Plaintiff is a public high school student who alleges she was unconstitutionally disciplined by her high school for sending a private Snapchat message while off-campus to fellow-student (G.G.), which stated in reference to another student (D.E.), "cant even spell in english. leave. go back to wherever u came from."
The Court granted Defendants' motion to dismiss Plaintiff's First Amendment Freedom of Speech claim, finding that schools are permitted to regulate off-campus student speech where the speech in question threatens a concrete and substantial disruption, because, as alleged, those circumstances were present here. Order. Plaintiff now moves the Court to reconsider that decision, arguing that the Court did not fully appreciate that the message was not sent directly to the student to which it referred, that it was only sent because the other student had disparaged veterans, and that the Court assumed certain facts not alleged in the FAC [First Amended Complaint]. For the reasons stated below, Plaintiff's motion for reconsideration is granted….
From Sixth Circuit Judges Alice Batchelder, Joan Larsen, and Chad Readler in Monday's Ronan v. LaRose:
Samuel Ronan declared his candidacy in the State of Ohio's Fifteenth Congressional District as a Republican. To become eligible for the ballot, Ronan signed a declaration of candidacy stating: "I am a member of the Republican Party," and "I further declare that, if elected to said office or position, I will qualify therefor, and that I will support and abide by the principles enunciated by the Republican Party." See Ohio Rev. Code § 3513.07. The declaration also contains a notice that "whoever commits election falsification is guilty of a felony of the fifth degree."
Sometime after signing this declaration, Ronan posted on Facebook that "Leftists need to infiltrate [R]epublican spaces and primary them" and that's why he is "running as a Repub[l]ican now." Ronan had previously run for Chair of the Democratic National Committee. Referencing that campaign, he separately posted a Facebook comment stating, "I believe [I] very clearly mentioned [in the] DNC Chair race that Democrats, if they wanted to govern and regain the trust of Americans, would have to primary Republicans in deep red districts, as Republicans .… So, if l am doing anything, it's following the argument I made on that stage."
As permitted by Ohio law, an Ohio voter then protested Ronan's Republican candidacy. During a March 6, 2026 hearing on the protest, the Franklin County Board of Elections tied two-to-two on whether to remove Ronan from the ballot. On March 13, the issue was referred to Secretary Frank LaRose for a tie-breaking vote …. After LaRose broke the tie in favor of the protest, Ronan and one of his supporters filed this suit against LaRose and the members of the Franklin County Board of Elections….
4/8/1952: President Truman signs executive order 10340. The Supreme Court declared this executive order unconstitutional in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co v. Sawyer(1952).
Over on X, @Optimist_Gaza challenged readers to list five examples of supposed international law Israel's critics invented to apply to Israel's detriment.
1. Designating a combatant a journalist automatically immunizes that combatant from attack.
2. A territory is occupied even if there is no presence whatsoever after a hostile armed force by virtue of being blockaded.
3. A famine can be declared where people are not dying of starvation.
4. A territory becomes the sovereign title of one party — even when that party never exercised sovereignty over it in the past — when a second party conquers it from a third party which attacked it.
5. An armistice line explicitly set by all parties in an armistice agreement as not constituting an international border becomes one when the armistice is violated and war relaunched. But only to the advantage of the aggressing and losing party.
6. An unimplemented non-binding resolution to create an international zone permanently excludes sovereignty by one state over any part of the zone, but has no such effect on other parties, such that, say West Jerusalem can't be considered to be in Israel, but Bethlehem is "occupied Palestinian territory."
7. A state is not allowed designate a city inside its sovereign borders as its capital.
8. If one belligerent party attacks another with rockets, the attacked party is now responsible for feeding the civilians of the attacking party. Read More
Earlier today, the Cato Institute and I filed an amicus brief in Burlap and Barrel, Inc. v. Trump, one of the cases challenging Trump's massive new Section 122 tariffs before the US Court of International Trade. The case was filed by the Liberty Justice Center (LJC), the same public interest group that I worked with on the earlier case that led to the invalidation of Trump's earlier IEEPA tariffs by the Supreme Court. I am not one of the attorneys representing the plaintiffs in this new case. But Cato and I are happy to support LJC and others in this important cause. For that reason, I wrote this brief.
Here is an excerpt from the Introduction to our brief, which summarizes our arguments:
Since the invalidation of the massive International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) tariffs, by the Supreme Court in Learning Res., Inc. v. Trump, 146 S. Ct. 628 (2026), the President has sought to effect a similar usurpation of congressional tariff authority by using Section 122 of the Trade Act of 1974 to impose 10 percent tariffs (likely to be increased to 15 percent) on imports from almost all our trading partners. This sweeping imposition is just as illegal as the previous one was, and for many of the same reasons.
Part I briefly explains why Section 122 simply cannot be used in current circumstances. The statute only permits tariffs for up to 150 days in response to "fundamental international payments problems" that cause "large and serious United States balance-of-payments deficits" or "an imminent and significant depreciation of the dollar," or create a need to cooperate with other countries in addressing an "international balance-of-payments disequilibrium." 19 U.S.C. § 2132(a). These conditions simply cannot exist in a flexible exchange rate regime of the sort in place today.
In Part II, amici explain why, if there is any ambiguity about whether Section 122 authorizes the massive tariffs imposed by the administration, the major questions doctrine (MQD) requires this issue to be resolved against the Defendants. The major questions doctrine requires Congress to "speak clearly" when it assigns to the executive "decisions of vast 'economic and political significance.'" Util. Air Regul. Grp. v. EPA, 573 U.S. 302, 324 (2014). The impact of the massive new Section 122 tariffs is as large or larger than many previous policies invalidated by the Supreme Court on major questions doctrine grounds. And the tariff power is not exempt from major questions scrutiny on the supposed ground that it is a "foreign affairs" power. The major questions doctrine also counts against giving the administration a blank check in determining whether the preconditions to invoke Section 122 exist.
Part III shows that, if Section 122 did grant the President the power he claims, it would violate the nondelegation doctrine, which constrains transfer of legislative power to the executive. "[T]he core Congressional power to impose taxes such as tariffs is vested exclusively in the legislative branch by the Constitution." V.O.S. Selections v. Trump, 149 F.4th 1312, 1332 (Fed. Cir. 2025), aff'd sub nom. Learning Res., 146 S. Ct. 628 (2026). If the Defendants' interpretation of Section 122 is correct, the President could claim there is a balance-of-payments crisis at virtually any time and repeatedly impose 15% tariffs against virtually any imports from any country, circumventing the 150-day time restriction simply by declaring a new balance-of-payments problem exists when earlier tariffs expire. Such a sweeping delegation of a core congressional power would violate the requirements that Congress cannot make "boundless" delegations of the power to tax, and that "[t]he 'guidance' needed is greater when an agency action will 'affect the entire national economy' than when it addresses a narrow, technical issue." FCC v. Consumers' Research, 145 S. Ct. 2482, 2497, 2501 (2025) (quotation omitted).
Cato and I are grateful to Joshua Claybourn of Jackson Kelly, PLLC, and his firm for their invaluable assistance in helping draft, format, and file the brief on short notice.
I have previously written about the Section 122 tariffs and the important issues they raise here, here, and here.
The Federalist Society is pleased to announce a $15,000 annual prize for new scholarship that makes a distinct and highly significant contribution to the field of originalism….
The Prize will be awarded to the best originalism article printed or accepted for publication during the prior calendar year [2025], or the best originalism book published in the prior calendar year….
Each year, a panel consisting of leading experts—drawn from academia, constitutional litigation, and the judicial branch—will recommend the Meese Prize recipient, and the Federalist Society will announce the Meese Prize recipient at the National Lawyers Convention, usually held in November.
The Federalist Society will accept nominations for the first annual Meese Prize until May 15, 2026 at meeseprize@fedsoc.org. While not required, any cover letter for the nomination should not exceed two pages.
City Journal has published my new essay, "The Transgender Tide Has Turned at the Supreme Court." This piece was largely inspired by the lopsided ruling in Chiles v. Salazar, but reflected some of my observations over the past year about Schilling, Skrmetti, Mahmoud, Orr, Mirabelli, and B.P.J. Here is the introduction:
"The arc of the moral universe is long, but it bends toward justice." Progressive like to cite this maxim because, in their view, the arc inevitably bends in one direction: to the left. Except when it doesn't.
Over just six years, the American public's perception of transgender rights has swung like a pendulum from the left to the right. Perhaps nothing illustrates this movement more clearly than six recent Supreme Court decisions recognizing that parents and governments may indeed preserve traditional understandings of gender.
And the conclusion:
These six (and likely seven) rulings would have been unthinkable in the immediate aftermath of Bostock. Indeed, the Supreme Court rejected a case identical to Chiles as recently as 2023. But times changed. Votes changed, too. Chief Justice John Roberts and Justice Neil Gorsuch, who joined the majority in Bostock, were also in the majority of the six recently decided cases and seem likely to do so as well in B.J.P.
Nor did all these cases involve a typical 6-3, conservative-liberal split. In Skrmetti, Justice Elena Kagan dissented but did not actually state that the Tennessee law was unconstitutional. (She would have reviewed the law with a more rigorous test than the majority did.) In Mirabelli, Justices Kagan and Ketanji Brown Jackson rejected the Supreme Court's interim ruling on the emergency docket but offered no defense of California's law. Indeed, Justice Kagan was surprisingly sympathetic to the claims of the parents. The vote in Chiles was 8-1, with Justices Kagan and Sonia Sotomayor writing separately to argue that Justice Jackson misunderstood Free Speech law. I suspect that the vote in B.P.J. could be 7-2, 8-1, or even 9-0.
Like pendulums, moral arcs can swing in both directions. At some point, restrictions on transgender rights may go too far. The goal should be an equilibrium that preserves the freedom to adhere to traditional understandings of biological sex.
I think this essay synthesizes a recent and important trend at the Court.
As a new analysis by Johan Norberg shows, the regime many MAGA Republicans see as a model to emulate has repressed civil liberties, undermined the free market, destroyed the rule of law, and made Hungary the poorest nation in the European Union.
Many MAGA Republicans view Viktor Orban's Hungary as a model for their own policies, and Vice President J.D. Vance has gone to Hungary to help the increasingly unpopular Orban stave off electoral defeat, which might well happen despite Orban's rigging of the election system. But, as my Cato colleague and prominent Swedish libertarian economic policy expert Johan Norberg explains in a new Cato policy analysis, Orban's rule is a cautionary tale, not an example to emulate:
Some US conservatives see Prime Minister Viktor Orbán's Hungary as a model for America's future. In reality, Orbán's crude majoritarianism has undermined the rule of law and media freedom in Hungary to take control of the economy and funnel resources to loyal oligarchs. The dismantling of institutional constraints on state power has gone further than in other modern democracies, and the results have consistently disappointed, even in areas where the government claims achievements such as strengthening the economy or increasing fertility rates. Far from being a model, Orbán's Hungary is a cautionary tale of what results from an unrestrained executive with strongly centralized power, crony capitalism, and the systematic dismantling of the rule of law.
Norberg documents each of these points in detail. Whether the standard is civil liberties, economic freedom, prosperity, or even such social-conservative goals as increasing the birthrate, Orban's rule has been awful. After initial success in transitioning from communism and raising standards of living under previous post-communist governments, Orban's regime has made Hungary the poorest and least free nation in the European Union. See also Norberg's shorter summary of his analysis in a recent Washington Post op ed.
I would add that the authoritarian tendencies, repression, and harmful economic statism we see in Hungary under Orban are far from entirely unique to this particular government. To a large extent, they exemplify broader pathologies of nationalism, which Alex Nowrasteh and I surveyed in our 2024 article, "The Case Against Nationalism." Just as Venezuela illustrates the perils of "democratic socialism," Hungary illustrates those of nationalism. Indeed, as Alex and I discuss in our articles, these two types of awful political systems have much in common, despite being based significantly different ideologies.
We should learn from the evils of Orban and other similar nationalists, not imitate them.
Last week the Supreme Court heard oral argument in United States v. Barbara, the case challenging the lawfulness of President Trump's anti-birthright-citizenship Executive Order.
I summarize some of my initial thoughts in today's Civitas Outlook column. In that piece, I also explain how the Court can resolve the case without resolving the underlying constitutional questions. Whatever the precise limits the exceptions to birthright citizenship under Section One of the Fourteenth Amendment, it is particularly hard to argue that the EO is consistent with federal law, as it has been understood, applied, and enforced for the past seventy-five years, and even harder to argue that the President, acting unilaterally, can rewrite the law of citizenship by executive decree.
From the piece:
The easiest way for the Court to reject the Administration's position does not require reaching the underlying constitutional question, however. Under 8 U.S.C. §1401, any "person born in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof," is a citizen of the United States. When enacted in 1940 and again in 1952, this language was understood to adopt the conventional understanding of birthright citizenship and "every statute's meaning is fixed at the time of enactment," as the Court reaffirmed in Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimando (2024). Throughout World War II, children born to Japanese citizens were recognized as citizens, even as their parents were considered enemy aliens. This conflicts with the Trump Administration's emphasis on "allegiance."
For decades, all three branches have consistently interpreted Section 1401 to embody the conventional understanding of birthright citizenship. The U.S. Reports are filled with Supreme Court decisions that simply assume that all born in the United States are citizens, without regard to their parentage. Accordingly, that interpretation should be entitled to statutory state decisis even if one believes the conventional account is wrong. Thus, the Court could simply hold that the Trump EO conflicts with federal law and leave it to another day whether Congress could enact a law withdrawing jurisdiction over illegal aliens or temporary visitors. After all, the Constitution entrusts Congress with the power to make laws concerning naturalization and to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment. Such enactments cannot be adopted by executive fiat. . . .
An obvious question for the SG was what upholding the EO would mean for those in the country who cannot trace their lineage back to a lawful permanent resident. Pressed on the point, Sauer stressed that the Administration was only asking for prospective relief. That may be, but it is no answer to the constitutional question. If the reason for the EO's validity is that only children of citizens and lawful permanent residents are birthright citizens under the Constitution, a ruling in favor of the government would cast a pall over millions of Americans whose citizenship has long been taken for granted. Sauer's pledge that the Administration would not pursue such claims is cold comfort, as legal questions about the citizenship of such people would inevitably arise (as would questions about how to determine "domicile"—as Justice Amy Coney Barrett noted at the oral argument).
I have long maintained that Congress may well retain some power to adjust the contours of birthright citizenship by defining the bounds of the jurisdiction of the United States, pursuant its power under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. But Congress has not exercised this power. To the contrary, Congress has reified the prevailing understanding of birthright citizenship. This makes the resolution of Barbara quite easy. We will see how many of the justices agree.
To state the obvious, many people put a lot of weight (far too much weight, in my view) on the US News law school rankings. Good evidence of this is the prevalence of the term "T14." The label arose in the 1990s when people noticed that the same 14 law schools—and only those 14—occupied the top 14 spots in every US News overall ranking starting with the first one in 1990. (There was a 1987 ranking that was simply a survey sent to selected law school deans, but the rankings with multiple metrics began in 1990.) That is, not only were these 14 schools always in the top 14, but no other school even tied for 14th.
That pattern continued with remarkable regularity through the rankings released in 2022, with three tiny exceptions noted below. (Sidenote: after Georgetown fell out of the top 14 a couple of times, some—often Georgetown supporters—suggested that the T14 should instead be defined as the top 10 schools that had ever appeared in the US News top 10, noting that Georgetown ranked #10 once, in 1993. But by that reasoning Georgetown would forever remain a top 14 school, even if consistently ranked #30, which is pretty silly.)
Between its 2022 and 2023 law rankings, US News changed its methodology considerably, moving toward more objective metrics and away from spending per student—a metric that wasn't reported to the ABA and could easily be manipulated. We now have four years of rankings under the new regime, and a few things have become clear:
The 1990–2022 rankings are so different from the 2023–2026 rankings that they are effectively separate regimes.
The T14 is dead. The top 14 is the second-least coherent grouping in the 2023–2026 rankings.
The 2023–2026 rankings show more variation (unsurprisingly, since they put more weight on things that change year to year, like employment numbers).
Perhaps surprisingly, at least for now there is a coherent replacement for the T14 in the new regime. Say hello to the T11—or, if you prefer, a T10 with 11 members.
On the first claim: There are various ways to illustrate the differences between the pre-2023 and 2023–2026 regimes, but the visualization above is the one I liked best. (You can open these visualizations in a new tab to enlarge them.) The lines move dramatically after 2022. Look at the table on the right side showing how much movement occurred. Only three of the current top 23 schools (based on the 2023–2026 average rankings) moved less than one rank, and many moved much more. Indeed, I found that I couldn't include the full movement of UNC and Georgia without severely compressing the rest of the chart. And charting the top 25 schools in the current regime would have included Texas A&M, which moved up steadily before 2023 (from 60 to 53 to 46 in 2020–2022) but then had a massive leap in 2023 to 29, followed by 26 in 2024 and 22 in 2025 and 2026. Its 2023–2026 average (24.8) was thus more than 18 ranks better than its 2020–2022 average. In any event, the bottom line is that the 2023–2026 rankings differ sharply from the 1990–2022 rankings.
From In the Matter of K.P., decided June 26, 2024 by the Massachusetts District Court Appellate Division (Judge Thomas L. Finigan, joined by Judges Kevin J. Finnerty and Jean M. Curran) but only recently posted on Westlaw:
In the fall of 2016, the appellant's addiction to painkillers and fentanyl led to the filing by his mother of a "section 35" petition in the District Court. General Laws c. 123, § 35 ("section 35") authorizes the involuntary civil commitment of a person for care and treatment where "there is a likelihood of serious harm as a result of the person's alcohol or substance use disorder." After examination by a court clinician and a subsequent hearing, a District Court judge committed the appellant ("K.P.") to a substance abuse treatment facility for a period not to exceed ninety days. K.P. did not appeal his commitment and was discharged from the facility approximately one month later.
A civil commitment under section 35 has a collateral consequence—it disqualifies an individual from holding a license to carry a firearm. The bar is not absolute. Rather, after the passage of five years, a person may file a petition with the District Court that ordered the commitment, seeking relief from the disqualification to obtain or restore a license to carry. In this case, K.P. did so and was denied. K.P. now appeals that denial….
The court [in a section 35 restoration proceeding] may grant relief "in accordance with the principles of due process" if the person's circumstances, record, and reputation are such that "(i) the person is not likely to act in a manner that is dangerous to public safety; and (ii) the granting of relief would not be contrary to the public interest." In so doing, the court may consider the opinion of a licensed physician or clinical psychologist that the person is "no longer suffering from the disease or condition that caused the disability or that the disease or condition has been successfully treated for a period of 3 consecutive years."
Roughly six and a half years following his commitment, K.P. filed a petition in the court that ordered his commitment seeking to restore his right to possess a firearm. In support of his petition, K.P. submitted letters from his father, mother (the original petitioner under section 35), and his girlfriend, as well as a letter and affidavit from K.P. himself, which included copies of clean drug screenings mandated by his employer. The supporting materials described K.P. as an individual who had overcome his addiction, maintained employment as a commercial truck driver, obtained his real estate salesperson's license, and was in a long-term relationship with his girlfriend while parenting his children. Nonetheless, a District Court judge denied K.P.'s petition without a hearing.
This case is before the court for ongoing disciplinary proceedings against Attorney Joshua Watkins and his former law firm, Burrill Watkins LLC, following Mr. Watkins's misuse of artificial intelligence to make false statements to the court….
On multiple occasions, in multiple filings and hearings, and in response to multiple questions and orders, Mr. Watkins has intentionally misled the court. Rather than taking responsibility for his actions, Mr. Watkins has feigned contrition, obfuscated the truth, changed his stories when it suits him, and attempted to blame others for his own professional misconduct….
Mr. Watkins's misconduct includes—and extends well beyond—the misuse of artificial intelligence to make both misleading and outright fabricated statements of law. Between the protracted misconduct in this case, and the similar AI issue in a sister court, the court is gravely concerned about the consequences of Mr. Watkins's misconduct.
Mr. Watkins's misconduct did not occur in a vacuum. The court also has serious concerns about Burrill Watkins's apparent lack of internal controls and guardrails surrounding its attorneys' use of artificial intelligence—indeed, the very AI the firm pays for and encourages its attorneys to use. Though Burrill Watkins maintains that it acted swiftly to remediate Mr. Watkins's errors, which it says it had no reason to know about, the firm has not explained how it enforced any policies about responsible AI use, how it will prevent improper AI use going forward, or any other circumstance—let alone an extraordinary one—why it shouldn't be sanctioned.
From Iowa Safe Schools v. Reynolds, decided today by Eighth Circuit Judge Ralph Erickson, joined by Judges Lavenski Smith and Jonathan Kobes:
Iowa Code § 279.78(3) provides: "If a student enrolled in a school district requests an accommodation that is intended to affirm the student's gender identity from a licensed practitioner employed by the school district, including a request that the licensed practitioner address the student using a name or pronoun that is different than the name or pronoun assigned to the student in the school district's registration forms or records, the licensed practitioner shall report the student's request to the administrator employed by the school district, and the administrator shall report the student's request to the student's parent or guardian." …
The district court found part of the statute was unambiguous and another part unconstitutionally vague. The court found the notice provision is unambiguously triggered if a student requests use of a pronoun different than the pronoun assigned to the student in the school district's registration forms or records.
In contrast, the district court concluded that the provision "accommodation that is intended to affirm the student's gender identity" is impermissibly vague because the term "accommodation" has a broad meaning and, without being defined, can lead to unpredictable interpretations and create a substantial risk of arbitrary enforcement. The district court found neither Merriam-Webster's Collegiate Dictionary nor other resources helpful in determining the meaning of "accommodation." The court concluded "accommodation" is a "capacious concept" and severed what it found to be an unconstitutional portion of the statute.
{[Bu t]he examples provided by the district court in an effort to demonstrate overbreadth—such as a female asking to sit with boys at lunch, or a male choosing a pink pencil, or a male choosing to write reports about female historical figures—are not on their face student requests to change or modify gender identity.}
The law provides, "A school district shall not provide any program, curriculum, test, survey, questionnaire, promotion, or instruction relating to gender identity or sexual orientation to students in kindergarten through grade six." The court held this wasn't unconstitutionally overbroad.
From Iowa Safe Schools v. Reynolds, decided today by Eighth Circuit Judge Ralph Erickson, joined by Judges Lavenski Smith and Jonathan Kobes:
[Iowa law] precludes a school district from providing instruction relating to gender identity or sexual orientation to students in kindergarten through grade six [the "Instruction Section"]…. [It also] requires school officials to notify parents if a student asks for the use of a pronoun that does not match the school's registration records or requests an "accommodation that is intended to affirm the student's gender identity" [the "Parental Notification Law"]….
Iowa Code § 279.80(2) provides: "A school district shall not provide any program, curriculum, test, survey, questionnaire, promotion, or instruction relating to gender identity or sexual orientation to students in kindergarten through grade six." When enacted, the statute referred to the definition of gender identity as set forth in § 216.2(12), which defined gender identity as "a gender-related identity of a person, regardless of the person's assigned sex at birth." …
Iowa law defines gender identity as "an individual's subjective identification as male, female, or neither male nor female … [and] shall not be considered a synonym or substitute for sex or gender." Sexual orientation is defined under Iowa law as the "actual or perceived heterosexuality, homosexuality, or bisexuality." …
In addressing Plaintiffs' facial challenge, the district court concluded that all but two words in this statute—program and promotion—pass constitutional muster. The court found the words "program" and "promotion" are too broad to refer only to mandatory classroom curriculum and violate the First Amendment by prohibiting school districts and educators from, for example, making extracurricular activities relating to gender identity and sexual orientation available to students in grades six and below.
When may public libraries, and especially public school libraries, remove books based on their content?
In Pico v. Bd. of Ed. (1982), the Supreme Court split 4-1-4 on the question. All the Justices agreed that books could be removed if they are "pervasively vulgar" or otherwise age-inappropriate. But four liberal Justices (to oversimplify) concluded that viewpoint-based removals are forbidden. Four conservative Justices concluded that they are permissible (because the government gets to choose what's included in either the curriculum or the libraries at government-run schools). And the ninth Justice, the centrist Justice White, concluded that there was no occasion in the case to decide the matter.
Since then, in Little v. Llano County (5th Cir. 2025), a 10-7 Fifth Circuit en banc majority concluded that the government can pick and choose what books can be removed from public or public school libraries, because people don't have a "right to receive information" via government-run libraries: "It is one thing to tell the government it cannot stop you from receiving a book. The First Amendment protects your right to do that. It is another thing for you to tell the government which books it must keep in the library." And just today, a unanimous Eighth Circuit panel held (in Penguin Random House, LLC v. Robbins, written by Judge Ralph Erickson, joined by Judges Lavenski Smith and Jonathan Kobes), that the government likely has broad (though not entirely unlimited) authority to pick and choose what books can be removed at least from public school libraries. An excerpt:
{[Iowa law] requires Iowa school districts to establish a library program, which contains "age-appropriate materials, and supports the student achievement goals of the total school curriculum." "Age-appropriate" is defined as "topics, messages, and teaching methods suitable to particular ages or age groups of children and adolescents, based on developing cognitive, emotional, and behavioral capacity typical for the age or age group." The law expressly precludes the inclusion of "any material with descriptions or visual depictions of a sex act," as defined in Iowa Code § 702.17.}
[T]he standard set forth in Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier (1988)—that is, whether the book restrictions are "reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns"—… applies to school activities that "may fairly be characterized as part of the school curriculum," and a school library is such an activity….
