The Volokh Conspiracy
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Supreme Court Turns Down Opportunity to Reconsider Three More Precedents
Justices Thomas and Gorsuch have a much greater appetite for reconsidering prior precedent than the other justices do.
Yesterday's Supreme Court order list produced five dissents from the denial of certiorari. In three of those cases, the justices diseenting from the denial wanted the Court to accept certiorari so that the justices could reconsider, if not overturn, prior Court precedent.
- In Clendening v. United States, Justice Thomas dissented because he believes the Court should overrule Feres v. United States, a 1950 case in which the Court held that military personnel cannot sue the United States for any injury "incident to military service," even though the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) does not preclude such suits. Wrote Thomas: "Congress set out a comprehensive scheme waiving sovereign immunity that we have disregarded in the military context for nearly 75 years. Because we caused this chaos, it is our job to fix it."
- In Khorrami v. Arizona, Justice Gorsuch dissented because he beleives the Court should reconsider Williams v. Florida, a 1970 decision in whcih the Court held that the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial (as incorporated against the states) does not require a twelve person jury. Wrote Gorsuch: "Williams was wrong the day it was decided, it remains wrong today, and it impairs both the integrity of the American criminal justice system and the liberties of those who come before our Nation's courts." Justice Kavanaugh would also have granted certiorari, but he did not join Justice Gorsuch's dissent.
- In Buffington v. McDonough, Justice Gorsuch dissented form the Court's refusal to consider an opportunity to narrow the Chevron doctrine. Whereas in prior writings Gorsuch expressed a desire to overturn Chevron v. NRDC outright, his Buffington dissent trains its focus on the "expansive reconstruction of Chevron" that holds sway in too many lower courts. Wrote Gorsuch: "With the passage of time, the problems with reading too much into Chevron have become widely appreciated. . . . We should acknowledge forthrightly that Chevron did not undo, and could not have undone, the judicial duty to provide an independent judgment of the law's meaning in the cases that come before the Nation's courts. Someday soon I hope we might." As Josh Blackman notes below, no other justice joined this dissent. I may have more to say about this opinion later.
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Nobody really cares about "constitutional errors". None of these cases have much ideological appeal, thus they get scant votes for certiorari.
If Thomas and Gorsuch want to clean things up, they need to find cases with ideological appeal.
Note that the first two are what would generally be considered "liberal" positions.
Yes, but that was before Thomas and Gorsuch adopted those positions.
One would think that progressives and non-progressives could join together to defend trial by jury and governmental accountability.
But for whatever reason, that ain’t happening.
If the Court made a mistake in Feres 75 years ago, it made a mistake about the scope of a federal statute, enacted by Congress. That happens. And Congress is fully capable of correcting the mistake. (Lilly Ledbetter, anyone?)
If Congress has let this mistake continue for 75 years, either it wasn't a mistake to begin with, or Congress is satisfied to let the mistake continue.
"or Congress is satisfied to let the mistake continue."....or Congress is too lazy to take account of the subsequent results of their action.
I have no idea if Congress intended this in a military context. It would be weasely to assume so, though, absent clear legislation or loud floor discussion of it.
Yes, congress is lazy. More accurately, congress is cowardly and supine, and prefers the other two branches to run with things.
In short, 75 years is plenty of time for Congress to clarify it. Why they didn't? See the paragraph above.
I don't have a strong opinion on Williams, but the failure to specify any particular size for the jury suggests to me there may not have been an intent to incorporate 12 as the magic number. This was a tradition established at common law, but so was the number of witnesses to convict someone for treason and the Constitution takes the time to spell that out ("No Person shall be convicted of Treason unless on the Testimony of two Witnesses to the same overt Act"). And the Constitution/BoR establishes exact amounts for all kinds of things--- an amount in controversy more than twenty dollars to get a jury, nine states to make the Constitution effective, two Senators per state, etc. If twelve was likewise the magic number for a jury, then they could have just said so. I might think twelve is better as a matter of policy, but I'm not sure this is a Constitutional question.
At least one of the quotes relied on in the dissent, by the way, says that it's 12 no more and no less. So it appears Gorsuch's position is that twelve is the magic number and both eleven and thirteen are unconstitutional. Absent a clear prohibition of tinkering with the number, I have my doubts.
I mean, this is a question of what 'jury' meant in the late 18th century. If its meaning necessarily included it being 12 people, then its just part of the definition of 'jury', and included in the text of the constitution. If it's meaning is not so specific on number, then its not included. Good historical analysis is needed here, and I would follow where that leads whichever way it comes out.
If it was a question of first impression then I would too. But with a precedent on the books you need more than that, or else the doctrine of stare decisis is illusory. Absent something truly compelling it's not so blatantly wrong that I would overturn the precedent. And even if the precedent does have to be overturned, I would do it without retroactive effect-- we can't have murderers going free because the state followed Supreme Court precedent and then the Supreme Court changed its mind, but that's the effect if it's been long enough that retrying the criminals is infeasible because evidence is gone, witnesses are dead, etc.
Stare decisis is an interesting question…they had to overrule precedent to get to the 6-person jury, so why not just say the previous precedents are reinstated and the 12-person rule applies once again?
I don't see what a precedent over 150 years after the fact means if it didn't do the historical analysis (or did it and was wrong). The meaning of 'jury' in the text was fixed when the founders put pen to page.
But then, I believe precedents which are wrong should be overturned because they are wrong. Stare decisis is just a mechanism for preserving bad decisions. (Because if the decision was good, there'd be no need to fall back on stare decisis).
Correct the typos in this sentence. In Khorrami v. Arizona, Justice Gorsuch dissented because he beleives the Court should reconsider Williams v. Florida, a 1970 decision in whcih the Court held that the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial (as incorporated against the states) does not require a twelve person jury.
In Clendening v. United States, Justice Thomas dissented because he believes the Court should overrule Feres v. United States, a 1950 case in which the Court held that military personnel cannot sue the United States for any injury "incident to military service," even though the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) does not preclude such suits. Wrote Thomas: "Congress set out a comprehensive scheme waiving sovereign immunity that we have disregarded in the military context for nearly 75 years. Because we caused this chaos, it is our job to fix it."
If Congress really wanted to allow such suits, it seems it would have clarified the point sometime in the last 72 years.
I love how we frequently imagine (and the court frequently imagines) that Congress can be bothered to fix things after they don’t work out the way Congress intended (whether because the court itself caused the problem, or the policy just didn’t survive impact with reality). History pretty clearly proves that Congress rarely does so, and then only when it becomes unignorable (either politically or practically). (Edit: And even the unignorable, like social security's coming insolvency, frequently fails to garner congressional action).
Regarding Buffington, I never understood why a clear, comprehensive statute like the Administrative Procedures Act, especially § 706, which is the actual express will of Congress on the subject, is overtly ignored in favor of Chevron, an at-the-time unremarkable case that wasn't construing or interpreting the APA. The directly-relevant comprehensive statue, squarely at odds with Chevron, wasn't even mentioned, not even § 706 which is the word from Congress regarding the scope of federal court review.
It seems like all we should need is the APA and Skidmore: follow the APA and if the agency interpretation or construction is well-reasoned, then its persuasiveness stands on its own two feet. No need for a government thumb on scale.
I hope SCOTUS takes a case cleanly addressing agency deference soon.