A federal court, however, has now largely blocked this restriction; the court rejected the argument that the parent violated the school's "bullying" policy.
but upholds limits on speech to plaintiff (or her visitors).
The bill is a "law against criticism of any kind," according to a lawyer who testified against it.
"[I]n seeking to hold Cooper Union liable for [students'] expression, [plaintiff] cannot help but say the quiet part loud: sweeping otherwise-protected political expression into the hostility analysis will create pressure on institutions 'to suppress speech to ensure compliance with Title VI,' causing 'regulated entities to adopt restrictive policies in an effort to avoid liability' for a hostile environment."
"Lily accused Gunther of 'Gaslighting' (underscoring omitted) by denying he suffered from steroid-induced rages during their marriage and denying Lily's contributions to Gunther's career success."
A federal district court discusses how the First Amendment limits liability for "hostile environment harassment" based on "speech on matters of public concern" in universities (public or private). And the reasoning may extend to Title VII liability on workplaces as well.
The Michigan Court of Appeals just upheld the conviction, under a statute that requires showing of purpose to (among other things) "harass[]" or "molest[]," and reason to know that third parties would send the target unwanted and "harass[ing]" or "molest[ing]" messages. The statute doesn't require any showing that the accusations were false.
An interesting window into how courts sometimes think about such requests; this decision turned heavily on the fact that plaintiff had already gotten a state court harassment restraining order against the defendant.
A federal judge has allowed the (now-graduated) student's discrimination, harassment, retaliation, and breach of contract case to go forward.
"Two officers convinced a prosecutor to charge Blackwell with stalking. But a judge acquitted him. Blackwell then sued the manager and officers for violating the First Amendment by inducing this prosecution in retaliation for his political speech."
The Second Circuit holds that the challengers sufficiently alleged that the ban is broad enough to cover their constitutionally protected speech (including speech that may offend some based on gender identity, race, religion, and more); the court didn't reach the question whether the ban actually violates the First Amendment, which the trial court will now have to take up.
Sarrita Adams, who was a prominent public critic of the English Lucy Letby murder trial, got that order almost four months ago.
But the Arizona Court of Appeals just reversed, concluding that speech about a person generally isn't "harassment," even if unwanted speech directed to the person may be.
Plaintiff had argued that defendants' publicizing the religious court's statement "serves as a form of social pressure, calling on the community to shun or ostracize the individual until they comply with the court's demands."
displayed on defendant's car and on her fence facing neighbors who have a transgender child; an appellate court reverses the conviction on procedural grounds, without resolving the First Amendment issue.
The court is discussing orders "enjoining protected speech or conduct ... without an adversarial hearing or adjudication on the merits that the speech or conduct is not protected."
The official argued, among other things, that defendant's speech constituted "words of incitement" intended "to rile up the Black community to attack [her]."
An Ohio trial court issued the injunction, but the Ohio Court of Appeals has just set it aside.
The court concludes the pastor's posts were about the activists' organization (Oklahomans for Equality) and not about them personally; it thus avoided having to decide whether the First Amendment would have protected the speech if it was indeed about the activists personally.
Yes, when the restriction is being imposed by the government.
notwithstanding the claim that it “invites worldwide haters to threaten, stalk, and commit violence against” her.
"Some courts have incorrectly used this exception to rationalize upholding a statute that criminalizes speech ... simply because their legislature passed a law labeling it criminal. The limited line of United States Supreme Court cases that have addressed this exception in no way supports such a broad reading."
I'm against it, whomever it's coming from.
Such speech can be found to be "impermissible harassment," the court says, partly because "deference to schoolteachers is especially appropriate today, where, increasingly, what is harmful or innocent speech is in the eye of the beholder."
The Indiana Court of Appeals, though, reverses the order, concluding the judge wasn't allowed to issue such an order on his own initiative; it doesn't decide whether such an order would violate the First Amendment.
Among other things, posts that "target the plaintiff's reputation and cause her emotional distress" aren't covered by the Massachusetts harassment prevention order statute.
The trial court found that "Decker continued contacting Siewert after she had asked him to stop five times" and "Decker's intent was to impose his will on Siewert to make her write about certain issues and to cover those issues in the way that he wanted them covered."
Do you care about free minds and free markets? Sign up to get the biggest stories from Reason in your inbox every afternoon.
This modal will close in 10
