Fourth Amendment

Eleventh Circuit Creates Circuit Split on Cell Phone Border Searches

Waiting for Carpenter? This issue may go upstairs next.


The Eleventh Circuit has handed down an important new ruling on cell phone searches at the border, United States v. Touset. In an opinion by Judge William Pryor, the court disagrees with the Fourth Circuit and Ninth Circuit caselaw requiring suspicion to conduct a forensic search at the border.

The basic issue in these cases is this: When the government seizes a computer or cell phone at the border, and they want to search it using forensic equipment, do they need some sort of suspicion that evidence or contraband is on the device? Or does the traditional border search exception (which ordinarily permits searches of prioperty crossing the border without suspicion) apply? Regular readers of this blog have heard a lot about this question over the years. Just two weeks ago, I wrote a long post on the Fourth Circuit's May 9th ruling in United States v. Kolsuz, by Judge Pamela Harris, which required some kind of suspicion to conduct such a search. And I've blogged extensively about the Ninth Circuit's en banc ruling from 2013 in United States v. Cotterman, authored by Judge Margaret McKeown, which required reasonable suspicion for forensic searches at the border. The new Eleventh Circuit decision disagrees with Kolsuz and Cotterman, arguing that no suspicion should be required for a forensic border search.

Here's the heart of Judge Pryor's reasoning:

The Supreme Court has never required reasonable suspicion for a search of property at the border, however non-routine and intrusive, and neither have we. Although in one decision the Supreme Court required reasonable suspicion for the prolonged detention of a person until she excreted the contraband that she was suspected of "smuggling . . . in her alimentary canal" or submitted to an x-ray or rectal examination, Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. at 541; see also id. at 534– 35, it has never applied this requirement to property. Nor has it "been willing to distinguish . . . between different types of property." Cotterman, 709 F.3d at 975 (Callahan, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part, and concurring in the judgment). Indeed, it held in United States v. Flores-Montano that the government may "remove, disassemble, and reassemble a vehicle's fuel tank" at the border without any suspicion. 541 U.S. 149, 155 (2004). It explained that "the reasons that might support a requirement of some level of suspicion in the case of highly intrusive searches of the person—dignity and privacy interests of the person being searched—simply do not carry over to vehicles." Id. at 152. And it rejected a judicial attempt to distinguish between "routine" and "nonroutine" searches and to craft "[c]omplex balancing tests to determine what [constitutes] a 'routine' search of a vehicle, as opposed to a more 'intrusive' search of a person." Id. We have been similarly unwilling to distinguish between different kinds of property. For example, we have upheld "a search without reasonable suspicion of a crew member's living quarters on a foreign cargo vessel that [wa]s entering this country," Alfaro-Moncada, 607 F.3d at 727, even though "[a] cabin is a crew member's home—and a home 'receives the greatest Fourth Amendment protection,'" id. at 729 (quoting United States v. McGough, 412 F.3d 1232, 1236 (11th Cir. 2005)); accord id. at 732.

We see no reason why the Fourth Amendment would require suspicion for a forensic search of an electronic device when it imposes no such requirement for a search of other personal property. Just as the United States is entitled to search a fuel tank for drugs, see Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. at 155, it is entitled to search a flash drive for child pornography. And it does not make sense to say that electronic devices should receive special treatment because so many people now own them or because they can store vast quantities of records or effects. The same could be said for a recreational vehicle filled with personal effects or a tractor-trailer loaded with boxes of documents. Border agents bear the same responsibility for preventing the importation of contraband in a traveler's possession regardless of advances in technology. Indeed, inspection of a traveler's property at the border "is an old practice and is intimately associated with excluding illegal articles from the country." Thirty-Seven Photographs, 402 U.S. at 376 (plurality opinion)

In contrast with searches of property, we have required reasonable suspicion at the border only "for highly intrusive searches of a person's body." AlfaroMoncada, 607 F.3d at 729. Even though the Supreme Court has declined to decide "what level of suspicion, if any, is required for [such] nonroutine border searches [of a person]," Montoya de Hernandez, 473 U.S. at 541 n.4, we have required reasonable suspicion for "a strip search or an x-ray examination," Alfaro-Moncada, 607 F.3d at 729. We have defined the "intrusiveness" of a search of a person's body that requires reasonable suspicion "in terms of the indignity that will be suffered by the person being searched," in contrast with "whether one search will reveal more than another." United States v. Vega-Barvo, 729 F.2d 1341, 1345 (11th Cir. 1984); accord id. at 1346. And "we have isolated three factors which contribute to the personal indignity endured by the person searched: (1) physical contact between the searcher and the person searched; (2) exposure of intimate body parts; and (3) use of force." Id. at 1346.

These factors are irrelevant to searches of electronic devices. A forensic search of an electronic device is not like a strip search or an x-ray; it does not require border agents to touch a traveler's body, to expose intimate body parts, or to use any physical force against him. Although it may intrude on the privacy of the owner, a forensic search of an electronic device is a search of property. And our precedents do not require suspicion for intrusive searches of any property at the border. See Alfaro-Moncada, 607 F.3d at 728–29, 732.

To be sure, the Fourth and the Ninth Circuits have concluded—in divided decisions—that the Fourth Amendment requires at least reasonable suspicion for forensic searches of electronic devices at the border. United States v. Kolsuz, ___ F.3d ____, No. 16-4687, slip op. at 19 (4th Cir. May 9, 2018); Cotterman, 709 F.3d at 968. In Cotterman, the Ninth Circuit equated a forensic search to "a computer strip search," 709 F.3d at 966, and stated that "[s]uch a thorough and detailed search of the most intimate details of one's life is a substantial intrusion upon personal privacy and dignity," id. at 968. And it reasoned that "[i]ntrusiveness includes both the extent of a search as well as the degree of indignity that may accompany a search." Id. at 967 (quoting United States v. Ramos-Saenz, 36 F.3d 59, 61 n.3 (9th Cir. 1994)). The Fourth Circuit later explained that the intervening decision of the Supreme Court in Riley "confirmed" that reasoning. Kolsuz, slip op. at 21. And it revived the distinction between routine and nonroutine searches of property, see id. at 19–24, that the Supreme Court rejected in Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. at 152.

We are unpersuaded. Although the Supreme Court stressed in Riley that the search of a cell phone risks a significant intrusion on privacy, our decision in Vergara made clear that Riley, which involved the search-incident-to-arrest exception, does not apply to searches at the border. 884 F.3d at 1312 ("[T]he Supreme Court expressly limited its holding to the search-incident-to-arrest exception."). And our precedent considers only the "personal indignity" of a search, not its extensiveness. Vega-Barvo, 729 F.2d at 1346. Again, we fail to see how the personal nature of data stored on electronic devices could trigger this kind of indignity when our precedent establishes that a suspicionless search of a home at the border does not. See Alfaro-Moncada, 607 F.3d at 729, 732. Property and persons are different. See Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. at 152.

We are also unpersuaded that a traveler's privacy interest should be given greater weight than the "paramount interest [of the sovereign] in protecting . . . its territorial integrity." Id. at 153. The Ninth and Fourth Circuits stressed the former interest and asserted that travelers have no practical options to protect their privacy when traveling abroad. For example, the Ninth Circuit explained that it is "impractical, if not impossible, for individuals to make meaningful decisions regarding what digital content to expose to the scrutiny that accompanies international travel" and that "removing files unnecessary to an impending trip" is "a time-consuming task that may not even effectively erase the files." Cotterman, 709 F.3d at 965. The Fourth Circuit added that "it is neither 'realistic nor reasonable to expect the average traveler to leave his digital devices at home when traveling.'" Kolsuz, slip op. at 21 (quoting United States v. Saboonchi, 990 F. Supp. 2d 536, 556 (D. Md. 2014)). But a traveler's "expectation of privacy is less at the border," Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. at 154, and the Fourth Amendment does not guarantee the right to travel without great inconvenience, even within our borders, see Corbett v. Transp. Sec. Admin., 767 F.3d 1171, 1179 (11th Cir. 2014) (holding that airport screening "is a reasonable administrative search under the Fourth Amendment"); see also Kolsuz, slip op. at 34 (Wilkinson, J., concurring in the judgment) ("Our new world has brought inconvenience and intrusions on an indiscriminate basis, which none of us welcome, but which most of us undergo in the interest of assuring a larger common good."). Anyone who has recently taken a domestic flight likely experienced inconvenient screening procedures that require passengers to unpack electronic devices, separate and limit liquids, gels, and creams, remove their shoes, and walk through a full-body scanner. See Corbett, 767 F.3d at 1174 (explaining that a traveler must walk through a scanner or undergo a pat-down in airports). Travelers "crossing a border . . . [are] on notice that a search may be made," Alfaro-Moncada, 607 F.3d at 732 (quoting United States v. Hidalgo-Gato, 703 F.2d 1267, 1271 (11th Cir. 1983)), and they are free to leave any property they do not want searched—unlike their bodies—at home.

In contrast with the diminished privacy interests of travelers, "[t]he Government's interest in preventing the entry of unwanted persons and effects is at its zenith at the international border." Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. at 152. As we have explained, child pornography, no less than drugs or other kinds of contraband, is prohibited from "enter[ing] the country," Ramsey, 431 U.S. at 620, and the government interest in stopping contraband at the border does not depend on whether child pornography takes the form of digital files or physical photographs.

Nothing in Riley undermines this interest. In Riley, the Supreme Court explained that the rationales that support the search-incident-to-arrest exception— namely the concerns of "harm to officers and destruction of evidence"—did not "ha[ve] much force with respect to digital content on cell phones," 134 S. Ct. at 2484, because "digital data" does not pose "comparable risks," id. at 2485. But "digital" child pornography poses the same exact "risk" of unlawful entry at the border as its physical counterpart. If anything, the advent of sophisticated technological means for concealing contraband only heightens the need of the government to search property at the border unencumbered by judicial secondguessing.

Indeed, if we were to require reasonable suspicion for searches of electronic devices, we would create special protection for the property most often used to store and disseminate child pornography. With the advent of the internet, child pornography offenses overwhelmingly involve the use of electronic devices for the receipt, storage, and distribution of unlawful images. See U.S. Sent'g Comm'n, Federal Child Pornography Offenses 5, 71 (2012); see also United States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 307 (2008) ("Both the State and Federal Governments have sought to suppress [child pornography] for many years, only to find it proliferating through the new medium of the Internet."). And law enforcement officers routinely investigate child-pornography offenses by forensically searching an individual's electronic devices. See U.S. Sent'g Comm'n, supra, at 67–71. We see no reason why we would permit traditional, invasive searches of all other kinds of property, see Alfaro-Moncada, 607 F.3d at 724–25, 728, 732, but create a special rule that will benefit offenders who now conceal contraband in a new kind of property.

At this point Supreme Court lawyers are shouting, "A circuit split! A circuit split!" And yes, this is a clear split on an important question. With the Supreme Court about to hand down Carpenter, this new split on computer border searches may be the next computer search and seizure issue to go up to the Supremes (although I'm still waiting for the Court to resolve the 2-2 circuit split on applying the private search doctrine to computers).

One caveat is that I'm not sure this is the case to get there. That's true for two reasons.

First, the Eleventh Circuit added an alternative holding. Even if reasonable suspicion is required, the court held, rthere was reasonable suspicion in this case. That may make cert somewhat harder, as the Supreme Court could reason that the clear split on whether some suspicion is required may make no difference to the outcome of the case if that case-specific alternative holding is correct. With that said, the Supreme Court may not care about that. They granted cert in Carpenter without a split, and I assume everyone realizes that Carpenter will lose on remedies even if he wins on the right in light of the good-faith exception. And the reasonable suspicion finding is often an issue in these cases: Because the government usually won't conduct a forensic search unless they had some kind of suspicion, the cases that make it to court will often be the ones where there was suspicion whether or not it is required. That's what happened in Cotterman, for example. After ruling that reasonable suspicion was required, the en banc Ninth Circuit ruled for the government on the ground that reasonable suspicion existed. Given that Supreme Court litigation on the Fourth Amendment is increasingly about the broader stakes rather than who wins or loses that particular case, the alternative holding may make no difference. And of course the Court could just take the broad issue, too, reviewing whether reasonable suspicion was required and if so whether it existed.

Another reason the Supreme Court might want to stay away for now is the Kolsuz uncertainty. The Eleventh Circuit recently ruled in Vergara that probable cause or a warrant isn't required for computer border searches. That let Touset focus on the narrower question of whether any suspicion is required at all. But the Fourth Circuit in Kolsuz left open whether the standard of suspicion should be reasonable suspicion or probable cause. The Supreme Court may want more circuits that require suspicion to weigh in post-Riley on just how much cause is required before reviewing the broader question of how the Fourth Amendment applies to border searches of computers and cell phones.

As always, stay tuned.

NEXT: Blocking of Twitter Users from @RealDonaldTrump Violates First Amendment

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  1. Is Pryor an “originalist,” an authoritarian, or — as is customary for recent Republican nominees — both?

  2. It seems self-evident to me that both vehicles and cell phones are personal effects, and therefore covered by “persons, houses, papers, and effects” in the Fourth Amendment.

    Besides, anyone who wanted to smuggle contraband data into or out of the US can do so very easily, in a way that is effectively impossible to search. Simply encrypt your data, upload it to a throwaway account on Dropbox or Google Drive, then cross the border, and when you get home, download and decipher it. The existence of this ability (and the total lack of any serious effort to defeat it) blows away any possible “rational basis” for ICE to even want to search somebody’s cell phone at the border.

    1. “It seems self-evident to me that both vehicles and cell phones are personal effects, and therefore covered by “persons, houses, papers, and effects” in the Fourth Amendment.”

      I don’t think anyone seriously disputes this. The judges here certainly accepted it, thus the Fourth Amendment analysis rather than just saying that cell phones aren’t protected.

  3. One thing that’s bugged me since Riley: the government’s briefing and oral argument just sort of took it for granted that if police search a person incident to arrest and find a notepad on him, they’re free to read the notepad without a warrant instead of just shaking it to see if a weapon falls out (say a razor blade), and by extension should be allowed to read the cellphone too. And Pryor’s reasoning here seems to assume the same thing.

    Has the Supreme Court ever held that, though? Because it seems to me reading the notepad is a second, different search than the search of the person.

    1. The logic (but not the holding) of Arizona v Gant suggests that they can look at the notebook only if there is reason to believe that evidence of the crime could be found in the notebook.

      So if they arrested you for jaywalking, they could not read the notebook. But if they arrested you for running an illegal gambling operation, they could.

      1. Gant only concerns vehicle passenger compartments. If you were walking down the street, Arizona v. Gant’s exception of a search related to a crime would not apply – however, the search incident to arrest would be broader than Gant’s exception that’s limited to situations where the defendant is still physically present.

  4. The relevant question in this case should be whether the entrant is a citizen/permanent resident. There should be a different standard at checkpoints for people who are presumed Americans vs. random “tourists” (aka we don’t know who you are at all).

  5. How can the justices make the argument about the strength of the government interest in searching digital devices on the basis of the goal of keeping out child pornography with a straight face?

    I mean surely it isn’t lost on the justices that it is trivially easy to simply transmit that same content into the country using any of hundreds of file transfer programs which by default encrypt the data while in motion. The reasoning behind the border security exception always flowed from the fact that the government has a particularly strong interest at the border because of the practical importance of searching travels in preventing the entry of contraband.

    I mean no one really thinks that border searches for child porn offer any more effectiveness in enforcing the law than randomly examining phones inside the united states do they? In both cases you do nothing to raise the difficulty level of importing that content into the US and are merely catching individuals who personally posses the material.

    Given this I’m having trouble seeing the decision as flowing from a serious consideration of the nature of the border security exception but I’m probably being uncharitable so maybe someone can tell me why (even if wrong) this reasoning is understandable.

    1. I’m not sure its trivially easy to transmit child pornography commercially by electronic means. Look at this case. He got caught because a financial processing company flagged payments he was making to the Philippines, notified his email provider, who discovered incriminating evidence, who notified authorities, who put him on the watch list (which is why the court went ahead and held that there was reasonable suspicion for the search).

      1. The facts of this case that you relate are totally unlike pornography and the rationale for border searches and I think only bolsters Peter’s point. Not only that, authorities should have been able to obtain a warrant anyhow in this case, so why use the border search (which probably wouldn’t have yielded obvious “contraband”) as a way to get around the requirement?

        The better response to Peter is that it doesn’t matter how likely it is for such searches to be productive. Pornography is the likeliest contraband to find but not the only. As the opinion says, at the border authorities can search property for contraband. If you bring 20 suitcases full of items, they can search them. If you bring a harddrive, they can search it. If contraband were defined solely as produce, Peter’s argument would be strong. You won’t find potatoes on a harddrive.

        1. While I’m not a fan of the administrative search exception to the Fourth Amendment in any context, and agree that it’s odd that they waited to get the search warrant (maybe the pictures they identified were creepy but not illegal?), I don’t think the facts of this case are that different from the rationale for border searches in general. From what I’ve skimmed, the decision doesn’t say why he was traveling overseas with a laptop and two external hard drives. One possibility is that he did so to bring back more child porn without having to transmit the material and payment electronically.

        2. The better response to Peter is that it doesn’t matter how likely it is for such searches to be productive.

          Really? It doesn’t matter? Seems to me that it should.

          1. Should and does are often two very different things. But according to Orin Kerr, these types of searches are typically done when there is suspicion regardless of whether it’s required, so I’m a little skeptical of the claim that these searches are unlikely to yield results. I just skimmed Cotterman, where the Ninth Circuit held that reasonable suspicion was required for a forensic search and that the search met that standard. There wasn’t any discussion of whether the search was likely to turn up something incriminating. Instead, the concern was about the near-certainty that the forensic search would turn up a whole bunch of non-incriminating stuff (they agreed that an ordinary search of an electronic device at the border didn’t require reasonable suspicion).

            1. according to Orin Kerr, these types of searches are typically done when there is suspicion regardless of whether it’s required, so I’m a little skeptical of the claim that these searches are unlikely to yield results.

              “Trust us,” say the border agents.

              1. I suspect it’s mostly a result of resource allocation and the government wanting to take short cuts by taking advantage of the administrative search loophole (which also applies in other “noncriminal” contexts). Despite the split, all three of the circuits seemed to hold that the agents had at least “reasonable suspicion” for the search.

        3. The point I want to put pressure on is *why* is there a border search exception. I mean it’s certainly not written into the text of the constitution.

          To the extent that the border search exception derives from the government’s strong interest in being able to perform searches because of the unique opportunity border checks and customs provide to prevent the entry of contraband than it does matter how productive such checks are in keeping contraband out of the country. Presumably, if it turns out that searching your phone at the border is no more effective at keeping contraband out of the united states than searching it randomly inside the country than the electronic search of the phone should no longer fall inside the carveout to the usual protections.

          But, perhaps you are saying that it’s simply a traditional exception and even if the reasons for the exception no longer apply to this part of the modern experience the exception should be taken to be written in as part of some kind of originalist interpretation.

          I mean I suppose one could simply state as a formal matter that it’s a categorical exception but that would just beg the question (for SCOTUS at least) of whether it should be and the very language I was responding to in the opinion suggested the justices felt the need to argue for the appropriateness of allowing such cell searches at the border so they were not comfortable just saying ‘yup, precedent says border is special’

          1. I have great sympathy for your argument I think it deserves a stronger answer. The closest the court comes to answering in the passage above is:

            “We are also unpersuaded that a traveler’s privacy interest should be given greater weight than the ‘paramount interest [of the sovereign] in protecting . . . its territorial integrity.'”

            Limits are placed on searches of a person only because of concerns for (1) integrity of the person, and (2) impossibility of a person leaving oneself, unlike belongings, home.

            Ultimately, the border is special because the 4th Amendment doesn’t apply outside our territory. The border operates as a grey zone facilitating entry and courts should be reluctant to trample, particularly as national security is one reason to permit extensive search authority. Also, as suggested in the opinion above, bringing items into the country may be treated as a kind of consent.

            There is a similar question as you raise on warrantless searches/seizures (let alone killing) of Americans abroad. And likewise there is reason to feel that something is wrong. But I’m not sure it could work for the courts to impose 4th Amendment protections (essentially) outside of the U.S.

            If there must be suspicion to search that could embolden wrongdoers to import dangerous/illegal materials. The government would be faced with the choice of shutting almost everyone out or permitting increased inflow of contraband. And that is contrary to the basic notion of territorial integrity.

          2. To add to this, why is the government’s interest in a border search the same for a person leaving the country as a person entering the country?

            1. How else are they going to seize the money you collected to build a hospital in Africa? They need to search the outgoing people to pay for the searches of the incoming people.

  6. The court does not seem to understand the difference between actual tangible things, like drugs or explosives, and electronically stored data.

    If you want to get child pornography into the country there are a million better ways to do it than putting it on your cellphone. Giving ICE the authority to randomly look at anyone’s phone or computer files is a terrible idea, more appropriate for a police state than a democracy.

    1. And yet in the other case, the individual was found with tangible items (gun parts) and then the cell phone search revealed more details about that crime.

      So there’s a distinct between “electronically stored data that forms the basis of a crime” and “electronically stored data that is supporting evidence in a set of crimes that also have tangible elements”.

      1. IANAL, so excuse me if I err here, but wouldn’t finding the gun parts be a good basis for a warrant to search the phone?

        Alternatively, could finding tangible evidence of possible crime be a justification for a warrantless search, so we don’t actually have to let ICE look at anyone’s computer?

        In any case, so to speak, we have to weigh the crime detection/deterrence against the invasion of innocent people’s privacy and the potential for abuse by border agents.

        1. Sure. And indeed the court there found specifically that a border search of electronic media had to be justified by a individualized suspicion. It also said that the exhaustive search of the phone far away from the border might not be justified by the border search exception except that it was “to uncover information about an ongoing transnational crime and so it fits within the core of the rationale underlying the border search exception.”

          It seems like Kolsuz gave you everything you wanted, no?

          1. Well, close. But I thought we were discussing Tousset.

  7. The text of Justice Rehnquist’s opinion in Flores-Montano went to lengths to characterize the privacy and other impacts of gas tank searches as minimal, pointing out that gas tanks “should be solely a repository for fuel” and that “a gas tank search involves a brief procedure that can be reversed without damaging the safety or operation of the vehicle.” These facts are used to help justify the conclusion of the court in this context.

    It requires a leap of logic to get from this ruling to a conclusion that all suspicionless property searches are A-OK at the border regardless of what privacy impact they impose and regardless of the impact on travelers. If the impact is totally irrelevant, why would Rehnquist have taken the time to discuss it?

    It seems that Rehnquist was trying to assure us that this ruling does not create a significant privacy problem. If, in fact, it does, perhaps it should be reconsidered in light of that fact?

    1. “a gas tank search involves a brief procedure that can be reversed without damaging the safety or operation of the vehicle.”

      Lack of damage? Tell that to my friend’s box of Kleenex on the back seat!

  8. The same could be said for a recreational vehicle filled with personal effects or a tractor-trailer loaded with boxes of documents.

    That strikes me as a particularly weak analogy. A person with a legitimate privacy interest in certain physical materials has at least some choice about compartmentalizing those materials to avoid their disclosure. With cell phones and laptops, not only are comprehensive details of the carrier’s life (private or not) promiscuously recorded in ways that are nearly impossible to manage, but also, likewise with regard to many other people with whom the carrier has had contact. In addition, there are now omnium gatherum databases of practically all electronic communications, stored by government or its contractors, just waiting for any cue to pop up?maybe during a border search?to enable activation and detailed surveillance of the entire stored personal record.

    Compared to old-fashioned physical searches, electronic searches of all kinds are far more fraught with totalitarian implications. It’s no accident that law enforcement would far prefer to search your computer than your filing cabinet.

  9. Adding another post here because Orin was sad everyone wants to talk about 1A/Twitter and not his most favoritest amendment.

  10. It’s worth nothing that Judge William Pryor of the Eleventh Circuit was one of the two names Trump mentioned in the GOP debates as potential SCOTUS nominees, along with Seventh Circuit Judge Diane Sykes. Judge Pryor’s name also appears on Trump’s subsequent List of Twenty[-one], published by Trump in September 2016 as the price for Ted Cruz’ fulsome endorsement, and it remains on the updated list from November 2017 that currently appears on the WH website.

    1. And this holding increasing the power of ICE will no doubt make Trump like him better.

  11. I only have two comments on this issue:
    (1) Entick v. Carrington
    (2) Boyd v. United States

    I completely reject the legal sophistry aimed at empowering the government beyond what was intended in this country.

  12. Fine, the Fourth Amendment does not extend outside the U.S. The searches are being conducted in the U.S.

    Too simple for a deep-thinking federalist such as Pryor, I suspect.

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