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Divided Sixth Circuit Panel Affirms Preliminary Injunction Against Department of Education Title IX Guidance
The court concludes states are likely to succeed in their procedural challenges to the Education Department's decision to extend Bostock to Title IX.
Today a divided panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed a preliminary injunction against multiple Department of Education guidance documents that would apply the Supreme Court's Bostock holding -- that discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation or gender identity constitutes discrimination on the basis of sex -- to Title IX. Of note, the decision did not address the substance of the Education Department's position, but rather focused on whether this action is the sort that needs to go through a notice-and-comment rulemaking. In other words, this was more of an administrative law decision than one about statutory interpretation or gender equality.
Judge Nalbandian wrote the opinion for the court in Tennessee v. Department of Education. He was joined by Judge Larsen. Senior Judge Boggs dissented.
The suit against the Department of Education was filed by 20 state attorneys general. While there is little question the plaintiff states object to the substance of the Education Department's position, the primary legal claim concerns whether the Department violated the Administrative Procedure Act in issuing the guidance documents without going through notice-and-comment. On this question, the court concluded that the plaintiff states were likely to succeed on the merits and that the district court did not abuse its discretion in issuing a preliminary injunction. In particular, the court concluded that the documents, while styled as guidances, were actually the sort of legislative rule subject to the APA's procedural requirements. Specifically, the court credited the states' arguments that the guidance documents effectively imposed new legal obligations upon them, and did not merely set forth how the Department interpreted and expected to apply pre-existing legal obligations.
Before reaching the merits, however, the panel had to address the government's arguments that the plaintiff states lacked standing, that the guidance documents were not final agency actions subject to judicial review, and that judicial review of these actions was precluded. These are both questions that commonly arise in suits challenging agency actions that may have the effect of legislative rules without being styled as such. It was these preliminary questions -- and standing in particular -- that divided the judges. In Judge Boggs' view, the documents at issue were more properly characterized as interpretive rules or policy statements, and thus not the sort of final agency action that is subject to judicial review or that can impose the sort of injury necessary for jurisdiction.
Given that the decision focuses on administrative law questions, there's is very little in either opinion that addresses the underlying question of whether Bostock's interpretation of Title VII applies equally to Title IX. If the states are ultimately successful with this procedural challenge to the Department of Education's position, it could be some time before federal appellate courts reach the merits of that question.
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When the Department of Education is eliminated next year, this will not matter.
"The suit against the Department of Education was filed by 20 state attorneys general."
Wouldn't it have been better to file 20 separate suits, or one per circuit, because one victory under the APA is as good as 20?
It wouldn't help. The cases would get consolidated per the procedure here (see Forum Selection at the bottom).
https://sourcebook.acus.gov/wiki/Judicial_Review_of_Agency_Action/view
It's amazing that keeping men out of girl's dressing rooms is so controversial.
Take it up with Justice Gorsuch.
You think he said that if a girl can go into a girls' dressing room, then a guy can go into a girls' dressing room?
Apparently he thinks Bostock made sex segregated bathrooms illegal.
He's not very informed.
Funny how statutory absolutist morons love their position when it comes to reading the Comstock Act, but not when it comes to reading Title VII.
When the federal government gets around to fulfilling its APA duties, it will be interesting to see the statutory absolutists pretzeling themselves to distinguish Title VII from Title IX in a way to satisfy the jaundiced eye of Justice Gorsuch.
Yiu think this lawsuit would be a thing absent Bostock?
Of course. They had these lawsuits before Bostock.
Wtf, why are people so underinformed?
Oh hay the antisemite has a take on bathroom policies.
Why you wasting time on this now passed wedge? Take on something truly your speed!
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Foreskin_Man
Well, I shall see. You will just do insults and wankery.
"Wtf, why are people so underinformed?"
Because they engage in pointless poo-flinging instead of looking thoughtfully at the issues.
LOL TIP calling on people to be thoughtful.
So the opinion of one justice is binding precedent? If you're casting blame name the rest of them.
Bostock did not resolve whether sex-segregated bathrooms, locker rooms and dress codes violate Title VII, or whether Title IX prohibits discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation or gender identity at all.
IMO, the Biden administration makes a strong case (based on Bostock) for why sex-segregated bathrooms and dress codes violate Title IX as applied to transgender people (but not cisgender): there is more than de minimus harm only to transgender people. On the other hand, I'm not perusuaded on locker rooms because of legiitmate privacy concerns.
It's too clever by half.
If there's no harm in people using the other sex's bathrooms, there's no justification for segregated bathrooms.
Perhaps, that's right. On the other hand, there is a lesser privacy concern when using a sex-integrated restroom than a sex-integrated shower which has traditionally justified justified single-sex restrooms.
But whether or not that tradition remains justified, when weighed against the substantial harm caused to trasngender people, it's not justified as applied to them
How do sex-segregated bathrooms harm people with gender dysphoria in a way that doesn’t harm people without it?
Using the restroom that corresponds with your gender identity is part of the treatment for gender dysphoria. Withholding that treatment is harmful. I don't see anything comparable for other people.
If bathrooms are segregated by sex, then there is no bathroom that corresponds with your gender identity.
Huh?
Bathrooms segregated by sex means there is a male and a female bathroom. A trans boy's sex is female and gender idenity is male. His doctor wants him to use the male bathroom.
Given that the Education Department has since issued Title IX regulations after going through the APA's required notice and comment process, why does this case matter? Isn't the real issue now the authority of the Education Department to issue the new rule, just enjoined against enforcement on behalf of four states by a district judge in Louisiana, rather than whether the now superseded guidance is or is not subject to notice and comment rulemaking?
Given that the Education Department has since issued Title IX regulations after going through the APA’s required notice and comment process, why does this case matter? Isn’t the real issue now the authority of the Education Department to issue the new rule, just enjoined against enforcement on behalf of four states by a district judge in Louisiana, rather than whether the now superseded guidance is or is not subject to notice and comment rulemaking?
I recognize that the majority argues that the recent rule adoption does not moot the case because of some minor differences between the rule and the guidance, but doesn’t that lend further support to Judge Boggs' dissent — if the new rule is silent with regard to some matters within the scope of the guidance, doesn’t the new rule control? In short and to borrow from the Bard, this seems like much ado about nothing.
Appreciate the additional detail. That would seem to be important context.
You've got to cut both the belt AND the suspenders if you want the pants to fall.
A three-clinger panel in a backwater circuit -- I gather Prof. Calabresi would approve!
I think there’s an argument to be made that the two are different.
First, Title IX is a spending clause provision, while Title VII is a commerce clause provision. And under Pennhurst, spending clause statutes are in the nature of a contract, and require explicit notice of what is required. Both the contractural nature explicitness requirements arguably limit the ability of courts to suddenly change settled expectations half a century after the provisions came into being. In addition to the text being far from a model of clarity on the issue, longstanding practices and settled expectations matter in the contractual interpretation analysis Pennhurst requires in a way that they didn’t matter in Bostock.
Second, Title IX contains exceptions and compromises not present in Title VII. It explicitly permits both same-sex schools and same-sex athletic teams. Because exceptions reserve rights to schools that employers do not have under Title VII, it is arguably the rights-holders, here the schools and not the students, who determine what constitutes “sex” for purposes of their exercise of their rights.