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D.C. Circuit Revives Viewpoint Discrimination Suit Against District of Columbia
The District allowed "Black Lives Matter" protestors to violate the city's defacement ordinance, but enforced the law against groups with a different political message.
Today the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit revived a lawsuit against the District of Columbia for selective enforcement of the district's defacement ordinance in violation of the First Amendment. Judge Rao wrote for the court in Frederick Douglass Foundation v. District of Columbia, joined by Judge Childs, reversing the district court's dismissal of the Foundation's First Amendment claim, but affirming dismissal of an Equal Protection claim. Judge Wilkins concurred in the judgment.
Judge Rao's opinion for the court summarizes the case and decision as follows:
The First Amendment prohibits government discrimination on the basis of viewpoint. "To permit one side … to have a monopoly in expressing its views … is the antithesis of constitutional guarantees." City of Madison Joint Sch. Dist. No. 8 v. Wis. Emp. Relations Comm'n, 429 U.S. 167, 175–76 (1976). The protection for freedom of speech applies not only to legislation, but also to enforcement of the laws. This case concerns a constitutional challenge to the selective enforcement of the District of Columbia's defacement ordinance against some viewpoints but not others.
In the summer of 2020, thousands of protesters flooded the streets of the District to proclaim "Black Lives Matter." Over several weeks, the protesters covered streets, sidewalks, and storefronts with paint and chalk. The markings were ubiquitous and in open violation of the District's defacement ordinance, yet none of the protesters were arrested. During the same summer, District police officers arrested two pro-life advocates in a smaller protest for chalking "Black Pre-Born Lives Matter" on a public sidewalk.
The organizers of the smaller protest, the Frederick Douglass Foundation and Students for Life of America (collectively "the Foundation"), sued. The Foundation alleged violations of the First and Fifth Amendments, conceding the defacement ordinance was facially constitutional, but arguing the District's one-sided enforcement of the ordinance was not. The district court dismissed the complaint. Concluding the First Amendment and equal protection claims were essentially the same, the district court held the Foundation had failed to adequately allege discriminatory intent, which the court considered a necessary element of both claims.
We affirm the district court's dismissal of the Foundation's equal protection claim because the Foundation has not plausibly alleged invidious discrimination by District officials. Discriminatory motive, however, is not an element of a First Amendment free speech selective enforcement claim. The First Amendment prohibits discrimination on the basis of viewpoint irrespective of the government's motive. We hold the Foundation has plausibly alleged the District discriminated on the basis of viewpoint in the selective enforcement of its defacement ordinance. We therefore reverse the dismissal of the Foundation's First Amendment claim and remand for further proceedings.
Judge Rao notes that selective enforcement claims are hard to substantiate, but that the Foundation plausibly alleged such selective enforcement here.
Selective enforcement claims must clear a high hurdle. Because the lawful exercise of prosecutorial discretion does not violate the Constitution, disparate enforcement of a neutral ordinance based on viewpoint is unlawful only when the prosecutorial factors are similar, and "unlawful favoritism" remains the predominant explanation for the government's targets. . . . The Foundation has plausibly alleged that when chalking the "Black Pre-Born Lives Matter" message, its advocates were similarly situated to advocates who painted and marked the "Black Lives Matter" message. . . .
Viewpoint discrimination, whether by legislative enactment or executive action, violates the First Amendment. "Once a forum is opened up to assembly or speaking by some groups, government may not prohibit others from assembling or speaking." Police Dep't of Chi. v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 96 (1972). We hold the Foundation has plausibly alleged the elements of a free speech selective enforcement claim. We may reasonably infer from the Foundation's complaint, first, that its members were similarly situated to other protesters who were not arrested and, second, that the District engaged in viewpoint discrimination by enforcing the defacement ordinance against individuals chalking "Black Pre-Born Lives Matter" but not against individuals painting and chalking "Black Lives Matter."
And from her concluding paragraphs:
The First Amendment prohibits the government from favoring some speakers over others. Access to public fora must be open to everyone and to every message on the same terms. The District may act to prevent the defacement of public property, but it cannot open up its streets and sidewalks to some viewpoints and not others. During the summer of 2020, the District arrested individuals chalking "Black Pre-Born Lives Matter" on the sidewalk, while making no arrests against the many individuals marking "Black Lives Matter" on sidewalks, streets, and other property. The Foundation has plausibly alleged that its members were similarly situated to individuals against whom the defacement ordinance was not enforced, and that the District discriminated on the basis of viewpoint when enforcing the ordinance. Because the Foundation has failed to adequately allege animus on the part of the District, however, its equal protection challenge fails.
This is a significant case.
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Any other "significant" cases in the news lately, Volokh Conspirators?
#Cowards
You have ten fingers and a keyboard....
You are perfectly free to post your own published opinions dealing with free speech issues. Anything else is outside the scope of this site.
Unless you want to talk about the continued genocide of the unborn ...
I actually believe this site does occasionally engage with topics other than published opinions on free speech issues. I’m sure I’ve encountered one or two such posts over the years.
I expressed my opinion.
By conspicuously avoiding the most important, interesting, and novel legal issues of our time, the professors who operate this white, male, right-wing blog are demonstrating that they are low-grade cowards and partisan hacks.
Some of the Volokh Conspirators discussed John Eastman before he was revealed to be an indicted, un-American crackpot. Why so bashful these days?
Carry on, clingers. But only so far as better Americans permit.
NPC Alert.
Seen on the Volokh Conspiracy in just the past week:
"Jack Goldsmith Responds to Critics on the Dangers of Prosecuting (or not Prosecuting) Trump for Trying to Overturn the 2020 Election"
"Prof. Michael McConnell, Responding About the Fourteenth Amendment, "Insurrection," and Trump"
"New Article on Insurrection, Rebellion, and Section Three of the Fourteenth Amendment"
"Trump Is Disqualified from Being on Any Election Ballots"
"The Dangers of Giving Trump Impunity are Far Worse than those of Prosecuting Him"
"The Trump Indictment Hangover"
But complain some more about how this topic isn't covered enough here.
The token libertarian is discussing the issues.
The conservatives — including the two wingnuts who endorsed John Eastman — are strenuously ducking the issues.
Why?
Carry on, clingers.
Six articles in a week by five different people. Another article today. At this point, if you don't like the product they sell here, I urge you to get a full refund and go somewhere else.
Those are analyzed ad nauseam everywhere else...
No sovereign immunity, so no need to jump through weird hoops to pretend you're respecting sovereign immunity.
Sovereign Immunity is essentially 11th Amendment -- this is a 1st Amendment issue, applied by the 14th, so why would sovereign immunity apply were (heaven forbid) DC a state?
Seriously, why? This is a constitutional right.
Wouldn't it be so much better if US constitutional amendments explained what it was that they were amending?
Sovereign immunity is generally stupid. Until recently it was stupid but harmless, but since Whole Woman's Health it may have become stupid and actively dangerous.
Just 1st Amendment since DC isn’t (thank God) a state.
Not quite. The Fifth Amendment due process clause applies to DC, since it’s a federal enclave. The Fifth Amendment does not contain an equal protection clause. However, SCOTUS has basically read one into the Fifth Amendment by analogizing to the Fourteenth Amendment (which has an equal protection clause). Bolling v. Sharpe. So equal protection analysis applies to DC. The reason the court dismissed the (Fifth Amendment) equal protection claim is that you have to have discriminatory motive/intent for an equal protection claim. Washington v. Davis. The plaintiffs apparently didn’t allege a credible claim that the selective prosecution was due to discriminatory intent, so the (Fifth Amendment) equal protection claim failed. Hope that clears things up a bit.
In this context, what's the difference between viewpoint discrimination and invidious discrimination?
Invidious = likely to arouse or incur resentment or anger in others. Viewpoint discrimination, on the other hand, could be completely placid or even salutary.
Invidious discrimination is prohibited by the equal protection clause where salutary discrimination might not be. Under a First Amendment claim, however, the invidious/salutary distinction is irrelevant. The fact that it's viewpoint discrimination (regardless of direction) is sufficient.
Thoughts on when placid or salutary discrimination is allowed in light of the recent Harvard/UNC case? Seems to me that most affirmative action is dead, unless it meets the rigorous test for remedying specific past injustices. Not sure where the limits are likely to be drawn beyond that.
Basically, to bring a Fifth/Fourteenth Amendment equal protection claim, you have to show that the government acted with intent to discriminate. No intent, no equal protection claim. With the First Amendment, there is no such intent requirement. Most discrimination based on viewpoint is enough to allow a First Amendment claim to move forward. Note that this is simply the beginning of litigation and the opinion only reverses the trial court's early dismissal of the First Amendment claim. The plaintiffs still need to prove that the govt engaged in such viewpoint discrimination and that such discrimination didn't fall into some fairly narrow exceptions.
On one hand, this probably was legitimately selective enforcement that violates 1A. On the other hand, allowing a deficient pleading to go forward based on what can be "plausibly inferred" is a pretty big can of worms.
On the gripping hand, as a matter of policy it's kind of shitty to criminalize chalking sidewalks, absent some factor such as harassment or intimidation.
Is that like "legitimate rape"?
That was bad for separate reasons, but the phrase "legitimate rape" itself in context just meant "something that really is rape" and quoting it as if it means "rape is a legitimate action to perform" is deceptive.
On the gripping hand, as a matter of policy it’s kind of shitty to criminalize chalking sidewalks, absent some factor such as harassment or intimidation.
I think the 1A does require viewpoint neutral laws. I'd prefer not to have the sidewalks blighted with swastikas, dicks, or whatever political slogans somebody has the time and energy to chalk. So therefore criminalizing chalking is the only solution left, there's some stuff people will chalk that we don't like and we can't discriminate.
Chaulking usually extends to buildings and statutes and such, which aren’t as readily cleaned by the rain. That means paying someone (at union wages) to remove it, usually with a pressure washer which means a dedicated truck and all the issues regarding that.
Even on sidewalks, you want your city to look pretty for the tourists so you really do need to remove the half-washed-away chalkings because they look like crap. Again, this means money -- and hassles for the supervisor, etc...
But DC is apparently okay with people having to deal with chalking (or street painting) supporting BLM, but not chalking supporting an antiabortion viewpoint.
Sounds like viewpoint discrimination to me.
Yes. The best part of this is that if the plaintiffs win DC will need to let people chalk things like "white lives matter", "Heil Hitler", and "King Trump". Hope the bastards choke on their coffee reading all the slogans.
The best part of your post is that you're arrogantly wrong.
The result of this case, should DC lose, is that they will have to enforce the anti-chalking ordinance equally, not remove the law altogether.
Go back to wherever you came from.
See, a normal person might say, "Maybe they're worried that rain might not clean chalk off buildings as easily as it does sidewalks." Dr. Ed, though, not only feels the need to pronounce confidently that it doesn't — showing that he has never actually seen chalk — but invents this elaborate fairy tale about pressure washers and union labor.
Damn right it is a significant case because it would (I presume) also extend to where non-state actors were given permission to PAINT the street in front of the White House. DC approved it, but DC did not paint it themselves.
Hence someone else wanting to paint "White Lives Matter" would also have to be given a permit.
And the issue with abortion is the statistical disproportionate number of BLACK babies aborted, which is overlooked in the larger debate. Some Black groups are starting to raise this issue as part of the BLM campaign -- so it was also the state deciding what a message is allowed to be.
I would characterize it differently. "This group is loud and angry and may not only give us problems at the voting booth, but may come hassle our families, leave them alone. That other tiny group, though, to hell with them. In fact, the main group may applaud silencing them."
Perhaps it does not extend that far.
Interesting.
Selective enforcement is almost always a loser (see, e.g., "But ossifer, why did you pull me over when other people were going even faster!!??!!!").
But given the gravamen of the complaint arguably sounds in viewpoint discrimination, I can see that it might pass muster.
Then again, I am a little unclear as to why the Court provided a saving construction to the pleading.
I think that's where the active/intentionality aspect could be helpful. I wish the court hadn't been so dismissive of the role of intent...
If your hypothetical officer were pulling over people based on personal biases rather than a simple inability to catch everyone, that would be different...
Racial Profiling???
Well, that's what makes selective prosecution, in general, so hard.
I'd have to really think about this, but, for example-
Does the DC police regularly go after children who chalk up the street for hopscotch (or whatever they do today)?
Or, for that matter, did they decide as a matter of discretion that there were too many people to after them all for BLM? After all, there are times when police choose not to go after people in large crowds when there are numerous violations- because of resources and their choice.
I am little adrift, here, because usually these types of cases (viewpoint discrimination) are brought as a result of government action in terms of permitting, etc., not because of selective prosecution. So ... dunno?
Yeah, I just think selective prosecution needs much more scrutiny in general...not sure exactly where the lines should end up, but everybody taking it more seriously should get us closer.
I don't disagree that selective prosecution is a problem, I just am unsure what fix would be better than the problem.
Re: intent, the plaintiff bears the burden of stating a plausible claim upon which relief can be granted under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). This would imply pleading enough to show a plausible case why the govt acted with intent for the Fifth Amendment claim (the First Amendment claim has no such intent requirement). I'm assuming the court found it obvious that the complaint didn't make a plausible enough case for intent.
From the opinion: "The Foundation has plausibly alleged that its members were similarly situated to individuals against whom the defacement ordinance was not enforced, and that the District discriminated on the basis of viewpoint when enforcing the ordinance."
I haven't read the case in any detail, but the "plausible" language makes it look like the Twombly/Iqbal standard is doing some heavy lifting here. I searched very briefly for "12(b)(6)" in the opinion and found it. So I'm assuming the court is just resolving things in favor of the plaintiff at the pleadings stage.
I think it's just a case where it's so egregious because the setting and message are so similar, yet all of one message were arrested while none of the other were. This stretches the bounds of believability past the breaking point.
They give extremely wide latitude to the state. However, this goes too far.
To use your example. If a road always has people going 15 mph over, but black men are ticketed for 0.5 mph over in a consistent manner while white men never are, that would qualify, but it needs to be extreme.
This is exactly what Equal Protection was intended for. Not to ensure that a groomer like the Rev. Kirkland could "marry" the "person that he loves."
Oops. wrong thread!
It seems hard to see how the “similarly situated” prong passes. Two isolated people are hardly a similar situation to a riot with thousands of people. The District could plausibly argue that if it attempted to enforce its law on the BLM people, hundreds of people would be injured and the resulting rampage might burn the city to the ground, while two isolated individuals posed little overall threat and hence could be easily picked up without mishap.
The “similarly situated” prong would appear to permit people likely to fight back and injure the police to be treated more lightly than others. Perhaps those more likely to resist violently are in a situation that, as a matter of strict justice, ought to be repressed more forcefully rather than treated more leniently. It may well be unfair to come down harder on people who are in fact more law-abiding. However that may be, they are nonetheless in an unambiguously DIFFERENT situation. And that, it seems to me, is enough to defeat the similarly situated claim.
Two people are unable to credibly threaten violence so they get arrested? Meanwhile a mob can do what it wants?
So you are arguing for the heckler's/rioter's veto on enforcement action? Seems to privledge the kind of anti-social behavior law exists to reduce, but hey who doesn't like a BBQ.
That was my thought as well. But the District will have the opportunity to convince the court of that now that the case can continue.
If the District can, for example, prove that while the BLM painting was going on it was just too dangerous for police at that moment to go in and identify/cite/arrest the violators or that all available manpower was busy with more critical tasks, that would be a pretty compelling argument. However if the District has no compelling evidence to support these or similar claims or chooses not to make such claims, that is their prerogative.
It's enough to survive dismissal, isn't it? Since it's fact-based, shouldn't a jury decide whether the situations are the same or different?