Today in Supreme Court History: April 3, 1962

4/3/1962: Engel v. Vitale argued.

Comments

[Dan Schiavetta]

Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (decided April 3, 1944): political party (here, Texas Democratic Party) is a “state actor” and liable under the Fifteenth Amendment and §1983 (actually its predecessor statute) for refusing to let black man vote in primary election

United States v. “Old Settlers”, 148 U.S. 427 (decided April 3, 1893): 1889 Act of Congress revived Cherokee claim under 1846 Treaty for reimbursement for taking their land; Court affirms calculation of amount

Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475 (decided April 3, 1978): trial judge improperly refused request by attorney for three rape defendants for separate counsel due to conflict of interest between defendants; convictions vacated

Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (decided April 3, 1972): unwed father of three children entitled to hearing as to his suitability as a parent after mother died; statute automatically making children wards of the state violated Equal Protection

Chapman v. United States, 365 U.S. 610 (decided April 3, 1961): consent of owner (who smelled mash) in tenant’s absence was not sufficient for warrantless search for illegal still (police found 1300 gallons of mash)

Oklahoma Tax Comm’n v. Jefferson Lines, Inc., 514 U.S. 175 (decided April 3, 1995): state sales tax on bus ticket to out of state did not violate Dormant Commerce Clause

Darr v. Burford, 339 U.S. 200 (decided April 3, 1950): must exhaust state court remedies before applying for habeas corpus (overruled by Fay v. Noia, 1963, which itself was overruled by Wainwright v. Sykes, 1977)

Collector v. Day, 78 U.S. 113 (decided April 3, 1871): federal government can’t tax income of state officials (here, a state judge) (overruled by Graves v. New York, 1939; state can tax federal official)

Vilas v. City of Manila, 220 U.S. 345 (decided April 3, 1911): City of Manila (Philippines was an American territory then) is liable for debts incurred during Spanish colonial era

City of Dallas v. Stanglin, 490 U.S. 19 (decided April 3, 1989): “teen disco” (limited to kids ages 14 - 18) did not violate teenagers’ right to associate (what? you mean I can’t bring in my 37-year-old boyfriend to meet my best buds??)

[JoeFromtheBronx]

In Stanley v. Illinois, "the interest of a parent in the companionship, care, custody, and management of his or her children" is cited as being protected in past opinions on grounds of due process, equal protection, and the Ninth Amendment.

City of Dallas v. Stanglin did not consider dance halls as involving protected associational rights given the size and the lack of intimacy (as compared to a single couple on a date).

Stevens (with Blackmun) concurred in judgment, recognizing "opportunity to make friends and enjoy the company of other people" is a protected liberty, but that the regulations were acceptable. I think that is a better approach. Dance halls do have a 1A aspect.

[SMP0328]

Darr v. Burford, 339 U.S. 200 (decided April 3, 1950): must exhaust state court remedies before applying for habeas corpus (overruled by Fay v. Noia, 1963, which itself was overruled by Wainwright v. Sykes, 1977)

Did Wainwright simply restore Darr or did it do something different from both earlier cases?

[apedad]

Re: Chapman v. United States (1961)

I wonder if United States v. Johns, 469 U.S. 478 (1985) overturns Chapman since here, "After the officers came closer and detected the distinct odor of marihuana, they had probable cause to believe that the vehicles contained contraband. See Carroll v. United States, 267 U. S. 132, 267 U. S. 149, 267 U. S. 162 (1925). Given their experience with drug smuggling cases, the officers no doubt suspected that the scent was emanating from the packages that they observed in the back of the pickup trucks."

And in Chapman, "They (cops) too smelled, as the Court says, 'a strong odor of "whiskey mash" coming from the house.'"

https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/469/478/

[Dan Schiavetta]

Searches into cars, I think, do not require a warrant, for obvious reasons.

See my comment for Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10 (decided February 2, 1948): Officer smelled opium smoke, knocked, she opened the door, and they arrested her. The Court holds that a warrant (which they point out would have been granted) was required. (There’s a “plain view” doctrine, but apparently no “plain smell” doctrine.)

Would a teetotalling police officer -- who doesn't know the smell of mash -- would be kept on desk duty?

(Actually, I don't know the smell of mash, either, except for Jack Daniels No. 7, the smell of which still makes me nauseous after I got really sick on it on the day before Thanksgiving, 1981.)

[apedad]

Thanks - and I haven't drank vodka since May 1980.

[John F. Carr]

After Massachusetts decriminalized marijuana the Supreme Judicial Court said police could not use the smell of marijuana to justify a search. Not even a strong smell. Not unburned. Not burned. No. Stop asking. Don't you have real crime to solve?

A conservative court could have allowed police to hassle people who smelled funny. A few years later marijuana was mostly legalized and even a conservative court would have a hard time.

[Noscitur a sociis]

I wonder if United States v. Johns, 469 U.S. 478 (1985) overturns Chapman since here, "After the officers came closer and detected the distinct odor of marihuana, they had probable cause to believe that the vehicles contained contraband. See Carroll v. United States, 267 U. S. 132, 267 U. S. 149, 267 U. S. 162 (1925). Given their experience with drug smuggling cases, the officers no doubt suspected that the scent was emanating from the packages that they observed in the back of the pickup trucks."

No. Under the Carroll case you cited, police can search vehicles without a warrant if they have probable cause. That’s the distinction.

[A Japanese Student]

I did not post yesterday (as I was busy), but turns out it was a good decision: the case was also related to separation of church and state. Here's a detailed case history.

Ehime Prefecture Yasukuni Shrine Tamagushi Case (Grand Bench, decided April 2, 1997) was the first time the Supreme Court declared official acts unconstitutional for violating the principle. The Governor of Ehime Prefecture, using public funds, paid "tamagushi fees" (contributions made as part of Shinto rituals) to Yasukuni Shrine - the shrine, established by the Emperor, that honors those who were killed (or executed for war crimes) in the World War II. This, according to the Court, was unconstitutional.

How did this dispute come to the Court? (After all, standing is the major obstacle to these suits in the US.) Japan allows residents of local governments to file a taxpayer suit for unlawful expenditure. (The law now requires them to seek audits first; this was not required before 2002.) They can seek declaratory and injunctive relief, as well as ordering the official (here, the Governor) to re-pay the amounts already spent.

In an earlier precedent, the Court adopted the first two prongs of Lemon - an act violates separation of church and state if it has a religious purpose and has the effect of promoting or interfering with exercise of religion. (It's been seemingly abandoned in 2010 in favor of multi-factor balancing test, which the Court loves.) It was obvious that making contributions to a shrine for religious rituals was unconstitutional under the test.

The defendant argued that it had a secular purpose of honoring those killed in action, but this argument was rejected. The Court highlighted that the Governor contributed to this specific shrine - the Yasukuni Shrine (and its branch, Ehime Gokoku Shrine) - and not to other shrines or churches. And the pre-WWII entanglement between Shinto and the political branches was the reason Japan adopted strict separation of church and state.

[JoeFromtheBronx]

Engel v. Vitale involved a prayer crafted to be read at the start of each public school day:

Almighty God, we acknowledge our dependence upon Thee, and we beg Thy blessings upon us, our parents, our teachers and our country. Amen.

This was supposed to be a benign "non-denominational" prayer, which is simply impossible. There are always going to be some sectarian choices. Jesus in the gospels also talked about prayer in private. This seems to violate his dictates.

Justice Stewart dissented because students were not required to take part. The very fact the state crafted the prayer is a problem. Also, once you have them, there will be pressure to conform.

A common approach, used by Stewart, is to quote public statements honoring God. This is confusion. A personal presidential statement is not an official prayer that is officially made part of the school day.

A footnote in the Court's opinion said that "singing officially espoused anthems which include the composer's professions of faith in a Supreme Being" is acceptable. Also, "manifestations in our public life of belief in God" alone is not a problem.

The lower courts generally have upheld saying "under God" in the Pledge which was seen as a benign patriotic statement. Originally, that phrase was not included. It was added during the 1950s as an answer to communist atheism.

It is not a prayer akin to Engel but on principle I would argue it is problematic. Likewise, "In God We Trust." Even Scalia acknowledged that "In Jesus We Trust" would have been a problem. Establishment of deism counts.

[David Nieporent]

"Ceremonial deism."

[JoeFromtheBronx]

Ceremonial establishment.

[Magister]

Roger Zelazny authored a totally nondenominational prayer only a few years after this case.

[Dan Schiavetta]

Thanks (looked it up).

[JoeFromtheBronx]

Looking it up, the very opening ("Insofar as I may be heard by anything") is problematic. Anything. Many prayers are to persons.

[not guilty]

Quite apart from legal issues, I have long doubted the bona fides of self-proclaimed "Christians" (such as former Coach Joe Kennedy) who make a spectacle of public prayers. I prefer to heed the admonitions of Jesus:

"Beware of practicing your piety before men in order to be seen by them; for then you will have no reward from your Father who is in heaven." Matthew 6:1.

"And when you pray, you must not be like the hypocrites; for they love to stand and pray in the synagogues and at the street corners, that they may be seen by men. Truly, I say to you, they have received their reward. But when you pray, go into your room and shut the door and pray to your Father who is in secret; and your Father who sees in secret will reward you." Matthew 6:5-6.

"Woe unto you, scribes and Pharisees, hypocrites! for ye devour widows' houses, and for a pretence make long prayer: therefore ye shall receive the greater damnation." Matthew 23:14.

[Dan Schiavetta]

Odd how many self-proclaimed Christians don't pay much attention to the teachings of Jesus on ethics. Probably because they don't believe in them.

[A Japanese Student]

Injury Case (First Petty Bench, decided April 3, 1975): May use reasonable force during citizens' arrest; chasing a vessel for three hours on request from another vessel witnessing poaching of abalone constitutes citizens' arrest; assault conviction reversed