning of public use in 1868, including state court decisions, legal treatises, and more. This evidence, too, largely supports the narrow definition of "public use" over the broad one adopted in Berman and Kelo. The same is true of the admittedly more limited evidence on the understanding of "public use" in 1791, when the Fifth Amendment and the rest of the Bill of Rights were initially ratified. This evidence, too, is covered in my book.

Brady argues that the nineteenth century state conventions also highlight the importance of the "necessity" requirement as a constraint on eminent. Necessity - a doctrine adopted in many states' eminent domain jurisprudence - requires proof that condemnation is needed in order to achieve the public use supposedly justifying the taking. While federal courts would do well to give greater consideration to necessity, it is not a substitute for restoring the correct meaning of "public use." A condemnation that is "necessary" for a private use is still unconstitutional.

In the aftermath of Kelo, many states enacted reforms constraining eminent domain abuse. But abusive takings still continue in many parts of the country, and state action is not a sufficient substitute for systematic nationwide enforcement of the Fifth Amendment's public use requirement.

I hope the Supreme Court eventually reconsiders its badly flawed "public use" jurisprudence, and reverses Kelo and Berman. Molly Brady's excellent work provides additional reasons for moving in this direction.

Free Speech

#TheyLied Defamation Plaintiff, Suing Over Rape Allegations, Can Prove Reputational Harm with His Own Testimony

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In Apperson v. Kaminsky, decided Friday by the Missouri Supreme Court (opinion by Justice Paul Wilson, Apperson sued his ex-romantic partners Kaminsky and Norman for defamation (see the intermediate appellate decision for more factual details):

After [their] involvements ended, Norman told more than one person Apperson raped and abused her, and Kaminsky told others (in person and through an extensive social media campaign intended to reach those with whom Apperson dealt personally and professionally) that Apperson stalked and raped her, was a serial rapist and serial abuser, was restrained from coming within 500 feet of her, and threatened to kill both her and Norman.

As a result of these statements, Apperson was confronted in his home by a group of people (several of whom were armed) supporting Kaminsky and Norman. Because of this confrontation, Apperson was forced out of his home for seven months. Kaminsky's statements also resulted in Apperson being asked not to patronize a local coffee shop, being made to disassociate himself from two organizations he founded, and losing a speaking engagement. Finally, Apperson was involuntarily removed from shared office space after Kaminsky told the management Apperson raped her and insisted management take action against him….

Missouri precedents, unlike those in many other states, require evidence of actual damages in a reputation case; damages may not merely be presumed. The trial court read those precedents as also requiring that the evidence had to go beyond just plaintiff's testimony on the issue, and thus granted a directed verdict in defendants' favor. But the Missouri Supreme Court disagreed:

True, a plaintiff's conclusory assertion of reputational damage is insufficient. A plaintiff's entirely subjective belief her "integrity" has been damaged also is insufficient. But such holdings are mere applications of the general rule there must be evidence (or a reasonable basis for inferring) the defendant's defamatory statement caused damage to the plaintiff's reputation…. If the plaintiff can testify competently to such damage, doing so will suffice to make a submissible case on the issue of reputational injury as readily as evidence from any other source.

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Free Speech

Israeli-American Doctor's Federal Conspiracy Claim Against CAIR and Other Critics Can Go Forward for Now

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From today's decision by Judge Thomas Thrash (N.D. Ga.) in Winer v. Mohammad:

This action arises out of alleged defamatory statements that Defendant Umaymah Mohammad, a student at the Emory University School of Medicine ("SOM"), made about Plaintiff Joshua Winer, a physician and professor at Emory. Mohammad, who is Palestinian, sent an email to the entire SOM student and faculty body on January 17, 2024, in which the Plaintiff alleges she "praised terrorism against Israel, expressed her hatred towards Israel and the United States, and stated that Israel, the United States, and Emory are perpetrating a genocide against Palestinians in Gaza."

Nearly two months later, in March 2024, the Plaintiff published an op-ed piece in an Israeli news publication sharing his decision to travel to Israel to volunteer as a physician in the Israeli Defense Force ("IDF") following the October 7th Hamas attack on Israel. The Plaintiff identifies as Jewish and maintains dual American and Israeli citizenship. He is a surgical oncologist at Emory Winship Cancer Institute, a professor in the Department of Surgery, Division of Surgical Oncology at the SOM, and serves as the SOM Surgical Clerkship Director.

In April 2024, Mohammad participated in an interview for a news organization called Democracy Now!. In the interview, Mohammad was asked about the email she sent and was asked to explain the importance of the issue to her. As part of her response, Mohammad referenced Winer by stating that

one of the professors of medicine we have at Emory recently went to serve as a volunteer medic in the Israeli Offense Force [sic] and recently came back. This man participated in aiding and abetting a genocide, in aiding and abetting the destruction of the healthcare system in Gaza and the murder of over 400 healthcare workers, and is now back at Emory so-called teaching medical students and residents how to take care of patients.

Mohammad was ultimately suspended from the SOM for one year based on her comments in the Democracy Now! interview. In November 2024, Mohammad participated in a podcast hosted by the International Union of Scientists in which she made similar statements about the Plaintiff. In January 2025, she made more statements about the Plaintiff's IDF service in the online publication Mondoweiss. In the Mondoweiss piece, Mohammad alluded that the Plaintiff "believe[d] in the legitimacy of apartheid, and that some human lives are not as important as others."

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Protest, Worship, and the Core of Free Exercise

On the anti-ICE protest at Cities Church in Minnesota

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During a recent Sunday worship service at Cities Church, a Southern Baptist congregation in the Minneapolis–St. Paul area, protesters entered the sanctuary and interrupted the service, chanting slogans related to immigration enforcement and ICE. The incident was captured on video, including the church's livestream. Church leaders and congregants later described the intrusion as frightening and deeply disruptive.

Given the early stage of the proceedings, one can't draw firm conclusions about either the facts or the law. But we do know enough for some early observations.

At a high level, the episode sits at the intersection of three familiar principles. Political protest lies at the core of First Amendment protection. At the same time, the First Amendment does not confer an entitlement to enter private property or to substantially disrupt a private gathering simply because one has something important to say. A church sanctuary during worship is not a public forum; it is a private religious space dedicated to a specific purpose. For that reason, incidents like this are often addressed through ordinary, content-neutral state criminal law, such as trespass or disorderly conduct.

The Minnesota authorities don't seem inclined to prosecute, though. But the feds do. According to recent reports, federal authorities have arrested two protest organizers. I don't think the precise charges have been publicly clarified, but the feds had previously indicated that they were investigating potential civil-rights violations.

One statute they reportedly are considering is the Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances Act, or FACE Act, 18 U.S.C. § 248. In addition to its application in the clinic-access context, the Act makes it unlawful to use "force," "threats of force," or "physical obstruction" to intentionally "injure, intimidate or interfere with" a person "exercising or seeking to exercise" the right of religious freedom at a place of worship. Whether those elements are met here will depend on the facts—for example, whether protesters physically blocked worshippers' movement, whether they employed threats or intimidation, etc. The statute does not criminalize protest as such.

Whatever the ultimate legal analysis, these issues matter beyond this particular episode. People debate what the free exercise of religion means, legally and philosophically. But, at least as far back as John Locke, the right to worship peacefully has been understood to lie at its core. If free exercise doesn't mean the right to worship peacefully in your own sanctuary without being interrupted by outside protesters, it's hard to know what it would mean. Protecting that right is essential to religious pluralism and to living together amid deep disagreement.

I discuss these issues in more detail in a short Legal Spirits episode, available here.

Free Speech

"Celebrating Buckley v. Valeo: A Landmark of Political Freedom," by Joel M. Gora

"An original Buckley litigator shares the inside story of one of America’s most important political speech victories."

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From an Institute for Free Speech symposium on the 50th anniversary of Buckley, which I've been cross-posting; this is by Prof. Joel M. Gora (Brooklyn Law School), who was one of the lawyers who argued Buckley (on behalf of the ACLU) before the Supreme Court:

It is an honor to participate in this celebration of the 50th anniversary of the landmark case of Buckley v. Valeo. I have been privileged to spend my entire professional career working in the area of constitutional law, and especially the protections of the First Amendment. As a full-time lawyer at the American Civil Liberties Union for a decade, and then as a volunteer lawyer for many years after, I started my teaching career at Brooklyn Law School. I estimate that I have worked on more than 100 Supreme Court cases, the majority of them dealing with rights under the First Amendment. Of all those cases, the one I am proudest to have worked on, and the one I think has had the greatest positive impact on political freedom, is the Buckley case decided by the Supreme Court on January 30, 1976. It was a watershed moment for the Court, and for the country.

Years later, when politicians sought to pass increasingly restrictive federal campaign finance laws, a Democratic leader was asked about whether they posed a problem under the First Amendment. His response was, in effect, you can either have free speech or fair and healthy elections, but you can't have both. My response was that precisely the opposite was true: You can't have one without the other.

Free speech is not the enemy of democracy; free speech is the engine of democracy. It is the most powerful political tool we have to control the government. To allow the government to control free speech is to take away that most powerful tool. That was what was at stake in the Buckley case. And the Court did an outstanding job, but not a perfect one, of protecting that vital tool.

The Origin Story: Five Years Earlier

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Third Circuit Denies Petition for Rehearing En Banc of Alina Habba Disqualification as U.S. Attorney

Could this case end up in the Supreme Court?

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Back in December, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed a district court order concluding that Alina Habba was not lawfully acting as the U.S. Attorney for the District of New Jersey.

Yesterday, the Third Circuit denied a petition for rehearing en banc. Of the twelve judges eligible to participate in the en banc vote, three noted their dissent from the order (Judges Phipps, Matey, and Mascott), one of which (Mascott) "will file a separate dissent sur rehearing on a later date."

The question now is whether the Administration will seek to bring this case to the Supreme Court.

My co-blogger Paul Cassell offered commentary on the Third Circuit's "curious" initial decision here.

New in Civitas Outlook: "Anti-Semitism and Anti-Christian Zionism On The Right"

"It is perverse to include Anti-Zionists and cozy up to antisemites."

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Today is International Holocaust Remembrance Day. We often repeat, reflexively, "Never again." Yet far too many people forget the "again" part. Antisemitism has been with us since the beginning of recorded history. While it is important to study the Holocaust, modern education fixates on that Shoach at the expense of obscuring the long train of hatred towards Jewish people that continues to this day. That education also portrays Jews as victims, and teaches that anything short of mass extermination is not that big of a deal.  I would commend a new op-ed in the Wall Street Journal, titled "Holocaust Education Obscures Antisemitism." It begins:

On Holocaust Remembrance Day, Jan. 27, it's important to reflect on, mourn and remember the six million Jews murdered by the Nazis. As time passes and the Holocaust fades further from memory, this somber day grows increasingly important. Yet with antisemitism surging and Jews being murdered in attacks worldwide, it's clear that remembering is no longer enough. If our understanding of Jew-hatred remains locked in the past, there's a risk that current and future forms of antisemitism will spiral out of control.

Today is a very fitting day to publish my new essay in Civitas Outlook, titled Anti-Semitism and Anti-Christian Zionism On The Right. From the introduction:

On the political left, antisemitism has long been cloaked under the garb of anti-zionism. Those advocating for Palestinian rights insist they have no animosity towards Jews, but simply reject Zionism: the belief that Israel is the Jewish state. The defense of Zionism invariably falls to Jewish people, who explained that this purported anti-zionism was little more than a ruse for anti-semitism. And in recent times, Jews found allies on the right with Christians who zealously supported Zionism as both a matter of policy and faith. But a rupture is forming. A rising tide on the right is attacking Zionists and Christian Zionists alike. In every civilization, antisemitism has morphed to match the circumstances of the day on all sides of the political spectrum. Regrettably, this movement to oppose Christian Zionism is little different than left-wing anti-Zionism on college campuses. As the very bounds of conservatism continue to ebb and flow, stark lines are being drawn of how those on the right view Israel and the Jewish people. Conservatives need to account for how this shift is drastically altering American domestic and foreign policy.

It is tempting to start this analysis with Kevin Roberts's ill-fated defense of Tucker Carlson. But we should step back a bit further. It has been widely reported that Carlson did nothing to push back against Nick Fuentes, a Holocaust denier, when Carlson interviewed him. But Carlson did express some opinions of his own. He described Christian Zionists as a "Christian heresy" whom he "dislikes more than anybody." Among these heretics were Ambassador to Israel Mike Huckabee, Senator Ted Cruz, former President George W. Bush, and others. Carlson actually said that Cruz was "serving for Israel." Tucker charged that this Zionism is a "brain virus." The implication was clear: disloyal American Jews have infected Christians to advance Israeli interests over American interests. Stop me if you've heard this trope before.

And from a somewhat hopeful conclusion:

Perhaps there is some room for hope. In a recent interview, the New York Times asked President Trump, "Do you think there's room within the Republican coalition, the Make America Great movement, for people with antisemitic views?" Trump replied, "No, I don't. I think we don't need them. I think we don't like them." Trump is right. It is perverse to include Anti-Zionists and cozy up to antisemites. Christian Zionists should be welcomed, and antisemites excluded. 

Never again means never again.

Free Speech

Conviction for Posting Mayor's Office Phone Number, Which Led to Hundreds of Threatening Calls from Poster's Followers

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From a decision in November in Hendry v. State, written by Indiana Court of Appeals Judge Leanna Weissmann, joined by Judges Mark Bailey and Elaine Brown:

Craig Hendry became a frequent visitor to city hall in the small town of Clinton, where he filmed confrontational interactions with employees and posted the videos to his YouTube channel. After he uploaded his first video from Clinton and listed the phone number of the mayor's office in the video's caption, city hall received hundreds of threatening phone calls and voicemails [apparently over about 30 days]….

There's a lot going on in the case, including a conviction for "target[ing] the mayor's assistant, P.K., banging on her closed office door and filming her through her closed blinds," and "follow[ing] P.K. to her car." But I was particularly struck by the prosecution for posting the phone number:

Hendry acknowledges that the phone calls and voicemails constituted harassment. The harassment statute at issue here criminalizes the placement of phone calls with the intent to "harass, annoy, or alarm" and without the intent of legitimate communication. After Hendry posted his video in April 2022, the city received over 350 threatening voicemails, and only a few conveyed actual matters of city business. Hendry acknowledged at trial that many of the messages were "disgusting and threatening," and on appeal concedes that those threatening messages "constitute an 'abuse' of the right to free speech." Hendry also does not refute the connection between his videos and the messages. Threatening calls spiked just after the videos were posted and continued in significant numbers in the weeks that followed. Most of the messages referred to the people and events depicted in Hendry's videos….

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Free Speech

One Judge's Perspective on Quoting Epithets

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From Judge Jamal Whitehead (W.D. Wash.) Friday in Young v. Boeing Co. (W.D. Wash.):

According to Troglia—who identifies as "mixed race (Hispanic) and not 100% Caucasian"—Young became frustrated and called Troglia a "bitch ass nigger"1 on February 24, 2023, while the two were working together….

1 Throughout this order, the Court uses the phrase "N-word" when speaking in its own voice. But when quoting the record, the Court reproduces the actual language used. Judicial opinions that euphemize the record risk obscuring the very conduct at issue. Where, as here, the use of a racial slur is central to an employer's termination decision and the plaintiff's claims, the Court declines to place a thumb on the scale by softening the language that drives the dispute.

Of course, as Randy Kennedy and I noted in our The New Taboo: Quoting Epithets in the Classroom and Beyond, different judges exercise their discretion differently on such matters: Some judges avoid expurgation altogether (see, e.g., this decision from last week); others expurgate some slurs; others expurgate a wide range of vulgarities; and others expurgate some mentions of a slur but not others (e.g., not direct quotations from the record). In any event, this example struck me as worth noting.

Eighth Circuit Suspends Injunction Related to Federal Immigration Enforcement in Minnesota

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From the opinion by Judges Bobby Shepherd and David Stras in Tincher v. Noem:

The district court entered a preliminary injunction with respect to federal immigration-enforcement operations in Minnesota. The injunction is unlikely to survive the government's … appeal, so we stay it pending a final decision in this case.

Six individuals who have "observed" and protested Operation Metro Surge, the ongoing immigration-enforcement effort in the Twin Cities, sued on behalf of "[a]ll persons who do or will in the future record, observe, and/or protest against" it. The preliminary injunction covers all of them and limits what federal agents who take part in the operation or respond to the protests can do while carrying out their official duties. Included in the district court's order are prohibitions on "[r]etaliating against" anyone "engag[ed] in peaceful and unobstructive protest activity" and stopping vehicles without "reasonable articulable suspicion that [the occupants] are forcibly obstructing or interfering with" immigration-enforcement activities.

For at least two reasons, the government has made "a strong showing" that its challenge to the injunction "is likely to succeed on the merits." First, the grant of relief to such a broad uncertified class is just a universal injunction by another name. See Trump v. CASA, Inc. (2025) (holding that "federal courts lack authority to issue them"). Even if "courts may issue temporary relief to a putative class," this one has no chance of getting certified. A.A.R.P. v. Trump (2025). And overlooking the difficulties of certification, as the Supreme Court did in A.A.R.P., is not necessary "to preserve our jurisdiction." …

We accessed and viewed the same videos the district court did. What they show is observers and protestors engaging in a wide range of conduct, some of it peaceful but much of it not. They also show federal agents responding in various ways. Even the named plaintiffs' claims involve different conduct, by different officers, at different times, in different places, in response to different behavior. These differences mean that there are no "questions of law or fact common to the class" that would allow the court to decide all their claims in "one stroke."

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