The Volokh Conspiracy
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This Supreme Court "Deserves Our Celebration, Not Our Condemnation"
Prof. William Baude on the Supreme Court and the false promise of court reform.
Professor William Baude has an op-ed in the New York Times, "This Is What an Independent, Competent Supreme Court Looks Like," defending the Supreme Court against its critics, left and right, and suggesting that many calls for court reform are misguided.
Noting that the Democratic electoral sweep has bolstered calls for reforming, and perhaps expanding, the Court to alter its course, Baude writes:
The left, understandably, strongly opposes the court's recent rulings on abortion, the Voting Rights Act, the unitary executive and so on. These decisions are a big deal. But court reformers still suffer from a failure of perspective. If Chief Justice John Roberts could write an opinion essay, I would imagine him saying: "What? Ruling against the administration's misuse of the National Guard, sweeping emergency tariffs and attack on birthright citizenship, plus preserving the independence of the Federal Reserve and the integrity of the midterm elections, wasn't enough for you?"
The court has ruled against the administration in high-stakes cases on those issues all in the past year. And it has done so even though six of the justices were appointed by members of the president's party — three by President Trump himself. . . .
Under the circumstances of the second Trump term, the Supreme Court is doing amazingly well. If anything, it deserves our celebration, not our condemnation.
Indeed, the Court's conservatives, on the whole, have shown themselves more willing to constrain Trump's excesses than were the Court's liberals when faced with executive branch overreach by Presidents Biden or Obama.
Baude notes that the Court's willingness to reject Trump Administration priorities has caused some on the Right to question the conservative legal movement's commitment to originalism, and cautions that "what goes around comes around, and principles will be worth more in the long run." Of course, some conservatives criticisms of the Court are for its failure to adhere to the principles some justices espouse, not that those principles are getting in the way of making America great again.
On the question of judicial reform, Baude strikes a cautionary note, particularly if court reform is nothing more than an effort to reverse the Court's current trajectory.
In the abstract, there is nothing wrong with bipartisan judicial reform. The Supreme Court should not be preserved in amber. But partisan judicial reform — reform motivated by frustration with specific judicial decisions and the hope that the reformed court will rule differently — is a dangerous game. Because partisan reform is a tactic equally available to both sides, it accomplishes little in the long run except to accelerate the court's transformation into a political superweapon. Such a tactic might be a short-run necessity in extreme circumstances, but we are far from those extremes.
He also--quite correctly--calls out the obsession with judicial ethics as "superficial." He could add that such concerns are nearly always one-sided and selective. While it may be appropriate to further limit the justices' outside income or ability to accept gifts, we should not pretend that any such reforms would have any effect on the Court's decisions.
The justices' views on big issues are well formed. The justices themselves aren't for sale; book income reflects their increasing celebrity, not any specific quid pro quo. To be sure, it is quite possible that travel and gifts and book sales subtly reinforce the justices' incentives to play to their respective fan bases. But this kind of corruption is quite indirect, and at the same time comes from so much more than money. So ethics reform is unlikely to change much about what the court actually does.
In the end, Baude thinks the best argument for court reform is as a placebo: To convince the public that something has been done so that attention can turn to more pressing issues. As he concludes this point: "If pointless reforms cause many Americans to believe that the court is better — more independent, less corrupt and so on — that would be great for the country."
I largely agree with Baude's piece, though I may be more open to certain sorts of reforms than he reveals in this piece. Reforms that represent genuine political engagement with the work of the courts, such as measures to alter or channel jurisdiction could be quite beneficial. Measures to reduce backlogs, limit forum shopping, constrain unwarranted or overly expansive equitable relief, and expand the Court's mandatory jurisdiction are all worth considering. They also represent the sort of meaningful legislation that Congress should engage in--legislation that requires Congress to take seriously its constitutional responsibilities. (In this regard, I view the willingness to engage with jurisdictional questions in the pending infrastructure reform bill to be a welcome sign, even if I might not endorse every jurisdictional measure the bill contains.)
As Baude ends his essay, courts are not above criticism, and this includes the Supreme Court. It is nonetheless is important to distinguish between criticisms of how the Court operates and performs its job from substantive or ideological disagreement with the decisions the Court reaches.