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SCOTUS Denies Trump Administration Application to Stay District Court Order Blocking Pause of USAID Payments; Certiorari Sure to Follow
A pre-opinion release order divides the justices 5-4, but this may not preview the split on the merits.
This morning, the Supreme Court denied the Trump Administration's application for a stay of a district court's temporary restraining order blocking the Administration's effort to pause the disbursement of funds from the U.S. Agency for International Development. The unsigned order in Department of State v. AIDS Vaccine Advocacy Coalition directs the district court to "clarify what obligations the Government must fulfill to ensure compliance with the temporary restraining order, with due regard for the feasibility of any compliance timelines." This likely means that the approximately $2 billion in funds "owed for work already completed" before entry of the court's TRO must be paid out.
While the order is unsigned, it is clear that it was joined by the Chief Justice and the four female justices (Sotomayor, Kagan, Barrett and Jackson). Justice Alito dissented, joined by Justices Thomas, Gorsuch, and Kavanaugh. The dissent begins:
Does a single district-court judge who likely lacks jurisdiction have the unchecked power to compel the Government of the United States to pay out (and probably lose forever) 2 billion taxpayer dollars? The answer to that question should be an emphatic "No," but a majority of this Court apparently thinks otherwise. I am stunned.
Justice Alito's dissent argues, among other things, that "the District Court's enforcement order should be construed as an appealable preliminary injunction, not a mere TRO." It further argues that the Trump Administration is likely to prevail on the merits on grounds of federal sovereign immunity (because the plaintiffs are seeking to force the disbursement of funds from the federal treasury). The dissenters seem unconvinced that the Administrative Procedure Act waives sovereign immunity for these purposes. This does not mean those who believe they are owed money by USAID have no remedy, just that they have to pursue such claims in the Court of Federal Claims instead of a federal district court.
The brief dissent concludes:
Today, the Court makes a most unfortunate misstep that rewards an act of judicial hubris and imposes a $2 billion penalty on American taxpayers. The District Court has made plain its frustration with the Government, and respondents raise serious concerns about nonpayment for completed work. But the relief ordered is, quite simply, too extreme a response. A federal court has many tools to address a party's supposed nonfeasance. Self-aggrandizement of its jurisdiction is not one of them. I would chart a different path than the Court does today, so I must respectfully dissent.
This is far from the end of the case. Indeed, since four justices dissented here, it is abundantly clear that there will be four votes for certiorari once the Department of Justice files a petition. In other words, stay tuned.
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If the other five justices say they will rule against the government the four dissenters may not vote for certiorari.
I am as sympathetic as anyone to arguments that the Trump administration's efforts to rein in spending are often overreaching, unwise and even illegal.
However, the notion that a court can issue a TRO compelling money to be paid under a contract stands the whole notion of a TRO on its head.
The point of a TRO is to STOP someone from doing something that would otherwise likely be irreversible.
So under certain circumstances, it would be appropriate to enter a TRO preventing the payment of money under a contract, but not the other way around.
And when the harm can be redressed with money, it's not normally considered "irreversible", so a TRO forcing payment should normally be a non-starter in any case.
Except the harm probably is irreversible. This isn't some good faith payment dispute. This is the government purposely not paying on contracts to try and put organizations out of business. No one actually believes they're doing a review of anything or have any articulable fraud concerns.
And you know this, how?
Literally talk to anyone involved? What issues has the government identified? It's been weeks of "reviews." What has come of them?
You think it's a good faith assertion that it takes weeks to review each of the billions of payments the government makes per year? Has any evidence of impropriety been asserted? These payments could be made without delay up until the beginning of February, why the sudden issue?
Which generally makes no difference. There is no irreparable harm. In a private dispute, there would never be a TRO or PI in such a situation. Court would say, sue for breach of contract, and seek money damages.
The problem with the TRO here is that gives the plaintiff full merits recovery without bothering with a trial or the opportunity for an appeal. With this TRO, there is no reason to have a trial. The plaintiff has already won.
On a preliminary injunction, you could plausibly order a contracting party to continue to make payments under a disputed contract but that would be immediately appealable and subject to stay pending the appeal. Even then, the equities weigh strongly against it.
The merits aren't 100% clear here. The government has the ability to cancel contracts and most federal contracts have provisions allowing the government to cancel them for various reasons and the counter parties have various rights of recourse. I'd expect this to be particularly true in the context of foreign policy where the executive is given large deference. It seems likely that a great number of the contracts that fall into the $2B payment are cancelable in the ordinary course.
Standing is another huge problem here. A group of contractors cannot simply act for other contractors. A contractor can complain about its contract but not someone else's.
This fleshes out nicely what I was too lazy to write earlier.
These include contracts for emergency activity to prevent people from dying.
The district court also has a significant jurisdictional problem, something that Judge Ali will have to cope with, as Judge Ali's court is probably the wrong place to request relief like the plaintiffs are asking.
Unfortunately, based on his actions up until today he may play games to keep this case alive as long as possible.
Your premise is that a TRO can stop someone from doing something, but it can't stop them from stopping doing something? I'm not sure why there would be such an asymmetry. A TRO ought to be able to temporarily preserve the status quo ex ante.
Because when you order someone to do something, at least in this case, you are not preserving the status quo, you are changing it.
In this case, there is no doubt that the Govt will have the $2 billion to satisfy its legal obligations when and if a legitimate judgement is rendered.
Plaintiff's claiming (truthfully or not) "I really need/want my money now" is not grounds for emergency relief.
Because when you order someone to do something, at least in this case, you are not preserving the status quo, you are changing it.
Although IANAL, I am sea lawyer enough tfor this. The "status quo" that is being preserved is not the location of the money, it is the government apparat's last order prior to the "unlawful" latest order to "hold those payments."
Thus imagine yourself at sea :
1. an enemy ship is sighted
2. the captain orders "open fire !"
3. before anyone has time to fire, the lookout shouts "hold on, it's not an enemy, it's our own flagship !"
4. the captain says "hold your fire !"
At this point, the court steps in and says "the order to hold your fire !" appears to be unlawful. We must preserve the status quo prior to this apparently unlawful order. The status quo was that the captain had given the lawful order to fire and he cannot now lawfully countermand it (probably, though I'm not actually deciding the actual merits here.) You must fire ! Now !
Thus shooting cannonballs at your own flagship, even though this occurs in the future, relative to the court's order, are legally part of the status quo ante.
SCOTUS seems to buy into this anaysis. So maybe I'm a real lawyer after all.
The law recognizes the difference between a mandatory and prohibitory injunction. The former requires someone to do something, the latter prohibits. Both are allowed, but courts require a higher showing for the former.
The mandatory/prohibitory dichotomy makes no sense and most courts give lip service to the difference but actually look at two issues. (1) Would an injunction preserve the status quo ante, i.e., the last peaceable position before the present dispute? Here that is the government complying with its contracts. (2) Would an injunction largely give the movant what it seeks in the case prior to trial? Here, the TRO does so. It awards the plaintiffs with full contractual damages for money owed on their contracts.
An injunction can issue where it would give the plaintiff what it seeks but it requires a very high showing of both likelihood of prevailing and irreparable harm. Irreparable harm appears to be lacking here.
Well nothing will happen immediately. This goes back to the district court to "clarify what obligations the Government must fulfill to ensure compliance with the temporary restraining order, with due
regard for the feasibility of any compliance timelines." So this hack of a judge must make some further determinations, and he'll overreach again. Then another appeal. Maybe even Roberts will have had enough of these antics by then. The little USAID NGOs better hold off on their Amazon checkout.
I dont understand this sentence: "The present application does not challenge the Government’s obligation to follow that order."
What? Isnt that exactly what the application challenged? Is the SC telegraphing to the SG that they didn't make the correct argument?
American law allows judges to punish violations of court orders that never should have been given. The limits of this power are at times unclear. See Walker v. Birmingham (related to an incident where Martin Luther King was jailed for violating a court order against a public demonstration).
I dont know how that relates to the sentence i highlighted in the order
The DOJ did not appeal Judge Ali's order directly. The DOJ only appealed the order that the payments had to be made by Feb 26th.
Inside-baseball folks are saying that this was intentional by the DOJ because you can't appeal a TRO. However, Judge Ali's order left some wiggle room on whether statutes/contractual terms allowed a delay in making payments which gave SCOTUS cause to step in to force the district court to clarify its order.
"In other words, stay tuned."
Or...the govt could simply meet its legal obligations.
You can't simply stop making blanket payments to otherwise legal claims.
If there's an allegation of fraud for a particular claim then GOOD! go after that with all the law enforcement tools available.
But not a blanket stoppage.
"You can't simply stop making blanket payments to otherwise legal claims."
Happens all the time in the private sector.
Mostly by Donald Trump.
Ah, but that's the question: what is legal? Lawyers created this messy system where legality is seldom known until a court says something, and even then some other court can change it later.
So deal with it as courts do, not as you wish the outcome would be.
It seems to me most unlikely that if the merits are ever reached, the SCOTUS 5 will do anything other than confirm that it was correct that the $2 billion was paid out. It would be way too embarrassing to fess up to a $2 billion "my bad."
However they reach that conclusion, that'll be the conclusion they reach.
From the per curiam order:
"On February 25, the District Court ordered the Government to issue payments for a portion of the paused disbursements—those owed for work already completed before the issuance of the District Court’s temporary restraining order—by 11:59 p.m. on February 26."
Ah, the outrageousness of requiring the issue of payments for work completed [I acknowledge Trump's precedent in finding that bad form] arising from congressionally authorized funding.
BTW, will we have a separate post about Trump's engagement with the justices last night, including Kennedy/Trump chatting a bit & Trump thanking Roberts for services rendered?
There's something I don't understand about this (and I really mean I don't understand it - I'm not trying to snarkily make a point). Defenders of the TRO have argued that such drastic relief is necessary because at least some of the payments are for urgent medical care, e.g., AIDS medication. But the District Judge's order, and your comment, says all payments are for work already completed. So if the work was already completed, and the case is really just about whether the government can stiff service providers for work already performed (or make them go to the Court of Federal Claims to get their money), how is the TRO necessary to ensure patients get their medicine?
This is insane. A stamp of imprimatur to this gross judicial overreach will not, in the end, inure to the benefit of the Court. One can only hope this judicial usurpation will ultimately be a catalyst for some sort of judicial reform. If not, we’re headed for a big constitutional crisis/confrontation.
A preview of the Blackman tantrum.
A continued reminder of how far your eloquence stretches.
Blackman's will be longer, politer, but considerably more flabby.
I wasn't polite?
'Ah, the outrageousness of requiring the issue of payments for work completed [I acknowledge Trump's precedent in finding that bad form] arising from congressionally authorized funding."
The merits are not outrageous (on their face), but the process is.
As the esteemed Judge Chamberlain Haller said in a slightly different context:
"Once again, the communication process has broken down. It appears to me that you want to skip the arraignment process, go directly to trial, skip that, and get a dismissal. Well, I'm not about to revamp the entire judicial process just because you find yourself in the unique position of defending clients who say they didn't do it"
[meant as a response to JFtB]
A somewhat incomplete summary of the process so far.
Grouping the “four female justices” together in a case with no specific bearing on sex seems a little… I don’t know. Tacky? Not trying to go cancel culture on you, but I’m guessing you wouldn’t group the five Catholic judges in a case that had nothing to do with religion.
More pertinent to say Roberts and Barrett joined the liberals (who are all women), I would think.
Women are inherently emotional. Not a surprise here. Hopefully Trump doesn't defer to FedSoc for any future judges
As compared to men, who are invariably creatures of cool and careful reasoning.
Compared to women, they certainly are.
What percent of the J6 insurrectionists were male vs. female?
Yeah, you have to admit there are a *few* men who aren’t totally level-headed. Thousands of robberies, rapes, and murders rapes occur every year and at least a couple of them are committed by men.
Hell, I’ve even heard that some serial killers are male!
All 8 of them?
Seemed obtrusive to me, too.
How many divisions does Roberts have?
It's clear that the lower courts should not be allowed to rule on anything Trump does. SCOTUS should take original jurisdiction on every one, especially if the lower court judges were appointed by the Arkansas trailer trash, the senile Catholic pedophile, or the half-African traitor.
At any rate, any lower court effort to enjoin the entire government should be automatically stayed and referred to the Supreme court. It simply IS absurd that one solitary low level officer of 'the least dangerous branch' is allowed to order about an entire branch of government.
Heck, Presidents scarcely have that much power over their OWN branch of government!
"Ordering about" = "telling the Executive to comply with the law". ZOMG
This is such a bad faith argument. First you guys argue that the entire executive branch is all actually one person, but then you portray it as some multitude that a judge shouldn't be able to issue binding rulings against.
And the judicial power is vested in that "one solitary low level officer."
Oh, and for the record, the TRO does not in fact "order about an entire branch of government." It is directed to Marco Rubio, Peter Marocco, Russell Vought, the Sate Department, USAID, and OMB. That is considerably less than the entire executive branch.
I'm not quite seeing the consistency when federal judges ordered past Democratic Administrations to do things.
If only it was constitutionally permissible. What would the jurisdiction be? Maybe if the plaintiff was an ambassador, but not here.
Who cares what's constitutionally permissible? We're beyond that.
Steve Vladeck parsed the ruling, which as he notes, involves many moving parts.
https://substack.com/inbox/post/158444348
And you know this, how?
"Does a single district-court judge who likely lacks jurisdiction have the unchecked power to compel the Government of the United States to pay out (and probably lose forever) 2 billion taxpayer dollars? The answer to that question should be an emphatic "No," but a majority of this Court apparently thinks otherwise."
-Alito, J.
This is a ham-handed attempt at reframing. The question is whether Congress has that authority. If it does, then the district judge is simply doing a district judge's job. (I recognize the procedural issues at play--but that's not what Alito is attacking in his sentence.)
Also intrigued by his ending there: "The answer to that question should be an emphatic 'No.'" Is Alito purporting to tell us what the law *is*, or what the law "should be"?
I don't much care to hear in this setting what a single associate justice thinks the law "should be." But he chose his words carefully, because he knows he was doing exactly what you described -- reframing ham-handedly.
I agree. The prospective "should" is normative, but often used descriptively.
Side note: "expect" is my favorite deposition word. "What did you expect Mr. Jones to do with that information?" is technically ambiguous. It might be asking the deponent to predict (retroactively) Mr. Jones' behavior, but it's easy to argue the question asks what the deponent believed Mr. Jones was obligated to do.
An Article III court cannot compel the payment of money, Alito? GTFO.