The Volokh Conspiracy Archive

From today's opinion in Mirabelli v. Bonta:

[Plaintiff] parents object that [California] policies prevent schools from telling them about their children's efforts to engage in gender transitioning at school unless the children consent to parental notification. The parents also take issue with California's requirement that schools use children's preferred names and pronouns regardless of their parents' wishes….

[T]he [District Court] granted summary judgment for all plaintiffs and entered a permanent injunction in their favor. The injunction prevents the schools from "misleading" parents about their children's gender presentation at school and their social transitioning efforts. It also requires the schools to follow parents' directions regarding their children's names and pronouns. And it compels defendants to include in state-created or approved instructional materials a notice of the rights protected by the injunction.

The Ninth Circuit granted defendants' motion to stay the injunction pending appeal…. On the free exercise issue, it relied on a not-precedential Sixth Circuit decision and brushed aside Mahmoud v. Taylor (2025), as "a narrow decision focused on uniquely coercive 'curricular requirements.'" The Ninth Circuit expressed skepticism about the parents' and teachers' Fourteenth Amendment due process claim because it viewed those claims as seeking to expand the protection afforded by established precedent.

When the Ninth Circuit stayed the injunction, the parents and teachers filed this application seeking vacatur of the Ninth Circuit's stay pending appeal….

We conclude that the parents who seek religious exemptions are likely to succeed on the merits of their Free Exercise Clause claim. California's policies likely trigger strict scrutiny under that provision because they substantially interfere with the "right of parents to guide the religious development of their children." Mahmoud (citing Wisconsin v. Yoder (1972)). The parents who assert a free exercise claim have sincere religious beliefs about sex and gender, and they feel a religious obligation to raise their children in accordance with those beliefs. California's policies violate those beliefs and "impos[e] the kind of burden on religious exercise that Yoder found unacceptable." Indeed, the intrusion on parents' free exercise rights here—unconsented facilitation of a child's gender transition—is greater than the introduction of LGBTQ storybooks we considered sufficient to trigger strict scrutiny in Mahmoud.

California's policies will likely not survive the strict scrutiny that Mahmoud demands. The State argues that its policies advance a compelling interest in student safety and privacy. But those policies cut out the primary protectors of children's best interests: their parents. See Troxel v. Granville (2000) (plurality opinion). California's policies also appear to fail the narrow-tailoring requirement. The State's interest in safety could be served by a policy that allows religious exemptions while precluding gender-identity disclosure to parents who would engage in abuse. For these reasons, the parents who object to the California policies on free exercise grounds are likely to succeed on the merits.

The same is true for the subclass of parents who object to those policies on due process grounds. Under long-established precedent, parents—not the State—have primary authority with respect to "the upbringing and education of children." Pierce v. Society of Sisters (1925); accord, Meyer v. Nebraska (1923). The right protected by these precedents includes the right not to be shut out of participation in decisions regarding their children's mental health. Parham v. J.R. (1979). Gender dysphoria is a condition that has an important bearing on a child's mental health, but when a child exhibits symptoms of gender dysphoria at school, California's policies conceal that information from parents and facilitate a degree of gender transitioning during school hours. These policies likely violate parents' rights to direct the upbringing and education of their children….

Back in 2013, Justice Scalia gave a wide-ranging interview with New York Magazine. One of my favorite exchanges concerned which media Scalia consumes:

What's your media diet? Where do you get your news?
Well, we get newspapers in the morning.

"We" meaning the justices?
No! Maureen and I.

Oh, you and your wife …
I usually skim them. We just get The Wall Street Journal and the Washington Times. We used to get the Washington Post, but it just … went too far for me. I couldn't handle it anymore.

What tipped you over the edge?
It was the treatment of almost any conservative issue. It was slanted and often nasty. And, you know, why should I get upset every morning? I don't think I'm the only one. I think they lost subscriptions partly because they became so shrilly, shrilly liberal.

So no New York Times, either?
No New York Times, no Post.

Justice Barrett apparently has different reading habits. During oral argument in United States v. Hemani, she pointed to a recent article in the New York Times concerning the harms from marijuana:

And so I guess my concern is let's say that I think Congress could make a determination, maybe, I don't know, I mean, there was just an article in the New York Times about the dangers of marijuana, and, you know, maybe that's true.

I did a quick search of the briefs in Hemani, and I couldn't find any articles from the Times cited on this point. The most recent piece from the NYT Editorial Board on February 9 (after amicus briefs were due) was titled, It's Time for America to Admit That It Has a Marijuana Problem.

I would wager that Justice Barrett consumes news from the New York Times on her own. Even if Justice Barrett has her social media mentions screened (I am skeptical), she voluntarily reads a publication that is intent on influencing her--and not in a good way. Remember what Jodi Kantor of the New York Times said: "I just want them to know we're watching them."

For what it's worth, I subscribe to the New York Times, the Washington Post, the Wall Street Journal, the Washington Times, and several other outlets. I try to read each site daily so I know what everyone on all sides is saying.

[The first of four blog posts drawing on tonight's Hallows Lecture at Marquette Law School.]

For several decades, we have been witnessing a Congress in long decline and a corresponding ascent of the President and the courts. I see this as a fundamental deformation of the Constitution—a deviation from its original and better design—and this deformation is the subject of my lecture today.

Congress has long been regarded as the keystone of the federal government. James Madison thought it self-evident that "[i]n republican government, the legislative authority necessarily predominates." Under the Constitution, only the Congress is given the power to enact laws, levy taxes, and appropriate monies for the government.

The President, by contrast, is given a short list of powers and duties, some rather inconsequential, such as the duty to receive ambassadors, presumably in a reception at the White House (or the like). Over time, the President's power has tended to wax during times of war and wane in times of peace. But at least in matters of domestic policy the President has been subordinate to Congress.

As for the third branch: The federal courts have always been small in number relative to state courts, and historically they have largely directed themselves to questions that state courts cannot effectively or appropriately decide.

Today, Congress passes relatively few laws, follows the President's lead on taxes, and stands by while the President reallocates appropriations without sanction. Meanwhile, the President issues a blizzard of Executive Orders, in the manner of an elected monarch. And the Supreme Court is expected to issue blockbuster decisions on a routine basis informing the country what it can and cannot do with respect to gun control, abortion, affirmative action, religious freedom, takings of property, and myriad other issues.

Prof. Merrill is giving the Hallows Lecture at Marquette tonight on this subject, and I'm delighted to report that he'll also be guest-blogging on it here this week. Here's the abstract of the lecture:

Why has Congress, the constitutional keystone of the federal government, become so ineffective, relative to the president and the federal judiciary? While many explanations have been offered, one important but unappreciated reason is legal ideas—not just widely discussed concepts such as the unitary executive and originalist interpretation of the Constitution but also, and perhaps even more importantly, unstated ideas that have taken hold without much explicit discussion or acknowledgment.

This lecture will identify and discuss three largely unquestioned ideas that have combined to deform our constitutional regime. Their result has been that the president wields immense power in the guise of issuing orders and binding regulations and the courts exercise great power in the guise of interpreting the Constitution and laws, while Congress stands largely out of the picture. While there is no magic incantation for restoring a proper constitutional balance, an important first step is to recognize the role that unstated ideas have played in the transformation, so that they can be unmasked and debated in the open.

Thomas W. Merrill is the Charles Evans Hughes Professor of Law at Columbia University. He is one of the nation's most widely respected and often-cited law professors, with an unusual range of expertise, including constitutional, administrative, environmental, and property law. His recent books include The Chevron Doctrine: Its Rise and Fall, and the Future of the Administrative State (Harvard University Press 2022). Merrill is also an accomplished lawyer, serving as deputy solicitor general of the United States from 1987 to 1990, where he argued twelve cases before the Supreme Court, practicing law for a number of years at Sidley & Austin, and continuing to engage actively today in the profession beyond the academy.

This annual lecture remembers E. Harold Hallows, a Milwaukee lawyer and a faculty member at Marquette Law School from 1930 to 1958 and a justice of the Wisconsin Supreme Court from 1958 to 1974 (chief justice the last six years).

From Hodges v. Gloria, decided Thursday by the Ninth Circuit (Judges Consuelo Callahan and Lucy Koh, and Judge J. Campbell Barker (E.D. Tex.)), an interesting exchange:

Dennis Hodges, a correctional officer and religious pastor, challenges San Diego Mayor Gloria's veto of his reappointment as a voluntary member to the City's Police Advisory Board … as violating his First Amendment rights to free speech and free exercise of religion. The Mayor stated that he vetoed Hodges's reappointment because Hodges had made repeated public comments that he considered "transgenderism" to be a sin just like adultery and fornication….

The court held this as to the free speech claim:

[A] consistent line of cases running from Elrod v. Burns (1976) through Branti v. Finkel (1980) to Blair v. Bethel School District (9th Cir. 2010) and most recently to Lathus v. City of Huntington Beach (9th Cir. 2023) hold that an appointed volunteer may be dismissed for statements that might otherwise be protected by the First Amendment when "commonality of political purpose" is an appropriate requirement for the volunteer's services.

Here, the district court correctly concluded that under the San Diego Municipal Code, the Advisory Board is an extension of the Mayor, who appoints its members, and that commonality of political purpose with the Mayor is required for members of the Advisory Board, such that the Mayor may decline to reappoint a member based on his public comments.

Even if commonality of political purpose presented a closer question, our decisions in Blair and Lathus concerned the removal of board members from their existing positions. Hodges offers no authority extending the asserted First Amendment right to serve on an advisory committee to cover reappointment to a committee. He does not deny that under the Municipal Code, the Mayor has discretion to appoint or reappoint individuals without cause.

Hodges assertion that we should apply a weighted Pickering v. Board of Education (1968), balancing test was rejected in Lathus (citing Hobler v. Brueher (9th Cir. 2003) ("where the Branti exception applies the employee can be fired 'for purely political reasons' without any Pickering balancing.")). We are bound by that decision….

And as to the free exercise clause claim:

Hodges would have to show that even though the veto of his reappointment did not violate his free speech rights, it violated his free exercise rights because of his underlying religious beliefs. He offers no case law supporting such a proposition. Moreover, he does not explain how his religious motive for making public statements changes the court's evaluation of his claim; nor does he deny that the Mayor chose not to reappoint him because of his public statements. Accordingly, he has not shown that the district court abused its discretion in rejecting his free exercise claim.

Judge Barker concurred, suggesting that "Lathus's articulation of the exception's breadth may be in tension with other First Amendment jurisprudence":

Everyone makes mistakes, even experienced professionals; a good reminder for the rest of us to learn from those mistakes. The motion in State v. Stroup starts off well in its initial pages (no case law hallucinations), but is then followed by several pages of two other motions, which I don't think the lawyer was planning to file, and which appear to have been AI-generated: It begins with the "Below is concise motion language you can drop into …" language quoted above.

Griffen Smith (Missoulian) reported on the story, and included the prosecutor's motion to strike that filing, on the grounds that it violates a local rule (3(G)) requiring disclosure of the use of generative AI:

An excerpt from Judge Andrew Carter's opinion Friday in Shaykhoun v. Daily Mail (S.D.N.Y.):

Sonya Shaykhoun ("Plaintiff") is a licensed New York attorney with 21 years of experience, including expertise in intellectual property licensing, proceeding pro se in this action…. On May 17, 2023, Plaintiff posted a "Tweet" on X.com regarding an unlicensed vendor in Riverside Park ….

Here's the Tweet, from the Complaint:

Back to the opinion:

The Tweet garnered nearly 7 million views and sparked significant engagement, both negative and positive. Plaintiff made $170.97 from the Tweet through X.com's monetization program from August 9, 2023 to May 27, 2024. Plaintiff thereafter decided to change her X account from public to private "to protect her safety," thereby halting any future earnings….

On May 18, 2023, The Daily Beast published an article written by news reporter AJ McDougall, entitled "Lawyer Roasted for Calling 911 on 'Unlicensed' Food Vendor in NYC Park" …. The Daily Beast Article partially embedded the Tweet but included a hyperlink to the full, original tweet and did not include the two photographs Plaintiff included in the original Tweet.

I have an opening for a research assistant at the Hoover Institution (Stanford) for a year starting June or thereabouts. This is a temporary position with a starting hourly rate of $23.59 (unfortunately, with no benefits, since it is classified as temporary). I'd be glad to have someone in the Stanford area who will come to the office in person, but I'd be open to someone working remotely as well.

The typical assignments will be reading cases and briefs, proofreading article drafts, finding and reviewing news articles and journal articles on various topics, cite-checking, tracking down court filings, investigating new technological developments (especially having to do with AI), and the like. My current RA graduated from Stanford last year and took the job for a gap year between college and law school. My sense is that she found the work interesting and of potential value for her future work in law school.

The start and end dates would ideally be June 1, 2026 to May 31, 2027 , but there is some flexibility on both ends. (Because of Stanford rules, I can't hire anyone for more than a year for this.) The job is limited to 980 hours until Dec. 16 or so and then 980 hours afterwards, so it's a titch less than full-time, especially if one starts June 1, but not by much.

If you know people who might find this interesting, please encourage them to apply here.

Over at The Dispatch, I have a new piece on the originalist case for birthright citizenship. President Donald Trump's executive order attempting to strip natural-born citizenship status from children born of undocumented aliens and temporary aliens is facing an uphill climb before the Supreme Court on April 1. The uncertainly about its fate is not whether the Court will strike down the executive order as unlawful but how many votes the White House might get from the justices. Will the loss be unanimous, or merely overwhelming? We'll know this summer.

Meanwhile, some scholars and activists have emerged to lend support to the administration's efforts. A small handful of scholars (including Trump favorite, John Eastman, and my own dissertation advisor, Rogers Smith) had developed a revisionist case on the history and constitutional theory of birthright citizenship many years ago. Since the executive order was issued, a small band of new advocates have joined that revisionist camp in defense of the administration's actions.

Because someone is wrong on the internet, I have been drawn back into debates that once occupied me in seminars in graduate school. The revisionist case is still wrong, and the conventional wisdom is still right. If one wants to defend the Trump executive order, one would be best served by arguing that the original meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment is not dispositive.

The original meaning of the "subject to the jurisdiction" clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is consistent with the principles of the centuries-old English and American common law that predated the adoption of that text. Children born of aliens within the borders of the United States and under American governing authority are natural-born American citizens. I have developed out the principle and logic of the ancient common-law rule in a recently published article, an amicus brief filed at the Supreme Court, and now in The Dispatch. I rather suspect that I'll be presenting additional evidence and arguments on this issue down the road.

From the new article:

The modern legal argument surrounding Trump's executive order turns on the meaning of the phrase "subject to the jurisdiction thereof" in the text of the 14th Amendment. The court last spoke on this issue at the end of the 19th century, declaring "the fundamental principle of citizenship by birth within the dominion was reaffirmed in the most explicit and comprehensive terms." The court then concluded that "subject to the jurisdiction thereof" was to be construed in light of the common law and American practice. It recognized three standard exceptions to the nativity rule: children born of foreign ambassadors, children born of alien enemies in hostile occupation, and children born as members of an Indian tribe that held itself apart as "an alien, though dependent, power."

. . . .

Historical revisionism is sometimes useful, but in this case it is simply wrong. [Lincoln's attorney general] Edward Bates pointed to the traditional rule and the traditional sources familiar to 19th century American lawyers in his opinion on citizenship early during the Civil War. James Kent, a New York jurist and one of the leading legal treatise writers of the early republic, had summarized the law simply as "all persons born within the jurisdiction of the United States" are native citizens. William Blackstone, the author of the treatise upon which Americans from the Revolution onward relied for their understanding of the English common law, likewise summarized, "Natural-born subjects are such as are born within the dominions of the crown of England." Blackstone restated this in more technical terms, explaining that "within the dominions" was synonymous with "within the ligeance" of the king. Being born within those circumstances created a mutual bond between king and subject, in which the subject owes the king allegiance and the king owes the subject protection. Once established, that bond was extraterritorial; a subject leaving the king's dominion still owed him allegiance and was still owed protection.

. . . . As Blackstone noted, "the children of aliens, born here in England, are, generally speaking, natural-born subjects, and entitled to all the privileges of such." Those children could not themselves be aliens, despite the status of their parents, because they were not "borne in a strange country under the obedience of a strange prince." Conversely, a statute was required in the United States, as it had been in England, to extend citizenship to children of Americans born abroad "in a strange country." By the operation of the common law and the Constitution alone, such children had been born outside the dominion, or the jurisdiction, and were thus aliens by birth regardless of the status of the parents.

Read the whole thing here.

3/2/2016: Whole Woman's Health v. Hellerstedt argued.

With the Supreme Court set to hear oral argument on April 27th in United States v. Chatrie, the geofence warrant case, I'm pleased to be able to post The Carpenter Adjustment, which is Chapter 9 of my 2025 book, The Digital Fourth Amendment. In the chapter, I explain what I think Carpenter means, the moves it is making, and how I think courts should interpret it. You can read the chapter here.

Here's the chapter summary:

The chapter considers how courts should interpret Carpenter v. United States (2018), the Supreme Court's blockbuster ruling that cell-site location records are protected under the Fourth Amendment. Carpenter is the Supreme Court's equilibrium-adjustment for noncontent network information: it recognizes that some network metadata is new and that the translation from physical space to network environments should treat some metadata differently. The question is, Which Internet data qualifies? This chapter develops a three-part test to apply Carpenter to Internet information. It then applies the test to a few important types of Internet information, such as Internet protocol addresses, geofence warrants, trip information, and Google search terms.

Ideally one would read this chapter in the context of the entire book, but I think this 20-page chapter stands on its own relatively well.

3/1/1880: Strauder v. West Virginia decided.

From his Free Press article; Ferguson is a Senior Fellow at the Hoover Institution, a former Harvard history professor, and a noted author both on historical matters and modern ones:

Since the news of the joint U.S.-Israeli strikes on Iran this morning, I have been thinking a lot about a song in the 2004 movie Team America:World Police. The movie was co-written by the creators of South Park and follows a group of heroic American puppets waging kinetic war on Islamic terrorists, the North Korean dictator Kim Jong Il, and liberal Hollywood, leaving cataclysmic collateral damage (the Eiffel Tower, Cairo, the Sphinx) in their wake. But the real highlight is a song called "America, Fuck Yeah." Here's how it goes:

America, fuck yeah
Comin' again to save the motherfuckin' day, yeah
America, fuck yeah
Freedom is the only way, yeah
Terrorists, your game is through
'Cause now you have to answer to …
America, fuck yeah
So lick my butt and suck on my balls
America, fuck yeah
What you gonna do when we come for you now?
It's the dream that we all share
It's the hope for tomorrow
Fuck yeah

Team America was an ambivalent movie at the time. That was what made it funny. It simultaneously mocked the liberal opponents of an aggressive foreign policy and the neoconservatives who advocated policies such as regime change in Iraq. The South Park team understood before many commentators that the United States has a track record of coming to save the day and leaving a trail of devastation.

For the habitual critics of U.S. foreign policy in general and Donald Trump's in particular, the analogy between today's air raids against Iran and the invasion of Iraq nearly 23 years ago is too obvious to be resisted….

An excerpt from Prof. Goldsmith's post at Executive Functions:

We're already seeing a debate about the legality of President Trump's use of force in Iran. I've grown cynical about these debates. Law is the language we use when criticizing presidential war powers—and it has been since the beginning of the nation. But the truth is that there are only political constraints.

As I've been saying for a while, there are no effective legal limitations within the executive branch. And courts have never gotten involved in articulating constraints in this context. That leaves Congress and the American people. They have occasionally risen up to constrain the president's deployment of troops and uses of force—for example, in Vietnam, and in Lebanon in 1983, and in Somalia in 1993. But those actions are rare and tend only to happen once there is disaster.

The Office of Legal Counsel opinions on the presidential use of force are famously promiscuously permissive. Some will now invoke the single acknowledged OLC limitation on unilateral uses of force to criticize the Iran attack. As the opinion justifying the attack on ISIS in 2014 explained: If the "'anticipated nature, scope, and duration' of the planned military operations, analyzed in light of the applicable historical precedent" amount to "war," the president must secure prior congressional approval.

President Trump in his statement about the attack said: "The lives of courageous American heroes may be lost, and we may have casualties," and that "that often happens in war." Does that implicate the OLC limitation and require him to seek congressional approval? It would be very easy for OLC to conclude not.

Frame grab from an eight minute statement made by United States President Donald J Trump that was released via his X account concerning the United States attack on Iran, on Saturday, February 28, 2026. (@realDonaldTrump via CNP/Newscom)

Last night, the US and Israel initiated a large-scale military attack on Iran. This action is blatantly unconstitutional. Its wisdom and morality are more debatable.

Article I of the Constitution gives Congress the exclusive power to declare war. One can debate the extent to which presidents can initiate relatively small-scale military actions, and such debates have raged for decades. But this attack is very obviously large enough to qualify as a war. Thus, it just as obviously requires congressional authorization. And Trump didn't get any, and indeed did not even try to do so.

Don't take my word for the proposition that it's a war. Take Trump's! He himself has called it a war, and proclaimed that the objective is regime change.

The closest historical analogue is Barack Obama's 2011 air campaign against Libya, which was also an attempt at regime change carried out with air strikes. For those keeping score, I condemned Obama's action and repeatedly criticized him for violating the Constitution and the War Powers Act (see also here). But Iran is a larger and more powerful nation than Libya, and thus this is likely to be an even bigger conflict. And, as I have said before, Obama's illegal actions don't justify Trump's (and vice versa).

The wisdom and morality of this action are a closer call. I am no reflexive opponent of military intervention, and I think regime change is sometimes justified. I have long differed on these issues with more dovish/isolationist libertarians.

The Iranian regime is a brutally oppressive dictatorship that recently slaughtered tens of thousands of protesters, has a long history of promoting terrorism, and constantly seeks to develop nuclear weapons. For these and other reasons, I would welcome regime change there. Even if the new government is far from ideal, it is likely to be less awful than regime of the ayatollahs. But I am skeptical that regime change can be achieved with air and missile strikes alone. And, at this point, it does not seem like the US and Israel have either the will or the capability of launching a major ground invasion. If the latter is attempted, it might turn out to be too costly to be worth it.

Perhaps airpower could achieve regime changes if coupled with a strong opposition movement within Iran. But Trump waited until after the regime crushed the protests that arose a few weeks ago, in the process slaughtering tens of thousands. It may be difficult or impossible for a strong opposition movement to emerge again, without a ground attack.

War is inherently dynamic, and it would be foolish to make definitive predictions. I have been largely out of the field of security studies for many years now, and thus no longer have much relevant up-to-date expertise. Thus, at this point, I can only say I am skeptical this intervention will achieve the regime change Trump seeks, or any other beneficial result great enough to outweigh the damage done to our constitutional system.

That latter is not just a technical legal issue. The requirement of congressional authorization for the initiation of war is there to ensure that no one person can take the country to war on his own, and that any major military action have broad public support, which can be essential to ensuring that we have the will and commitment needed to achieve victory against difficult opponents.

I will note one clear beneficial consequence of this action that has largely been ignored by the media so far: Iran is a major supplier of weapons to Russia for its war of aggression against Ukraine. As long as Iran is fighting the US and Israel, it is unlikely to continue extensive weapons deliveries to Russia, since it will need those arms for its own use.

But, on balance, it would have been more effective to help Ukraine by simply giving them weapons directly, which Trump has largely stopped doing. And, unlike starting a war without congressional authorization, giving arms to Ukraine doesn't violate the Constitution, and does not expose US forces to any significant risk.

In sum, this is a blatantly unconstitutional war. Time will tell whether it achieves any beneficial results that outweigh the costs - including the damage to our constitutional system of separation of powers.

2/28/1966: Miranda v. Arizona argued.

The Volokh Conspiracy

S. Ct. Reinstates Trial Court Injunction Blocking Cal. Policy Limiting Schools' Disclosure to Parents of Student's Changed Gender Identity

Justice Scalia did not read The New York Times; Justice Barrett does.

How Unstated Legal Ideas Have Deformed the Constitution

Prof. Tom Merrill (Columbia) Guest-Blogging About "Unstated": How Three Implicit Legal Ideas Have Sidelined Congress and Empowered the President and the Courts

Mayor's Right to Dismiss Volunteer Board Appointees for Speech, Including Religiously Motivated Speech

Apparent AI Glitch in Filing by Montana Public Defender, Recent Congressional Candidate

Reproducing Controversial Tweet in News Story = Fair Use

Looking for a Research Assistant for a Year (Good for a College-to-Law-School Gap Year)

Birthright Citizenship is Our Law

Today in Supreme Court History: March 2, 2016

Open Thread

The Carpenter Adjustment

Today in Supreme Court History: March 1, 1880

Open Thread

My Colleague Niall Ferguson on Iran

"Law Is Irrelevant to the U.S. Attack on Iran," by Prof. Jack Goldsmith (Harvard)

An Unconstitutional War

Today in Supreme Court History: February 28, 1966

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