The Volokh Conspiracy
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Ending Chevron Deference in the States
While the US Supreme Court continues to require judges to defer to administrative agencies' interpretations of law in many situations, numerous states have abolished or severely curbed such deference. The results should temper both hopes and fears associated with ending judicial deference to agencies.
The Supreme Court's controversial 1984 decision in Chevron v. Natural Resources Defense Council requires federal judges to defer to administrative agencies' interpretations of federal laws that the latter administer, so long as Congress has not clearly addressed the issue in question, and the agency's view is "reasonable." Many conservatives and libertarians have long sought to overturn Chevron, and some hope that doing so will seriously constrain the administrative state. By contrast, defenders of Chevron (many of them on the political left) fear that overruling it would greatly hamper regulatory agencies, and prevent them from using their expertise effectively.
So far, at least, the Supreme Court has not been willing to overturn Chevron, though it has issued a number of decisions limiting its reach. But as my co-blogger Jonathan Adler notes in a recent article for the Brennan Center, many states have barred such deference to agencies when it comes to their state law. Jonathan discusses a recent Ohio Supreme Court decision holding that deference to agencies is only permissible if a statute is ambiguous, and even then never mandatory.
In another recent article (coauthored with Bradyn Lawrence), my wife Alison Somin (an attorney with the Pacific Legal Foundation), defends a proposed Nebraska law that would ban judicial deference to agencies in that state. The bill may well pass in the near future.
As Jonathan notes, Ohio is just one of many states that have either banned judicial deference to agencies or severely constrained it. The list isn't limited to conservative red states like Utah and Florida. It also includes the blue state of Delaware (a longtime rejector of deference) and purple states such as Michigan, Arizona, and Wisconsin. Some of these states restrict deference by state supreme court decision, others by legislation or the enactment of constitutional amendments.
The results of these state-level experiments should temper both hopes and fears associated with ending Chevron deference at the federal level. Ending or restricting judicial deference to agencies hasn't gutted the administrative state in any of these jurisdictions or even come close to it. Neither has it ended the use of agency expertise on regulatory issues and turned over policymaking to ignorant yahoos (or at least the yahoos don't seem to have much more influence than they would have otherwise). The no-deference and low-deference states have not become libertarian utopias (or dystopias, depending on your point of view).
So far, at least, the state experience reinforces points I made back in 2018 about the limited impact of ending Chevron deference:
[M]any people tend to forget that the Supreme Court only decided the Chevron case in 1984, and we had a large and active administrative state long before then. Somehow, the powerful agencies established in the Progressive era, the New Deal, the Great Society, and the Nixon administration managed to survive, thrive, and regulate without Chevron.
Pre-Chevron administrative agencies did enjoy the benefit of less extensive forms of judicial deference, such as "Skidmore deference." Those would likely persist even if Chevron were to be severely limited or overruled. But even if the Supreme Court were to completely eliminate judicial deference to administrative agencies' interpretations of federal law (thereby treating them the same as any other litigant), the latter would still wield enormous discretionary power. In a world where there are far more federal laws than any administration could hope to effectively enforce, they would still have broad discretion to determine which violators to go after, and how aggressively. They would also retain control over a broad array of technical questions….
Even on the specific question of interpretation of statutory law, the elimination of formal deference probably would leave in place a good deal of deference in practice. Across a wide range of issues, generalist judges seeking to manage large case-loads may still give special weight to the views of supposedly expert agencies, even if they are not formally required to do so. This is especially likely to happen when it comes to questions that are highly technical and not ideologically controversial….
To the extent that ending Chevron would put agencies on a tighter leash, it is far from clear that this would necessarily benefit the political right more often than the left. As my VC co-blogger (and leading administrative law scholar) Jonathan Adler points out in a New York Times article, a reduction in judicial deference could stymie deregulatory policies as readily as those that increase regulation. The Chevron decision itself deferred to a Reagan administration policy that shifted air pollution regulation in ways decried by environmentalists….
In policy areas such as immigration and drug prohibition, most conservatives—especially since the rise of Trump—actually favor more regulation than most of the left does. Pereira v. Sessions, one of the Supreme Court's recent decisions cutting back on Chevron deference, strikes down a policy that sought to make it easier to deport immigrants. The same is true of then-Judge Gorsuch's most famous lower court opinion criticizing Chevron.
But there are still likely to be important benefits to ending or at least curbing this form of deference. As Alison points out, doing so is a matter of basic fairness in the judicial process:
Chevron and its state clones require judges to abandon their traditional role as umpires who call balls and strikes. Instead, they require judges to put a thumb — and in some cases, more like an anvil — on the scales in favor of the government.
The Nebraska bill would reject the presumption in favor of agency interpretation with one in favor of one preserving liberty in cases where the law is vague. For reasons Alison outlines, this would be a beneficial change. But it is not entailed merely by barring judicial deference to agencies. It requires additional legislation, like the relevant provision of the Nebraska bill (or application of a constitutional rule to the same effect).
In addition to promoting more impartial adjudication, getting rid of Chevron deference can reduce partisan swings in legal interpretation, and end judicial abdication of duty. I summarized these points in my 2018 post:
Ending Chevron deference would not gut the administrative state…. It would, however, have some important beneficial effects. It would put an end to what then-Judge—and future liberal Supreme Court justice—Stephen Breyer, writing in 1986, called an "abdication of judicial responsibility." Neil Gorsuch expressed similar views more recently, calling Chevron "a judge-made doctrine for the abdication of the judicial duty." The Constitution gives judges, not agency bureaucrats, the power to interpret federal law in cases that come before the courts….
The elimination of Chevron would also increase the stability of legal rules, and make it harder for administrations to play fast and loose with the law. As Gorsuch pointed out in a well-known opinion he wrote as a lower court judge, Chevron deference often enables an agency to "reverse its current view 180 degrees anytime based merely on the shift of political winds and still prevail [in court]." When the meaning of federal law shifts with the political agendas of succeeding administrations, that makes a mockery of the rule of law and undermines the stability that businesses, state governments, and ordinary citizens depend on to organize their affairs. A new administration should not be able to make major changes in law simply by having its agency appointees reinterpret it.
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Chevron deference? I thought this would be another post on the Donziger case....
So ... maybe I missed it, but shouldn't there be some great empirical studies on this now? Not just musings of law professors with notable agendas, but ACTUAL DATA. Because we have states performing experiments- you can look at real numbers - before and after changes, as well as between states (states that change and states that don't). This is a genuine natural experiment that is perfectly set up to give some answers. I know I'd like to see some.
Because based on my limited and anecdotal experience, I would say that the result of getting rid of Chevron deference at a state level has been "less bad than predicted by naysayers, but not still bad." Let me explain-
It's not like getting rid of Chevron deference ended the world. Or made the administrative process a joke. For the most part, things continued on just as they did before. But all the effects I have seen have been bad- increased cost of litigation. Increased uncertainty. More arguably incorrect results. And it's not like the agencies get reigned in, or the courts are swooping in to protect liberty, either.
So run some numbers. Use a big state like Florida (before and after). Tell me what the actual results of these changes are, not just the "feels."
Before you can "run the numbers", you have to define what numbers you're going to look at. What specific metrics do you propose that would tease out the costs and benefits of Chevron deference?
It can't just be case reversals. That's a one-time hit. Once the precedent is set, it won't even be argued (by either side) in future cases. That makes it's effect conceptually very relevant but statistically hard to identify. Agency actions (or their lack)? What could you actually measure?
Great question. I think the following would be helpful to look at, both before and after the decision:
1. Number of cases that get appealed to court after going through the agency process.
2. Number of cases that find against the agency.
That's right off the top of my head- for example, imagine the following scenario:
After repeal of "state Chevron," you have:
A. Large increase in number of administrative decisions (ALJ decisions) appealed.
B. Stable number of cases finding against the agency.
If that was the case, it would tell you that it is dramatically increasing the cost of litigation, without changing the results. Play with those numbers on both ends and you get different results.
(As for tax litigator below, you can't really just look at numbers in isolation. That's why you should start with one of these natural experiments. In addition, the vast majority of the time that a court employs Chevron deference it's not going to bother explaining other plausible reasons, in the same way that a court with a heightened standard in other areas often doesn't bother.)
Here is a link to my new paper on this subject:
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=4279930
And a response by Judge Jeffrey Sutton and John Rockenbach:
https://www.bu.edu/bulawreview/files/2022/11/SUTTON-with-ROCKENBACH.pdf
"By contrast, defenders of Chevron (many of them on the political left) fear that overruling it would greatly hamper regulatory agencies, and prevent them from using their expertise effectively."
As covid showed - most of the policies implemented during covid were not based on actual science expertise.
For many, Covid shattered any illusion that these federal institutions are anything but self-serving partisan midwits.
Did you see the NIH is gonna collect a cool $415M on mnra royalties? We all know that $415M is going to wind up in the bank accounts of a bunch of Fauci-types.
Bravo - I have numerous comments from commentators regarding the effectives of the vaccines in preventing deaths and hospitalizations based on the numerous studies showing the effectiveness. (though those multitude of studies all use the same data base - so effectively only one study). Most of the commentators display very weak mathematical skills.
I have stated that the vax effectiveness is vastly overstated which is contrary to the published studies.
3 major factors stand out.
1) if the vax are only 5%-10% effective in preventing transmission, are they really 90+% effective against serious illness or death. Then only effective for 6 months or less. Seems to be much weaker than assumed
2) 80+% of deaths have occurred in the 65+ age group which is 80%+ vaxed. The historical trend for pandemics has been the 3 major wave has 60%-90% death rate compared to the 2nd major wave. The covid death rate in the third wave was approx 65-70% of the death rate 2nd wave. If the vax was as effective as advertised, the death rate in the 3rd major wave would have been in the 20%-30% range.
3) the death rate of the unvaxed in the 2nd wave was approx 50 per week per 100k where as it was approx 190-250 per week for the unvaxed in the 3rd wave. totallly implausible.
Thus my point that the expertise of the experts just isnt there - or intentionally missleading
Your arguments are not mathematical. They are 1) speculation, 2) speculation, and 3) appeal to incredulity.
You can throw out insults to those pointing out you're being foolish all you want, but it doesn't make it a good choice to follow some random blog so slavishly.
This is basic math - Your response is further demonstration that you lack basic math skills
though you are in good company with queen & Nige.
Off course you , queen or Nige have ever been able to point to a single statement I have made that has been incorrect.
I have done some data analysis of Chevron in the Courts of Appeals. I used two different one-year data sets compiled by others. The conclusion I draw from these data sets and other forays into Chevron deference is:
1. Chevron deference like deference before Chevron applied to reasonable agency interpretations. As Justice Scalia said in a seminal law review article, Chevron resulting in the two-step Framework simply made it more predictable when a court would defer to reasonable agency interpretations.
2. The Chevron Framework is sufficiently flexible to permit in most cases the court to apply the interpretation it prefers without deferring to an agency interpretation that it thinks is not best. Consider this insight from Second Circuit Judge Jon O. Newman: On Reasonableness: The Many Meanings of Law’s Most Ubiquitous Concept, 21 J. App. Prac. & Process 1, 83 (2021):
It is difficult to know how the Supreme Court or other federal courts determine whether an agency’s interpretation of an ambiguous statute is “reasonable.” No weighing process appears to be involved. It would probably be too cynical to suggest that the courts are just accepting agency interpretations with which they agree and rejecting those they disfavor, but in some cases that almost seems to be what is happening. Clearly there is no one meaning of “reasonable” in the context of Chevron deference. Perhaps this is simply a context where there is a narrow range of acceptable agency interpretations, on either side of the disputed issue, that courts are willing to uphold, but they are ready to assert the power to reject others that, for stated, or more often unstated, reasons, they deem beyond an amorphous notion of “reasonable.”
3. In my dataset analysis, I found not one court of appeals opinion that said real deference applied. Real deference is a court actually articulating a “better” interpretation than the agency interpretation and then deferring to the agency interpretation. Not one opinion said that. By invoking Chevron and stopping at finding the agency interpretation reasonable, the courts did not state whether the agency interpretation was better or not better than an alternative interpretation. I suspect, as I think Judge Newman suspects also, that those courts were “deferring” to what they believed without saying was the better agency interpretation. I put deferring in quotes because there is no such thing as actual deference to the better agency interpretation (i.e., the better agency interpretation is certainly reasonable). There is deference only when the court believes that there is an interpretation better than an agency interpretation and nevertheless defers to the agency interpretation. Not one opinion in the data sets indicates that that phenomenon occurred. Not one.
4. Finally, to close the loop on deference, Skidmore is not deference. All Skidmore does is require a court to respectfully consider the agency interpretation in determining what is the better interpretation. If the court considers the agency interpretation and finds it better, then it is not deferring to the agency interpretation.
My latest foray into the Chevron smokescreen is here: Overlap Between Chevron Deference and Skidmore Respect; Chevron Deference Masking Skidmore Respect (Federal Tax Procedure Blog 3/25/23) http://federaltaxprocedure.blogspot.com/2023/03/overlap-between-chevron-deference-and.html
I conclude that eliminating Chevron deference (and earlier forms of real deference) would not affect outcomes in most cases.
I earlier wrote a Blog linked in the above blog titled: Chevron Deference: Much Ado About Not Much.
Exactly!
Ending Chevron is the first step. Challenging Congress' numerous arguably unconstitutional delegations of authority to an alphabet soup of effectively unaccountable bureaucrats is the next.
What does "...ban judicial deference to agencies..." mean, in practice? Courts must overrule any regulatory agency's decision? Or does it just mean courts can't use the words "defer" or "deference" in their decisions. Perhaps these laws don't change the regulatory landscape much because they are meaningless posturing.
State regulators are idiots, generally.