Federal Court Strikes Down Missouri's Second Amendment Protection Act on Supremacy Clause Grounds

From today's U.S. v. Missouri, decided by Judge Brian Wimes (W.D. Mo.):

The Supremacy Clause provides that the "Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof … shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding." "By this declaration, the states are prohibited from passing any acts which shall be repugnant to a law of the United States." "The states have no power, by taxation or otherwise, to retard, impede, burden, or in any manner control the operations of the constitutional laws enacted by congress to carry into effect the powers vested in the national government." Further, "[t]he law of congress is paramount; it cannot be nullified by direct act of any state, nor the scope and effect of its provisions set at naught indirectly." As such, a state legislature's attempt to "interpos[e]" itself against federal law "is illegal defiance of constitutional authority." …

Section 1.420 [which is part of the Missouri Second Amendment Preservation Act] provides that certain federal firearms regulations are "infringements on the people's right to keep and bear arms, as guaranteed by Amendment II of the Constitution of the United States and Article I, Section 23 of the Constitution of Missouri, within the borders of this state, including, but not limited to," in summary, (1) taxes or fees on firearms, accessories, or ammunition; (2) registration of firearms, accessories, or ammunition; (3) registration or tracking of ownership of firearms, accessories, or ammunition; (4) bans on possession/ownership/transfer of firearms, accessories, or ammunition by law-abiding citizens; and (5) confiscation of firearms, accessories, or ammunition from law-abiding citizens.

A federal law preempts a state law if the two are in direct conflict. A "direct conflict" occurs "[w]hen compliance with both federal and state regulations is a physical impossibility or when a state law stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress …." If "Congress enacts a law that imposes restrictions or confers rights on private actors," and "a state law confers rights or imposes restrictions that conflict with federal law," then "the federal law takes precedence and the state law is preempted."

Under the uncontroverted facts, the NFA [National Firearms Act] sets forth taxation requirements on the manufacture and transfer of certain firearms. Section 1.420(1) states "[a]ny tax, levy, feel or stamp imposed on firearms, firearm accessories, or ammunition … that might reasonably be expected to create a chilling effect on the purchase or ownership of those items by law-abiding citizens," is an "infringement on the people's right to keep and bear arms, as guaranteed by Amendment II of the Constitution of the United States … within the borders of [Missouri]." However, that Missouri states that the taxation requirements "create a chilling effect

…" is immaterial where Congress has lawfully imposed the requirements. Further, such a statement stands as an obstacle to the full purposes and objectives of federal firearms regulatory measures because it creates confusion regarding a Missouri citizen's obligation to comply with the taxation requirements of the NFA. As such, § 1.420 is preempted.

Under the uncontroverted facts, the NFA provides for the registration and tracking of firearms and their possession. The GCA [Gun Control Act] imposes other requirements on those engaged in the business of dealing or manufacturing or importing firearms or ammunition. These Federal Firearms Licensees (FFL) must receive a license from the Attorney General and pay certain fees. Each FFL is required to maintain "records of importation, production, shipment, receipt, sale, or other disposition of firearms," and may not transfer a firearm to an unlicensed person without completing a Firearms Transaction Record. FFLs must also conduct background checks using the National Instant Criminal Background Check System and verify a purchaser's identify for an over-the-counter sale of a firearm. Moreover, FFLS must ensure each firearm manufactured and imported must be identified by serial number and the licensees' identifying mark.

However, §§ 1.420(2) and 1.420(3) state "[a]ny registration or tracking of firearms, firearm accessories, or ammunition," and/or "[a]ny registration or tracking of the ownership of firearms, firearm accessories or ammunition," is an "infringement on the people's right to keep and bear arms, as guaranteed by Amendment II of the Constitution of the United States … within the borders of [Missouri]." Sections 1.420(2) and 1.420(3) create confusion regarding registration of firearms by purporting to invalidate federal registration and tracking requirements. The logical implication is that Missouri citizens need not comply with federal licensing and registration requirements "within the borders of [Missouri]." Since Missouri citizens must comply with federal registration and licensing requirements for firearms notwithstanding SAPA's definition of infringements, §§ 1.420(2) and 1.420(3) stand as obstacles to the full purposes and objectives of federal firearms regulatory measures and are preempted.

Moreover, the GCA also prohibits possession of firearms by certain categories of individuals, including those who have been convicted of a felony, those who have been convicted of a misdemeanor crime of domestic violence, those who have been dishonorably discharged from the military, noncitizens not lawfully in the United States, unlawful users of controlled substances, and others. Sections 1.420(4) and 1.420(5) state "[a]ny act forbidding the possession, ownership, use, or transfer of a firearm, firearm accessory, or ammunition by law- abiding citizens" and/or "[a]ny act ordering the confiscation of firearms, firearm accessories, or ammunition from law-abiding citizens is an "infringement on the people's right to keep and bear arms, as guaranteed by Amendment II of the Constitution of the United States … within the borders of [Missouri]." As used in these provisions, "law-abiding citizen" is defined as "a person who is not otherwise precluded under state law from possessing a firearm and shall not be construed to include anyone who is not legally present in the United States or in the state of Missouri." Sections 1.420(4) and (5) refer to as "infringements" limits on who may possess a firearm, as those limits are set forth in the GCA. SAPA's definition of "law- abiding citizen" expands who may lawfully possess a firearm within the state of Missouri and/or whose firearms, firearm accessories, or ammunition may be subject to confiscation.

Sections 1.420(4) and 1.420(5) create confusion about the lawful possession, ownership, use, transfer, or confiscation of firearms within Missouri by purporting to reduce the scope of federal regulations pertaining to the possession, ownership, use, transfer, or confiscation of firearms, with which federal regulations Missouri citizens must comply. By attempting to alter the definition of a "law-abiding citizen" who may possess or own or transfer or use a firearm within Missouri, §§ 1.420(4) and 1.420(5) conflict with the GCA's definition of who may possess or own or transfer or use a firearm within Missouri, and as such, §§ 1.420(4) and 1.420(5) stand as obstacles to the full purposes and objectives of federal firearms regulatory measures and are preempted. For all of these reasons, § 1.420 is preempted and unconstitutional on its face….

Moreover, SAPA's other substantive provisions are unconstitutional independent of § 1.420 because they violate the doctrine of intergovernmental immunity…. Section 1.430 provides that all federal laws and acts that infringe on the people's right to keep and bear arms under the Second Amendment are invalid in Missouri, are not recognized by Missouri, and are rejected by Missouri. At best, this statute causes confusion among state law enforcement officials who are deputized for federal task force operations, and at worst, is unconstitutional on its face. While Missouri cannot be compelled to assist in the enforcement of federal regulations within the state, it may not regulate federal law enforcement or otherwise interfere with its operations.

Section 1.440 imposes a duty on Missouri courts and law enforcement agencies to protect against infringements as defined under § 1.420. In creating an affirmative duty to protect against infringements, § 1.440 effectively imposes an affirmative duty to effectuate an obstacle to federal firearms enforcement within the state. In imposing a duty on courts and state law enforcement to obstruct the enforcement of federal firearms regulations in Missouri, § 1.440 violates intergovernmental immunity. "No State government can exclude [the Federal Government] from the exercise of any authority conferred upon it by the Constitution, [or] obstruct its authorized officers against its will …."

Section 1.450 regulates the United States directly in violation of the doctrine of intergovernmental immunity. Section 1.450 states that "[n]o entity … shall have the authority to enforce or attempt to enforce any federal acts …" that are deemed infringements under § 1.420….

Finally, §§ 1.460 and 1.470 are each independently invalid as discriminatory against federal authority in violation of the doctrine of intergovernmental immunity. Section 1.460 imposes a monetary penalty through civil enforcement action against any political subdivision or law enforcement agency that employs an officer who knowingly violates § 1.450 while acting under color of federal law—that is, any local law enforcement official who assists in federal firearms regulatory enforcement in a deputized capacity. Section 1.470 imposes a monetary penalty through civil enforcement action against any political subdivision or law enforcement agency that employs an officer who formerly enforced the infringements identified in § 1.420—that is, certain federal firearms regulations—or, an officer who has given material aid and support to others engaged in the enforcement of the infringements identified in § 1.420—that is, federal law enforcement. The exposure to monetary penalties set forth in § 1.460 and 1.470 arise from federally deputized state law enforcement officials' enforcement of federal firearm regulations. Moreover, these enforcement schemes are likely to discourage federal law enforcement recruitment efforts. For these reasons, § 1.460 and § 1.470 violate intergovernmental immunity and are invalid.…

Comments

[Dr. Ed 2]

“the states are prohibited from passing any acts which shall be repugnant to a law of the United States.”

I presume this would include both legalization of marijuana and sanctuary city/state laws.

“that state and local officials may lawfully participate in joint federal task forces, assist in the investigation and enforcement of federal firearm crimes, and fully share information with the Federal Government without fear of [SAPA’s] penalties.”

This I have a problem with -- how can the Federal government require a state to pay for Federal task forces? Doesn't the state have the right to say "no, you can't go" -- not wearing a state-issued badge and on state time. If the Feds want to hire them and issue them FEDERAL badges, fine, but that's different.

Even if the officers "volunteer", don't they have to have the permission of their employer?

[Drewski]

"I presume this would include both legalization of marijuana and sanctuary city/state laws."

So wait: You think every state must have a law analogous to every federal criminal law, and that not having one is identical to a law that declares the federal law invalid? You also think the Supremacy Clause somehow overrides the Non-commandeering Clause and requires states to enforce federal crimes? Is that what you're presuming? Because that's obviously not equivalent.

[Brett Bellmore]

That does appear to be where the reasoning of this decision points. I don't think Dr. Ed actually agrees with the decision, though; He's just pointing out the implications for other policies.

[Noscitur a sociis]

That does appear to be where the reasoning of this decision points.

In what conceivable way? The decision doesn't require the state to do anything; it just can't obstruct the federal government from fulfilling its own lawful functions.

[Brett Bellmore]

Remember, the court struck down the WHOLE law. Part of it just prohibited state employees from assisting in enforcement of federal gun laws.

Doing that stood anti-commandeering on its head, it requires the state to permit its own employees to enforce federal gun laws.

[Zarniwoop]

What part of

While Missouri cannot be compelled to assist in the enforcement of federal regulations within the state, it may not regulate federal law enforcement or otherwise interfere with its operations.

don't you understand?

[Brett Bellmore]

The part where the whole law didn't do that, and it had a severability clause.

Prohibiting state employees from assisting in enforcement isn't relevantly "or otherwise interfering", it's simply an exercise of the state's authority over its own employees in the context of anti-commandeering. If telling state employees not to enforce a federal law was unconstitutional, the anti-commandeering principle would be dead.

Maybe you want that, maybe this judge wants that, but I doubt the Supreme court does.

[Zarniwoop]

So then whinge about the improper severability analysis (I think you’re still wrong, but that’s at least slightly arguably closer).

Don't complain that the court "requires the state to permit its own employees to enforce federal gun laws" when it expressly says the exact opposite thing in the opinion. That part makes you look like a moron.

[Brett Bellmore]

Have you somehow missed me whinging about the improper severability analysis?

[Absaroka]

Noscitur, if you're feeling charitable:

I get that Missouri can't e.g. have the State Police arrest ATF agents, or block their cars or whatever. But can you talk about:

"Section 1.460 imposes a monetary penalty through civil enforcement action against any political subdivision or law enforcement agency that employs an officer who knowingly violates § 1.450 while acting under color of federal law—that is, any local law enforcement official who assists in federal firearms regulatory enforcement in a deputized capacity."

Is this just saying 'if you let local LEOs be deputized, then they have to obey all the orders they get down the federal chain of command'? So if you let your LEOs be deputized for a drug task force, they can't refuse to arrest for felon in possession or whatever? Can a county or whatever forbid its LEOs from accepting federal deputization at all?

(not a fan of these laws, for guns, immigration, or whatever. Just trying to understand the federal/state boundaries better)

[Brett Bellmore]

"Can a county or whatever forbid its LEOs from accepting federal deputization at all?"

See Portland. Portland pulls officers from federal deputations, but legal questions swirl

[Absaroka]

Interesting. There the the city was withdrawing its permission.

I'm not sure that's completely the same as the city telling its officers 'you may not accept federal deputy status'? At least some cities require approval for any outside employment by LEOs. Is being federally deputized 'outside employment', or is it like joining the garden club?

[Mr. Bumble]

It would at least seem like a conflict.

[Brett Bellmore]

More the former, I'd think, since it carries actual powers and, perhaps, duties. Though it seems to have been considered in the Portland case that the city could, indeed, order their cops, so deputized, to not enforce federal laws.

In Portland the issue was that being federal deputies allowed the feds to prosecute attacks on the cops as a federal crime, even if the local authorities didn't want to prosecute. The city objected to this circumventing their efforts to allow their own cops to be attacked without consequence.

A very Portland complaint indeed! I'm guessing the cops themselves were not sympathetic to the city's position.

[Martinned]

the Non-commandeering Clause

The what now?

[David Nieporent]

I presume this would include both legalization of marijuana and sanctuary city/state laws.

Yes, because you're, to use a technical legal term, a moron.

Legalization of marijuana — i.e., not punishing people for possessing/using it — does not in any way prevent the federal government from punishing people for possessing/using it.

Similarly, sanctuary city/state laws — i.e., a city or state not volunteering information about people's immigration status to the federal government — does not in any way prevent the federal government from rounding up and deporting those people.

[Frank Drackman]

David Never-potent strikes again,
define "Moron", Moron.
and if you weren't such a Moron you'd realize it's very insensitive to the Morons, just like "Nigger, Kike, Spook, Slant, Cocksucker" are to umm, you get the idea.
Since I don't want to keep a Moron in suspense,
Moron (noun) "A person of a mild to moderate degree of learning difficulty (mental retardation). A person with an IQ of between 50 and 70. The term is not used in medicine. From the Greek moros , stupid."

Frank "Shaddapppp"

[ObviouslyNotSpam]

Are you claiming to be offended on behalf of people with an IQ between 50 and 70?

[Absaroka]

"Legalization of marijuana — i.e., not punishing people for possessing/using it — does not in any way prevent the federal government from punishing people for possessing/using it."

That's a good example, perhaps. A state legalizes marijuana, and tells the state troopers 'we don't want you arresting anyone for marijuana', and passes a law to that effect. Some troopers are on the Joint State-Fed Drug Task Force and are federally deputized. One day the commander says 'OK, guys, today we are raiding a state-legal marijuana store'. Can the troopers say 'Uh, sorry, our state has a law that says we can't help you with that'.

[shawn_dude]

Why not? They're still state employees and any cooperation state employees have with federal employees has to be sensitive to these differences in approach. The bigger question would be: why would a state willingly join a task force where it would be put in this situation in the first place? If they did join the task force, wouldn't they stipulate areas where state employees could not be used?

[John F. Carr]

The court decided the provisions of the law were not severable and invalidated the law in its entirety.

[Michael P]

Now do immigration law and "sanctuary" jurisdictions.

[Krayt]

Sanctuary laws are usually crafted carefully, relying on denying state employees from assisting, perfectly fine, and usually end with an escape clause, something like, "except where conflicts with federal law."

[Krayt]

Having said that, it would be interesting to see if any sanctuary legislation applies fines or punishment for helping the feds.

And what about firing for insubordination? And even if firing is ok, will they get to claim unemployment?

[Brett Bellmore]

AB450: Employment regulation: immigration worksite enforcement actions.

"
This bill would impose various requirements on public and private employers with regard to federal immigration agency immigration worksite enforcement actions. Except as otherwise required by federal law, the bill would prohibit an employer or other person acting on the employer's behalf from providing voluntary consent to an immigration enforcement agent to enter nonpublic areas of a place of labor unless the agent provides a judicial warrant, except as specified. Except as required by federal law, the bill would prohibit an employer or other person acting on the employer's behalf from providing voluntary consent to an immigration enforcement agent to access, review, or obtain the employer's employee records without a subpoena or court order, subject to a specified exception. The bill would grant the Labor Commissioner or the Attorney General the exclusive authority to enforce these provisions and would require that any penalty recovered be deposited in the Labor Enforcement and Compliance Fund. The bill would prescribe penalties for failure to satisfy the prohibitions described above of $2,000 up to $5,000 for a first violation and $5,000 up to $10,000 for each subsequent violation, as defined. The bill would specify circumstances for which penalties do not apply."

So, yes.

[Brett Bellmore]

"Sanctuary laws are usually crafted carefully,"

Maybe outside California they are. California actually requires private employers to, for instance, warn employees if ICE is making inquiries.

[Sarcastr0]

Which is carefully drafted. It prevailed against a DoJ lawsuit.

[Brett Bellmore]

About as carefully drafted as this law; The state law required employers to affirmatively thwart immigration law enforcement.

[Sarcastr0]

Except as required by federal law!

California did a marginally better job in walking that tightrope.

I have my theories about why, but we'll see how it shakes out in the end.

[Brett Bellmore]

California got a judge who wanted to uphold their statutes, Missouri didn't.

[Mr. Bumble]

Bingo!

[Sarcastr0]

When in doubt, just declare it was those libs and move on.

Congrats on your unfalsifiable worldview. It's really lame!

[rloquitur]

This decision seems very wrong--first, a State gets to set rules for participation of the employees of a State's political subdivisions in Federal task forces. Second, since when does void for vagueness apply to Supremacy questions.

[Brett Bellmore]

I agree. It appears to me that at least some parts of this law are absolutely constitutional under anti-commandeering doctrine, for instance.

Additionally, how can the state be compelled to hire people it doesn't want to hire?

Finally, how can the court decide the provisions of a law are unseverable when it contains an explicit severability clause?

I'll admit the provisions permitting sanctioning of federal employees doing their jobs probably run afoul of the supremacy clause, though I question whether the supremacy clause actually applies to unconstitutional federal laws.

But there are definitely parts of this law that should have been upheld, and I'll be interesting to see the appeal.

[rloquitur]

Hmmm--what about the prosecution of a federal officer who gets QI?

[Brett Bellmore]

I don't think the courts, which invented UQI would permit it to be circumvented by a state.

[Kazinski]

Qualified immunity is for lawsuits not criminal acts, and Federal officers almost never get qualified immunity because the federal courts throw the suit out before it even gets that far. For the most part Bivens is a dead letter.

But, let's say a federal officer shoots an unarmed perp for refusing to obey commands, and the court decides that they get QI because there is no case on point. Do you think the state is barred by the constitution to charge the federal agent for murder or manslaughter? I can't find that in my constitution.

[Brett Bellmore]

No, they're not barred from doing it, as such, it's just futile, because the case will be moved to federal court, and then dropped. Like happened with Horiuchi.

[bernard11]

I question whether the supremacy clause actually applies to unconstitutional federal laws.

And I question why you think you or the State of Missouri have the right to declare a law unconstitutional.

Because you don't. Neither does MO.

[Brett Bellmore]

Aren’t states bound by the 2nd amendment? I’m pretty sure the McDonald decision says they are.

Aren’t states independently obligated to not violate constitutional rights even before the courts tell them to stop? Which means they have to form their own opinions of which laws are unconstitutional, prior and independently from the courts.

Now, such opinions can’t authorize action; The state can't act on its belief a law is constitutional, in the teeth of a court ruling to the contrary. But the state can certainly refrain from an act it thinks unconstitutional, even if the courts would permit it.

Aren’t states entitled to refuse to assist in the enforcement of federal laws? Non-commandeering?

This pretty clearly implies that states can at least refuse to assist in the enforcement of laws they think unconstitutional, even if the courts don’t (yet) agree.

[Sarcastr0]

Aren’t states independently obligated to not violate constitutional rights even before the courts tell them to stop? Which means they have to form their own opinions of which laws are unconstitutional, prior and independently from the courts.

Not independently from the courts, no.

[Brett Bellmore]

Not independently in the sense of being able to act on their belief something is constitutional when a court has ruled it unconstitutional, no. The courts have the last word in the negative sense.

Independently in the sense that they don't have to wait on a court ruling a law unconstitutional before refraining from upholding it? Yeah, in that sense they do.

Remember, the Supreme court has repeatedly upheld the notion that a President has an independent obligation to consider the constitutionality of laws, even prior to court rulings, because he is oath bound not to violate it.

But state officials are similarly bound by their oaths of office not to violate the Constitution, so the same reasoning applies to them.

[Sarcastr0]

Independently in the sense that they don’t have to wait on a court ruling a law unconstitutional before refraining from upholding it? Yeah, in that sense they do.

This is not how our separation of powers jurisprudence works. You yell about faithfully execute on other grounds; where there is no discretion, hiding behind your interpretation of the constitution isn’t a shield. Where there is discretion, you don't need a shield.

[Brett Bellmore]

Yeah, actually it IS how it works. If Congress passes an arguably unconstitutional law, the President doesn't have to wait on a court order to refuse to enforce it. There are multiple cases where the Supreme court has confirmed that the President's 'take care' duty does NOT obligate him to enforce a law he thinks is unconstitutional.

On the state level it's even stronger, because the President has that "take care" duty, and the states have no obligation AT ALL to assist in the enforcement of federal laws. They can't obstruct, but they can tell the federal government to do it themselves, and not lift so much as a finger to help.

So, at least in that part, this law is perfectly constitutional.

[Sarcastr0]

If Congress passes an arguably unconstitutional law, the President doesn’t have to wait on a court order to refuse to enforce it.

I mean, anyone can refuse to enforce anything and go to court to claim the law being enforced is unconstitutional.
But you said something a lot stronger than that: "Aren’t states independently obligated to not violate constitutional rights even before the courts tell them to stop? Which means they have to form their own opinions of which laws are unconstitutional, prior and independently from the courts."

That's an affirmative legal duty that is not real.

[Brett Bellmore]

You think it's not real, anyway, apparently. But state officials typically take oaths to uphold the Constitution.

[Absaroka]

It's 1942, and Sheriff Jones just got told to start rounding up American citizens of Japanese descent. Korematsu has yet to be decided. Your view is that Sheriff Jones may not say 'I think this is unconstitutional, and I will not participate'?

[Dr. Ed 2]

If whomever gave Sheriff Jones his authority to lawfully use force tells him not to do it, then he has no authority under that grant of authority to do it. And particularly not using their equipment and while on their time.

[Sarcastr0]

He can say it's immoral and take his licks, and he can say it's because of the constitution - but that's the constitution's moral force, not it's legal force.

[Dilan Esper]

He can violate it if it is indeed unlawful. You can always violate an unlawful order.

But you had better be right that it's going to be held unlawful. (And of course Japanese internment was upheld.)

[Kazinski]

Well you are wrong there.

Most state officials also take an oath to support and defend the constitution. Are you saying the oath is only operative if a judge tells them it's operative?

I've heard plenty of cases of local and state officials refusing to enforce laws because they think the law is unconstitutional.

[bernard11]

Aren’t states independently obligated to not violate constitutional rights even before the courts tell them to stop? Which means they have to form their own opinions of which laws are unconstitutional, prior and independently from the courts.

You ignore, on purpose, I suspect, that much of this law tries to prevent the federal government from enforcing federal law on the grounds that MO considers that federal law unconstitutional.

In creating an affirmative duty to protect against infringements, § 1.440 effectively imposes an affirmative duty to effectuate an obstacle to federal firearms enforcement within the state.

Aren’t states independently obligated to not violate constitutional rights even before the courts tell them to stop? Which means they have to form their own opinions of which laws are unconstitutional, prior and independently from the courts.

[Brett Bellmore]

"You ignore, on purpose, I suspect, that much of this law tries to prevent the federal government from enforcing federal law on the grounds that MO considers that federal law unconstitutional."

I don't ignore that. I've already said that the part that actually interferes with the actions of federal officers or sanctions them would be unconstitutional. The part that regulates what STATE employees can do, OTOH? Just fine.

And MO's opinion in this matter is quite reasonable and widely shared.

[David Nieporent]

Finally, how can the court decide the provisions of a law are unseverable when it contains an explicit severability clause?

Severability analysis is generally a two-part inquiry: (1) can these individual provisions work on their own; and (2) would the legislature have wanted that? A severability clause speaks only to the second factor, not the first. If provisions cannot logically stand on their own, then they cannot be severed regardless of the presence of a severability clause.

[Brett Bellmore]

As near as I can tell, the judge decided against severability because he thought the state's findings violated the supremacy clause; That the state could not constitutionally have its own opinion about the constitutionality of federal laws.

[Brett Bellmore]

This bit from the decision is telling:

"SAPA’s practical effects are counterintuitive to its stated purpose. While purporting to protect citizens, SAPA exposes citizens to greater harm by interfering with the Federal Government’s ability to enforce lawfully enacted firearms regulations designed by Congress for the purpose of protecting citizens within the limits of the Constitution."

It seems the judge isn't willing to even admit protecting 2nd amendment rights IS protecting citizens. Well, nominated by Obama, hardly surprising.

[Sarcastr0]

Oh hey saying your unsupported Second Amendment obeisance is not the required analysis, Brett.

nominated by Obama, hardly surprising.
When they rule against what you want, they're either nominated by Dems or captured by the establishment.
When they rule for what you want, they were either forced to as a sop to the masses because your way was so clearly correct, or they were Republican appointees with amazing fidelity to the law.

That kind of partisan tautology is amazing for delegitimizing the judicial system, and not for much else.

[Brett Bellmore]

You think it IS surprising that a President who didn't like the 2nd amendment would nominate like minded judges?

[Zarniwoop]

FFS, you are completely misreading what the court says:

While Missouri cannot be compelled to assist in the enforcement of federal regulations within the state, it may not regulate federal law enforcement or otherwise interfere with its operations.

The court expressly says the anti-comandeering doctrine applies, and this ain't about that.

[Brett Bellmore]

Strange, then, that they struck down the whole law, including the anti-commandeering part.

That is to say, they may nod in the direction of anti-commandeering, but didn't permit it to have any effect.

[Voize]

They can, they just need to do it carefully like California did, constraining the actions of state agencies and use of state resources, with exemptions for complying with federal law.

[Brett Bellmore]

You need to look at AB 450. Penalizes private employers who allow ICE access to records or the workplace without being compelled by a warrant or subpoena, and requires employers to warn employees if ICE makes any inquiries. You cited the only immigration law that didn't have supremacy problems in that package of bills they passed.

[M L]

Pay attention, "constitutional conservatives." This is how something like the Second Amendment becomes the tool used to defeat the very thing it was supposed to protect.

Government by judiciary is not a solution. This is why the doctrine of "incorporation," invented by judges some 70 years after the amendment that supposedly accomplished it was enacted (without constitutional ratification), is problematic.

Centralized government doesn't work. The paradigm of "just vote harder to send Republicans to D.C. and get more judges" is as good as dead. The compact was broken decades ago with judicial decisions, now we're beyond that and they just send mobs to your judges' doorsteps and threaten the lives of their children.

Regardless, in a case like this, of course the framers had a remedy in mind, Jefferson called it the "rightful remedy" which is for a state to ignore or nullify laws or decisions that are unconstitutional.

[apedad]

How is this centralized government?

The Constitution is an umbrella which covers certain situations/actions.

As long as the state - which VOLUNTARILY joined the nation - remains under the umbrella, then there's no problem.

And stick a fork in the 'state sovereignty' BS too.

The states are legal (or political) entities, but they ain't sovereign.

[Brett Bellmore]

They aren't fully sovereign, but that's as true of the federal government as it is of the states; The federal government is only sovereign over those topics it is assigned, not all matters.

The American federalist system divides sovereignty into parts, and assigns some of it to the federal government, with the residual portion remaining with the states, or with the people if not taking up by the states.

[Stephen Lathrop]

Bellmore, the sovereign of every state is the People of the entire United States. The government of no state is sovereign in any way, just as the government of the United States is not sovereign.

[Kazinski]

I was absent the week they taught Lathropism in school in American Government.
Thank God it wasn't on the final.

[Brett Bellmore]

The states and federal government have been delegated the people's sovereignty. They exercise it on loan, as it were.

[M L]

"How is this centralized government?"

If you take vast areas of potential government activity, and move them away from state and local municipal governments where they traditionally resided, to a small body of unelected federal judges (even as few as 9), that is rather centralizing, wouldn't you say?

[Sarcastr0]

Um, so ignore the Constitution or else you're a statist?

/Oh, it's you. Go lose another Civil War.

[hoppy025]

This all makes sense as long as states are allowed to leave the nation, which you leftists are never willing to admit.

[Ben_]

Seems like a poorly reasoned ruling. Just to pick something:

"At best, this statute causes confusion among state law enforcement officials who are deputized for federal task force operations…"

So what? The state need not make their personnel available for such operations.

Should be interesting on appeal.

[Zarniwoop]

And the court addresses that, if you actually bother to read the opinion! Third time I'm quoting this! It's not rocket surgery!

While Missouri cannot be compelled to assist in the enforcement of federal regulations within the state, it may not regulate federal law enforcement or otherwise interfere with its operations.

[Ben_]

Again, so what? Did such regulation or interference happen? I don’t think so.

[Zarniwoop]

You're the one whinging about, and I quote:

The state need not make their personnel available for such operations.

If you want to admit your comment is irrelevant, please cowboy up.

[Brett Bellmore]

The judge said that, and then struck down the law that actually represented the state ordering them to not be available.

[Kazinski]

The state should just pass a law that forbids state or local officers from being deputized or assisting in any federal law enforcement.

There's your non-comandeering doctrine.

But I think it's going to be reversed and remanded.

[John F. Carr]

The United States has standing because: "The United States’ law enforcement operations have been affected through withdrawals from and/or limitations on cooperation in joint federal-state task forces, restrictions on sharing information, confusion about the validity of federal law in light of SAPA, and discrimination against federal employees and those deputized for federal law enforcement who lawfully enforce federal law."

Does a state have a right to prohibit employees from participating in a federal-state task force? Participants are "deputized as federal law enforcement officers and voluntarily serve alongside federal officials to enforce federal law."

[Brett Bellmore]

I had thought that it was previously well established that they could do so, at least during working hours. On their own time is more questionable.

[David Nieporent]

Does a state have a right to prohibit employees from participating in a federal-state task force? Participants are “deputized as federal law enforcement officers and voluntarily serve alongside federal officials to enforce federal law.”

I do find that part puzzling, yes.

[Mr. Bumble]

When is the LEO a Fed and when is the LEO a local?

[Estragon]

I imagine they could prohibit it through their employment contracts, no? Other practical consequences might flow from such a step but I don’t see why a state couldn’t say no to this.

[F.D. Wolf]

This case seems to conflict with United States v. California,921 F.3d 865 (9th Cir. 2019).

In that case, the Ninth Circuit largely upheld three California laws passed with the obvious intent of frustrating federal enforcement of immigration laws. One law forbade public or private employers from voluntarily allowing federal immigration officials access to their facilities unless they had a warrant. No problem said the Ninth. Another law prevented transferring an individual to immigration authorities absent a warrant. Again, no problem said the Ninth.

The court held these state laws were permissible under the Tenth Amendment and anticommandeering principles. The instant case does not cite this Ninth Circuit decision. Nor does it make a single mention of the Tenth Amendment or anticommandeering.

[Brett Bellmore]

Exactly my point above: At least some parts of this law are clearly constitutional under anti-commandeering doctrine. States are perfectly entitled to tell their own employees not to help enforce a federal law. At least, they are while they're on the clock.

If said employees decide to anyway on their own time, it gets murkier.

But there's no way this entire law should have been struck down this way, parts of it are clearly constitutional, and it has an explicit severability clause that the court refused to enforce.

The court literally quoted the severability clause, and then ignored it, basically because the judge objected to the state not wanting to enforce these laws.

This law really is pretty analogous to California's sanctuary laws, in some regards it doesn't even go as far.

[hoppy025]

Black judges are almost always thugs who seek to impose their will at any cost.

[Brett Bellmore]

Do try to remember that Thomas IS black, OK?

This doesn't have anything to do with race except as an incidental correlation; Since most blacks are Democrats, even were judicial nominations completely color blind, most black judges would be Democrats, generally left-wing.

But, of course, not all judicial nominations are color blind, the Democrats are racially obsessed, and nominate black judges in excess of their share of the available hiring pool. So, yeah, almost all black judges are left-wingers, but it's not the melanin causing it.

This guy was nominated by Obama, though, which is enough by itself to account for him being 2nd amendment hostile.

[hoppy025]

For every Clarnece Thomas and Tim Scott, there are literally hundreds of pieces of shit like this judge, Maxine Waters, Hakeem Jefferies, and so forth.

They're generally thugs who act outside of America. They don't feel themselves part of it, so they seek to remake it solely for the benefit of people who share their skin color.

That's why they excuse black criminality and seek to disarm whites who may use those arms against the criminals among them (who are a huge portion of their population). That's why they think they're entitled to perpetual rent "moratoriums," "student loan relief" and everything else which is effectively a wealth transfer from whites to them.

It's time to start recognizing reality.

[Kazinski]

" One law forbade public or private employers from voluntarily allowing federal immigration officials access to their facilities unless they had a warrant."

I think this should be struck down.

Say you've got a tree nursery that gives tours to the local rotary, school children, and gardening clubs and allows them to ask questions of the staff.

Why can the state say that's fine but no INS agents?

[Mr. Bumble]

"...shall not be infringed" seems so obvious and yet is enmeshed in a tangled web.

[Frank Drackman]

it doesn't "Seem Obvious" it is obvious. Seems there were (are?) Justice Department Agents making sure "Certain" States obeyed "Certain" Civil Rights Laws.. Speaking of Federal Laws, doesn't the ADA require a wheelchair ramp or something to help Senescent J get into Air Farce 1?? Only a matter of time until he breaks his neck and goes full Christopher R.

[ReaderY]

I notice that in its discussion of standing, the District Court states that the United States has shown an injury im fact, but never states exactly what that injury is.

Later in the opinion, it appears the injury is that the Missouri law will confuse people about whether or not they will have to comply with US laws.

I think standing requires more than this. I think standing requires a demonstration people have actually been confused, not a speculative opinion that it might happen.

In general, legislatures are as free to decorate their statute books with whatever sayings and exhortations they think fit as they are free to decorate their chambers with whatever art they want. Their literary choices only matter to the judiciary if and when they have a concrete effect on somebody. Normally this occurs if there is some sort of enforcement.

In the recent litigation over Texas’ abortion law, it was relative straightforward to show a concrete injury. The law had caused the state’s abortion clinics to stop doing most abortions, and this represented a concrete and particular injuryy for people who wanted to get one in Texas that was judiciably cognizable. There was abundant evidence. It was easy to find clinic staff willing to testify that they had stopped doing abortions specifically because the law put them in legal jeopardy if they did. Finding defendants to sue over the injury (the causation prong) was the key problem in that case. Injury in fact was never an issue.

But here, the United States didn’t bother to show that anybody actually stopped or was even thinking about stopping complying with US law because of the Missouri law. They relied on the speculative claim that people might stop. This is an injury-in-conjecture, not an injury-in-fact.

In order to demonstrate that this statute actually served something other than a purely decorative, rhetorical purpose, that it wasn’t enacted merely for the benefit of the Missouri equivalent of the good folks of Buncombe County (the origin of the term “bunk”) so they would think their legislature was doing something, the United States needed to show that somebody somewhere was actually not complying with US law, or at least thinking about not complying, as a result of the statute. This required concrete evidence, not mere speculation or conjecture. And no such evidence was produced, or at least it isn’t described anywhere in the opinion.

[Brett Bellmore]

I don't think even that gets them to a concrete injury; I mean, if J. Random Citizen (Or a large organization like the NRA.) were to argue that federal gun laws were unconstitutional, it could have the same effect, and couldn't be treated as a concrete injury because J. Random Citizen has a 1st amendment right to so argue.

Is the state legislature lacking in similar 1st amendment rights?

[ReaderY]

That’s more or less what I’m saying, although I’m characterizing it as a standing issue. The Missouri Legislature can in effect (you would say has a right to) express its opinion on any subject it wants to, and just the opinion by itself sitting there decorating the ststute books doesn’t result in any concrete injury or give rise to a justiciable case or controversy. And that’s all the United States seems to have shown in this case. It hasn’t provided evidence the opinion has actually affected anybody or given rise to a concrete injury.

[Brett Bellmore]

Even if somebody acted on that expression, since the expression itself is constitutionally protected, that action wouldn't be a legally relevant 'harm'.

[hoppy025]

The judge is a jogger appointed by the head jogger. No surprise here.

[Sarcastr0]

Coward can't even get the stones to write nigger.

[hoppy025]

You are evil for writing such a horrible word.

[Lawman45]

Just pass a state restriction on state employees holding powers/jobs under 2 Sovereigns. If they take the federal "job" by allowing themselves to be "deputized" they are deemed to have resigned their state position.
Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 ought to support such reservation of state power.