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Ninth Circuit Confirms that District Courts Can Enforce Expansive Restitution Agreements
The general federal restitution statute grants statutory authority to district courts to award restitution to crime victims to the extent provided in a plea agreement.
Today the Ninth Circuit handed down an interesting opinion on restitution, confirming that criminal defendants can agree to pay expansive restitution beyond what is required by the crimes of conviction. Interpreting the general federal restitution statute--18 U.S.C. § 3663--the Ninth Circuit explained that Congress has granted district courts statutory authority to award restitution to the extent agreed to by the parties in a plea agreement. I argued this case for a sex trafficking victim ("Jane Doe")--along with my friends at Justice at Last, an excellent non-profit organization helping labor and sex trafficking victims. The Ninth Circuit's opinion discusses several important issues in crime victims' rights, which are worth briefly highlighting.
The case involves a defendant, who kidnapped Jane Doe, then twelve years old. The defendant drove her from California to Nevada to sexually exploit her. Eventually Jane Doe was able to alert authorities, and police arrested the defendant. Federal prosecutors indicted him for sex trafficking. Following lengthy plea discussions, the defendant entered into a written plea agreement. Under the agreement, in exchange for the government's promise to drop the sex trafficking charges, he pleaded guilty to two lesser crimes (interstate travel in aid of unlawful activity) and agreed to pay Jane Doe full restitution.
The plea agreement provided that "[t]he Defendant acknowledges that the conduct to which he is entering a plea … gives rise to mandatory restitution to the victim(s). See 18 U.S.C. § 2259. The Defendant agrees that for the purpose of assessing such restitution, the Court may consider losses derived from the counts of conviction as well as losses caused from dismissed counts and uncharged conduct in which the Defendant has been involved. The Defendant agrees to pay the victim(s) the 'full amount of the victim's losses' as defined in 18 U.S.C. § 2259(b)(3)."
In sentencing proceedings in the district court, the defendant received the shorter sentence that he had bargained for. He was sentenced to 96 months in prison, less than the prison term the federal sentencing guidelines would have called for if he had been convicted of sex trafficking. But extended wrangling followed over how much restitution the defendant owed. The defendant ultimately argued that he owed little or no restitution because he had not pleaded guilty to a crime under section 2259--the provision cited in the plea agreement. The district court agreed with this position. Despite finding that the defendant had engaged in "egregious conduct," the district court believed it was powerless to award restitution because the defendant had not admitted to a crime under section 2259.
At this point, Justice at Last and I filed a petition for a writ of mandamus with the Ninth Circuit. We argued that the district court had interpreted its restitution authority too narrowly.
We filed our mandamus petition under the Crime Victims' Rights Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3771, which promises crime victims (among other rights) the "right to full and timely restitution as provided in law." The CVRA also promises crime victims a decision within 72 hours of the filing of the petition, unless the litigants agree to a more extended schedule. Because we wanted to give the Ninth Circuit more time to evaluate our position, we proposed (with the agreement of the prosecutors and defense counsel) a longer schedule than just 72 hours to decide the case.
The several weeks ago, the Ninth Circuit issued a decision on whether the 72-hour requirement was jurisdictional. The Circuit (per Bybee, J.) decided that the requirement was not jurisdictional and thus was waivable by crime victims: "Holding the deadlines to be jurisdictional would prejudice the very victims that the statute was meant to protect, and so, absent clear indication from Congress, we will not interpret § 3771(d)(3) to require such a result."
Today, the Ninth Circuit (per Graber, J.) granted Jane Doe's petition for a writ of mandamus, reversing the district court's decision that it lacked statutory authority to award her any restitution. The Circuit began by holding that CVRA mandamus petitions are not subject to the stringent standard of review that ordinarily would apply to a petition for extraordinary relief. Instead, based on an earlier Ninth Circuit precedent and a 2015 amendment to the CVRA, ordinary standards of appellate review apply. In this case, because the issue was one of the legal authority of the district court to award restitution, the standard of review was de novo.
Regarding the district court's authority, the Circuit turned immediately to 18 U.S.C. § 3663(a)(3), which provides: "The court may also order restitution in any criminal case to the extent agreed to by the parties in a plea agreement." The Circuit explained that "Congressional intent is clear. If a defendant has agreed to pay restitution in a plea agreement, then the plain meaning of the statutory text grants the district court statutory authority to order the agreed-upon restitution."
Working through the restitution provision in the defendant's plea agreement, the Circuit concluded that it was potentially ambiguous. The provision could be read to require the defendant to pay restitution. But, on the other hand, as the defendant argued, it could be read to limit restitution only to crimes in violation of § 2259--and the defendant had not pled to such a crime.
Given the ambiguity, the Circuit resorted to extrinsic evidence of the parties' intentions in drafting the agreement. The defendant's interpretation would essentially mean that he would pay no restitution at all. But the parties' course of conduct revealed that the defendant was agreeing to pay substantial restitution to Jane Doe. The extrinsic evidence unambiguously demonstrated that the defendant had agreed to pay restitution to Jane Doe. Because the extrinsic evidence was conclusive, the rule that ambiguities in a plea agreement are construed against the government did not apply. Accordingly, the Circuit granted Jane Doe's petition and remanded to the district court to determine how much restitution the defendant would pay.
On the surface, this today's ruling might appear to be solely a victory for crime victims. But the opinion will also prove useful to many defendants. Often defendants will want to plead guilty to less serious charges than the prosecutors have filed. But prosecutors may be concerned that, if the charges are reduced, the defendant may escape paying full restitution. Under the Ninth Circuit's decision, the problem is resolved by affirming that plea deals to lesser charges can be structured to provide full restitution to victims. As the Ninth Circuit explained, properly construed, the restitution statute "thus gives the government, victims, and defendants flexibility to reach a just result for all involved."
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I was going to complain about the ability of the wealthy to buy a reduction in prison term, but that's already the case in practice so no harm done here.
John - I think the answer to your point is that the restitution procedures in the federal system involve two determinations: (1) restitution owed; and (2) payment schedule. The restitution owed is always the full amount. So wealth needn't be a factor.
But only the wealthy can offer restitution for a crime they didn’t plead guilty to as a realistic bargaining chip for reducing their sentence. Or for that matter, hire lawyers able to sneak in fine print that creates grounds for an argument for weaseling out of it.
Everything that happened here was something only wealthy people could afford to do.
I don't like using incidents which never went to trial as part of sentencing or anything to do with verdicts, settlements, or anything else. But once he signed this --
-- too bad. To try to duck out later was wrong.
If the sentencing guidelines were relaxed plea bargaining would be more straightforward. The parties wouldn't have to agree to contradictions like "the defendant didn't rape her... but he did rape her."
I must say, these sorts of cases are an argument in favor of victims-rights laws. And of the enforcement of such laws.
We need to elevate crime victims above the status of disposable props for prosecutors.
So (unironic) congratulations to Prof. Cassell for this victory.
As the old saying goes, "When they say it isn't about the money, it's about the money." While 'victim's rights' sounds nice, I fear that in practice this kind of thing (reducing a sentence in return for money) will lead to serious distortions and problems in our criminal legal system. "Blood money" has a very long, and controversial, history. And prosecutorial discretion, for all of its faults, has the virtue of being simple. Giving 'victims' (usually defined very broadly) an even greater economic interest in case outcomes - that can only be used when the defendant has the means to pay - is liable to have all sorts of bad consequences.
In my state, in theory at least, "restitution" is owed upon every criminal conviction, so there should be no need for a victim to bargain for it. And what counts as restitution is limited by its legal definition, and should be determined by authorities (by a judge in open court if necessary). "Agreeing" to anything more is not truly restitution. I would suggest it is bribery, but know that many will object strenuously to that term.
Well, victims take what they can get.
Perhaps the victim can be a “civil party” in a criminal prosecution, with a civil jury and a criminal jury sitting together, and each jury only hearing such evidence as the respective rules of evidence for criminal and civil trials permit.
Or if there's a plea on the criminal side, the civil jury of course still does its thing, unless there's a *separate and independent* civil deal between victim and criminal.
I have the reverse thoughts -- we'd be better off if every verdict was in terms of money and nothing else. Eliminate the distinction between misdemeanors and felonies, judge everything simply by how much restitution is owed. Add up all costs, not just lawyer's fees -- lost wages, accommodations and travel time, police work, everything that would not have been spent absent the crime.
I have seen too many reports claiming lockup as a deterrent peaks around a week or a month, and after that just turns a bad criminal into a better one, less likely to ever be rehabilitated, yet still almost guaranteed to be released as a hardened unemployable criminal. If an irredeemable criminal needs to be locked up to prevent revenge or a continuation of his criminal life, that's different. But I'd rather a reformable criminal be employed, paying restitution, paying taxes, and supporting a family than be locked up at taxpayer expense.
In theory I agree with you. The practical problem is that in many cases, unless the defendant wins the lottery, making restitution will simply be beyond his means, especially given that someone with a felony conviction is not likely to get a good paying job. He may not be able to pay taxes, support his family, and make restitution all at the same time. So maybe we put a time limit on it -- anything that remains unpaid after, say, ten years gets written off, provided the defendant has in good faith been attempting to meet his obligations during that period.
Yes, the idea that a criminal can actually pay restitution is pretty optimistic, to put it mildly. And the no-bail reform movement has been so badly implemented that it puts paid to any idea of no jail for criminals. But sometimes I wonder what the point is of locking up criminals at great expense with not even a hint of rehabilitation when they are going to be released in 5 or 10 years anyway, better skilled at their craft and more hardened; why not release them after a week or month, before they gain new skills and become more hardened? And if they don't have a misdemeanor or felony conviction on their record, only an unpaid verdict debt, maybe that makes it easier to get a job.
Good thing no one died and left me in charge!
And a mountain of debt has legal consqeuences, including but not limited to difficulty getting state licenses or permits needed to hold a job. Florida politicians responded to a constitutional amendment limiting felon disenfranchisement by requiring that fees and restitution be paid before felons could vote.
We have a law in Massachusetts allowing the court to dismiss a crime that is also a tort if the victim has been paid. I don't remember if it applies to felonies or only misdemeanors.
I don't think it is abused, because there is an easier way for the connected to get out of jail free. An early stage in a prosecution is a probable cause hearing. (It might have a different formal name.) A magistrate decides whether the case should go forward. The law and facts don't matter unless the magistrate wants to consider them. (These are the same people who run the traffic courts.) Police officer defendants are likely to see the case go away at this stage.
If the prosecution seriously wants the case to proceed an appeal is allowed. But if the charges are pro forma to avoid charges of discrimination the case may be over. A private complainant may not appeal and is especially likely to lose at the probable cause hearing. In felony cases, the prosecutor may seek an indictment which automatically moves the case to Superior Court.
I am probably thinking of MGL 276-55.
"If a person committed to jail is under indictment or complaint for, or is under recognizance to answer to, a charge of assault and battery or other misdemeanor for which he is liable in a civil action [except for law enforcement victims and domestic abuse] and the person injured appears before the court or justice who made the commitment or took the recognizance, or before which the indictment or complaint is pending, and acknowledges in writing that he has received satisfaction for the injury, the court or justice may in its or his discretion, upon payment of such expenses as it or he shall order, discharge the recognizance or supersede the commitment, or discharge the defendant from the indictment or complaint, and may also discharge all recognizances and supersede the commitment of all witnesses in the case."