"Outside of certain narrow and presently inapplicable circumstances, federal lawsuits are public proceedings and members of the public are free to comment on them."
She had admitted that some (though not all) of the speech was false, but the injunction (entered in a restraining order case, not following a full defamation trial) extends to all speech, not just falsehoods: "Even speech otherwise protected by the First Amendment may be enjoined if it disturbs the petitioning party's peace."
"So whatever hard to imagine rationalization Haverford might offer for obscuring the content of its actual bias policy—an artifice reminiscent of Dean Wormer's 'double secret probation'—I find the demarcation 'draft' to be of no legal import."
"[B]oth parties exchanged these Snapchat videos while they were intoxicated and their judgment was impaired. Notwithstanding, the communications were private and intended to be jokes between close friends."
A temporary order had been issued, but the trial court refused to extend it into a permanent order, and awarded $15K in attorney fees; an appellate court has just upheld the trial court's final decision, and added $8K for appellate attorney fees.
So Texas's high court for criminal matters held yesterday.
Two protesters in Wales were convicted for handing out pamphlets and filming an argument with their member of Parliament.
"Unlike 'Festivus,' the fictional holiday created by Jewish artists, wherein 'worshippers' are permitted to air their personal grievances but once per year," "Ye adheres to an artistic vision in which he is unencumbered to share his grievances at any time of the year—and so he does."
A federal court, however, has now largely blocked this restriction; the court rejected the argument that the parent violated the school's "bullying" policy.
but upholds limits on speech to plaintiff (or her visitors).
The bill is a "law against criticism of any kind," according to a lawyer who testified against it.
"[I]n seeking to hold Cooper Union liable for [students'] expression, [plaintiff] cannot help but say the quiet part loud: sweeping otherwise-protected political expression into the hostility analysis will create pressure on institutions 'to suppress speech to ensure compliance with Title VI,' causing 'regulated entities to adopt restrictive policies in an effort to avoid liability' for a hostile environment."
"Lily accused Gunther of 'Gaslighting' (underscoring omitted) by denying he suffered from steroid-induced rages during their marriage and denying Lily's contributions to Gunther's career success."
A federal district court discusses how the First Amendment limits liability for "hostile environment harassment" based on "speech on matters of public concern" in universities (public or private). And the reasoning may extend to Title VII liability on workplaces as well.
The Michigan Court of Appeals just upheld the conviction, under a statute that requires showing of purpose to (among other things) "harass[]" or "molest[]," and reason to know that third parties would send the target unwanted and "harass[ing]" or "molest[ing]" messages. The statute doesn't require any showing that the accusations were false.
An interesting window into how courts sometimes think about such requests; this decision turned heavily on the fact that plaintiff had already gotten a state court harassment restraining order against the defendant.
A federal judge has allowed the (now-graduated) student's discrimination, harassment, retaliation, and breach of contract case to go forward.
"Two officers convinced a prosecutor to charge Blackwell with stalking. But a judge acquitted him. Blackwell then sued the manager and officers for violating the First Amendment by inducing this prosecution in retaliation for his political speech."
The Second Circuit holds that the challengers sufficiently alleged that the ban is broad enough to cover their constitutionally protected speech (including speech that may offend some based on gender identity, race, religion, and more); the court didn't reach the question whether the ban actually violates the First Amendment, which the trial court will now have to take up.
Sarrita Adams, who was a prominent public critic of the English Lucy Letby murder trial, got that order almost four months ago.
But the Arizona Court of Appeals just reversed, concluding that speech about a person generally isn't "harassment," even if unwanted speech directed to the person may be.
Plaintiff had argued that defendants' publicizing the religious court's statement "serves as a form of social pressure, calling on the community to shun or ostracize the individual until they comply with the court's demands."
displayed on defendant's car and on her fence facing neighbors who have a transgender child; an appellate court reverses the conviction on procedural grounds, without resolving the First Amendment issue.
The court is discussing orders "enjoining protected speech or conduct ... without an adversarial hearing or adjudication on the merits that the speech or conduct is not protected."
The official argued, among other things, that defendant's speech constituted "words of incitement" intended "to rile up the Black community to attack [her]."
An Ohio trial court issued the injunction, but the Ohio Court of Appeals has just set it aside.
