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DC Circuit Finds Some FINRA Authority Violates Private Nondelegation Doctrine
The private nondelegation doctrine is getting an increasing amount of attention from the courts.
On Friday--the same day the Supreme Court granted certiorari in a case raising the private nondelegation doctrine--the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit concluded that at least some of the authority wielded by the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA), without adequate federal oversight, violates the private nondelegation doctrine.
Judge Millett wrote the 41-page opinion for the panel in Alpine Securities Corp. v. FINRA, joined by Chief Judge Srinivasan. Judge Walker concurred in the judgment in part and dissented in part, as he would have looked favorably on more of the challenge to FINRA than the majority.
Judge Millett summarized the case and the court's conclusions as follows:
The United States securities industry is regulated by both private entities and the federal government. These private regulators, referred to as self-regulatory organizations, date back centuries to when groups of securities traders adopted self-governing rules by which they would conduct business and ensure public trust in their operations.
Today, a private corporation, the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority ("FINRA"), regulates and oversees large parts of the securities industry. Congress, however, has overlain federal law on those private self-regulatory practices. As relevant here, federal law effectively requires most firms and individuals that trade securities to join FINRA as a condition of engaging in that business. Federal law, in turn, subjects FINRA to oversight by the Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC") and requires that FINRA ensure that its members comply both with FINRA's own rules and with federal securities laws.
In 2022, FINRA sanctioned one of its members, Alpine Securities Corporation, for violating FINRA's private rules for member behavior and imposed a cease-and-desist order against Alpine. Alpine then sued in federal court, challenging FINRA's constitutionality.
While that lawsuit was pending, FINRA concluded that Alpine had violated the cease-and-desist order and initiated an expedited proceeding to expel Alpine from membership in FINRA. Alpine then sought a preliminary injunction from the district court against the expedited proceeding, arguing that FINRA is unconstitutional because its expedited action against Alpine violates either the private nondelegation doctrine or the Appointments Clause. The district court denied the preliminary injunction.
We now reverse only to the extent the district court allowed FINRA to expel Alpine with no opportunity for SEC review. Alpine is entitled to that limited preliminary injunction because it has demonstrated that it faces irreparable harm if expelled from FINRA and the entire securities industry before the SEC reviews the merits of FINRA's decision. Alpine has also demonstrated a likelihood of success on its argument that the lack of governmental review prior to expulsion violates the private nondelegation doctrine. We accordingly hold that FINRA may not expel Alpine either before Alpine has obtained full review by the SEC of the merits of any expulsion decision or before the period for Alpine to seek such review has elapsed.
At the same time, we hold that Alpine has not demonstrated that it will suffer irreparable harm from participating in the expedited proceeding itself as long as FINRA cannot expel Alpine until after the SEC conducts its own review. For that reason, Alpine has not shown that it is entitled to a preliminary injunction halting that proceeding altogether.
As this case comes to us in a preliminary-injunction posture, we necessarily do not resolve the ultimate merits of any of Alpine's constitutional challenges, and our determination about Alpine's likelihood of success on the private nondelegation issue is based only on the early record in this case. We leave it to the district court on remand to determine the ultimate merits of Alpine's claims.
Judge Walker's 29-page opinion concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part begins:
Article II of the Constitution begins, "The executive Power shall be vested in a President of the United States of America." That means private citizens cannot wield significant executive authority. Nor can anyone in the government, except for the President and the executive officers appointed and removable consistent with Article II.
The Financial Industry Regulatory Authority is a nominally private corporation. It investigates, prosecutes, and adjudicates violations of federal securities laws. Those laws generally forbid broker-dealers from doing business unless they belong to FINRA.
Today, the majority holds that the Constitution likely requires government review before FINRA may expel a company from its ranks and thereby put that company out of business. That holding is a victory for the Constitution.
But it is only a partial victory because the problems with FINRA's enforcement proceedings run even deeper. FINRA wields significant executive authority when it investigates, prosecutes, and initially adjudicates allegations against a company required by law to put itself at FINRA's mercy. That type of executive power can be exercised only by the President (accountable to the nation) and his executive officers
(accountable to him).By flouting that principle through an "illegitimate proceeding, led by an illegitimate decisionmaker," FINRA imposes an irreparable injury that this court should prevent by granting the requested preliminary injunction in its entirety.
I respectfully dissent from the majority's decision to deny that relief.
I am quite sure Alpine Securities will file a petition for certiorari. The question is whether FINRA will do the same (or whether it will file a petition for rehearing en banc).
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That type of executive power can be exercised only by the President (accountable to the nation) and his executive officers
(accountable to him).
This is ipse dixit.
I'm all for an explicit doctrine for nondelegation. Have been since I took admin in law school and the section on nondelegation basically said 'it's a thing. We know nothing more yet.'
What I'm not for is yet another shapeless magic words thing that courts can namecheck to strike down government action for not passing a vibe check.
Think of it as the “improper animus” of Trump Law and Homo marriage case law.
FINRA isn’t “government action”, though. It’s a private corporation.
1. Animus isn’t a currently an operable doctrine outside of Establishment.
2. Animus has contours – it requires specific evidence to show a particular thing.
3. This case is a court striking down government action.
I know you've said you're a proud shitposter who doesn't even try to make their posts consistent or logical, but this is a pretty poor showing.
“This is ipse dixit.”
Who is this ipse of whom you speak ? The dixit is here :
The executive power shall be vested in a President of the United States of America.
And it was not Judge Walker who made these words up. Nor are they “shapeless magic words” – they’re pretty clear words. So the question is where, in the Constitution, is the exception that says this or that part of the federal executive power may be vested in somebody else, beyond the power of the President to exercise it himself or to direct the exercise of it ?
What words say this ? And where are they written ?
The ipse dixit is that this this power is not delegable.
I fully believe that some stuff is outside that bounds, but there needs to be some logic, not just 'this is out of bounds.' That's the ipse dixit.
What are the contours of what is delegable and what is not? There is no guidepost at all.
But the sentence to which you object EXPLICITLY recognises that the President’s executive powers can be delegated to duly appointed officers under his control.
Admittedly the constitution doesn’t say explicitly that the President can delegate to executive officers, but since it does set out a whole procedure for their appointment, it would be perverse to assume that they can only be used as decorations and can’t have actual executive tasks delegated to them.
But there’s nothing in the Constitution about delegating to Walmart, nor anything about anyone exercising executive powers who hasn’t been through the constitutional appointment process.
Nondelegation is about Congress, not the President.
As I see DMN below noted as well.
There’s nothing in the Constitution about delegating to Walmart
The legislative power in determining how to execute a law is pretty broad, I don't think 'it doesn't include walmart' obviously means Congress can't decide to include walmart.
Sasha Volokh had a post elsewhere about a different agency case that raises an interesting point. It's not the non-delegation clause that's at issue, but the appointments clause. If they have executive authority, they qualify as officers of the United States and need Presidential nomination and Senate approval.
That seems to address the issue that is at issue, so to speak. The non-delegation clause generally concerns itself over whether Congress is giving up too much of its authority. But the issue here seems to be whether Congress is giving away authority it doesn't have in the first place. If the concern is Congress is delegating a task held by the executive branch to a private entity, the solution is to require the President to nominate the people in charge. That way there's no worries about whether something is delegated that is improper to delegate.
What makes you think this is part of the executive power?
From medieval times until the industrial age guilds were a very common way to organize craft industries, and you often had to be a member of a guild to conduct a trade or husiness, giving guilds a quasi-governmental status. FINRA is essentially a guild. It’s a kind of medieval survivor.
I understand the concept of guilds makes libertarians shit in their pants. But why is it uncoonstitutional to organize society, or a particular industry, that way? There’s a rational basis for it. In most cases it would violate anti-truzt. But anti-trust is statutory, not constitutional. Congress could have a different policy if it wants.
I'm close to an anarchist and have zero problems with guilds, as long as ...
* The government doesn't mandate membership.
* The government doesn't mandate honoring them.
* They don't use coercion to self-mandate themselves.
The only problem I see here is the one reported: that the government mandates membership in FINRA yet doesn't control FINRA.
Unconstitutional? I dunno. There have been some bizarre rulings in the past. One of the best was that case granting business to certain parties, see ya later, with the cynical statement how that kind of crap was “America’s passtime”
But as with taxi medallions and angry responses to Uber disruption, the entrenched interests and their protectors in government have no problem conjuring kitchen sink lists of why it shouldn’t be disrupted.
Fundamental Theorem of Government: Corruption is not an unfortunate side effect of the wielding of power. It is its purpose from day one.
How can you get paid to get out of the way, if you can’t first get in the way?
The Republicans are easy: if it hurts business, boo! But why would the Democrats of all people be behind junk like this? The above explains it.
Yet again, your Fundamental Theorem is more simplistic ideology than anything from facts.
How's Uber doing these days? How are taxi companies doing?
Is baseball's antitrust exemption from Congress or the Court?
And what is your fundamental theorem?
Government is just a gang big enough to squelch lesser gangs, and it only has to do that well enough to keep the peasants from wanting to find better gangs.
He has two rules that form the basis of all his beliefs:
1.) The General Welfare clause is an endless grant of power to those with pure hearts.
2.) The governing class made up primarily Washington elites, Democrats and unelected bureaucrats, whom are also Democrats and Washington elites have pure hearts.
While you have certain ideas about government, others have different ideas. The Constitution does not enshrine your theority of government.
I want to make it clear that don’t in any way doubt the sincerity of your and Stupid Govenment Tricks’ belief that all government officials are corrupt thieves. Indeed I have complete faith in both of you that if either of you were to become government officials, you would both do your very best to follow and demonstrate by your example the truth of your philosophy, to the fullest.
Nonetheless, not everyone shares that philosophy.
You share the philosophy of an organization that takes 4 years, and 100s of millions of dollars to build 50 ft of bridge after a barge ran into it, will be super mega efficient at managing all your healthcare.
You also believe unaccountable, independent federal agencies or private corporations with regulatory power is properly classified as "Democracy".
In other words, a moronic philosphy.
You do realize the reason that America takes a long time to build stuff is that we need to get public buy-in and they (as in we) like a lot of safeguards?
China sure can build things fast, without needing to care about what kind of horrific externalities and deaths they gotta pay to get it done. That's not because they're less corrupt!
I love how you tip your hand with that utterly delusional premise that "America" = "Federal Government".
No. Sarcastr0. "America" and "Federal Government" are not synonyms. In fact, in it's current state they are antonyms.
The reason the people who make up the Federal Government take so long to do simple things is because they are corrupt, incompetent, generally stupid, and incentivized to not be efficient, on time, or otherwise helpful to the American Citizen.
I don't think government employees are thieves by nature, although I do think government power attracts unsavory people.
I do think bureaucracies breed control freaks who are more enamored of the ritual which keeps them in power than in doing a job which, were it done properly, would solve the problems they were hired to fix and self-fire them.
You sure do think a lot of stuff!
Someone has to take up the slack from you not thinking at all.
Cute, but being a zealot is actually you thinking less than other people.
Apart from being a racist antismite, I've noticed you really have a hard time arguing against anything that isn't a strawman.
And what is your fundamental theorem?
I'm not the one who keeps spouting a fundamental theorem of government.
Government is just a gang big enough to squelch lesser gangs, and it only has to do that well enough to keep the peasants from wanting to find better gangs.
This seems to ignore the nature of the republican form of government.
This seems to not be any kind of rebuttal.
In a republic, government is not a gang independent of the society it makes policies for.
And there are no peasants.
Since ours is a government based on enumerated powers, where precisely do you find the enumerated power for the guild to grant itself monopoly powers or any of the other powers traditionally held by guilds?
Guilds were indeed a common practice in medieval times - and one that society rejected as their anticompetitive aspects outweighed their few advantages. Guilds locked in the very class structure that people were emigrating to America to escape.
The “guild” didn’t grant itself its powers: Congress granted them when it passed a statute (as an exercise of its enumerated authority to regulate interstate and foreign commerce) requiring industry participants to join.
As to society rejected – society’s elected legislatures are always free to decide, based on additional experience, that maybe previously rejected forms weren’t so bad after all, and maybe the newer and supposedly better forms weren’t so good. Or perhaps the advantages don’t outweigh the disadvantages in general, but do in certain special situations.
The whole purpose of a legislature is to be able to make these sorts of decisions and adjust things based on accumulated experience and new ideas and circumstances. You may be right. Guilds may be bad policy across the board. They may be unwise. But in our system of government, wisdom and policy decisions are for legisatures to make, not courts.
> But why is it uncoonstitutional to organize society, or a particular industry, that way?
Er, what do you think a constitution is?
The core purpose of any constitution is to allocate who has what powers, and any attempt to reallocate those powers in contradiction to that constitution is tautologically unconstitutional.
So, it is automatically and inherently unconstitutional to allocate the powers of the Federal government to guilds because the Constitution of the United States, in allocating those powers, didn't allocate any of them to guilds.
The core purpose of any constitution is to allocate who has what powers, and any attempt to reallocate those powers in contradiction to that constitution is tautologically unconstitutional.
That is flatly contradicted by founding era practice.
https://columbialawreview.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/03/Mortenson-Bagley-Delegation_at_the_Founding.pdf
Mortensen and Bagley clearly showed that there is no good originalist argument for non-delegation. To be fair, DRM’s comment wasn’t really making an originalist argument. He’s making a Volokh Conspiracy Comment Section type argument, wherein opinions are stated as if they are incontrovertible facts.
No, sorry, you've been mislead by your assumption that when I said "allocate"/"reallocate", it meant the same thing as "delegate".
It is, of course, entirely normal for a person with power to be allowed to delegate that power to others; as the article you link says, " Eighteenth-century legal discussions regularly evince the presumption that competent persons and institutions could delegate their authorities to agents, and that those agents would then exercise those authorities both on behalf and under the ultimate supervision of the original principal."
(Indeed, since all executive power is vested in the President, pretty much all exercises of executive power in US history have been exercises of delegated power.)
And there is, just as your article says, no particular reason to conclude that legislative power is any less susceptible to delegation than executive; even a strict reading of the enumeration of powers as not including a power of delegation then runs into the buzzsaw of "necessary and proper" there.
And so, I agree entirely with the main thrust of that article -- Congress can freely delegate its legislative powers to other persons*.
No, the problem here is that, as a simple matter of definition, a person or persons cannot delegate powers they do not possess. If I do not have an authority, I cannot authorize an agent to exercise it on my behalf. And as the executive power was vested in the President by the Constitution, Congress does not have it to delegate.
Which then brings us back to the issue. Congress has no executive power to delegate, and Congress cannot reallocate any executive power from the President to anyone other than the President, because that would violate the allocation made by the Constitution. So, insofar as Congress could create something resembling a "guild" (as opposed to a department responsible to the President), the "guild" would have to lack all executive power. At which point it has no power to enforce anything, which makes it a pretty sorry excuse for a "guild".
(From this we actually could extract an implicit private nondelegation principle for Federal legislative powers. As the very paper you linked says, "When an administrative agency issues a generally applicable rule that regulates private conduct, has it acted in an executive capacity? Under the standard constitutional grammar of the Founding, the answer is yes." In that case, Congress cannot delegate its legislative power to anyone except people who are authorized to use the delegated executive power of the President under the supervision of the President, which is to say, executive branch officials.)
*Well, at least as a matter of originalism. If the majority ruling in INS v. Chada is applied consistently, it bans all delegation of legislative power because the delegated persons can't meet the bicameralism requirement. This is one of several reasons the majority opinion in INS v. Chada is an utter crock of shit.
The authority here comes from Congress; it is not inherently executive. This indeed delegation and not reallocation.
So all your words seem misaligned with what has happened in this case.
And as for private conduct, yeah that was true before the 14A.
Chadha does not apply to rulemaking when done within the bounds of a Congressionally delegated authority.
In general, you seem to be mixing a lot of what the law is and what you wish the law to be. You really need to be clear when you're talking about which.
FINRA can rule-make and enforce.
Congress can rule-make but not enforce.
In my area, it is common for the regulator to limit various safe harbors and regulatory exceptions to entities that are regulated by other agencies. The reasoning being that the regulator does not need to impose its own rules or restrictions on entities that are already subject to extensive rules and restrictions serving a similar purpose, under separate regulatory regimes. No non-delegation problem there, I would say.
However, it typically includes in these safe harbors and exceptions entities that are regulated only by states, without separate oversight by the federal government. In effect, the regulator is relying on state regulators wholly outside the federal government to oversee matters within its own ambit. Is that a non-delegation problem?
If not, then could the SEC "cure" its reliance on FINRA by employing a similar approach - i.e., not requiring market participants to join FINRA, but crafting rules in a way that favors market participants who have joined and are regulated by organizations like FINRA?
Universities are also medieval survivors, and a kind of guild. Their accreditation is also delegated to quasi-private agencies. Is the way accreditation is done unconstitutional?
And more than that, university degrees are required for many government jobs or to have a number of kinds of licenses to engage in various professions, such as law. This government is assigning fitness to be in a profession to a private body. Is that unconstitutional? It strikes me as also being a kind of private delegation. How does the private delegation doctrine address the right to and autonomy of private education? Do people have the right to private education, but government can’t use private degrees for mandatory professional gatekeeping purposes? You have a right to get a legal education at a non-public university, but government can’t constitutionally delegate the question of whether you have enough education to meet educational requirements to that university, and only government officials can decide that?