Supreme Court Rejects Missouri's Attempt to Sue New York Over Trump Prosecution

Insofar as the justices split, it was due to long-standing disagreement over the nature of the Court's original jurisdiction.

This morning, as expected, the Supreme Court rejected the state of Missouri's attempt to sue the state of New York over the prosecution of Donald Trump and the imposition of a gag order during the pendency of appeals. Missouri had filed a motion for leave to file a bill of complaint against New York in the Court's original jurisdiction. To call the underyling legal theory aggressive would be an understatement (something about how the state law prosecution of a presidential candidate unconstitutionally inhibits the ability of Missouri voters and electors to support the candidate of their choice). Missouri invoked the Court's original jurisdiction by styling this as a dispute between one state and another, and thus sought to bring this suit, in the first instance, in the Supreme Court.

The justices are not having it. The order reads in full:

Missouri's motion for leave to file a bill of complaint is denied, and its motion for preliminary relief or a stay is dismissed as moot. Justice Thomas and Justice Alito would grant the motion for leave to file the bill of complaint but would not grant other relief.

This means the Court split 7-2 over whether Missouri should be allowed to file its bill of complaint, but was unanimous in rejecting Missouri's request for relief in this case. (In other words, Justices Alito and Thomas would let Missouri make their case, but would not grant any of Missouri's requested relief, which included enjoining the gag order imposed on Trump by New York courts.)

No doubt some commentators will read this order as an indication that Justices Alito and Thomas believe that Missouri's filing had merit. Those that do so will show they know very little about the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction and the long-standing debate over whether the Court has jurisdiction to reject bills of complaint filed by states against other states.

The reason that Justices Thomas and Alito dissented form the denial of Missouri's motion for leave to file the bill of complaint is because they believe that when a state seeks to invoke the Court's original and exclusive jurisdiction, the Court is obligated to hear the case. This is also not a new view. See, for instance, this dissent by Justice Thomas, joined by Justice Alito, in Arizona v. California. It reads in relevant part:

The Constitution establishes our original jurisdiction in mandatory terms. Article III states that, "[i]n all Cases . . . in which a State shall be [a] Party, the supreme Court shall have original Jurisdiction." §2, cl. 2 (emphasis added). In this circumstance, "[w]e have no more right to decline the exercise of jurisdiction which is given, than to usurp that which is not given." Cohens v. Virginia, 6 Wheat. 264, 404 (1821) (Marshall, C. J., for the Court).

Our original jurisdiction in suits between two States is also "exclusive." §1251(a). As I have previously explained, "[i]f this Court does not exercise jurisdiction over a controversy between two States, then the complaining State has no judicial forum in which to seek relief." Nebraska v. Colorado, 577 U. S. ___, ___ (2016) (opinion  dissenting from denial of motion for leave to file complaint) (slip op., at 2). Denying leave to file in a case between two or more States is thus not only textually suspect, but also inequitable.

The Court has provided scant justification for reading "shall" to mean "may." It has invoked its "increasing duties with the appellate docket," Arizona v. New Mexico, 425 U. S. 794, 797 (1976) (per curiam) (internal quotation marks omitted), and its "structur[e] . . . as an appellate tribunal," Ohio v. Wyandotte Chemicals Corp., 401 U. S. 493, 498 (1971). But the Court has failed to provide any analysis of the Constitution's text to justify our discretionary approach.

Justice Thomas raised this concern when Nebraska and Oklahoma sought to file a bill of complaint against Colorado over marijuana legalization too.

As I have noted before, Justice Thomas is making a serious argument, and one which I suspect may be correct. Note that this would not mean that the Court has to actually hear oral argument. Rather it would mean that the Court has to accept the bill of complaint and resolve it on the merits—something that would be quite easy to do in a case like this, but might be more difficult in other contexts (e.g. the dormant commerce clause). I suspect the justices do not want to open this door lest they invite other filings in the sorts of cases they prefer to see percolate up through the lower courts, but it is not clear to me the Constitution gives the Court that choice.