The Volokh Conspiracy

Mostly law professors | Sometimes contrarian | Often libertarian | Always independent | Est. 2002

The Volokh Conspiracy

Guns

Second Amendment as a Right to Sell Guns as Well as to Have and Buy Them?

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From Fifth Circuit Judges James Ho and Andrew Oldham in an unsigned opinion filed yesterday in U.S. v. Deare:

Jeremiah Deare was indicted for conspiracy to engage in the business of dealing firearms without a federal firearms license in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(a)(1) and for making false statements with respect to records of licensed firearms dealers. Deare then filed a motion to dismiss the indictment, broadly challenging the constitutionality of § 922(a)(1)'s licensure requirement and related record-keeping requirements.

The district court denied his motion to dismiss, holding that federal licensing and record-keeping requirements are not implicated by the Second Amendment because such requirements do not affect an individual's right to keep or bear arms. The court further held that, even if federal licensing requirements are implicated by the Second Amendment, such requirements are consistent with our Nation's historical tradition of firearm regulation….

Deare primarily challenges the district court's denial of his motion to dismiss the indictment. Specifically, he argues that the Second Amendment's plain text covers firearm sales, and that § 922(a)(1)'s licensure requirement and related record-keeping requirements are inconsistent with our Nation's history of firearm regulation.

The plain text of the Second Amendment covers the sale of firearms. As we noted in Reese v. BATFE (5th Cir. 2025), "the right to 'keep and bear arms' surely implies the right to purchase them." During oral argument, the government conceded that the Second Amendment applies to the commercial sale of firearms.

Accordingly, we vacate the district court's order denying Deare's motion to dismiss the indictment and remand to the district court for further proceedings.

(As I read the opinion, it doesn't affect the false statements charge.)

Judge Ho concurred:

It's gratifying that our court today reaffirms what we should have long understood—that the Second Amendment right to "keep and bear Arms" plainly encompasses the sale of arms as well. It seems obvious that constitutional rights are meaningless if the Government can simply prohibit the means by which citizens are able to exercise those rights.

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Guns

Gun Rights and Guilt by Association

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Credit: Wikipedia / Welkinridge.

Some excerpts from the longish opinion today in Shilling v. County of San Diego, decided today by Ninth Circuit Judge Patrick Bumatay, joined by Judges Kenneth Lee and Jennifer Sung:

The San Diego County Sheriff revoked Kenneth Shilling's concealed-carry weapon ("CCW") license over his affiliation with the Boozefighters Motorcycle Club…. [We conclude, among other things, that] the district court improperly dismissed his First Amendment [freedom of association] claim….

Kenneth Charles Shilling resides in San Diego, California. He's a member of the Boozefighters Motorcycle Club, which, according to Shilling, was founded in 1946 by World War II veterans. In his view, it's not like some other motorcycle clubs, which are known for criminal and gang activity. Instead, the Boozefighters focus on charitable work and the "core values of family, work, and community." Shilling's record is clean; he has no criminal history.

In June 2022, when the "good moral character" requirement [for getting a concealed caryr license] still existed [under California law], Shilling applied for and received a CCW license from then-San Diego County Sheriff Anthony Ray. This was short lived. Less than a year and a half later, in December 2023, a different San Diego County Sheriff, Kelly Martinez, used the "good moral character" requirement to revoke Shilling's CCW license. In a letter notifying Shilling of the revocation, Sheriff Martinez explained that the "San Diego Sheriff's Department['s] good moral character definition" excludes a person who:

Has a pattern of or propensity for criminal conduct, as demonstrated by anything in the application or investigation for a license. This includes, but is not limited to, evidence of criminal behavior or a close nexus to a criminal gang. In making this determination, the Sheriff's Department shall use an objective inquiry, considering the facts and circumstances known at the time of the application or through the investigation.

The letter said that Shilling's license was revoked due to his association with the Boozefighters Motorcycle Club, which the Sheriff described as a "criminal street gang." Shilling was not given the opportunity to contest the allegations before his license was revoked, but he could request reconsideration of the decision. The new CCW regime with the "dangerousness" requirement took effect on January 1, 2024, shortly after Shilling's license was revoked….

Here's the court's analysis allowing Shilling's First Amendment freedom of association claim to go forward:

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Politics

Short Circuit: An inexhaustive weekly compendium of rulings from the federal courts of appeal

Uncontrolled burns, false claims, and federal highway funds.

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Please enjoy the latest edition of Short Circuit, a weekly feature written by a bunch of people at the Institute for Justice.

Victory! Millions of Americans want and need low-FODMAP foods, which are low in certain sugars that can cause debilitating stomach issues, aggravate irritable bowels, and worse. Fortunately, this week (following the Ninth Circuit's revival of our First Amendment challenge), the FDA lifted its ban on producers truthfully labelling their products "Low-FODMAP." Says IJ client Michelle Przybocki, who abides by a strict low-FODMAP diet after nearly dying from digestive complications, "I'm thrilled that the federal government is going to allow companies to start labeling their products as 'Low-FODMAP,' because this makes it easier for me to find foods that I know will not cause me digestive issues." Click here to learn more.

New on the Short Circuit podcast: Fancy some Elevenses? Serving up Eleventh Circuit refreshments in our #12Months12Circuits series. There's excessive bail in Alabama and excessive bar fees in Florida.

  1. Man has two DUIs decades ago in Massachusetts. He recently moved to New Hampshire and tried to buy a gun but was rebuffed due to the federal ban on felons buying such things. He challenges the ban on him buying and also owning a firearm. District court: Dismissed. First Circuit: Yeah, but he hasn't alleged an intent to possess a firearm that's been in interstate commerce, and, like, maybe a gun or two out there hasn't. Somewhere? Perhaps. So no standing. As for the whole purchasing thing, we guess there might be standing given you actually were told you couldn't buy a gun? So vacated and remanded.
  2. Cop killer spends 26 years in solitary confinement in Connecticut prison. Cruel and unusual? Jury: No. District court: Oof, that's a miscarriage of justice. Second Circuit: Grant of new trial affirmed. Read More

Free Speech

No Pseudonymity for Man Suing Trump+Rubio+Musk over Ukraine-Related Actions

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From Chief Judge James Boasberg (D.C.C.) today in Doe v. Trump:

Plaintiff Michael Doe is an American citizen whose wife and daughter reside in Kyiv, Ukraine. In March 2025, his wife and daughter were almost killed in a drone strike. On behalf of himself and a class of Ukrainian refugees, Doe sues President Trump, Secretary Rubio, and Elon Musk for violating, inter alia, a federal statute that imposes sanctions on Russia, the Take Care Clause, and the First Amendment. [The claims are apparently related to the Trump Administration's actions related to sanctions on Russia Musk's actions related to Ukraine and Starlink. -EV]

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Free Speech

Great News: 80% of Americans Get This Free Speech Question Right

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According to a Foundation for Individual Rights in Education survey, 9% of Americans have full confidence that the Democratic Party will protect their free speech rights, and a statistically indistinguishable 10% have full confidence that the Republican Party will do so. Assuming no overlap between the two groups, that means 80% of Americans do not have full confidence in either party on this, which of course is the right answer.

I've got to say that I'm skeptical about the people who said "quite a lot of confidence" to each (17% as to the Democratic Party, 12% as to the Republican Party), but at least they don't have full confidence, so there's that.

Free Speech

Some of Trump's Libel Claims Against N.Y. Times Can Go Forward

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From Judge Steven Merryday (M.D. Fla.) yesterday in Trump v. N.Y. Times Co.:

Times v. Sullivan states that the First Amendment "prohibits a public official's recovering damages for a defamatory falsehood relating to his official conduct unless he proves that the statement was made with 'actual malice'—that is, with knowledge that it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not." … {[N]otwithstanding the ordinary meaning and usage of "actual malice," "allegations of ill-will, improper motive or personal animosity play no role in determining whether a defendant acted with actual malice," which "does not concern ill-will, improper motive, or personal animosity," a conclusion which appears correct, in law if not elsewhere in the English language or in the common understanding. In sum, "actual malice is not about whether the speaker had evil intent or a motive arising from ill-will."} "[F]ailure to investigate before publishing, even when a reasonably prudent person would have done so, is not sufficient to establish reckless disregard[.]" Harte-Hanks Communications v. Connaughton (1989).

[But] "reckless disregard may be found where there are obvious reasons to doubt the veracity of the informant or the accuracy of his report." "Although failure to investigate will not alone support a finding of actual malice, the purposeful avoidance of the truth is in a different category." …

The court concluded that a large set of statements that Trump alleges to be libelous aren't actionable, "for one or more of the many and varied reasons amply and ably explained by the defendants in the motion to dismiss." But it concludes that several statements may be actionable, even given the "actual malice" requirement:

[A]s alleged in the complaint, the book, Lucky Loser, includes these statements: (1) "Donald Trump had received the equivalent of more than $400 million from his father, much of it through fraudulent tax evasion schemes"; (2) "In the language of the tax code, Fred had given his son taxable gifts masquerading as loans, a likely tax fraud that went unnoticed"; (3) "A plan was soon devised to funnel some of Fred's cash to Donald and his three siblings. They would accomplish that goal by adding a sham layer to Fred's business, one designed to evade the gift and estate taxes"; (4) "So the Trumps began submitting the padded bills to request rent increases from state officials. Part of the cost of Donld Trump's off-the-books inheritance would be passed along to this father's middle-income tenants"; (5) "Between the trust funds, the invoice-padding operation, and other devices created to siphon off his father's wealth outside the gift and estate tax system, Donald was already collecting almost $2 million a year from his father companies. His own business failures meant he kept that money tax-free"; and (6) "Donald Trump had faced these moments before, periods when it seemed his failures could not be saved only by aggressive tax maneuvers or not paying his debts". As described in the complaint, the second article includes the statement (7) "Federal, state and local authorities looked into his ties with the Mafia, found violations of money laundering rules and penalized him for skirting stock trade rules."

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Free Speech

Didn't I See That Guy on All Those Medical TV Shows?

Plus an interesting discussion of implied facts, and Virginia libel law on the requirement that a statement sufficiently tend to damage reputation.

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From Judge Norman Moon (W.D. Va.) Wednesday in Smith v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va.:

The University of Virginia's ("UVA") Post-Baccalaureate Pre-Medical Program is a one-year curriculum designed for pre-med students who did not complete all prerequisites during their undergraduate study…. The Program … boasts a 94% medical-school placement rate and, accordingly, is highly selective ….

Plaintiff … did exceptionally well [in the Program], earning a "near-perfect" GPA and a 96th-percentile score on the Medical College Admission Test …. [After finishing the Program,] Plaintiff applied to thirty medical schools …. Plaintiff asked the [Post-Baccalaureate Pre-Medical Program Committee] for a letter of recommendation. These "Committee Letters" reflect "the Program's collective institutional assessment of the applicant," scaled on a score of 1 (unable to recommend at this time) to 5 (recommended with enthusiasm)…

Plaintiff alleges that he received "highly favorable" letters from his individual recommenders, who praised his intellect, work ethic, personality, and overall potential to succeed in medical school. In contrast to these letters, however, the Committee allegedly wrote a "materially adverse" letter and assigned Plaintiff a score of 2 (recommended with reservations)….

Plaintiff was rejected by all thirty medical schools he applied to, twenty-eight rejecting him without an interview. Given his otherwise strong qualifications, Plaintiff identifies the Committee letter as the clear explanation for this failure. But not only did the letter devastate these thirty applications, Plaintiff maintains—it also "derail[ed] his entire future and eradicate[ed] his chances of pursuing a career in medicine." …

Plaintiff sued for, among other things, defamation, based on these statements from the Committee Letter:

  1. Plaintiff "would benefit from some maturing years before heading to medical school."
  2. Plaintiff "was not as consistent with keeping his shadowing assignments … as expected."
  3. Plaintiff "was not as consistent with … communicating his intended class absences as expected."
  4. Plaintiff "at times had difficulty following the flow of conversation in class."
  5. "[M]any social interactions with" Plaintiff "felt awkward or disjointed." …

The court held that "Statements 1, 4, and 5 are pure expressions of opinion":

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Emergency Powers

My New Just Security Article on "How Congress Should Constrain Emergency Powers"

The article outlines an agenda for reform.

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Today, Just Security published my article "How Congress Should Constrain Emergency Powers," which outlines an agenda for reforms curbing the dangerous growth of executive emergency powers. Here is an excerpt:

Emergency powers are special authorities that are supposed to be reserved for extraordinary, unexpected crises. But all too often, U.S. presidents have sought to turn them into blank checks they can use whenever they want. As conservative Supreme Court Justice Neil Gorsuch recently put it, "Everything is an emergency" now. "Through delegations of authority, through emergency legislation of all stripes," he warned, power has increasingly moved "over to the executive branch"—a development he described as "not a recipe for a healthy democracy over the long term." A recent report by the progressive Brennan Center for Justice similarly warns that "presidents of both parties have stretched the meaning of 'emergency' far beyond reason, enabling them to draw from a growing stockpile of statutory authorities with few real safeguards." Both Gorsuch and the Brennan Center are right.

In his second term, President Donald Trump has engaged in especially grave abuse of emergency powers. But the problem predates his return to power, and is likely to outlast his departure from the political scene. The Democrats' massive victory in the 2026 midterm election gives Congress an opportunity to begin enacting much-needed constraints on executive emergency powers. Some of those authorities should be abolished completely. Others need tighter constraints to ensure they are limited in duration, confined to genuine emergency situations, and subject to strong, nondeferential judicial review enforcing these restrictions.

Some of the powers in question arise from the National Emergencies Act of 1976, which has been particularly prone to abuse. But others involve different legislation, such as the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA), the Alien Enemies Act, laws governing domestic use of the military, and various statutes delegating tariff authority to the executive.

While Trump's abuses of power can provide an initial impetus for reform, there is room for potential cross-ideological cooperation here. Some of the necessary reforms have previously been advocated by conservative Republicans. Given the significant likelihood that a Democratic president might be elected in 2028, conservatives might want to take the opportunity to constrain a future administration's use of these authorities.

The rest of the article outlines reform proposals for specific statutes.

Free Speech

"Original Meaning and the Freedom of Speech and Press": "Scant Evidence: Provoking a Riot"

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I'm serializing my new Notre Dame Law Review article, "Original Meaning and the Freedom of Speech and Press: Some Illustrative Examples"; here's the second Part:

Let me turn now to a different question, as to which the evidence is intriguing but scant: Was freedom of expression understood as including expression that created resentment that risked provoking riots? (This question has of course arisen often more recently, in cases such as Terminiello v. Chicago (1949) and Forsyth County v. Nationalist Movement (1992).) In fact, I hadn't seen any evidence until I came across one early case, which has been apparently virtually undiscussed during the last fifty years, perhaps because it's not on Westlaw or Lexis.

The case is Commonwealth v. Haines (1824), a decision by Pennsylvania Supreme Court Justice John Gibson (later the Chief Justice), apparently sitting alone as a trial judge. Haines had been accused of intentionally causing a riot by "erecting and fixing, a certain figure, resembling a man, commonly called a Paddy, as and for the effigy of St. Patrick … with the accompaniment of a rum bottle and a string of potatoes," in "a neighborhood inhabited principally by emigrants from Ireland." "[T]he exhibition of a Paddy was resented as an insult upon the Catholic portion of the Irish …."

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Preemption

Fourth Circuit Panel Splits Three Ways on Kalshi Preemption

Three judges produce four opinions on one of the more consequential preemption questions in the lower courts.

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Yesterday, in KalshiEX LLC v Martin, a three-judge panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit split three ways on whether sporting event contracts offered by Kalshi are "swaps" (as opposed to sports gambling), and whether state regulation of such contracts is preempted by federal law. The court's ultimate opinion was a one sentence per curiam affirming the district court, with two concurrences and a dissent.

In the end, two judges (Gregory and Thacker) concluded state regulation of these contracts is not preempted, but split over whether the contracts at issue are "swaps." (Judge Thacker concluded they are not, but Judge Gregory concluded there is no need to resolve that question.) A third judge (Benjamin) concluded that Kalshi's sporting event contracts are swaps and are preempted. So that's two votes against preemption, and two votes that whether Kalshi's contracts are swaps should determine whether they are preempted.

Judge Gregory began his concurrence as follows:

KalshiEX, LLC ("Kalshi") brings this appeal, which presents a narrow question of federal preemption. The Commodity Exchange Act ("CEA" or "the Act") grants the Commodity Futures Trading Commission ("CFTC") exclusive jurisdiction over transactions involving swaps traded or executed on a designated contract market ("DCM"). 7 U.S.C. § 2(a)(1)(A). But Congress also enacted a separate provision elsewhere in the same Act providing separate treatment for certain event contracts specifically involving gaming, among other things, and providing that certain such contracts may not be listed or traded on a DCM. Id. § 7a-2(c)(5)(C)(i)–(iii). The question here is whether, when read together, those provisions clearly establish that the CFTC's authority over the sports event contracts at issue excludes Maryland's traditionally recognized authority to enforce its gaming laws.

I do not decide whether Kalshi's sports event contracts are "swaps" within the meaning of the CEA. That is because, even assuming they are, neither the Act nor the CFTC's implementation of it clearly establish that such contracts are entitled to trade on a DCM free from state gaming laws. Whether the contracts are swaps bears on the scope of the CFTC's regulatory authority; it does not alone answer whether that authority is exclusive to the CFTC and displaces Maryland's concurrent authority to regulate gambling. Rather than providing a settled answer, the statutory and regulatory framework leaves unresolved the relationship between the CEA's grant of exclusive jurisdiction and Congress's treatment of gaming contracts.

Because the regulation of gambling has long been a matter of traditional state police power, I would not infer that Congress displaced Maryland's concurrent authority absent a clear expression of its intent to do so. Nor has Kalshi shown that complying with both the CEA and the Maryland law at issue would be impossible or stand as an obstacle to Congress's objective to create a centralized federal regulatory framework for trading derivative contracts. I therefore conclude that Kalshi has not demonstrated that the CEA preempts Maryland's sports wagering laws and concur in the judgment affirming the district court.

Judge Thacker concurred separately, as she saw the issues differently, only she reached the same bottom-line result. Her opinion begins:

Although I ultimately concur in the bottom line opinion, that is, affirmance of the district court, I get there via a different route than does my concurring colleague. KalshiEX, LLC ("Appellant") operates a prediction market. On that market, users enter into contracts with one another in which they try to predict whether or not a given event will occur. This appeal focuses on Appellant's sporting event based contracts. For instance, a user can predict whether a given NASCAR driver will win Talladega, or whether a college basketball team will win or lose a particular game. If the prediction is correct, the user gets paid. If not, they lose money.

In this appeal, we are asked whether Appellant's sporting event based contracts are "swaps" as defined by the Commodity Exchange Act ("CEA"). In my view, Appellant's sporting event based contracts are not swaps within the meaning of the CEA. See also, KalshiEX, LLC v. Assad, No. 25-7516, 2026 WL 2543846 (9th Cir. Aug. 28, 2026). As a result, I would hold that Appellant's contracts lie beyond the exclusive regulatory authority of the Commodity Futures Trading Commission ("CFTC"). Therefore, Maryland officials can co-regulate these contracts.

And Judge Benjamin, dissenting, began her opinion this way.

This case concerns whether the Commodity Exchange Act ("CEA") preempts Maryland's application of its gambling laws to KalshiEX's ("Kalshi") sports related event contracts traded on a federally regulated exchange. Kalshi argues that because it operates as a designated contract market ("DCM") under the CEA, its contracts fall within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Commodity Futures Trading Commission ("CFTC"). Maryland argues that Kalshi's contracts are functionally indistinguishable from sports betting and thus remain subject to traditional state authority over gambling.

This appeal turns on two issues: (1) whether Kalshi's sporting event contracts are "swaps" under the CEA and, if so, (2) whether the CEA preempts otherwise applicable state law. Because I think Kalshi's sports-related event contracts are "swaps" under the CEA, and because Congress has granted "exclusive jurisdiction" over such swaps to the CFTC, I would vacate the district court's denial of the preliminary injunction and remand for further proceedings. I respectfully dissent.

This question is certainly headed to the Supreme Court, whether in this case or one of the others. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, in a split decision, found preemption was likely (in reviewing a preliminary injunction), whereas the U.S. Courts of Appeals for the Ninth and Sixth Circuits found Kalshi's arguments for preemption unpersuasive. I am personally skeptical of preemption here, but we will see whether that is ultimately the view held at One First Street.

[Note: The post above has been revised to clarify/correct my summary of the opinions. My initial phrasing was sloppy.]

Second Amendment Roundup: Major New Film "Firearms and the AR-15 Rifle"

The mechanics and features of America’s leading rifle are explained for the bench and bar.

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"Firearms and the AR-15 Rifle: A Primer for the Bench and Bar" is the title of a new and important film designed to help judges and legal professionals understand the mechanics and features of modern firearms, including the AR-15 semiautomatic rifle. The film is available on YouTube and on Rumble. Following my brief introduction, firearms expert Richard Vasquez takes the center stage.  After 21 years in the Marine Corps as an advanced gunsmith and ordnance officer, Mr. Vasquez served for 14 years in the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATF), including time within the Firearms Technology Branch.  He is now a firearms consultant.

This is a critical time to inform the bench and the bar about the operation of the AR-15 platform and similar semiautomatic rifles, given the ongoing legal fights over modern semiautomatic firearms including the pending Supreme Court cases of Viramontes v. Cook County and Grant v. Higgins.  This film sticks to the facts about the operations and mechanics of modern firearms without touching upon any of the legal or political debates about the AR-15. It does a particularly good job explaining the various features found on most AR-15 rifles and does a great job explaining the differences between semiautomatic firearms and other types of modern firearms, including fully-automatic machine guns.

The film was written, directed and produced by law professor and Second Amendment scholar Mark W. Smith, who was most recently seen discussing firearms and the American Revolution on the Federalist Society annual convention panel "When in the Course of Human Events" (at 22:30).

The film begins with a historical overview of the development of firearms, from single-shot flintlocks to today's semiautomatics. The film describes the basic components of firearms and rifles, in particular.  It explains what makes gas-operated semiautomatic rifles different from lever action, bolt action and pump action rifles.  The film then goes on to show in great detail how a gas-operated semiautomatic rifle operates.

Spoiler alert:  I suspect that one of the film's biggest contributions to the public discourse on semiautomatic firearms will be its easy-to-understand graphics and animations. Thanks to many colorful images, video clips, animations as well as Vasquez's break downs of modern firearm mechanics and operations, I suspect this film will become a valuable teaching tool for people interested in firearms including judges and legal professionals.

Getting to the technical aspects, Mr. Vasquez explains the AR-15 firing mechanism, beginning with the insertion of a cartridge into the chamber, pulling of the trigger, activation of the sear, release of the bolt and firing pin, striking of the primer, explosion of the powder, discharge of the bullet, bleeding of gas causing the bolt carrier group to retract, elimination of the spent cartridge, and insertion of a new cartridge from the magazine to the chamber, thus beginning a new firing cycle.  Easy to follow diagrams of each process in that order simplify and bring to life what happens each step of the way.

Next, Mr. Vasquez moves onto the outward features typical of the AR-15 platform.  The telescoping stock allows the shoulder stock to be adjusted for different statures, such as two spouses, or seasonal clothing, like an overcoat while hunting.  The pistol grip and straight-line stock reduce recoil and muzzle jump, allowing a second, more accurate shot.  The handguard (barrel shroud) with Picatinny Rail facilitates various attachments like iron sights, scopes, and flashlights.  A threaded barrel can be equipped with a flash suppressor to reduce blindness when firing at night or with a muzzle brake to lesson recoil.

Two aspects of the operational process are worth emphasis.  First, nothing about the AR-15 rifle itself dictates the number of rounds it will fire before needing to reinsert a new magazine.  That depends on the magazine, which may hold 5, 10, 20, or 30 rounds.  Second, while firing a shot automatically loads a new cartridge into the chamber, firing the next shot requires that the trigger be pulled again.  That distinguishes a semiautomatic from a fully automatic, aka a machine gun, which requires only the trigger to be depressed and held down to fire all rounds in the magazine.

It's my belief that "Firearms and the AR-15 Rifle: A Primer for the Bench and Bar" will become the definitive documentary on the mechanics of the AR-15 and modern semiautomatic rifles.

Alaska

Trump Justice Department Drops Attempt to Block Certification of Alaska Senate Election Result in "Voter Confusion" Case

The lawsuit never had any merit.

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Alaska Senate candidate Mary Peltola (on the left) and Senator Dan Sullivan (on the right)
Mary Peltola (left) and Sen. Dan S. Sullivan (R-Alaska) (right). (Mattie Neretin - CNP/Tom Williams/CQ Roll Call/Newscom)

 

I previously wrote about the Trump Justice Department's lawsuit seeking to block certification of the Alaska Senate election results, and the district court ruling rejecting it.  The Trump DOJ argued that blocking the  results was necessary to prevent "voter confusion" caused by the presence of two candidates with very similar names on the ballot. As I  explained previously, Republican candidate Dan J. Sullivan can potentially be confused with Dan S. Sullivan (the incumbent GOP senator), and some voters might have accidentally chosen Dan J. even though they intended to back Dan S.

Today, as reported by prominent election law scholar Rick Hasen, DOJ filed a brief in the US Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit seeking to dismiss the case. They also want the district court ruling vacated for procedural reasons (I will not opine on whether that's warranted).

This brings to an end a lawsuit that was always a turkey of a case (though perhaps calling it that is an insult to turkeys!). As explained in my post on the district court ruling and in an excellent amicus brief filed by Rick Hasen, the case never had any merit, and a court decision ruling in its favor would have set a dangerous precedent.

In addition, the election results show that Democratic candidate Mary Peltola got an absolute majority of the vote (about 50.1%), more than both Dan Sullivans and all other candidates combined. Thus, even if all of the 1.7% of voters who chose Dan J. actually intended to back Dan S., it made no difference. Alaska's system of ranked choice voting (under which, if no candidate gets a majority in the first round, votes get reallocated) might have further reduced any problem. But no reallocation took place here, because Peltola got an absolute majority to begin with. This is likely what led DOJ to finally thrown in the towel.

As noted in one of my earlier posts about the case, Democrats may well deserve blame for seeking to deceive voters in this way, even though it was never likely to change the result (evidence indicates Dan J. may have gotten on the ballot as part of a Democratic effort to siphon off voters from Dan S.). But for reasons outlined in the same post, this kind of thing is far from the worst example of exploitation of voter ignorance.

Peltola's win was mostly just part of the broader "Blue tsunami" which saw the Democratis gain 9 Senate seats, including in several traditional red states. But perhaps Peltola got over the top because of the immense popularity of her pet lizard! We could use more lizards on Capitol Hill.

Politics

Retrospective Voting and the 2026 Election

A key "information shortcut" worked well in the 2026 election. But political ignorance remains a serious danger.

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In my book Democracy and Political Ignorance  and various other writings going all the way back to my very first academic article (published in 1998), I have warned of the dangers of widespread voter ignorance. And I have argued that "information shortcuts" - small bits of knowledge that supposedly make up for ignorance about details - are generally ineffective or even counterproductive. Thus, I should acknowledge that one of those shortcuts - retrospective voting - worked fairly well in the recently concluded 2026 election. At the same time, the problem of political ignorance remains a grave menace.

Retrospective voting is probably the most often-used information shortcut, and the one most cited by scholars who argue that voter ignorance isn't much of a problem. The basic idea is simple: to be a good voter you don't need to know much about government and public policy. You just need to know whether things are going well or badly under the rule of the incumbents.

If things are going well, you vote to reelect them to continue their good work. If badly, you vote to "throw the bastards out." Then you elect a new set of bastards in their place; but the new bastards will hopefully know they need to do a good job, else they will get thrown out in their turn, at the next election. As Ronald Reagan famously put it during the 1980 election, "Next Tuesday all of you will go to the polls… I think when you make that decision it might be well if you would ask yourself: Are you better off than you were four years ago?"

I and other critics have long pointed out that, when ignorant voters use the retrospective voting shortcut, they often end up rewarding and punishing incumbents for things they did not cause (usually short-term economic trends), while ignoring more subtle long-term issues. In addition, they often don't know which officials are responsible for which issues, and tend to overlook the possibility that the opposition party's policies will be as bad or worse.

Nonetheless, retrospective voting actually worked pretty well in the 2026 election. As I noted in a previous post, polls show that many voters punished the Republicans for high prices caused by Trump's tariffs,  the failed Iran War, and the administration's cruel campaign of mass deportations (which particularly angered Hispanic voters in key states and congressional districts). One can also add the issue of corruption, which polls  indicate also had a big impact.

The Republicans really were responsible for all three of these policies. They weren't caused by exogenous factors outside of Trump's control. And the policies really did have massive negative effects in raising prices, an unsuccessful war, and massive cruelty and violations of civil liberties caused by the deportation campaign. The scope and effects of corruption are harder to measure. But this administration may be the most corrupt in American history. And, on all four issues, the Democrats are likely to be at least somewhat better.

But while retrospective voting worked reasonably well in the 2026 midterm election, we cannot conclude that the problem of political ignorance doesn't matter, or even that it's overblown. Rather, the shortcut was effective primarily because of the large and obvious nature of Trump's failures.

Along with other scholars, I have long recognized that retrospective voting can be effective if incumbents screw in ways that have large and obvious bad effects - ones that even very ignorant voters can easily see and understand. For example, I often cite economist Amartya Sen's famous finding that mass famines never or almost never occur under democracies (even as they happen much more often under dictatorships). Even ignorant voters will notice a famine is going on, blame incumbents for it, and vote accordingly.

Trump's failures over the last two years weren't quite as bad as a mass famine. But they were nonetheless large (including a major war and  the highest tariff schedule since the Great Depression), highly visible, and many of their effects were easy to understand. It isn't hard to notice that massive tariff increases cause prices to rise. The war and its effects on prices were also highly visible. Images of brutal deportations and resulting civil liberties violations were all over the news. Most voters probably didn't know about the details of the administration's corruption. But there was so much of it, that most probably heard at least something about it.

Many policy failures are far less readily apparent than that. And ignorant voters are therefore likely to overlook or misunderstand them. It's not hard to find examples even in the 2026 election itself. To take a particularly important case, the US faces a massive looming fiscal crisis, caused in large part by the combination of an aging population and out-of-control entitlement spending.  Yet most candidates of both parties largely ignored this problem, and promise continued massive spending, and avoiding tax increases for almost everyone, except perhaps a few billionaires and other very wealthy people. They could do that because surveys show most voters are ignorant about our fiscal situation and especially don't realize the key role of entitlement spending.

Voters' justified negative reaction in 2026 to tariffs, mass deportations, corruption, and the Iran War also highlight the failure of information shortcuts in the 2024 election. At that time, it was evident to informed observers that Trump would seek to institute massive tariffs and cruel deportation policies. Indeed, I myself was among those who cited them as among the principal reasons to oppose Trump in that election. Large-scale corruption was also predictable, given Trump's long history of skullduggery. Yet swing voters got these issues wrong - despite the fact that high prices were a major issue in 2024, and tariffs and mass deportations would predictably raise them (as I also pointed out at the time).

The Iran War was admittedly less predictable. Trump even promised to avoid new wars. But his well-documented combination of ignorance and impulsiveness meant that returning him to office created a significant risk of a foreign policy crisis spiraling out of control.

And on all these issues, it was predictable (and predicted by many, including me) that Trump 2.0 would surround himself with cronies and loyalists likely to indulge his worst instincts. No longer would he be constrained by "adults in the room," as occasionally happened during his first term.

Thus, while an information shortcut worked well in 2026, it's important to recognize that was only necessary because shortcuts failed miserably in 2024, which was an only modestly more difficult situation. In that earlier election, we did not yet see the effects of Trump's awful second-term policies. But most of those policies and effects were readily predictable by any moderately well-informed observer. Yet most swing voters were much more ignorant than that, and thus instead voted to punish Democrats for high prices, ignoring the high likelihood that electing Trump would make that problem worse, not better.

In addition, as I emphasized in my November 2024 post on voter ignorance in that year's election, a combination of ignorance and bias led many voters to underestimate the significance of Trump's assault on basic norms and principles of liberal democracy.

It is also important to remember that the problem of voter ignorance is not just that it leads voters to make "wrong" choices between the options put before them. It also makes those options worse in the first place. As I have long argued in my book and elsewhere, political ignorance also makes those options worse in the first place. Politicians and campaign strategists know they face a largely ignorant electorate, and act accordingly. Sweeping the fiscal crisis under the rug is just one of many examples of that tendency. Even if information shortcuts consistently helped voters choose the lesser of the evils before them (which, sadly, they don't!), ignorance would still make those options much more evil than they would be otherwise.

Trump is a particularly egregious long-time exploiter of political ignorance, which played key roles in his rise and return to power. But more conventional politicians also routinely exploit it, as Barack Obama did, for example.  For those keeping score, I have been arguing that political ignorance is a serious danger for over 25 years, under both Republican and Democratic administrations, and through many changes in the political winds.

The  2024 election led me to conclude that voter ignorance was an even more serious problem than I previously thought. This year's election is, perhaps, a data point for the other side.  But whether or not the problem is worse than I thought before 2024, it continues to be a serious danger.

There is no easy fix for widespread voter ignorance. I assessed  various possible options in my 2023 book chapter on "Top-Down and Bottom-Up Solutions to the Problem of Political Ignorance, and in Chapters 5-7 of Democracy and Political Ignorance. I think the most promising approach make fewer decisions at the ballot box and more by "voting with your feet," where incentives to seek out information and use it wisely are better. I also argue in both works that the idea of simply paying voters to increase their knowledge deserves more attention. But any remedy will take time, and we may need a combination of several strategies, not just one.

In sum, the 2026 election is an example of retrospective voting working relatively well. But we should not conclude this shortcut - or any other - is a good general solution to the problem of widespread political ignorance.

Religion and the Law

Expressly Christian Messages by Secretary of Agriculture to Employees Violated Establishment Clause,

a federal court held today.

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The top of the Secretary's Easter message.

From Judge Trina Thompson (N.D. Cal.) today in Nat'l Federation of Federal Employees v. U.S. Dep't of Agriculture:

The Court ORDERS that the Secretary must recognize certain boundaries when communicating religious messages. She "[m]ust stop if a colleague asks [her] to stop," she "[c]annot create a hostile work environment through persistent unwelcome advances," and she "[c]annot use official authority to pressure subordinates." USDA Secretary's Memorandum 1078-019. She may "[d]iscuss [her] religious beliefs with interested colleagues," "[s]hare why [her] faith is meaningful to [her]," "[p]olitely invite coworkers to religious services or events," "[e]xpress religious viewpoints during appropriate conversations." This Court expresses no view whatsoever on what the Secretary can and cannot do in her personal capacity….

On July 4, 2025, Secretary [of Agriculture Brooke] Rollins sent an email from her official email account celebrating Independence Day. The message was sent to all USDA employees. Her message concluded with a written statement, "May God continue to protect the United States of America and may His favor shine over all her land." On November 26, 2025, Rollins sent a Thanksgiving message from her official email account to all USDA employees, attributing the first Thanksgiving in part to "gratitude towards a loving God."

The complaint identifies two subsequent communications as expressly promoting Christianity. On December 23, 2025, Rollins emailed USDA employees a Christmas message containing a video in which she stated that "The spirit of generosity flows from the very first Christmas when God gave us the greatest gift possible, the gift of his Son and our Savior Jesus Christ, who came to free us from our sins and open the door to eternal life. This is the reason for the season…."

On April 5, 2026, she sent an Easter email addressed to "All USDA Employees" which read:

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The Pew Research Center Report on Future of World Religions

The religious landscape in the United States will look very different in 2070, and so will debates about religious liberty.

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The Pew Research Center has published a comprehensive survey about population growth within the world religions between 2020 and 2070. The results are worth a careful study to forecast the future religious landscape in the United States, and how those numbers will affect debates about religious liberty. Here is a summary:

The United States is expected to follow roughly the same pattern of religious change as the overall North American region.5 By 2070, Christians are expected to decline to less than half of the U.S. population, while religiously unaffiliated people will rise to about 41%. And Jews – who were the country's third-largest religious group in 2020 – will be outnumbered by both Muslims and Hindus in 2070 if recent demographic trends continue.

The numbers concerning Jews are also significant:

As of 2020, Pew Research Center estimates there were about 15 million Jews by religion around the world, 12.5 million of whom lived in Israel and the United States. By the Center's projections, Israel alone will hold the majority of the world's Jews within a few decades.

If recent demographic trends continue, Israel will be home to 62% of the global Jewish population in 2070, up from 46% in 2020. During this 50-year time span, the number of Jews living in Israel is forecast to grow from 6.8 million to 11.1 million, due primarily to what demographers call "natural increase": the number of births exceeding the number of deaths in a population.

I've written on this blog before that I can see a future where my family and I will have to move to Israel. The events of the last election make that outcome seem just-that-much-more likely. And remember, the persecution of Jews will always be a precursor to persecution of other faiths.

Ultimately, debates about religious liberty will look very different as the composition of religious group changes. I would note that at the recent Federalist Society convention, there was a brief mention about the risks of Shariah Law--a topic that I can't ever recall being discussed on a FedSoc platform. This issue will soon get even hotter in Texas as the government continues to shift.

contract law

Georgetown's Counterclaims Against Professor Fired for "Sexual Misconduct" Can Go Forward

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From Judge Amy Berman Jackson (D.D.C.) yesterday in Egolf v. Georgetown Univ.:

Plaintiff David Egolf was a tenured associate professor at defendant Georgetown University …. In 2015, after an investigation into an internal complaint lodged against Egolf by a Georgetown student, the parties entered into a settlement agreement that placed rules on Egolf's conduct in return for his continued employment at the University. In 2023, following a second report by a recent Georgetown graduate, the University completed another investigation into Egolf and his conduct.

Egolf filed suit against Georgetown and certain University officials, claiming that the second investigation violated Title IX, Georgetown's Faculty Handbook, and the 2015 settlement agreement. Georgetown has answered the complaint and has filed a counterclaim alleging that Egolf breached the 2015 settlement agreement when he engaged in conduct that violated numerous provisions of the contract. Georgetown seeks compensatory damages and a declaratory judgment….

According to Georgetown, on September 20, 2013, a student accused Egolf of sexual harassment. Egolf was placed on administrative leave with pay while the University reviewed the student's complaint. The University's Office of Institutional Diversity, Equity, and Affirmative Action ("IDEAA") investigated the claim and, on May 9, 2014, issued a Notice of Findings in which it found, in part, that Egolf:

violated the University's Policy Statement on Harassment and Sexual Harassment by making unwelcome sexual advances and engaging in unwelcome conduct of a sexual nature in violation of the policy; engaged in prohibited retaliation against the student; and failed to recognize and ignored the principle underlying [the University's Policy on Consensual Sexual Relationships], which prohibits participation in a professional relationship with a student where there is a conflict of interest.

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