The Volokh Conspiracy

Mostly law professors | Sometimes contrarian | Often libertarian | Always independent | Est. 2002

The Volokh Conspiracy

Takings

Cato Amicus Brief in the Texas and Florida Social Media Cases

The brief urges the Supreme Court to reverse its badly misguided precedent in Pruneyard v. Robins.

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The Cato Institute recently filed a Supreme Court amicus brief in  Moody v. NetChoice and NetChoice v. Paxton,  cases challenging Florida and Texas state laws barring major social media firms from using most types of content moderation. Although I serve as the B. Kenneth Simon Chair in Constitutional Studies at Cato (in addition to my primary job as a law professor at George Mason University), I was not involved in writing this brief. But I very much agree with the points made by my colleagues Thomas Berry and Anastasia Boden. They urge the Court to, if necessary, overrule its badly misguided 1980 decision in Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins. Here is their summary of the brief:

Two years ago, Texas passed a law declaring that large social media services are "common carriers" subject to onerous regulations dictating what speech they must disseminate. The law prohibits services from removing, demonetizing, or blocking a user or a piece of content based on the viewpoint expressed. Services found to violate this requirement face liability for each piece of content they remove.

The law was soon challenged by NetChoice and CCIA, two internet trade associations whose members operate a variety of websites covered by the law. Although a federal district court held that the law violated the First Amendment, a panel of the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed that decision by a 2–1 vote. The panel held that the law does not inflict a First Amendment injury because the websites "are free to say whatever they want to distance themselves from the speech they host" and thus would not be falsely identified as endorsing the speech they are forced to disseminate.

Meanwhile, Florida passed a similar law around the same time as Texas's, which was also challenged by NetChoice and CCIA. In that case, the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit struck down key portions of the law as violating the First Amendment rights of the websites.

The Supreme Court has granted review of both cases, and now Cato has filed a joint amicus brief supporting NetChoice and CCIA in both cases. There are many reasons why the laws violate the First Amendment, but our brief focuses on just one aspect of the Fifth Circuit's decision: its reliance on PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins (1980), a flawed Supreme Court decision that should be overruled.

In PruneYard, the Supreme Court held that California could force a private shopping center to host political pamphleteers on its property. The Court held that there was no First Amendment injury to the shopping center because passersby would not likely believe that the shopping center endorsed the speakers it was forced to host. But as our brief explains, there are many reasons why compelling a private entity to disseminate speech inflicts an injury. The false appearance of endorsement is one possible relevant injury, but not the only one. Supreme Court decisions before and after PruneYard have recognized this fact, making PruneYard an outlier in First Amendment doctrine.

For example, in Wooley v. Maynard (1977), the Supreme Court held that New Hampshire could not force drivers to display the state motto "Live Free or Die" on their license plates. It did so despite the fact that drivers were highly unlikely to believe that other drivers endorsed the (required) license plates on their cars. Rather, the Court recognized that a driver was injured simply by being forced "to participate in the dissemination of an ideological message by displaying it on his private property." And before and after PruneYard, the Supreme Court has held in several cases that it is a First Amendment injury to be forced to fund the private speech of others. Here too, the harm is not in any false appearance of endorsement, but simply in the compelled support of speech.

Our brief urges the Court to overrule PruneYard and fully endorse the more comprehensive view of compelled speech that underlies both Wooley and many compelled‐​funding cases. Americans have a First Amendment right not only to refrain from speaking but also to refrain from printing, funding, disseminating, staging, selling, or otherwise facilitating or supporting the speech of others. We have these rights for many reasons, not just because we (sometimes) want to avoid associating ourselves as supporters and adopters of that speech. We also may want to simply avoid spreading ideas we don't think are worth spreading.

As our brief explains, the Supreme Court does not need to overrule PruneYard for NetChoice and CCIA to win these cases, but it should overrule PruneYard sooner or later. At the very least, the Court should note PruneYard's outlier status in First Amendment doctrine and decline to extend it to these novel circumstances. The Court should reverse the Fifth Circuit and affirm the Eleventh Circuit, striking down the Texas and Florida laws as First Amendment violations.

In addition to being a badly flawed First Amendment precedent, Pruneyard is also a terrible Takings Clause precedent, for reasons outlined in two articles by Prof. Gregory Sisk (see here and here). That aspect of Pruneyard isn't before the Court in the Texas and Florida social media cases. But the justices should overrule it when and if they get the chance. In my view, the Texas and Florida laws do in fact violate the Takings Clause as well as the First Amendment. But the plaintiffs in the two cases have not pursued that issue.

I have written about the stakes in these cases in greater detail here and here.

For those keeping score, I am one of the relatively few people who simultaneously support the Fifth Circuit's recent decision to bar the White House and other federal officials from coercing social media firms to take down content they deem "misinformation" and oppose that same courts' decision (with a different panel) upholding the Texas social media law. And I have held the same views on these cases regardless of who owns Twitter/X. I didn't like many of the content moderation policies of pre-Musk Twitter, and I like Musk's own policies even less. But the owners of a site should have the right to determine which speech they want to host, and which they don't. If Musk (or any owner) wants to kick me off his site because he doesn't like my views, he should be free to do so - even if it's for a stupid reason.

University Administrators Behaving Badly

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A bit lost in the controversy over antisemitic speech on campus is the failure of university administrators to enforce existing rules that are content-neutral.

I have already written about my own university's failure to enforce Virginia's law banning masked demonstrations. That failure continues, despite a letter from the state attorney general reminding universities of their obligation to enforce the law, and despite an incident in which a student waving a pro-Israel Israel flag was attacked by masked demonstrators. My understanding is that other universities in Virginia are also refusing to enforce the law. I have an email from one university police department official explaining that the law was intended to be enforced only if another crime has been committed.  This is nonsense. The law is meant to prevent intimidation by hateful mobs, and to help police identify suspects if laws are broken. I understand that one would not want to suddenly enforce the law and arrest masked students on felony charges, but I don't see any problem with enforcing the law after providing due warnings.

Meanwhile, at Cornell anti-Israel groups have been disrupting indoor spaces with extremely loud chanting of "from the river to the sea" and so forth. When students and their parents complained to the school, the response they received from the dean's office is that the university would not intervene unless the protests were "too" disruptive. When pressed, 20-30 minutes of disruption was deemed not "too" disruptive. But it gets worse. According to the Cornell Sun, a university official admitted that the administration has been cooperating with the disruptions, including the students' "occupying" a campus building as he made the statement!

During the meeting, Lombardi also stressed the administration's cooperation and commitment to free expression and student protests. He emphasized that the administration has cooperated with students and demonstrators with respect to the events planned for the week by CML.

"You've had a lot of activities [and] demonstrations, and the staff that's been here has been very committed to helping you be able to do that and express yourself during your demonstrations throughout the week," Lombardi said. "So we remain very committed to that, including today."

UC Berkeley has an "all-comers" policy, ie, student organizations must be open to everyone with no discrimination. Nevertheless, as revealed in a recent lawsuit filed against the university, twenty-three student organizations have adopted policies that discriminate against "Zionists" in various ways. Dean Erwin Chemerinsky has determined that putting aside any civil rights considerations, these policies violate the university's all-comers policy. Starting next semester, he has told students, work for any of these organizations will not be eligible for course credit. However, the organizations apparently remain free to use the Berkeley Law School name, office space, funding, and faculty advisors. Dean Chemerinsky seems to think this is required by the First Amendment. For my part, I don't see how student organizations have a First Amendment right to violate content-neutral university policy, nor why that any such right would apply differently to course credit as opposed to other privileges.

A lawsuit filed against New York University provides several examples of university officials declining to enforce the university's own regulations against anti-Israel protestors and activists.

Anti-Israel students at MIT blocked entrance to a university building while classes were being held, obviously contrary to university rules. The university declined to suspend them because of "serious concerns about collateral consequences for the students, such as visa issues."

These are just a few of the examples I have come across since October 7 of universities declining to enforce their own content-neutral rules. Such actions leave the universities vulnerable to civil rights complaints, given that failure to enforce these rules (a) can contribute to a hostile environment for Jewish students, as their pleas for the university to enforce the rules are ignored; (b) may permit discrimination against Jewish students (as at Berkeley) contrary to school rules; and (c) may constitute discrimination by demonstrating selective indifference to the concerns of Jewish students, if the rules get enforced in other contexts.

But legalities aside, many people are calling for universities to crack down on "hate speech." Instead, critics should demand that universities enforce existing content-neutral rules--and that they certainly should not, as at Cornell, be actively collaborating with student groups in breaking those rules.

The Rotten Core Of College Campuses

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Many readers may be aware that it is currently the holiday of Chanukkah. And maybe you know that during this holiday, the Jewish people light a menorah (candelabra) with eight candles to remind us of a miracle: in ancient times, there was only enough oil to light a lamp for one day, but the oil lasted for eight days. But why was there so little oil left over? Why was the holy temple destroyed? The Syrians forced the Jewish people to accept their Hellenistic beliefs, and worship pagan idols. A small band of Jewish rebels, known as the Maccabees (Hammers), fled from the Syrians, and hid in the hills. Against all odds, the Jews defeated the Syrian army, and rededicated, or sanctified their temple. Chanukkah translates to dedication.

The Chanukkah story is not an outlier. Throughout the entirety of recorded history, there have been countless attempts to wipe out the Jewish people. It is told that King Louis XIV asked Blaise Pascal, the French philosopher, to provide evidence of miracles. His response was simple: the Jews. As all other civilizations come and go, the Jews somehow continue. Nevertheless we persisted, as the saying goes. This story may be apocryphal, but it conveys an important lesson: in every generation, there are attempts to exterminate the Jews, yet this scrappy minority survived. Indeed, many Jewish holidays can be summed up with some humor: they tried to kill us, they failed, let's eat.

In every generation, different rationales are put forward for why the Jews cannot be accepted: they practice heretical beliefs (monotheism), they reject the true religion (polytheism), they follow laws without reason (chok), they committed deicide (Jesus), they spread disease (the Black Death), they were infidels (Islam), they engaged in harmful practices (usury), they refuse to convert (Inquisition), the holy land belongs to us (multiple crusades), they don't belong (multiple expulsions), they do not belong (pogroms), they cause struggles (Nazis), and so on. The history of civilization can be written based on whatever the elite society of the day thinks about the Jewish people. As Justice Scalia reminded us, the Holocaust "happened in one of the most educated, most progressive, most cultured countries in the world."

In the wake of the Holocaust, there was perhaps a brief moment of lucidity when the nations of the world recognized that the Jewish people needed a home of their own to ensure these atrocities never happen again. To put it in terms even Tirien Steinbach could understand, Israel would be a "safe space," or "affinity housing," for the world's most oppressed minority. (Don't ask her if the Jews are worth the squeeze.)

Regrettably, as soon as Israel was established, the millennia-long train of anti-semitism simply morphed into its latest manifestation: anti-Zionism. They don't hate all Jews, they just oppose all Jews who seek to protect the the only speck on planet Earth devoted for their protection. This doctrine was dressed up in all the academic garb of Marxism, anti-colonialism, and critical racial studies. Anti-Zionism was championed by elite academics on campuses. DEI apparatchiks, ostensibly hired to promote equity, reified the anti-Zionist trope. Students, who are woefully unfamiliar with world history, see the children of the Holocaust as just another oppressor. And, as they are taught, any act of resistance against the oppressors is not only justified, but necessary. The right type of violence demands silence.

The "gotcha" questions about whether a call for genocide is anti-semitic largely misses the mark. The deeper question is why are elites, in every civilization, drawn to theories that antagonize the Jews. Whether it is Hamas, Hitler, Hadrian, the Hellenists, or Harvard, the root cause is always the same: the Jews are different. The wise people of the day can always make up some rationale to get to that conclusion. Really nothing ever changes. Recently, during the oral argument in Students for Fair Admissions v. Harvard, Justice Gorsuch observed "Harvard's move to a holistic application approach happened in the 1920s because it wanted to impose a quota on Jewish applicants, but it didn't want to do through front door, so it used diversity as a subterfuge for racial quotas." There are always subterfuges to treat the Jews differently.

This background brings me to recent events on campus. Let me make two points at the outset. First, I think Eugene has accurately described First Amendment doctrine, as well as the analogous principles that private universities purport to follow. Second, modifying campus speech policies would likely be turned around to censor Jewish students in the future who defend Israel's policies.

The problem here is not the First Amendment or any campus speech protocol. The root of the problem is the rotten core of college campuses. From the earliest age, students are inculcated with a flawed philosophy: the world must be divided between the oppressed and oppressors. And the answer to any question turns not on any sort of objective moral truths, but based on a dogmatic preference for the plight of the oppressed. So long as this ideology predominates, no committees or task forces can make any difference. Simply adding Jews to the list of "oppressed" people masks the underlying rot. Indeed, the past two months have demonstrated the complete failure of DEI as an institution. If DEI could not handle the most blatant outbreak of anti-semitism since the Holocaust, what good does it serve? These apparatuses should be abolished and the intersectional pyramid should be toppled.

I still favor robust protections for free speech on campus, and oppose governmental intervention in academia. I also worry what happens when donors can influence what happens in academic progress. I'll admit, these views are much less sturdy then they were a few months ago. Let's see what the future brings, as Presidents lose their jobs, as donors withdraw donations, and perhaps, a future Department of Education in a Republican administration brings down the Maccabee.

Donald Trump

Presidential Immunity Does Not Bar Suits Against Trump for His Conduct on January 6

The U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit rejected the former President's attempt to claim presidential immunity covered his conduct on January 6.

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On December 1, a panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit unanimously rejected Donald Trump's attempt to dismiss multiple suits filed against him for his conduct on January 6 on grounds of presidential immunity. Specifically, the Court in Blassingame v. Trump affirmed the district court decision denying Donald Trump's motion to dismiss various federal and D.C. law-based claims filed against him seeking recovery for physical damages and emotional distress allegedly caused by his incitement of the riot at the Capitol.

The opinion for the panel, by Chief Judge Sri Srinivasan, is a careful and reasoned exploration of the law of presidential immunity. It is also quite narrow, in that it does not determine whether the claims filed agaisnt Trump will or can ultimately succeed. Judge Greg Katsas joined the opinon in full, and Judge Judith Rogers concurred in part.

Judge Srinivasan's introduction, which begins after the jump, nicely summarizes the law of presidential immunity and describes the "objective" text for whether a President's conduct -- and, in this case, his speech -- is cloaked with immunity. This approach strikes as quite sound, and directly in line with the few Supreme Court precedents to bear on this question. (And for those who care about such things, was joined in full by an Obama and Trump nominee, and in part by a Clinton nominee.)

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Free Speech

Fareed Zakaria (CNN) on "Why University Presidents are Under Fire"

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From Friday's opinion piece:

American universities have been neglecting excellence in order to pursue a variety of agendas — many of them clustered around diversity and inclusion. It started with the best of intentions. Colleges wanted to make sure young people of all backgrounds had access to higher education and felt comfortable on campus. But those good intentions have morphed into a dogmatic ideology and turned these universities into places where the pervasive goals are political and social engineering, not academic merit….

Out of this culture of diversity has grown the collection of ideas and practices that we have all now heard of — safe spaces, trigger warnings, … micro aggressions … [and] speech codes ….

In this context, it is understandable that Jewish groups would wonder, why do safe spaces, micro aggressions, and hate speech not apply to us? If universities can take positions against free speech to make some groups feel safe, why not us? Having coddled so many student groups for so long, university administrators found themselves squirming, unable to explain why certain groups (Jews, Asians) don't seem to count in these conversations.

Having gone so far down the ideological path, these universities and these presidents cannot make the case clearly that at the center of a university is the free expression of ideas and that while harassment and intimidation would not be tolerated, offensive speech would and should be protected….

The whole thing is much worth reading.

Israel

Is Support for "From the River to the Sea" Based Upon Ignorance?

Younger Americans, in particular, appear to support calls for Palestinian liberation, but do they understand what a common slogan means?

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For the past two months, colleges and public squares across the country have been filled with demonstrations in support of Palestinian statehood and opposing Israel's military response to the October 7 terrorist attacks and its policies toward the West Bank. "From the river to the sea, Palestine shall be free," is a common chant at these protests, prompting debate over whether the phrase is or should be considered inherently threatening to Jewish students and others. University of Pennsylvania professor Claire Finkelstein, for one, argues this phrase "in the present context . . . creates a hostile environment that can impair the equal educational opportunities of Jewish students."

Political Science Professor Ron Hassner of the University of California at Berkeley was curious whether college students and others calling for Palestine to be "free" "from the river to the sea" understood what that slogan entails, so he conducted a survey to find out, and wrote up his results in the Wall Street Journal. His op-ed begins:

When college students who sympathize with Palestinians chant "From the river to the sea," do they know what they're talking about? I hired a survey firm to poll 250 students from a variety of backgrounds across the U.S. Most said they supported the chant, some enthusiastically so (32.8%) and others to a lesser extent (53.2%).

But only 47% of the students who embrace the slogan were able to name the river and the sea. Some of the alternative answers were the Nile and the Euphrates, the Caribbean, the Dead Sea (which is a lake) and the Atlantic. . . .

Would learning basic political facts about the conflict moderate students' opinions? A Latino engineering student from a southern university reported "definitely" supporting "from the river to the sea" because "Palestinians and Israelis should live in two separate countries, side by side." Shown on a map of the region that a Palestinian state would stretch from the Jordan River to the Mediterranean Sea, leaving no room for Israel, he downgraded his enthusiasm for the mantra to "probably not." Of the 80 students who saw the map, 75% similarly changed their view.

Hassner also reports that a majority of those surveyed who initially voiced support for a single Palestinian state moderated their views "when they learned it would entail the subjugation, expulsion or annihilation of seven million Jewish and two million Arab Israelis."

Hassner's survey focused on the implications of "from the river to the sea." I would not be at all surprised were surveys looking at claims Israelis are European colonizers or comparing civil and religious freedom across the Middle East to find similar levels of ignorance, and an equivalent moderation of views when respondents were presented with relevant history and context.

While some argue that universities (and others) should tamp down on free expression in order to quell discord on college campuses, Hassner's findings suggest universities might do better to double-down on their core mission: Educating their students and providing a forum for the presentation and examination of ideas. As Hassner found, something as simple as showing students maps of the Middle East significantly informs and affects their understanding of the current Israel-Hamas conflict. Now imagine what might happen if universities made a serious effort to sponsor substantive forums on the history of the conflict, presenting thoughtful proponents of the competing positions and laying bear the full complexity (and perhaps intractability) of the current situation, all the while modeling civil discourse for assembled students. This would do more than policing memes and chants. Universities, of all institutions, should believe in the power of education.

Public Health

Is Economic Freedom Good for Public Health?

New research on how the growth of government may affect public health, even if only indirectly.

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The protection of public health is often a justificiation for increasing government power. But could increasing government power also have negative consequences, including for public health itself?

A new paper, "How does economic freedom influence public health? Evidence from U.S. cities" by economists Justin Callais, Kelly Hyde, Ilia Murtazashvili, and Yang Zhou, forthcoming in the Southern Economic Journal, investigates the relationship between economic freedom and public health, and finds evidence that the former may be good for the latter.  Here is the abstract:

Although there is substantial agreement how microeconomic forces—income, risk aversion—shape public health outcomes, there is substantial disagreement about the relationship between macroeconomic forces—market liberalization and economic freedom—on public health. In this paper, we investigate the relationship between public health, economic freedom, and wealth using a large sample of metropolitan-level data from the United States. We find that economic freedom does have a statistically significant and positive impact on general, physical, and mental health, but the overall results are small in magnitude. When we disaggregate the three areas of economic freedom, we find that areas with lower government spending and freer labor markets have the strongest positive effect on physical and mental health. However, our results are strongest for the richest group of respondents, suggesting that the economic freedom-health relationship is perhaps indirect, and shown through income.

The authors note that their findings undermine efforts "to blame market capitalism, globalization, and neoliberal policies forworsening mental and physical health in the United States." At the same time, they caution caution that there are reasons to question whether the findings show a causal relationship, in part because the research relies upon self-reported health data, but it nonetheless suggests the existence of health-related trade offs when government policies seek to improve public health.

Free Speech

What Universities Should Punish and What They Shouldn't

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Talia Khan, an MIT graduate student, had a detailed and powerful statement about what she sees as anti-Semitism on campus (apparently written in response to an invitation from Reps. Fox and Stefanek).

And I think it well reflects how many different things are being mixed together here. For instance, the statement refers to "a radical anti-Israel group at MIT called the CAA" whose members have "stormed the offices of Jewish faculty and staff in the MIT Israel internship office. Staff reported fearing for their lives, as students went door to door trying to unlock the offices." If this is accurate, then it should certainly be punished. Likewise as to "Jewish students being physically blocked from moving through the anti-Israel crowd through the main MIT lobby."

Similarly, this allegation, if accurate, would show serious and improper viewpoint-discriminatory enforcement of MIT's rules:

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Political Ignorance

New Survey Showing Public Ignorance About the Holocaust Among Young Americans

The Economist/YouGov survey indicates 1 in 5 young Americans believe the Holocaust is a "myth." The result is troubling, but less bad than it looks. It is also just one part of a broader problem of widespread ignorance about history and political issues.

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Yad Vashem archives. (Yad Vashem.)

 

A new Economist/YouGov survey has gotten a lot of media attention because of its finding that 1 in 5 Americans between the ages of 18 and 29 believe the Holocaust is a "myth." This is indeed a troubling result. But it's somewhat less bad than it looks. Ambiguities in the survey question make it seem worse than might actually be the case. In addition, much of the ignorance here may be just one facet of widespread general public ignorance about politics and history, rather than an indicator of neo-Nazism or anti-Semitism. That latter point is simultaneously comforting and troubling.

The question in the survey asks responds whether they "strongly agree," "tend to agree," "tend to disagree," "strongly disagree," or "neither agree nor disagree" with the statement that "the Holocaust is a myth." In the sample as a whole, only 7% picked "strongly agree" (2%) or "tend to agree" (5%). But among young people (age 18-29), the figure was 20% (8% "strongly agree" and 12% "tend to agree"). This is the figure that has understandably caused consternation.

Some of that outrage is justified. The Holocaust is one of the worst events in all of human history and one of the best documented. There is no even remotely plausible reason to consider it a myth. Such claims are in the same boat as those of people who think the Earth is flat, or that the Moon landings were faked.

At the same time, the survey is result is somewhat less awful than it might seem. There are two ambiguities in the question wording that likely have the effect of making things seem worse than the underlying reality. First, a majority of those who endorse the statement picked "tend to agree" rather than "strongly agree." The phrase "tend to agree" is ambiguous enough to include everything from having a slight tendency towards agreement to having a very strong one. Even the former is problematic, when it comes to a statement like this one. But it's much less bad than the latter.

A second relevant ambiguity is that the question doesn't distinguish between people who know what the term "Holocaust" refers to and those who don't. The latter may seem implausible. Who doesn't know what "Holocaust" means? But much evidence shows widespread public ignorance of basic facts of history, science, politics, and even the basic structure of government. A majority of Americans can't name the three branches of government, don't know when the Civil War happened, and support mandatory labeling of food containing DNA (the latter probably because they don't understand what DNA is). And most surveys of political and historical knowledge find that it is inversely correlated with age; that is, younger people tend to know less than older ones. The latter phenomenon isn't confined to the present generation of young people. Survey researchers found the same thing with previous generations when they were young.

A person who doesn't know what the term "Holocaust" refers to might say they "tend to  agree" it's a myth precisely because of that ignorance. If it was a real thing, they might reason, I would know about it!

In one sense, being ignorant about the meaning of "Holocaust" is even worse than knowing what it refers to, but still thinking it a myth. The person who believes the former may be even more ignorant than one who believes the latter. But someone who simply doesn't know the meaning of the word is far less likely to be an anti-Semite, a neo-Nazi or some other type of committed Holocaust denier. She is likely just unfamiliar with history and politics, generally.

Some people who believe the Holocaust is a myth really are anti-Semites, neo-Nazis, or adherents of other horrible ideologies. But many are probably just ignorant without being malicious.

It is also important to emphasize that ignorance about the Holocaust is a facet of more general widespread public ignorance of history, politics, and economics. What I said about a previous survey finding widespread ignorance about the Holocaust is relevant here, as well:

Ignorance about the Holocaust is not a unique phenomenon driven by anti-Semitism or by some desire on the part of educators to cover up the truth about this specific event. It is one of many manifestations of a more general problem of public ignorance. Indeed, I suspect that more systematic analysis would find that public ignorance about the Holocaust is actually less severe than that about many other historical events. For example, it is likely that many more Americans know what the Holocaust was than have heard of Mao  Zedong's Great Leap Forward, the largest mass murder in the entire history of the world….

The point here is not to suggest that ignorance about the Holocaust is unimportant, or that the Great Leap Forward and other similar communist atrocities were necessarily worse than the Holocaust…. I lost several relatives in the Holocaust myself, and have no desire to somehow downgrade its importance.

Rather, the point is that ignorance about the Holocaust is part of a broader pattern. Any solution to the problem probably cannot focus on the Holocaust alone, but must consider the broader issue of historical and political ignorance, as well. For reasons elaborated in my book, Democracy and Political Ignorance, increasing public knowledge of politics and history is likely to prove a much tougher challenge than some imagine it to be. In the meantime, public ignorance about the Holocaust, communist mass murders, and other historical events makes it more likely that we will fail to learn the lessons of these tragic events, and thus be at greater risk of repeating them.

In some respects, therefore, surveys showing that large numbers of people are ignorant about the Holocaust are less troubling than they might seem to be. They aren't necessarily an indication of either widespread anti-Semitism or unusually severe ignorance about the Holocaust relative to other major historical events.

In another way, the fact that such ignorance is not unique to the Holocaust actually makes the situation even more concerning. Political and historical ignorance can and does cause harm across a wide range of issues, not just those related to the Holocaust, anti-Semitism and related questions.

And if the problem is a general one, that makes it harder to solve than if it were limited to knowledge of the Holocaust. I go over the strengths and weaknesses of various possible strategies to mitigate political ignorance in this recent article.

Free Speech

More on Advocacy of Genocide

Let's focus concretely on proposed bans on advocacy of "genocide," at Stanford and beyond.

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[1.] Stanford put out this statement Thursday:

In the context of the national discourse, Stanford unequivocally condemns calls for the genocide of Jews or any peoples. That statement would clearly violate Stanford's Fundamental Standard, the code of conduct for all students at the university.

The Fundamental Standard provides that violations can lead to expulsion:

Students at Stanford are expected to show both within and without the University such respect for order, morality, personal honor and the rights of others as is demanded of good citizens. Failure to do this will be sufficient cause for removal from the University.

At the same time, it adds,

The Fundamental Standard does not restrict speech that is otherwise protected, including speech that some may find objectionable.

I take it that Stanford must therefore be suggesting that calls for the genocide of any peoples are not "protected" "speech." And Stanford acknowledges that the definition of what is "protected" "speech" must rely on First Amendment rules, because a California statute (the so-called Leonard Law) so provides:

As state actors, public universities are held to the strictest of standards when restricting speech and in California, the Leonard Law holds private universities to the same standard. As a protected constitutional right, speech may not be subject to discipline unless that speech rises to a legal standard of being unprotected.

Stanford thus seems to view advocacy of genocide as falling within a First Amendment exception, which means that it's unprotected not just at California private universities but also against civil liability and criminal punishment.

[2.] Now what exactly is genocide? The term is often used loosely, but there is a definition in the U.N. Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide:

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Free Speech

NRA and ACLU Teaming up on the First Amendment in NRA v. Vullo

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I'm delighted to report (as Adam Liptak wrote in today's New York Times) that the ACLU will be representing the NRA in this important First Amendment case, and that the ACLU's Legal Director David Cole—an experienced Supreme Court advocate—is (the Times notes) planning on arguing.

The issue in the case is whether New York financial regulatory authorities coerced banks and insurance companies to cut off ties with the NRA and thus violated the First Amendment. As the petition argued,

The Second Circuit's opinion below [rejecting the First Amendment claim] gives state officials free rein to financially blacklist their political opponents—from gun-rights groups to abortion-rights groups to environmentalist groups and beyond.

Cole's presence at the lectern and the ACLU's presence on the briefs will help convey the core message to all the Justices: The case is about everyone's free speech rights, not just the NRA's. Cole has argued six cases before the Court, all connected to the First Amendment, most recently Mahanoy Area School District v. B.L. (2021). Mahanoy was an 8-1 decision, and I hope NRA v. Vullo will be 9-0.

Note that I consulted with William Brewer, Sarah Rogers, and Noah Peters of Brewer Attorneys & Counselors on the petition, and look forward to consulting further with them and with Cole (with whom I've much enjoyed working in the past) on the merits briefs.

The First Geofence Warrant Case Reaches the Federal Court of Appeals

United States v. Chatrie is heard in the Fourth Circuit.

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In March 2022, I had a long post on the district court's ruling in United States v. Chatrie, the first federal district court ruling on geofence warrants and the Fourth Amendment.  Today the Fourth Circuit held oral argument in the case, which you can listen to here starting at about 1:10:

I posted my oral argument impressions on X, and I thought I would summarize my thoughts here, too.

It was a somewhat unusual argument, in that the judges spent a lot of time expressing their views and arguing amongst each other.  In general, though, I thought it went well for the government. I would guess they prevail 2-1.

Judge Richardson seemed to be a vote on the government's side, and on the broadest ground.  He suggested that there was no Fourth Amendment protection in the specific records known as "Google Location History" because you need to opt in to have Google collect them.  Only about 1/3 of Google customers opt in to that. And to Judge Richardson, that was outcome determinative: If Google only keeps these particular records if you opt in, then you have volunteered to have those records and the third party doctrine applies.

I happen to think that's right, as I argue briefly in a forthcoming book (more on the book project later). I realize some are skeptical that Google really doesn't keep these records about everyone, but I understand Google's claim to be not that they can't figure out where phones are, but that they have a specific service called Google Location History that is at issue here. Those are the records that the government turned over, and those are the records that (Google claims) they only collect from the 1/3 or so of their users who opt in.

Judge Wilkinson was clearly on the government side, although quite possibly on a different basis.  Judge Wilkinson was very concerned about limiting law enforcement use of this useful tool. He suggested he might want to rule for the government without deciding anything except the good faith exception.  That way, the law could develop slowly without grand rulings from appellate courts trying to settle too much.

Judge Wynn was clearly on the defense side. He thought this was extremely disturbing surveillance.  He analogized this authority to what you might expect in Nazi Germany. He also argued that that opting in is a fiction. There is no real option, in his view.

Looking ahead, an interesting question is whether Judges Richardson and Wilkinson will agree on a rationale to make a majority opinion. It's not clear they'll be able to find a common ground. We could end up with a narrow majority opinion on good faith with both Richardson and Wilkinson writing concurrences—with Judge Richardson writing on opting in and Judge Wilkinson hitting his usual themes of the need to go slowly in this area.

Speaking for myself, I hope the court doesn't decide the case on the good-faith exception without deciding at least some of the merits issues.  We've been waiting for years for a geofence case to get to a federal court of appeals. There's almost no law from any court on what is a search in geofence cases, and the law on the particularity of warrants has so far only consisted of really weak and unilluminating decisions from trial courts.  For the big case to finally reach a federal court of appeals, and to not get a ruling on any of the merits issues, would be the good faith exception at its worst.  It would make sure no one ever knows what the law is.

That would be particularly problematic here, I think, because right now geofence investigations are conducted in the alternative universe of Google Policy.  Google has the records, and it won't turn them over without a warrant.  The company has come up with a complex procedure for how it will comply with the warrants.  That procedure doesn't reflect law; it just reflects Google policy.  And Google is very hard to sue about this stuff, as law enforcement would have to stop its investigation for a few years to litigate procedural issues just to try that. As a practical matter, right now Google sets the rules.

But it's hardly clear that Google's corporate policy is the right framework.  First of all, if it's really the case that only 1/3 of Google users opt in to turning Location History on, then I am skeptical that there is probable cause to support a warrant in these cases.  And if the same opt-in requirement that generates that skepticism means that such records are not protected by the Fourth Amendment, as Judge Richardson (I think correctly) suggested, then there is no legal basis on which Google can demand a warrant anyway.

So it may be that the whole warrant regime that Google has created is the wrong framework. It may be that warrants not only can't be demanded, but can't be obtained.  Geofencing would instead take place under the statutory regime of 18 U.S.C 2703(d). And that would raise all the issues I wrote about in this article about how to do particularity for non-content records under the Stored Communications Act.

Anyway, it seems to me that a working system would feature courts ruling about the constitutional issues potentially raised by geofence warrants and then Congress legislating in response to those constitutional rulings— with Google's input, certainly, but not with Google calling the shots. On the other hand, if we're just muddling through under the good faith exception, it may be that the strange world of Google Policy continues on for a long time.

Police

"Say No To Police Profanity"

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An interesting column by one of my favorite commentators, Prof. John McWhorter. An excerpt:

Precincts across the nation do, in fact, have rules against profanity on the job. However, they are barely enforced if at all …. This casual cursing at people is not a mere matter of the informality of our times and it must stop. It is a much more serious matter than it may seem….

Profanity can be a form of hostility. To be sure, I am skeptical of claims that injurious words always constitute "trauma" (just as I am that "silence is violence"). However, profanity can still be a game changer. In interactions with cops it influences public perception. One study (of many similar) showed that, when presented with a silent video of a person detained by a police officer with captions in which the officers' profanity was left out, observers judged the interaction as more reasonable than when the profanity was included in the captions. Other studies similarly document that, when it comes to the cops, profanity matters—profoundly influencing how citizens view their interactions with police….

On the other hand, we must not fall for a crude, blanket notion that police officers must never be caught in a recording using, say, the word "fuck" on the job for any reason. This would operate upon an almost willfully uninformed sense of how language actually works. Any word remotely interesting likely has a lot of meanings….

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