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The Ninth Circuit Appoints Berkeley Law Dean Erwin Chemerinsky to Defend a Police Officer's Excessive Force Conviction …
... and also allows victim's attorney Caree Harper and me to defend the conviction.
I've previously blogged about the Justice Department's effort to vacate a LA County sheriff's deputy's federal civil rights conviction for using excessive force. After District Judge Wilson of the Central District of California rejected that effort to vacate, both the officer and the Justice Department appealed. And yesterday, the Ninth Circuit appointed UC Berkeley Law Dean Erwin Chemerinsky to defend the judgment below—while also allowing me and co-counsel Caree Harper to file an amicus brief on behalf of the victim supporting the judgment below. The Ninth Circuit's order sets up judicial review of the important issue of whether federal prosecutors have unconstrained power to dismiss federal charges at any time for any reason.
I've previously described the facts of the case, involving a police officer's take-down of bystander, J.H. When she began recording the officer making an arrest on her phone, the officer responded by slamming her to the ground and pepper spraying her. You can see for yourself: the relevant events were captured on video. The Justice Department filed a civil rights charge against the officer and, following a jury trial in February, he was convicted. But later Judge Wilson rejected the Department's request for a probationary sentence as too lenient. Instead, he imposed a four-month prison sentence, in light of the officer's clear betrayal of the public trust. Unhappy with that sentence, the Department then moved to dismiss the entire case under Fed. R. Crim. P. 48(a). On behalf of J.H., Ms. Harper and I objected. And Judge Wilson agreed with our position, denying the the motion to dismiss:
The motion is a direct attempt to override the Court's decision to sentence Defendant to four months in prison. Indeed, after the Court rejected its request for probation and imposed a custodial sentence, the Government responded by seeking to dismiss all charges—ensuring Defendant serves no time at all. Put simply, the Government disagrees with the Court's sentencing decision and is using Rule 48(a) to erase it. It has even acknowledged that this is its reason for seeking dismissal.
Both the Justice Department and the officer (Trevor Kirk) appealed to the Ninth Circuit, challenging the Judge Wilson's refusal to allow the Department to dismiss the case. Because of the unusual procedural posture with both the appellant and appellee on the same side, no party was defending the judgment below. Ms. Harper and I moved to be appointed as an amicus to defend the judgment below. And yesterday, the Ninth Circuit granted our motion in part.
Relying on the case cited in our brief, United States v. Arpaio, 887 F.3d 979, 982 (9th Cir. 2018), the Circuit noted that an appellate court has "inherent authority to appoint disinterested counsel to represent the position taken by the United States below when the United States refuses to defend its prior position." But rather than appointing us, the Ninth Circuit appointed Erwin Chemerinsky—a well-known constitutional law scholar and Dean of Berkeley Law—to defend the judgment below as the specific Court-appointed amicus.
Presumably the Circuit was concerned that we were not "disinterested" in the judgment below. We represent the victim, who supported a prison sentence for the officer. So, at the same time as it appointed Dean Chemerinsky, the Ninth Circuit also "granted in part" our motion to be appointed amicus curiae to defend the judgment below. The Circuit allowed us to also file an appropriate amicus brief defending the judgment and sentence.
The Ninth Circuit set up a briefing schedule, under which the opening briefs by the Justice Department and Kirk—challenging the final judgment and post-judgment refusal to dismiss—are due on November 5, 2025. The answering brief by amicus curiae Dean Chemerinsky—defending the judgment and order—is due December 5, 2025. My amicus brief for crime victim J.H. is due seven days later. And then Kirk and the Government can reply.
This briefing will address the important question of whether the Government can properly move to dismiss a criminal case—even after the trial judge has imposed a prison sentence. In the district court, the Government advanced the breathtakingly sweeping claim that the public interest is "what the government says is the public interest in this courtroom." Judge Wilson responded: "The Government is wrong—at this stage, it does not have unbounded discretion to dismiss cases. The history of Rule 48(a) makes that clear." Judge Wilson then recounted that, under Rule 48(a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, a "leave of court" requirement was imposed for any prosecutor motion to dismiss charges specifically to ensure that the public interest—as determined by a judge—is protected.
Under the Ninth Circuit's order, Dean Chemerinsky as well as Ms. Harper and I will file briefs defending Judge Wilson's decision in December. The issues are important. If the Justice Department prevails, it will have the power to dismiss not only the charge in this case but more broadly any criminal charge whenever it disagrees with the trial judge's sentence. That would dramatically shift sentencing power away from the Judicial Branch to the Executive. I look forward to joining Dean Chemerinsky and explaining why, in cases like this one, judges have an appropriate role to play in reviewing motions to dismiss and ensuring that the public interest is protected.
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IANAL. This is not clear. Is it the defense position that the government cannot dismiss charges once sentenced, but could at any prior point? Or to put it another way, at what point can the government no longer dismiss the charges -- when both sides rest their case, before the jury starts playing their role, before the jury decides, ...?
The defense position? I think you're confused as to the parties. Prof. Cassell's position (I believe) and the judge's position is that the government cannot dismiss charges after the sentence solely because it is unhappy about the sentence.
Yes, I am confused.
Seems that both Chemerinsky and Cassell+Harper are defending the judgment below.
So as I asked, at what point do they contend is the point of no return, the point at which it becomes wrong / unethical / illegal for the prosecution to dismiss charges?
Yes. They are not the defense. They are on the side of the prosecution. (Although the US Attorney himself no longer is.) The defense is the cop.
Well, it's never "illegal," but the prosecution can't actually dismiss charges at all; it can only ask the court to do so. But they contend that the reason for the request to dismiss, not the timing, is what makes it wrong or not. (However, the timing affects the practicality of the issue; the court can't force the prosecutor to prosecute, so — except in cases of contempt, when the court can sometimes appoint a prosecutor — if there are still steps for the prosecutor to undertake, then the dismissal will stand regardless of its propriety.)
Judge Wilson considered the facts of the case as he had them. Specifically, he imposed a prison sentence. And then, thereafter, the Government moved to dismiss. On that fact pattern, he concluded that the Government's dismissal motion was an improper attempt by the Government to control the sentencing.
Denying the federal prosecutor the option to avoid a politically disagreeable sentencing adjudication through a voluntary dismissal does not leave the federal prosecutor without recourse. The federal prosecutor's ultimate boss---the President of the United States ---has the constitutional authority to pardon the convicted party (or to commute the politically disagreeable sentence).
That is so, which demonstrates why Prof. Cassell's position is ultimately just a colossal waste of everyone's time. The decision to bring a prosecution (or dismiss one) is an executive function, not a judicial one. A conviction is not "final" until all appeals are exhausted (or the time to file one has passed). Until then, the executive can drop one at any time. A judge can't force the executive to pursue a prosecution it does not wish to pursue. To allow such a thing would be a grotesque violation of the separation of powers, something Cassell professes to champion. If the Rule 48(a) "leave of court" requirement has the broad construction he would give it, then it is unconstitutional.
This never should have been a federal case (notably, there have been no state charges), but some BLM activists and the usual anti-law enforcement suspects started caterwauling, so the Biden Justice Department, ever political, decided to give them a sacrificial lamb. Deputy Kirk will not spend any time in prison. As you note, should this ruling hold up (which I doubt), Trump will very probably either commute his sentence and/or pardon him outright.
Wolf coming out in favor of police brutality, by inventing yet another Trump-can-do-whatever-he-wants claim with no actual textual basis in any law or constitutional provision.
I see it exactly the opposite way. The existence of the pardon is the great salve that washes away the supposed harms to the executive of Prof. Cassell's position. But, and this is the important part, the executive doesn't get the shadow pardon people. If they want to pardon people, they need to actually do it.
My hope is CA / LA County have an indictment ready at hand in case the DOJ succeeds in its bid to erase even the minimal justice dispensed by Judge Wilson.
Correct me if I’m wrong, but the state or LA County pursuing charges against Kirk would not be double jeopardy per SC precedent.
And not susceptible to Presidential pardon.
You are correct, but local politics typically makes the localprosecution of cops unlikely. (I mean, as a general rule; I'm not saying there's something special about LA politics.)
The President has to expend political capital to pardon a convicted criminal, especially in a controversial case like this involving a person in authority who callously assaulted a sympathetic and relatable member of the public. Not everybody is going to agree with such a decision. Political difficulty runs the other way too.
Having the courts quietly do the job for him would avoid expending that capital.
There is absolutely a difference between the two paths. If the President wants to override the decision of the courts once decided, he needs to take responsibility for doing so and do so himself, in his own name.
Except that pardons may have their own political implications. Pardoning a convicted felon looks worse than dismissing a case before judgment is entered.
[I see ReaderY made more or less the same point.]
"Because of the unusual procedural posture with both the appellant and appellee on the same side..."
Sounds like there is no case or controversy.
Yep. I've never liked courts appointing amici in this scenario. What we have here is a case of agreement all around. Let the parties do what they want. Don't create an argument where there is none.
My understanding is that the case or controversy requirement does not apply to criminal cases in the way you are thinking. In fact, I'm not sure it applies at all.
Yeah, I think that pushing back against what I said earlier, the court would say that this is unlike a civil case that you want it to settle or a criminal case where you want charges dismissed.
Here you have an entered conviction. It would require the judgment of a court to overturn that conviction. Well, it's nice that you all agree and stuff but the court isn't just going to order stuff because you want it. It has to do what's in the interests of justice.
So, if you take the "no case or controversy" line, the court will happily dismiss the appeal and leave the conviction standing. But that's not what either party wants.
I will never forgive Erwin Chemerinsky for his con law book we had to read in law school.
Why? I actually took Con Law I from Prof. Chemerinsky (but not at USC, go figure). I remember him as a quality lecturer, who -- unlike others that I will only curse privately and not name -- generally managed to keep his politics out of the classroom.
There are links to lots of things. But there doesn’t seem to be a link to the 9th Circuit’s order.
It was basically a text order - I quoted the one substantive sentence in the post.
What a fucking grifter: Like Erwin Chemerinsky himself is really going to write that brief
“Unhappy with that sentence, the Department then moved to dismiss the entire case under Fed. R. Crim. P. 48(a).”
Non-lawyer question: Does anyone know WHY the government was unhappy with that sentence? Skipping the legalese part, what possible reason would the government WANT people to be slammed to the ground and pepper sprayed for recording an interaction?
Perhaps the government disagrees with your characterization of the events.
Because it doesn’t want people to think they can talk back to the muscle with impunity. Nor does it want inconvenient witnesses or bystanders trying to interfere when the muscle does the nasty.
Oh, we are still pretending she was merely a bystander?
You can pretend whatever you want. But both a federal judge and a federal jury found she was.
What is unclear about, "With leave of court"?
"Presumably the Circuit was concerned that we were not "disinterested" in the judgment below. We represent the victim, who supported a prison sentence for the officer."
And you honestly don't consider that a conflict of interest?