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Laws Requiring Social Media Firms to Host Content they Prefer to Exclude Violate the Takings Clause
Ethan Blevins of the Pacific Legal Foundation explains why. I myself have made similar arguments.

The Supreme Court is currently considering two cases in which social media firms challenge the constitutionality of Texas and Florida laws requiring them to host content the platforms would prefer to exclude. The issue before the Court is whether these laws violate the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment. But, in a recent Reason article, Ethan Blevins of the Pacific Legal Foundation - one of the nation's leading public interest law firms litigating takings cases - argues they also violate the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment:
While pundits and lawyers cross swords over free speech on social media, a quieter yet critically important principle is being ignored: property rights. In addition to violating the First Amendment, the rush to force social media platforms to host content violates the Fifth Amendment as well—in particular, the Takings Clause.
The Takings Clause says that government shall not take private property "for public use, without just compensation." While many are familiar with the clause's importance when the government wants to seize land through eminent domain, courts have also applied this right as a limit on the ability to overregulate property. For example, if a beach town requires the owners of oceanfront properties to let the public walk across their yards to get to the beach, this would require compensation, because the regulation effectively takes the property owner's right to exclude, a cornerstone of ownership.
Likewise, the Takings Clause shields social media platforms from regulations requiring they host content or users they want to exclude. These platforms have as much right to eject unwelcome digital interlopers as homeowners do to stop the government from using their yard as a public right of way—unless they are given just compensation. If states intend to force social media apps to host users and content against their wishes, they will have to pay for it….
Both state and federal laws already treat online platforms as property. All states criminalize unauthorized access to computer systems, often expressly framing these crimes as trespass….
Laws that mandate online platforms to accept certain content or users effectively invade private property. And the courts have established that when the government grants third parties access to private property without the owner's consent, that requires compensation. The federal government had to pay a private marina owner in Hawaii before it could be compelled to allow public boating access. Similarly, the Supreme Court ruled just a few years ago that California had to compensate employers after it forced them to let union representatives access their property.
I very much agree, and previously made a similar argument here:
The Takings Clause bars government from taking "private property" without paying "just compensation." In its 2021 ruling in Cedar Point Nursery v. Hassid, the Supreme Court ruled (correctly, in my view) that even a temporary government-mandated "physical occupation" or invasion of private property counts as a per se taking….
The Florida and Texas social media laws are also blatant attacks on the right to exclude. No one doubts that the Twitter site and its various features are Twitter's private property. And the whole point of the Florida and Texas laws is to force Twitter and other social media firms to grant access to users and content the firms would prefer to exclude, particularly various right-wing users. Just as the plaintiffs in Cedar Point wanted to bar union organizers from their land, so Twitter wishes to bar some content it finds abhorrent (or that might offend or annoy other users)….
To be sure, there are obvious differences between virtual property, such as a website, and more conventional physical property, like that involved in the Cedar Point case. But the Taking Clause nonetheless applies to both. If Texas decided to seize the Twitter site, bar current users, and instead fill it with content praising the state government's policies, that would pretty obviously be a taking, much like if California decided to seize the Cedar Point tree nursery's land. In the same way, requiring Twitter to host unwanted content qualifies as an occupation of its property, no less than requiring a landowner to give access to unwanted entrants…
One could argue that forcing a website owner to host unwanted users isn't really a "physical occupation," because the property is virtual in nature. But websites, including the big social media firms, use physical server space. Other things equal, a site with more user-generated content requires more such space than one with less. Even aside from the connection to physical infrastructure, it seems to me that occupation of virtual "real estate" is analogous to occupation of land. Both are valuable forms of private property from which the owner generally has a right to exclude.
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So, they're entitled to just compensation. What is the fair market value of an infinitesimal slice of bandwidth? One cent seems high.
If even that much. Government regulation of broadcast frequencies is based on the theory it is a limited resource. That doesn’t apply to the Internet, which is functionally unlimited, thanks to these very companies.
But there are other ways to twist arms, like clobbering section 230 unless they censor harrassment the way every Democrat in the 2016 debate screetched, which was then applied to “harrassing tweets” of political opponents, and Republicans threatened 230 if the companies did go along with that.
And here we are, years downstream, still fighting those battles. None of this should be happening, but the original $400 billion stock clobber threat boat long since sailed.
First, you are begging the question of 1st Amendment rights to control your own speech, which is the larger barrier in a mandate that the government force one private party to carry the undesired speech of another private party.
But aside from that, Just Compensation, like product or service pricing, is based not on the marginal cost of producing one additional sold unit, nor even that plus original investment and current physical/intellectual property. In both cases, at least in a free market, such compensation or pricing—fair market value as you say—is the value of a defined good/service, as perceived by a willing buyer and a willing seller.
In this case, the defined good is an interactive communications platform carrying only what its private owners desire it to carry. Remove that characteristic, and it is no longer the same defined good, but an entirely different thing.
From the difference between the value of the original platform and that different thing, may be calculated Just Compensation.
"In both cases, at least in a free market, such compensation or pricing—fair market value as you say—is the value of a defined good/service, as perceived by a willing buyer and a willing seller."
In takings, as you well know, the latter doesn't actually exist, because a taking isn't a free market transaction. It's a gunpoint transaction.
And the calculation you suggest never, ever, gets performed.
That definition of “defined good” would make any regulatory taking “uncomputable”.
Thus a bakers shop ceases to be a bakers shop, but “a bakers shop providing only goods that glorify the Lord”
Any business enterprise that deliberately turns away profitable custom (for whatever reason) necessarily reduces its “fair” value. So if the government forces you to accept a customer you don’t want, there are several reasonable complaints you could make, but depriving you of the “fair value” that is due to you is not one of them.
Not ANY regulatory taking. Only the ones that compel profitable transactions, which isn't most regulatory takings.
But I agree that public accommodation laws aren't reasonably treated as "takings", since you retain the property, and are "just" required to serve a customer you'd rather not.
It's a general problem you see a lot: The government is violating some traditional general liberty interest, but the courts don't recognize traditional general liberty interests, they treat the 9th amendment as though it didn't exist, treat non-enumeration as, yes, denying or disparaging rights despite being explicitly directed not to.
So you try to shoehorn that liberty interest into some related right the Court actually does recognize on account of it being enumerated. Usually freedom of speech, or freedom of association, though, not the takings clause.
Though I guess the takings clause does seem a natural stand in for the economic liberties the Court decided to stop respecting.
This argument fails if a social medium platform is a common carrier as I argue in the complaint, which I filed in Massachusetts District Court.
https://drive.google.com/file/d/14HurZBgejHWSo_PuVUeDT7j-_dsJ5Uuw/view?usp=sharing
You could have just said, "I am a kook. Please involuntarily commit me."
By similar argument, the OSHA requirement to post notices of workers’ rights is also a taking, right? That’s presumably worth much more because there is limited wall space in the break room that the company could instead spend on posters that glorify the CEO.
Exactly.
And what about antidiscrimination law? If the government is going to make me let black people sit at tables in my restaurant shouldn’t it be required to pay me rent?
If you want damages just show that race is a reasonable proxy for wealth and blacks (being poorer) tend to have smaller checks.
I am a strong advocate for property rights, but this one hell of a stretch, even for me. You're getting way too caught up on "exclude" in this context, which is not the same thing as the ability to exclude someone from your private property.
.
Every bit as much as Elon Musk and Eugene Volokh are free speech champions, I suspect.
When all you have is the takings clause...
...and 1A. When you have two amendments on your side, it's better than one.
Isn't the Sherman Act a "taking"?
Of course. If antitrust law is used to split a company up, presumably the company will have to take a loss on the divestment, because it's a forced sale. And don't even get me started about the takings of legitimate monopoly profits that comes with any kind of antitrust enforcement.
If states intend to force social media apps to host users and content against their wishes, they will have to pay for it….
Yet another hyper-rationalist argument which fails because it misunderstands the subject it purports to regulate. You could not maintain a legal regime to force publishers to accept any and all contributions. If that happened, the means to accomplish publishing would disappear, because publishers would lose their indispensable capacity to curate audiences and sell advertising.
If publishing cannot support its expenses on the basis of proceeds derived solely from publishing-related activities, press freedom will vanish. The party which pays the bills will determine what content gets published.
Yet another argument that equates social media platforms with traditional publishers.
Used underwear selling Twitter exists. Posting pictures of literal feces Twitter exists. Feet picture Twitter exists. Think of anything horrible or nasty that isn't graphically violent or pornographic, and you can probably find it on a social media platform. You will never, ever find this stuff unless you are actively looking for it, and I can guarantee you that the actual owners and operators of the social media platforms are unaware of the vast majority of it.
So... if you'll never find it unless you're looking for it, and you found all of that... never mind, I don't want to know.
And yet, Jacob, you apparently found it, used underwear, feces, feet and all. Hmm....
Well, I had to come up with examples somehow...It was purely for intellectual purposes.
Thankfully I didn't actually search twitter but used google.
Intellectual curiosity, that's how they hook you. Then before you know what hit you you're a full-on poop pic pariah.
Still, his point is correct.
I was a member of a private group on FB at one time, invite only. Just some friends who'd met online at a defunct site, (Pete DuPont's "Intellectual Capitol") and who liked to chat about various issues.
It was supposed to be flatly impossible to find your way into this group by accident. Well, until FB gave some busybodies the privilege of looking at private groups, and the power to shut down any they didn't like for unspecified infractions.
Several times we got locked for unspecified offensive content. I mean that: We were supposed to guess what had pissed off FB's hall monitor. We finally had to move to MeWe to escape the harassment.
At no point was any other customer of FB ever exposed to our discussions. Even if they'd wanted to be, it was after all invite only.
I'm still on FB, because a lot of my relatives are there, and literally the only time I see anything offensive on FB, anything I didn't go out of my way to see, is when FB itself insists on pushing content to me. To the limited extent this problem of seeing stuff you didn't want to on these platforms is real, it's a result of the platforms going out of their way to override their customers' own preferences, presumably for monetization purposes.
Err, uh…I think Professor Somin is making a very bad argument. But he is arguing in favor of your position, not against it.
The party which pays the bills will determine what content gets published.
Or what you are permitted to say on a college campus.
Wait, that's a good thing, er a bad thing, wait, what?
A social medium service is no more a publisher that an email service is a publisher. User content is bailment of a social medium service. User content is neither speech nor property of the social medium service.
Now do telecom companies that need bigger cables and switches because they're forced to carry calls that they don't agree with.
Now do banks forced to flip a few extra bits to hold accounts of all legal depositors.
Haha, just kidding. Banks are "de-banking" politically disfavored folk already.
Laws Requiring HOTELS to Host PERSONS they Prefer to Exclude Violate the Takings Clause
/FIXED
Whether it is or not (and I don't think it is) surely the guest paying the normal rate for the room takes care of the "just compensation" requirement.
The Takings clause does not require the government to subsidize bigotry.
The hotel has still suffered an injury if other guests boycott because of the guests the hotel allows.
For example, high caste Hindus may refuse to stay at a hotel that allows low caste Hindus and untouchables to stay there.
I think this is one of the arguments that failed when the civil rights laws were challenged in the 1960s.
Do you really think it’s going to work this time?
It’s pretty durn well established that government can limit the ability of a business to exclude prospective customers without running afoul of the takings clause. That’s why more recent challenges have been made on speech, religion, and similar grounds.
I was thinking something similar. If forcing a business to host someone they don't want to host (if they want to remain in business) implicates the Takings Clause, then that would have implicated it.
Blevins and Somin don't understand the principle of assumpsit. Because of assumpsit, a state legislature had to create a statute to permit racial discrimination on a train, at a restaurant, or at an inn.
From Blackstone.
"There is also in law always an implied contract with a common innkeeper, to secure his guest's goods in his inn; with a common carrier or bargemaster, to be answerable for the goods he carries; with a common farrier, that he shoes a horse well, without laming him; with a common taylor, or other workman, that he performs his business in a workmanlike manner; in which if they fail, an action on the case lies to recover damages for such breach of their general undertaking. But if I employ a person to transact any of these concerns, whose common profession and business it is not, the law implies no such general undertaking; but, in order to charge him with damages, a special agreement is required. Also, if an innkeeper, or other victualler, hangs out a sign and offers his house for travellers, it is an implied engagement to entertain all persons who travel that way; and upon this universal assumpsit an action on the case will lie against him for damages, if he without good reason refuses to admit a traveller."
Per Blackstone, however, if the inkeeper or other victualler hangs out a sign and offers his house for all straight white Christian tavellers, that would only be an implied angagement to entertain all such travellers.
The caselaw does not permit a purveyor of a common service to offer his service only to part of the public unless there is a statute that provides a clear statement that gives the purveyor the right so to discriminate -- hence the historic Jim Crow statutes.
So the question is - what defines a “common service” if neither the intentions nor advertisements of the provider are relevant ?
The test is relatively simple.
Does a provider hold out the service to a group within the public for a fee on standard terms?
Is there a legitimate reason or statutory basis to limit the offer of service only to a group within the public and not to the whole of the public?
The rule you provide is simply stated, but hardly simple.
What's "a group within the public" ? Mormons ? People not wearing MAGA caps ? Yankees fans ? Mormons with missing front teeth ?
And what's a "legitimate" reason ?
I like Mormons ? I don't like people wearing MAGA hats ?
Legitimacy or permissibility of restriction to a subgroup within the public is usually a matter of state caselaw that a Judge will reference when he determines by law whether a service provides common carriage. A Ferris Wheel provides common carriage in many states. A Judge is likely to rule that restricting a member of the public to a maximum weight is allowable.
If only we lived in 18th century England, that might be relevant!
Here are some 1L notes for a lawyer that believes assumpsit is no longer relevant today.
https://uollb.com/blog/law/what-is-assumpsit
But this contradicts your "simple" rule above :
In cases of express assumpsit, the promise is explicitly stated, either orally or in writing. The plaintiff brings an action based on the defendant's failure to fulfill a clear and definite promise. Implied assumpsit arises when there is no explicit promise, but the circumstances imply an obligation to perform a certain act. It is based on the defendant's conduct or the nature of the relationship between the parties.
If the defendant states clearly, for example at the entrance to his shop "We do not sell anything to Chinese people" there is no express promise to sell to Chinese people, nor is there any implied promise, since the "defendant's conduct" involves an express denial of any promise and the "nature of the relationship between the parties" is that the defendant has stated ab initio that there is never going to be a relationship between the parties.
Usually, the caselaw refers to an unfitness like weight restriction mentioned above on the Ferris Wheel.
This is not a taking, it is a contract.
they get immunity from lawsuits in exchange for hosting the shit they don't like?
That's an interesting comment at a blog that wants immunity from lawsuits while engaging in viewpoint-driven censorship.
Blackstone explicitly address the contract of the universal assumpsit.
It's not a contract if the business never agreed to it.
Please read up on assumpsit. Are you a lawyer? Have you ever heard of either implied contract in fact or implied contract in law?
Businesses agree to certain rules and restrictions when they apply for and accept a business license.
These particular laws did not exist when these businesses got their license. So that wouldn't be a reason even if I would accept that reason in general (which I wouldn't.)
All of these convoluted state law problems could be avoided if Congress simply conditioned Section 230 on not filtering based on political content, with a possible exception for if users affirmatively elect to filter all political content.
The social media firms live and die by Section 230 immunity. But it's entirely a creature of statute.
Define “political content”. Advocating for or against a particular candidate? Sure. Advocating for or against a particular piece of legislation? Sure. How about… expressing general concern for the welfare of the natural environment? Is that “political content” (climate change alarmism!) or just a comment about the state of your backyard? How about a claim such as “vaccines cause autism”?
There is no way to objectively and concretely define “political content”, and we really don’t want the government making such determinations.
That is why Section 230 leaves it up to each website owner to decide what they want to host and what they don't want to host. So that the government doesn't have to get into the messy business of deciding what is allowed and what is not.
So modify Section 230 to only apply to sites that hold themselves up as common carriers and carry all legal content.
Tune it to allow selection based on user preferences but not based on provider preferences.
A social medium platform does not determine whether it provides common carriage. On the basis of the facts, a court determines as a matter of law whether the social medium platform provides common carriage.
We've all seen, on the main Reason site, what happens if you don't moderate spammers well. I assume those spammers aren't actually breaking any law, so every site that wanted immunity from lawsuits (which is all of them) would have to allow them? That would be stupid.
Congress did already did that, essentially. They wrote a law they understood to permit only moderation for things normal, sane people would be offended by. Then the courts interpreted that 'or otherwise offensive' catch-all to hand the platforms consequence free total editorial control.
Most of the moderation was actually supposed to be via customer selected third party filters, which the platforms were supposed to inform customers about. (Section 230 D)
That is incorrect. There is no "exchange" in Section 230; they get immunity from lawsuits, period.
What about laws demanding someone bake a cake?
A better analogy would be prohibiting a kitchen that allows people in to bake custom cakes with messages from discriminating based on the legal content of those messages.
Serving people at a lunch counter was handled back in 1960.
https://americanhistory.si.edu/brown/history/6-legacy/freedom-struggle-2.html
Sandwich... cake... no difference.
So laws requiring private businesses to serve customers they prefer to exclude violates the takings clause?
Probably a better case for treating platforms this way than hotels, given that the marginal cost of the service is approximately zero for the platforms, and quite large for the hotels.
Not clear what your initial phrase means, but:
The marginal cost of a guest is not that high for a hotel.They have to clean the room, of course, (though lots of them try to weasel out of this) and have some administrative costs, but much of a hotel's cost is going to be fixed.
And so what? Who cares what the marginal cost is, for these purposes? The cost of forcing the hotel to rent you a room is opportunity cost - they can't then rent it to me. But they are compensated for that by the fact that you pay the normal rate for the room.
No harm, no foul, no taking.
Clearly, hotels that were discriminating prior to Heart of Atlanta had a different analysis of cost than you do.
What about other guests who boycott the hotel?
Or demographics who spend less on room service and ancillary services?
"The marginal cost of a guest is not that high for a hotel."
It's still hugely higher than the marginal cost of hosting a FB account.
Nevertheless Bernard is correct. It is opportunity cost that matters.
If the government requires you to lodge me at $50 when you could have sold the room to Bernard for $100, it has taken $50 from your profits, whether the marginal cost of lodging a guest is $30 or $0.01.
Or zero.
And the platforms have no opportunity cost at all unless their servers are at their limits. They're like a hotel that is at all times half empty and can freely add new rooms at slight cost.
Every difference between the platforms and hotels is such that regulating the platforms is actually less objectionable.
No, because bad content can actually decrease the value of the platform. Just like the search result I got a few minutes ago telling me that 100 federal Senators are lawyers, which is 1/3 of the Senate. Having that result there decreases the value of the search.
No, that's different. It's fine to make a baker make a wedding cake for a homosexual couple, but treating Facebook as a common carrier is just awful.
Of course. Every regulation we don’t like is a taking, if you bend over backwards enough.
Yeah this is what's happening here.
It's been said before but Prof Somin continues to ignore it. All this Takings Clause logic is every bit as applicable to common carriers. Yet that precedent is quite long-standing. Nothing legally distinguishes the social media companies from historical common carrier designations.
In some states, e.g. New York, a telegraph service is defined to be a service that transports a message electrically either by wire or by wireless means. Under this definition, a social medium platform provides not only a communications common carriage service, but it according to the statute provides a telegraph service. In a state like Michigan, where denial of telegraph service has twice the penalty that denial of common carriage has, the statutory definition of a telegraph service is important. A specific social medium platform statute like that of Texas or of Florida is not needed to stop social medium platform discrimination against a user. If a social medium platform bans a user, the user should bring a complaint pursuant to 47 U.S. Code § 202 and invoke supplemental jurisdiction over state common carriage law. Such a complaint will include claims for multiple millions of dollars to be paid to the plaintiff. Denial of common carriage is almost always a self-evidencing violation.
Please make sure you bring such a claim in a state with strong anti-SLAPP laws, so that we can enjoy the sight of you being sanctioned.
I filed a federal complaint. How would the Massachusetts anti-SLAPP law be relevant? I am truly curious.
Once again, the historical phrase is "common carriers for hire", and the hosting of user content that social media companies perform is not done for hire.
Their hosting of advertising content is, though, if you want to take a run at that.
Users of a social medium platform exchange some combination of money, barter, and work for hire.
This aspect of common carriage has hundreds of years of caselaw.
User content becomes bailment of the social medium platform (barter). This bailment is valuable to the social medium platform because it attracts other users to the social medium platform.
"Eyes on a page" (user work) gives an advertiser a reason to buy advertising space.
I go through all the issues of communications common carriage of a message by a social medium platform in paragraphs 11-15 of my federal complaint against the Harvard Crimson. See my first comment at the top. The intersection of law and technology is not rocket science.
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