[T]he Financial Accounting Standards Board on Thursday voted unanimously to give auditors more flexibility in valuing illiquid mortgage assets that may have long-term value.
The new guidance, which is expected to boost bank operating profits when they report first quarter results later this month, alters so called mark-to-market rules, which have required banks and other corporations to assign a value to an asset, such as mortgage securities, credit-card debt or student-loan investments, based on the current market price for either the security or a similar asset.
Banks have complained that they have viable assets with strong cash flows that can't be sold because there is no market for them.
Seeking to resolve this situation, FASB's new guidance allows banks and their auditors to use "significant judgment" when valuing the illiquid assets such as mortgage securities.
Given that the toxicity of mortgage-backed securities have been front page news for two years now, and U.S. taxpayers are on the hook for $13 trillion and counting in the ensuing bailouts, this loosening of a Bush-era Wall Street regulation seems rather on the slow side. But, still.
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"Given that the toxicity of mortgage-backed securities have been front page news for two years now... this loosening of a Bush-era Wall Street regulation seems rather on the slow side."
This isn't really a response to financial institutions having shitty assets. It is a response to those asset values (often unrealistic if you have the ability to hold them) impacting the capitalization of said institutions. It helps the firms work through the period of depressed valuation without blowing through debt covenants.
Sure it offers more flexibility for creative accounting (which can hurt [dumb] investors and lenders) but it isn't as if the debt holders are saints either. There are a lot of examples of banks executing low bid-side sales to manipulate the prices of specific assets so that they can foreclose on and BWIC entire portfolios. FASB decision is in part in response to this action and evens the playing field imensly, taking power out of the hands of some brokerages who need to deleverage, while also easing their deleveraging process by making it easier to stay well capitalized and not breach regulatory statutes or debt covenants.
Seeking to resolve this situation, FASB's new guidance allows banks and their auditors to use "significant judgment" when valuing the illiquid assets such as mortgage securities
This will not end well.
We are replacing the only objective measure of an assets value, the price the market will pay right now, with the self-interested estimation of those who hold the assets. This is pretty much like a fully socialist state establishing prices by fiat without regard to actual price mechanisms.
The problem here is a belief in what Giether called "intrinsic value" i.e. the idea that assets have some kind of built-in, persistent worth that a properly functioning financial system will correctly price. Unfortunately, intrinsic value does not exist. The value of anything at any given moment is the amount of some other good other will trade of it at a particular moment in time. Any other valuation is just guesswork.
Over priced residential mortgages that back the toxic residential mortgage-backed securities from Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac and other issuers are what wrecked the system. Even institutions that had no major mortgage related business became insolvent if they used the FM's securities for their legal collateral. Many if not most of the worst mortgages came from California and with that state on the track to become the next Michigan it is unlikely those houses will ever fully recover their value.
Basing our accounting on the idea that the mere hope that currently worthless assets will reacquire significant value in the indefinite future is a fools gamble. We should bite the bullet and stay with objective pricing. We got into this mess by trying to get something for nothing. We shouldn't repeat the mistake.
Banks have complained that they have viable assets with strong cash flows that can't be sold because there is no market for them.
Banks are lying. There is always a market for viable assets with strong cash flows, as long as there is some expectation that those cash flows will continue. If there is a strong expectation that those cash flows won't continue, the asset could hardly be termed "viable."
The problem here is a belief in what Giether called "intrinsic value" i.e. the idea that assets have some kind of built-in, persistent worth that a properly functioning financial system will correctly price. Unfortunately, intrinsic value does not exist. The value of anything at any given moment is the amount of some other good other will trade of it at a particular moment in time. Any other valuation is just guesswork.
The problem here is we're trying to value stuff without actually selling it. This works in some case but not in others. Commodity goods? Yeah, tell me what it is and I'll give you a pretty good estimate of how much it's worth. Real estate? Not so much. It's a known problem. No matter how similar you claim house A is to house B, I can find you a laundry list of reasons why one is worth more or less than the other. Until you actually go out and find someone who's willing to give you cold hard cash for it, you just don't know.
UAW socialist gay porn: a white collar manager has his wrists tied with his expensive silk tie and is held down on the assembly line. One burly line worker has his way with him while three others sit around and watch. At first the manager protests but as the mighty union cock pumps away at him he moans in ecstasy and comes while screaming "You have nothing to lose but your chains, you have nothing to lose but your chains!"
The mark-to-market rule hasn't been around that long, and the carnage it's indirectly contributed to is pretty plain, so I don't think it's unreasonable to change this rule.
However, using "significant judgement" doesn't seem like the right idea. In his pieces on the financial crisis Michael Flynn suggested a rolling average. Alternatively, rules for how capital ratios should be computed or when bank's lending regulations kick in in response could be modified.
The problem with the current crisis has been that mark-to-market causes these sudden jumps in the capital ratios if an asset's market value changes suddenly - as it did when the MBS market collapsed. One day the bank is fine, the next it's bumping up against its capital ratio. As a result, the bank can't lend, because any jolt could send it over the edge.
Basically, something has to smooth out the curves, so wild gyrations in market values don't the effects of regulations to kick in unexpectedly.
The meat and potatoes of the decision is it gives more flexibility to move assets from level 2 (significant direct or inderect market inputs) into level 3 (unobservable inputs). It basically gives more flexibility for not using quotes from distressed sales or BWICs (Bid Wanted In Competition [i.e. after foreclosure/bankruptcy]).
You are also mistaken that this is a really really big deal for RMBS portfolios (especially because the most toxic stuff won't be written up i.e. ABX). It will impact MBS (although more so CMBS), but where it will really have a large impact will be in illiquid small and medium bussiness loans (or commercial) where you might see a similar sale every couple of months and its often in an auction from a distressed seller.
Financial institutions under the new interpretation of FAS157, still have to fair value assets, and people still don't have to believe them. But regardless it will help aleviate pressure cuased by GAAP movements and not by realizable earnings and losses.
If i'm wrong on any of this I'd appreciate any accountants we have to correct me.
A statistical projection of proven market prices using a standard algorithm would be a better alternative than any current method since clearly we can't rely on the concept that an entire class of assets can not collapse suddenly.
It is disconcerting to see how much of this crisis resulted not from actual loss of income flowing in the door institutions but rather from institutions becoming legally insolvent due to sudden changes in the valuation of their collateral assets.
Maybe we shouldn't have passed laws that let institutions hold residential mortgage-backed securities from government sponsored enterprises as their legal collateral on par with T-bills. Bit of a blooper in hindsight.
Banks have complained that they have viable assets with strong cash flows that can't be sold because there is no market for them.
If the assets are so great, why isn't there a market for them? Could it be that potential buyers are worried about RISK? Could it be that this entire crisis is borne out of a sudden realization that prices and investment ratings did not adequately reflect risk, that the happy assumption wherin some assets are viable with strong cash flow is a myth?
However, the battle over mark-to-market may not yet be over. Bankers are pressing [to be allowed] to retroactively recoup losses...
Barney Frank, D-Mass., told the American Bankers Association..."They [bankers] ought to be able to go back and say they took that loss on an asset that is being held to maturity and recoup that loss."
Sop for the banks, that's all this is. What next? Will people be allowed to qualify for mortgages based on the purchase value of their plush animal collections? Will we all have access to Pollyannas-cum-auditors for the purposes of solvency evaluation?
If the assets do not recover in value, this policy change will only accomplish making bank failures in the future a surprise.
While the mark to market rule may be fairly recent, so reversion might not be the worst thing, it irks me that people were using it to get rich on the way up (because they could increase their leverage), but now when things are going down, trying to get rid of it. Consistnent rules are important.
Also, mark to market is really the only 'true' test of value. Things are only worth what people are willing to pay for them. As the best explanation of mark to market illustrates:
Pawnbroker: Burnt my fingers, man.
Louis Winthorpe III: I beg your pardon?
Pawnbroker: Man, that watch is so hot, it's smokin'.
Louis Winthorpe III: Hot? Do you mean to imply stolen?
Pawnbroker: I'll give you 50 bucks for it.
Louis Winthorpe III: Fifty bucks? No, no, no. This is a Rouchefoucauld. The thinnest water-resistant watch in the world. Singularly unique, sculptured in design, hand-crafted in Switzerland, and water resistant to three atmospheres. This is *the* sports watch of the '80s. Six thousand, nine hundred and fifty five dollars retail!
Pawnbroker: You got a receipt?
Louis Winthorpe III: Look, it tells time simultaneously in Monte Carlo, Beverly Hills, London, Paris, Rome, and Gstaad.
Pawnbroker: In Philadelphia, it's worth 50 bucks.
Louis Winthorpe III: Just give me the money.
Louis Winthorpe III: [looking in display case] How much for the gun?
"why isn't there a market for them?"
-You are right to an extent and in some asset classes it is that risk was (or is) misspriced, but that doesn't hold for a lot of assets. It takes time for markets to correct themselves, and meanwhile people are getting fucked over, hard. It is no secret in finance that the markets swing too far in both dirrections. The difference between distressed and orderly sales in this environmetn is huge. Arguing that 'fair value' is forcing someone to take a mark on an asset that was sold in a distressed sale two months ago is obsurd. It's also pretty naive to pretend like all of the repricing is due to an accurate realization of what the actual risk attached to these securities are.
With regard to your second point, this isn't revolutionary and it isn't a taxable or realizable profit (unless you release reserves). If you write an asset down, and then it appreciates in value you have a GAAP gain. You don't actually realize the profit until you sell the asset or it matures. This impacts balance sheets and capitalization. And didn't the gov't waive appraisals for recent mortgages that are refinancing? So what's next already happened.
Didn't everything go along o.k. from when FDR repealed mark-to-market in 1938 and Bush re-regulated it in 2007? Several bankers of my acquaintance claim the whole financial meltdown could have been easily contained without mark-to-market. If so, then Bush's regulation, not de-regulation, caused the bulk of this crisis.
The accounting profession has always gone by the principle of "lower of cost or market."
My company has a building on the books at cost, $1,000,000. Recent appraisal $4,000,000.
We can't recognize the $3,000,000 gain unless we actually sell the property. However, if the EPA discovered toxins on the property and the property could not be sold, then the CPAs would require it be written down to zero.
Or take a peanut butter re-seller. If his whole inventory had to be thrown out, due to discovery of salmonella, he still might recover by demonstrating to his customers that his new supplier's peanut butter was fine. A short term hit can frequently be borne. Fractional reserve banks are different. They have to maintain certain ratios of assets to liabilities. Even rumors of insolvency will cause them to lose all their customers, no matter how much they claim the assets are only temporarily impaired. Accountants have ways of determining an Allowance for Bad Debts based on the history of receivables collections and other economic factors. The profession needs to develop a formula that fairly values assets which are temporarily impaired.
If the assets are so great, why isn't there a market for them? Could it be that potential buyers are worried about RISK? Could it be that this entire crisis is borne out of a sudden realization that prices and investment ratings did not adequately reflect risk, that the happy assumption wherin some assets are viable with strong cash flow is a myth?
Of course that is the reason, but the point of marking to market is that the firm could liquidate at those levels if they wanted to. Where there is no market, or an insufficiently liquid market (for whatever or any reason) the rational behind M2M doesn't really hold water. The old approach was mark them at cost. Marking them to a fancy (probably wrong) model is an improvement to that, and probably to trying to infer a "market" price where none exists.
Several bankers of my acquaintance claim the whole financial meltdown could have been easily contained without mark-to-market. If so, then Bush's regulation, not de-regulation, caused the bulk of this crisis.
We should pause here to note that two simple regulatory tweaks could have prevented much of the carnage. Suspending mark-to-market accounting rules (you could use a 5-year rolling average instead, for example) would have shored up the balance sheets. And a temporary easing of capital requirements would have provided banks breathing room to sort out the MBS mess.
If only the Dutch had thought of abandoning "mark to market" when tulip prices went all skizzy back in the day...
very different. Dutch tulip dealers had contracts that forced them to pay enormous sums of cash for the immediate delivery of bulbs whose value had fallen precipitously and they could not resell. They had a cash crunch. No regulator was saying they needed to hold ex amount of reserves against a 5 year contract. The banks had plenty of cash, but then they were required to raise more because of regulatory requirements. The only way to do this was to sell the assets that are causing the problem in the first place. It's a catch-22.
Isn't the government establishing a value by buying up the assets with the 700B? If there are 700B items, the value is $1, right? Then if someone buys them from the government at $1.25 doesn't that become the market value and up and up? I know I'm out of my league in this discussion, but that's how it looks. Serious question about how the value gets established.
Some reserves, if the reserves are permitted to change in value.
Unless I misunderstand matters, the ultimate nonsense is that reserve requirements apparently permit the holding of some proportion of investments instead of just cash. If I were the guarantor and designer of a fractional reserve banking system, I wouldn't have the first line of defense against bank runs (banks' own reserves) rest on assets subject to cyclical changes of value. The whole point is too avoid business cycles leading to bank runs!
This may be good news for stockholders in financials, but count me on the side of those who think this is bad news for the real economy.
Doesn't this make it even less likely that institutions holding these things will dump them? If they can't get what they're holding them on the books for, why would they put them back in play in the market?
And isn't that what we're trying to get them to do?
Pardon me if I'm stating the obvious, but it seems to me that the "problem" was the easy money policy and just like the Austrians say, that led to misinvestment, in this case, in things like mortgage backed securities. The credit crunch, then, is part of the solution to the problem--it cuts off more money for bad investments which would make the problem worse.
The other half of the solution is unwinding those bad investments, and it seems to me that ending mark to market makes unwinding those investments, AKA getting rid of them at market prices, less likely, more cumbersome, means that it'll take more time... I don't see why these companies would dump them at market prices now, and I certainly don't see why anyone would buy them at artificially inflated prices.
This is one of the reasons why bankruptcy, rather than bailouts, is better, by the way, because it returns these instruments back into the market rather than having them locked onto some otherwise defunct institution's books.
And God forbid stressed institutions actually lend against these marked up instruments! Wasn't that what got everyone all excited in the first place? Wasn't that what got Bear Stearns, Washington Mutual and Lehman in trouble?
And I just don't see how ending mark to market is consistent with free markets and the good things they do. Maybe I'm missing something, and if I am I'd love to know. So somebody set me straight, okay? Why is the market so right about so much but so wrong about this?
Mark to market is the only way to value assets. Assets are only worth what people are willing to purchase them for, not some random made up bullshit numbers pulled from some accountant's rectum. Just because you say a 1986 Hyundai Excel is worth fifty thousand dollars doesn't make it worth fifty thousand dollars.
That's where you misunderstand their aims, Ken Shultz. The goal is to keep the banks from having to sell anything.
If banks are selling assets because of mark-to-market, it's to procure cash to meet reserve requirements. If they're procuring cash so as to sit on it to meet reserve requirements, they aren't lending it. This, in the words of the Administration and Bernanke, is the root of the crisis.
Reserve requirements are the veil holding the banking system together. They are the official backstop against getting taken over by the FDIC for being insolvent (which is what is supposed to happen before depositors get spooked and make a run on the bank).
Pretty mind-blowing stuff, isn't it? The goal right now is to accomplish the exact opposite of what you think should be happening. I was just trying to argue from their perspective, where the goal is to keep both the economy and the fractional reserve banking system intact.
Of course that is the reason, but the point of marking to market is that the firm could liquidate at those levels if they wanted to. Where there is no market, or an insufficiently liquid market (for whatever or any reason) the rational behind M2M doesn't really hold water. The old approach was mark them at cost. Marking them to a fancy (probably wrong) model is an improvement to that, and probably to trying to infer a "market" price where none exists.
If nobody is willing to buy something, than the value of that something (from a financial aspect, at least) is zero. Period, end of story. It doesn't matter what you paid for it. Items can, and do, go down in value.
Let me give you an easy example: Before each major sports event (World Series, Superbowl, etc.), T-shirts with the names of both teams are printed saying they are the world champions. The T-shirts of the actual winner are sold for twenty bucks each. The T-shirts of the loser are turned into rags or donated to third world nations-that is, they become basically worthless overnight-less than their cost to make. But both cost the same amount to make.
Under mark-to-market, the second batch is recoginzed as being worthless. Under the old/new rules, the second batch would be valued at at least the cost of production.
Sometimes things really are worthless, or nearly so. Sometimes things are worth less than the cost to produce or purchase them.
Yeah, whenever I hear a bank guy talking about how mortgage backed securities are "worthless", I just take it as a codeword meaning "We're not willing to take what the market's offering right now."
It is disconcerting to see how much of this crisis resulted not from actual loss of income flowing in the door institutions but rather from institutions becoming legally insolvent due to sudden changes in the valuation of their collateral assets.
Maybe we shouldn't have passed laws that let institutions hold residential mortgage-backed securities from government sponsored enterprises as their legal collateral on par with T-bills. Bit of a blooper in hindsight.
That strikes me as right. The banks were holding MBSes in reserve instead of T-bills because the MBSes were giving higher returns - as a result of the artificially low interest rates set by the fed.
The MBSes were being treated as if they were bonds because of the myth that housing prices would always rise.
If I'm getting this right ... If the MBSes had held their value, the banks would not have been overleveraged. But when the value of the MBSes collapsed, their capital ratios shot up and forced the banks to stop lending. Ergo, credit crunch.
Basically, it again comes back to a huge miscalculation of the risk in the mortgage market. Which goes back to the ratings agencies.
How is it that the MBSes got AAA ratings on subprime loans again?
"How is it that the MBSes got AAA ratings on subprime loans again?"
Part of it was the insurance. The ratings agencies gave an issue an investment grade rating if it was insured. So what happens if the companies that insured all those issues all go bust?
We're pretty much lookin' at it.
The part that's almost funny? The ratings agencies had to give them an investment grade rating because a lot of the institutions and funds that were buying the stuff are specifically prohibited in their formation docs from buying anything under an investment grade rating.
Institution: "We'd love to buy some of your subprime stuff, be we can't buy anything under a AA."
Security Issuer: "We can take care of that, we'll just buy some insurance!"
That doesn't seem right ... if the MBSes were getting AA ratings because they were insured, how did the insurance company decide how to price the insurance?
"That doesn't seem right ... if the MBSes were getting AA ratings because they were insured, how did the insurance company decide how to price the insurance?"
I believe there are essentially two ratings. There's the base rating or underlying rating and then what I see referred to as a shadow rating or the insured rating.
"Providing a shadow rating on bonds that carry a monoline guaranty. Obligations being considered for insurance are not only reviewed by AFGI member firms, but also by one or more rating agencies. Generally, the triple-A insurers will not insure an obligation if it falls below investment- grade credit quality independent of the financial guaranty."
I think there were a lot of contributing factors. People should have been doing their own due diligence, you never take the seller's word for it or his consultant's word for it--that's whether you're buying a used car, a piece of real estate or an investment tranche.
I think the ratings agencies too had to work with the information that was given on the loan applications, a lot of which was baloney. Sometimes it was inflated by mortgage brokers, sometimes, I think, there was outright credit fraud--individuals just lied.
There's no doubt there were lax lending standards. I remember New Century telling us that it hadn't lowered its lending standards. My memory's not 100%, but I think I remember them saying that they required either a down payment or proof of employment, but that you had to have one or the other. I think that turned out to be...um...inaccurate.
What it all boils down to though is cheap credit. When there's that much cheap credit sloshing around, all looking for the same investments, the investments will materialize out of the woodwork to absorb all that money.
But yeah, we should throw all the crooks in jail, even if it is a natural part of the business cycle. Freedom allows a certain amount of crime, but it's worth it in the long run.
I can't believe people didn't get the Marky Mark reference.
Six months later the government figures out how fucked up mark to market is. (Is that a new speed record?) The whole this is the only objective measure is BS. Land that backs MBS has intrinsic value. It will only go to zero when the last human dies and Xorbb from Glacknar declares Earth his. Why does land have have intrinsic value? It is finite, there is only so much, you ain't makin more, and humans are increasing in population (although not a requirement). If you start seeing homes going for $0 let me know. (this does not apply to eminent domain) People are talking about MBS as if they are equities and can go to zero.
It's a business cycle. With a giant bubble that more than one person had a hand in. The government pushed for housing overtly and through omission while the private sector discovered MBS and went bat shit nuts leveraging them. The government forced the risk free rate to damn near negative against inflation while at the same time saying MBS are virtually risk free (backed by land that was skyrocketing http://www.investmenttools.com/images/re/re_median.gif) without actually saying so through fannie and freddie. So where do you park your cash to protect against inflation? In MBS. What if you are out of prime borrowers? You move down the scale. Why can you move down the scale and not significantly increase the risk? Because Black Scholes is a complete piece of shit model.So we mix sub prime with prime slice it up sell it off and then insure with nothing more than a gamble to feel safer. The loan originators go hog wild to provide for the demand, Congress claps like a retarded monkey on the side as constituents get fat and happy in homes they can't afford, Wall Street goes on a leverage binge to turn this mole hill of profit into an intergalactic bubble. When one of the small bubbles holding the big bubble goes (MBS due to sub-prime concerns)the shit hits the fan with the force of a 7AM hung over taco bell crap.
At the end of the day there are some firms that survived just fine. Our hockey playing cousins are up north with their banks rocking along. People like to scream it's their regulation, and in part may well be. But oddly enough they avoid risk like it's herpes and most hold capital adequacy ratios well over the required and lend well below the limit. Along with some US banks.
The culture as a whole got greedy. Greedy for $350K homes on $40K salaries. Greedy to maintain Congressional seats and power. Greedy for increased returns with leverage. Greedy to buy more shit with someone else's money. And it has all come back to bite us in the ass.
Mark to market was a bad idea and a knee jerk reaction. It should have been gone six months ago or never started.
The rating agencies are a scam. They manipulate and pencil fuck models to get what they want or what serves them. They are damn near as big a scam as the market makers on the exchange floors.
I for one completely approve of government handing hundreds of billions of dollars to jews.
Israel deserves our support while they kill our soldiers, commit false flag ops on our soil, Control our government and generally incite the world to hate us.
Going back to Reason's article on the ratigns agencies from last fall, I think this is a really crucial bit of information:
The key additional fact is that experts were selling advice about mortgage-backed assets as if those assets were independent when, in reality, they weren't at all independent assets. Only once investors realized that the housing market is a national market-not a local one-did it become clear that these securities were extraordinarily risky. Hence the collapse.
What this is really saying is that the people doing the statistical analysis were making the assumption that mortgage markets were IID or independent identically distributed.
This is a common enough assumption if you're trying to do something like statistical signal processing. I.e. Assume noise is not correlated from sample to sample - that noise is "white", so you can average it out.
Or another way of putting this is that the assumption was that fluctuations in the mortgage markets would average out to zero if you included a basket of mortages from all over the country in the security. Florida might go bust, but Colorado would be booming, so you're losses and gains would average out, reducing your risk.
Of course, the housing bubble caused local markets to become statistically correlated - everything was booming at the same time, which meant that a simultaneous bust would raise your losses dramatically. The risk rating should have shot up because you couldn't average it out anymore. But the computer models they were using to calculate risk still included that IID assumption.
My guess is that nobody noticed that the assumptions were wrong until these securities started going bust and someone had to investigate why. They were asleep at the switch, and by that point, it was too late.
The rating agencies are a scam. They manipulate and pencil fuck models to get what they want or what serves them. They are damn near as big a scam as the market makers on the exchange floors.
You're probably right. Whether they deliberately ignored the warning signs, or weren't paying attention, they should be liable.
It's either negligence or deliberate malfeasance. Prosecutable either way.
if you can sue Exxon for putting a drunk at the helm of the Valdez, you can sue Moody's for using a fucked up statistical model to calculate risk.
Anyway, even if they don't have the money, they'll be out of business and we can get some new agencies that will be a tad more careful about the accuracy of their recommendations.
Taking my cue from FASB (which, frankly, has rarely if ever led me astray), I've determined that my diet will work so much faster and more efficiently if I simply sand all the numbers off of my scale.
Then, I can get up in the morning, stand on the scale, and decide what my intrinsic weight will be for that day.
Dude. Not cool. Not cool, man.
Although in fairness, I suppose it does provide some balance to the whole "Reason Lobster Girl" thing.
Er.... what does the gay porn have to do with this?
personally I think they should be allowed to value them at whatever made up value they want it worked for Enron, worldcom etc.
I'd love to comment, but the twink has to go.
You fools!! The "gay porn" "twink" represents the Funky Bunch of folks in charge of this nightmare.
Where's my Kindle?
"Given that the toxicity of mortgage-backed securities have been front page news for two years now... this loosening of a Bush-era Wall Street regulation seems rather on the slow side."
This isn't really a response to financial institutions having shitty assets. It is a response to those asset values (often unrealistic if you have the ability to hold them) impacting the capitalization of said institutions. It helps the firms work through the period of depressed valuation without blowing through debt covenants.
Sure it offers more flexibility for creative accounting (which can hurt [dumb] investors and lenders) but it isn't as if the debt holders are saints either. There are a lot of examples of banks executing low bid-side sales to manipulate the prices of specific assets so that they can foreclose on and BWIC entire portfolios. FASB decision is in part in response to this action and evens the playing field imensly, taking power out of the hands of some brokerages who need to deleverage, while also easing their deleveraging process by making it easier to stay well capitalized and not breach regulatory statutes or debt covenants.
Er.... what does the gay porn have to do with this?
Mark Wahlberg--AKA Marky Mark
I don't get the picture either. Is it some sort of test? Oh my god, am I gay? Mommy!
From the linked article:
Seeking to resolve this situation, FASB's new guidance allows banks and their auditors to use "significant judgment" when valuing the illiquid assets such as mortgage securities
This will not end well.
We are replacing the only objective measure of an assets value, the price the market will pay right now, with the self-interested estimation of those who hold the assets. This is pretty much like a fully socialist state establishing prices by fiat without regard to actual price mechanisms.
The problem here is a belief in what Giether called "intrinsic value" i.e. the idea that assets have some kind of built-in, persistent worth that a properly functioning financial system will correctly price. Unfortunately, intrinsic value does not exist. The value of anything at any given moment is the amount of some other good other will trade of it at a particular moment in time. Any other valuation is just guesswork.
Over priced residential mortgages that back the toxic residential mortgage-backed securities from Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac and other issuers are what wrecked the system. Even institutions that had no major mortgage related business became insolvent if they used the FM's securities for their legal collateral. Many if not most of the worst mortgages came from California and with that state on the track to become the next Michigan it is unlikely those houses will ever fully recover their value.
Basing our accounting on the idea that the mere hope that currently worthless assets will reacquire significant value in the indefinite future is a fools gamble. We should bite the bullet and stay with objective pricing. We got into this mess by trying to get something for nothing. We shouldn't repeat the mistake.
I'm not reading this blog anymore until it returns to its heterosexual male/lesbian roots.
Banks have complained that they have viable assets with strong cash flows that can't be sold because there is no market for them.
Banks are lying. There is always a market for viable assets with strong cash flows, as long as there is some expectation that those cash flows will continue. If there is a strong expectation that those cash flows won't continue, the asset could hardly be termed "viable."
"Er.... what does the gay porn have to do with this?"
WHAT doesn't it have to do with this? Gay Porn is our only way out of this. The UAW will be cranking out gay porn by shipload.
Our future is hard and sweaty.
Mark Wahlberg--AKA Marky Mark
Ugh. Is there some punishment for the photo equivalent of a bad pun?
The problem here is a belief in what Giether called "intrinsic value" i.e. the idea that assets have some kind of built-in, persistent worth that a properly functioning financial system will correctly price. Unfortunately, intrinsic value does not exist. The value of anything at any given moment is the amount of some other good other will trade of it at a particular moment in time. Any other valuation is just guesswork.
The problem here is we're trying to value stuff without actually selling it. This works in some case but not in others. Commodity goods? Yeah, tell me what it is and I'll give you a pretty good estimate of how much it's worth. Real estate? Not so much. It's a known problem. No matter how similar you claim house A is to house B, I can find you a laundry list of reasons why one is worth more or less than the other. Until you actually go out and find someone who's willing to give you cold hard cash for it, you just don't know.
Isn't he the one with the third nipple?
The UAW will be cranking out gay porn by shipload.
Our future is hard and sweaty.
Can it be socialist propaganda style?
Can we hire Shepard Fairey to do it?
"Isn't he the one with the third nipple?"
You're thinking of Matt Welch.
UAW socialist gay porn: a white collar manager has his wrists tied with his expensive silk tie and is held down on the assembly line. One burly line worker has his way with him while three others sit around and watch. At first the manager protests but as the mighty union cock pumps away at him he moans in ecstasy and comes while screaming "You have nothing to lose but your chains, you have nothing to lose but your chains!"
Seriously now...
The mark-to-market rule hasn't been around that long, and the carnage it's indirectly contributed to is pretty plain, so I don't think it's unreasonable to change this rule.
However, using "significant judgement" doesn't seem like the right idea. In his pieces on the financial crisis Michael Flynn suggested a rolling average. Alternatively, rules for how capital ratios should be computed or when bank's lending regulations kick in in response could be modified.
The problem with the current crisis has been that mark-to-market causes these sudden jumps in the capital ratios if an asset's market value changes suddenly - as it did when the MBS market collapsed. One day the bank is fine, the next it's bumping up against its capital ratio. As a result, the bank can't lend, because any jolt could send it over the edge.
Basically, something has to smooth out the curves, so wild gyrations in market values don't the effects of regulations to kick in unexpectedly.
Our future is hard and sweaty.
Shannon,
The meat and potatoes of the decision is it gives more flexibility to move assets from level 2 (significant direct or inderect market inputs) into level 3 (unobservable inputs). It basically gives more flexibility for not using quotes from distressed sales or BWICs (Bid Wanted In Competition [i.e. after foreclosure/bankruptcy]).
You are also mistaken that this is a really really big deal for RMBS portfolios (especially because the most toxic stuff won't be written up i.e. ABX). It will impact MBS (although more so CMBS), but where it will really have a large impact will be in illiquid small and medium bussiness loans (or commercial) where you might see a similar sale every couple of months and its often in an auction from a distressed seller.
Financial institutions under the new interpretation of FAS157, still have to fair value assets, and people still don't have to believe them. But regardless it will help aleviate pressure cuased by GAAP movements and not by realizable earnings and losses.
If i'm wrong on any of this I'd appreciate any accountants we have to correct me.
-J
SugarFree'd my tag:
"Dad, why'd you take me to a gay steel mill?"
"We work hard, we play hard."
Mark Wahlberg--AKA Marky Mark
Not to be confused with Mark (L.) Walberg. 😉
Er.... what does the gay porn have to do with this?
Let's go watch some gay porn to get our hate back!
Mark Wahlberg Talks to Animals
Mark Wahlberg is kinda badass though: 1) he's from Beantown 2) He stole a car 3) he did time 4) he didn't follow his brother into a boy band
Mac: [to Sweet Dee and Charlie] Are you two seeing this?
[all look over at Dennis]
Dennis: [gayly] ...boys are out tonight, huh?
A statistical projection of proven market prices using a standard algorithm would be a better alternative than any current method since clearly we can't rely on the concept that an entire class of assets can not collapse suddenly.
It is disconcerting to see how much of this crisis resulted not from actual loss of income flowing in the door institutions but rather from institutions becoming legally insolvent due to sudden changes in the valuation of their collateral assets.
Maybe we shouldn't have passed laws that let institutions hold residential mortgage-backed securities from government sponsored enterprises as their legal collateral on par with T-bills. Bit of a blooper in hindsight.
Banks have complained that they have viable assets with strong cash flows that can't be sold because there is no market for them.
If the assets are so great, why isn't there a market for them? Could it be that potential buyers are worried about RISK? Could it be that this entire crisis is borne out of a sudden realization that prices and investment ratings did not adequately reflect risk, that the happy assumption wherin some assets are viable with strong cash flow is a myth?
However, the battle over mark-to-market may not yet be over. Bankers are pressing [to be allowed] to retroactively recoup losses...
Barney Frank, D-Mass., told the American Bankers Association..."They [bankers] ought to be able to go back and say they took that loss on an asset that is being held to maturity and recoup that loss."
Sop for the banks, that's all this is. What next? Will people be allowed to qualify for mortgages based on the purchase value of their plush animal collections? Will we all have access to Pollyannas-cum-auditors for the purposes of solvency evaluation?
If the assets do not recover in value, this policy change will only accomplish making bank failures in the future a surprise.
While the mark to market rule may be fairly recent, so reversion might not be the worst thing, it irks me that people were using it to get rich on the way up (because they could increase their leverage), but now when things are going down, trying to get rid of it. Consistnent rules are important.
Also, mark to market is really the only 'true' test of value. Things are only worth what people are willing to pay for them. As the best explanation of mark to market illustrates:
Some F-ed,
"why isn't there a market for them?"
-You are right to an extent and in some asset classes it is that risk was (or is) misspriced, but that doesn't hold for a lot of assets. It takes time for markets to correct themselves, and meanwhile people are getting fucked over, hard. It is no secret in finance that the markets swing too far in both dirrections. The difference between distressed and orderly sales in this environmetn is huge. Arguing that 'fair value' is forcing someone to take a mark on an asset that was sold in a distressed sale two months ago is obsurd. It's also pretty naive to pretend like all of the repricing is due to an accurate realization of what the actual risk attached to these securities are.
With regard to your second point, this isn't revolutionary and it isn't a taxable or realizable profit (unless you release reserves). If you write an asset down, and then it appreciates in value you have a GAAP gain. You don't actually realize the profit until you sell the asset or it matures. This impacts balance sheets and capitalization. And didn't the gov't waive appraisals for recent mortgages that are refinancing? So what's next already happened.
Didn't everything go along o.k. from when FDR repealed mark-to-market in 1938 and Bush re-regulated it in 2007? Several bankers of my acquaintance claim the whole financial meltdown could have been easily contained without mark-to-market. If so, then Bush's regulation, not de-regulation, caused the bulk of this crisis.
The accounting profession has always gone by the principle of "lower of cost or market."
My company has a building on the books at cost, $1,000,000. Recent appraisal $4,000,000.
We can't recognize the $3,000,000 gain unless we actually sell the property. However, if the EPA discovered toxins on the property and the property could not be sold, then the CPAs would require it be written down to zero.
Or take a peanut butter re-seller. If his whole inventory had to be thrown out, due to discovery of salmonella, he still might recover by demonstrating to his customers that his new supplier's peanut butter was fine. A short term hit can frequently be borne. Fractional reserve banks are different. They have to maintain certain ratios of assets to liabilities. Even rumors of insolvency will cause them to lose all their customers, no matter how much they claim the assets are only temporarily impaired. Accountants have ways of determining an Allowance for Bad Debts based on the history of receivables collections and other economic factors. The profession needs to develop a formula that fairly values assets which are temporarily impaired.
RIP, mark to reality.
Welcome aboard, mark to fantasy!
If the assets are so great, why isn't there a market for them? Could it be that potential buyers are worried about RISK? Could it be that this entire crisis is borne out of a sudden realization that prices and investment ratings did not adequately reflect risk, that the happy assumption wherin some assets are viable with strong cash flow is a myth?
Of course that is the reason, but the point of marking to market is that the firm could liquidate at those levels if they wanted to. Where there is no market, or an insufficiently liquid market (for whatever or any reason) the rational behind M2M doesn't really hold water. The old approach was mark them at cost. Marking them to a fancy (probably wrong) model is an improvement to that, and probably to trying to infer a "market" price where none exists.
If so, then Bush's regulation, not de-regulation, caused the bulk of this crisis.
Like most massive financial panics there is never one single thing - but an interaction of many factors. This is undoubtedly one of the big ones.
Ugh. Is there some punishment for the photo equivalent of a bad pun?
Yes, but the punishment is reading Hit & Run. DAMN YOU WELCH!
Several bankers of my acquaintance claim the whole financial meltdown could have been easily contained without mark-to-market. If so, then Bush's regulation, not de-regulation, caused the bulk of this crisis.
That's pretty much what Michael Flynn says here:
We should pause here to note that two simple regulatory tweaks could have prevented much of the carnage. Suspending mark-to-market accounting rules (you could use a 5-year rolling average instead, for example) would have shored up the balance sheets. And a temporary easing of capital requirements would have provided banks breathing room to sort out the MBS mess.
If only the Dutch had thought of abandoning "mark to market" when tulip prices went all skizzy back in the day...
If only the Dutch had thought of abandoning "mark to market" when tulip prices went all skizzy back in the day...
very different. Dutch tulip dealers had contracts that forced them to pay enormous sums of cash for the immediate delivery of bulbs whose value had fallen precipitously and they could not resell. They had a cash crunch. No regulator was saying they needed to hold ex amount of reserves against a 5 year contract. The banks had plenty of cash, but then they were required to raise more because of regulatory requirements. The only way to do this was to sell the assets that are causing the problem in the first place. It's a catch-22.
Isn't the government establishing a value by buying up the assets with the 700B? If there are 700B items, the value is $1, right? Then if someone buys them from the government at $1.25 doesn't that become the market value and up and up? I know I'm out of my league in this discussion, but that's how it looks. Serious question about how the value gets established.
Some reserves, if the reserves are permitted to change in value.
Unless I misunderstand matters, the ultimate nonsense is that reserve requirements apparently permit the holding of some proportion of investments instead of just cash. If I were the guarantor and designer of a fractional reserve banking system, I wouldn't have the first line of defense against bank runs (banks' own reserves) rest on assets subject to cyclical changes of value. The whole point is too avoid business cycles leading to bank runs!
This may be good news for stockholders in financials, but count me on the side of those who think this is bad news for the real economy.
Doesn't this make it even less likely that institutions holding these things will dump them? If they can't get what they're holding them on the books for, why would they put them back in play in the market?
And isn't that what we're trying to get them to do?
Pardon me if I'm stating the obvious, but it seems to me that the "problem" was the easy money policy and just like the Austrians say, that led to misinvestment, in this case, in things like mortgage backed securities. The credit crunch, then, is part of the solution to the problem--it cuts off more money for bad investments which would make the problem worse.
The other half of the solution is unwinding those bad investments, and it seems to me that ending mark to market makes unwinding those investments, AKA getting rid of them at market prices, less likely, more cumbersome, means that it'll take more time... I don't see why these companies would dump them at market prices now, and I certainly don't see why anyone would buy them at artificially inflated prices.
This is one of the reasons why bankruptcy, rather than bailouts, is better, by the way, because it returns these instruments back into the market rather than having them locked onto some otherwise defunct institution's books.
And God forbid stressed institutions actually lend against these marked up instruments! Wasn't that what got everyone all excited in the first place? Wasn't that what got Bear Stearns, Washington Mutual and Lehman in trouble?
And I just don't see how ending mark to market is consistent with free markets and the good things they do. Maybe I'm missing something, and if I am I'd love to know. So somebody set me straight, okay? Why is the market so right about so much but so wrong about this?
Ken,
I'd love to explain to you where you're wrong, but as far as I can tell, you're dead on.
Mark to market is the only way to value assets. Assets are only worth what people are willing to purchase them for, not some random made up bullshit numbers pulled from some accountant's rectum. Just because you say a 1986 Hyundai Excel is worth fifty thousand dollars doesn't make it worth fifty thousand dollars.
That's where you misunderstand their aims, Ken Shultz. The goal is to keep the banks from having to sell anything.
If banks are selling assets because of mark-to-market, it's to procure cash to meet reserve requirements. If they're procuring cash so as to sit on it to meet reserve requirements, they aren't lending it. This, in the words of the Administration and Bernanke, is the root of the crisis.
Reserve requirements are the veil holding the banking system together. They are the official backstop against getting taken over by the FDIC for being insolvent (which is what is supposed to happen before depositors get spooked and make a run on the bank).
Pretty mind-blowing stuff, isn't it? The goal right now is to accomplish the exact opposite of what you think should be happening. I was just trying to argue from their perspective, where the goal is to keep both the economy and the fractional reserve banking system intact.
domoarrigato | April 2, 2009, 3:14pm | #
Of course that is the reason, but the point of marking to market is that the firm could liquidate at those levels if they wanted to. Where there is no market, or an insufficiently liquid market (for whatever or any reason) the rational behind M2M doesn't really hold water. The old approach was mark them at cost. Marking them to a fancy (probably wrong) model is an improvement to that, and probably to trying to infer a "market" price where none exists.
If nobody is willing to buy something, than the value of that something (from a financial aspect, at least) is zero. Period, end of story. It doesn't matter what you paid for it. Items can, and do, go down in value.
Let me give you an easy example: Before each major sports event (World Series, Superbowl, etc.), T-shirts with the names of both teams are printed saying they are the world champions. The T-shirts of the actual winner are sold for twenty bucks each. The T-shirts of the loser are turned into rags or donated to third world nations-that is, they become basically worthless overnight-less than their cost to make. But both cost the same amount to make.
Under mark-to-market, the second batch is recoginzed as being worthless. Under the old/new rules, the second batch would be valued at at least the cost of production.
Sometimes things really are worthless, or nearly so. Sometimes things are worth less than the cost to produce or purchase them.
Yeah, whenever I hear a bank guy talking about how mortgage backed securities are "worthless", I just take it as a codeword meaning "We're not willing to take what the market's offering right now."
...which isn't exactly "worthless", is it.
I think Shannon Love hit it up thread:
It is disconcerting to see how much of this crisis resulted not from actual loss of income flowing in the door institutions but rather from institutions becoming legally insolvent due to sudden changes in the valuation of their collateral assets.
Maybe we shouldn't have passed laws that let institutions hold residential mortgage-backed securities from government sponsored enterprises as their legal collateral on par with T-bills. Bit of a blooper in hindsight.
That strikes me as right. The banks were holding MBSes in reserve instead of T-bills because the MBSes were giving higher returns - as a result of the artificially low interest rates set by the fed.
The MBSes were being treated as if they were bonds because of the myth that housing prices would always rise.
If I'm getting this right ... If the MBSes had held their value, the banks would not have been overleveraged. But when the value of the MBSes collapsed, their capital ratios shot up and forced the banks to stop lending. Ergo, credit crunch.
Basically, it again comes back to a huge miscalculation of the risk in the mortgage market. Which goes back to the ratings agencies.
How is it that the MBSes got AAA ratings on subprime loans again?
"How is it that the MBSes got AAA ratings on subprime loans again?"
Part of it was the insurance. The ratings agencies gave an issue an investment grade rating if it was insured. So what happens if the companies that insured all those issues all go bust?
We're pretty much lookin' at it.
The part that's almost funny? The ratings agencies had to give them an investment grade rating because a lot of the institutions and funds that were buying the stuff are specifically prohibited in their formation docs from buying anything under an investment grade rating.
Institution: "We'd love to buy some of your subprime stuff, be we can't buy anything under a AA."
Security Issuer: "We can take care of that, we'll just buy some insurance!"
What could go wrong?
That doesn't seem right ... if the MBSes were getting AA ratings because they were insured, how did the insurance company decide how to price the insurance?
"That doesn't seem right ... if the MBSes were getting AA ratings because they were insured, how did the insurance company decide how to price the insurance?"
I believe there are essentially two ratings. There's the base rating or underlying rating and then what I see referred to as a shadow rating or the insured rating.
See these links:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Monoline#Bond_insurance_problems_in_2007
On the next link they wrote:
"Providing a shadow rating on bonds that carry a monoline guaranty. Obligations being considered for insurance are not only reviewed by AFGI member firms, but also by one or more rating agencies. Generally, the triple-A insurers will not insure an obligation if it falls below investment- grade credit quality independent of the financial guaranty."
http://www.afgi.org/ratingsagency.htm
I guess they're saying that if you aren't higher than BB+ they won't give you anything above BB+ even if you have bond insurance.
...I don't know exactly how recent an innovation that is, but I don't believe it was that way until recently.
I would throw out too that credit default swaps are essentially insurance too, and that was more or less making the same error.
Hey, AIG has the other side of this, so there's nothing to worry about!
I'm beginning to think that the justice department should seriously look into fraud charges against the ratings agencies.
Heck, they should have done it back in 2000 after the dot-com bubble burst. We all know how everything had a 'Buy' or 'Strong Buy' rating on it.
Maybe the fact that they got away with ridiculous Buy recommendations encoraged them to put AA ratings on subprime mortgage securities.
I think there were a lot of contributing factors. People should have been doing their own due diligence, you never take the seller's word for it or his consultant's word for it--that's whether you're buying a used car, a piece of real estate or an investment tranche.
I think the ratings agencies too had to work with the information that was given on the loan applications, a lot of which was baloney. Sometimes it was inflated by mortgage brokers, sometimes, I think, there was outright credit fraud--individuals just lied.
There's no doubt there were lax lending standards. I remember New Century telling us that it hadn't lowered its lending standards. My memory's not 100%, but I think I remember them saying that they required either a down payment or proof of employment, but that you had to have one or the other. I think that turned out to be...um...inaccurate.
What it all boils down to though is cheap credit. When there's that much cheap credit sloshing around, all looking for the same investments, the investments will materialize out of the woodwork to absorb all that money.
But yeah, we should throw all the crooks in jail, even if it is a natural part of the business cycle. Freedom allows a certain amount of crime, but it's worth it in the long run.
I can't believe people didn't get the Marky Mark reference.
Six months later the government figures out how fucked up mark to market is. (Is that a new speed record?) The whole this is the only objective measure is BS. Land that backs MBS has intrinsic value. It will only go to zero when the last human dies and Xorbb from Glacknar declares Earth his. Why does land have have intrinsic value? It is finite, there is only so much, you ain't makin more, and humans are increasing in population (although not a requirement). If you start seeing homes going for $0 let me know. (this does not apply to eminent domain) People are talking about MBS as if they are equities and can go to zero.
It's a business cycle. With a giant bubble that more than one person had a hand in. The government pushed for housing overtly and through omission while the private sector discovered MBS and went bat shit nuts leveraging them. The government forced the risk free rate to damn near negative against inflation while at the same time saying MBS are virtually risk free (backed by land that was skyrocketing http://www.investmenttools.com/images/re/re_median.gif) without actually saying so through fannie and freddie. So where do you park your cash to protect against inflation? In MBS. What if you are out of prime borrowers? You move down the scale. Why can you move down the scale and not significantly increase the risk? Because Black Scholes is a complete piece of shit model.So we mix sub prime with prime slice it up sell it off and then insure with nothing more than a gamble to feel safer. The loan originators go hog wild to provide for the demand, Congress claps like a retarded monkey on the side as constituents get fat and happy in homes they can't afford, Wall Street goes on a leverage binge to turn this mole hill of profit into an intergalactic bubble. When one of the small bubbles holding the big bubble goes (MBS due to sub-prime concerns)the shit hits the fan with the force of a 7AM hung over taco bell crap.
At the end of the day there are some firms that survived just fine. Our hockey playing cousins are up north with their banks rocking along. People like to scream it's their regulation, and in part may well be. But oddly enough they avoid risk like it's herpes and most hold capital adequacy ratios well over the required and lend well below the limit. Along with some US banks.
The culture as a whole got greedy. Greedy for $350K homes on $40K salaries. Greedy to maintain Congressional seats and power. Greedy for increased returns with leverage. Greedy to buy more shit with someone else's money. And it has all come back to bite us in the ass.
Mark to market was a bad idea and a knee jerk reaction. It should have been gone six months ago or never started.
The rating agencies are a scam. They manipulate and pencil fuck models to get what they want or what serves them. They are damn near as big a scam as the market makers on the exchange floors.
I feel better. (sorry for the rant)
I for one completely approve of government handing hundreds of billions of dollars to jews.
Israel deserves our support while they kill our soldiers, commit false flag ops on our soil, Control our government and generally incite the world to hate us.
Going back to Reason's article on the ratigns agencies from last fall, I think this is a really crucial bit of information:
The key additional fact is that experts were selling advice about mortgage-backed assets as if those assets were independent when, in reality, they weren't at all independent assets. Only once investors realized that the housing market is a national market-not a local one-did it become clear that these securities were extraordinarily risky. Hence the collapse.
What this is really saying is that the people doing the statistical analysis were making the assumption that mortgage markets were IID or independent identically distributed.
This is a common enough assumption if you're trying to do something like statistical signal processing. I.e. Assume noise is not correlated from sample to sample - that noise is "white", so you can average it out.
Or another way of putting this is that the assumption was that fluctuations in the mortgage markets would average out to zero if you included a basket of mortages from all over the country in the security. Florida might go bust, but Colorado would be booming, so you're losses and gains would average out, reducing your risk.
Of course, the housing bubble caused local markets to become statistically correlated - everything was booming at the same time, which meant that a simultaneous bust would raise your losses dramatically. The risk rating should have shot up because you couldn't average it out anymore. But the computer models they were using to calculate risk still included that IID assumption.
My guess is that nobody noticed that the assumptions were wrong until these securities started going bust and someone had to investigate why. They were asleep at the switch, and by that point, it was too late.
The assumptions could have been correct and the mess still would have happened. The model used in the manner it was used is flawed.
The rating agencies are a scam. They manipulate and pencil fuck models to get what they want or what serves them. They are damn near as big a scam as the market makers on the exchange floors.
You're probably right. Whether they deliberately ignored the warning signs, or weren't paying attention, they should be liable.
It's either negligence or deliberate malfeasance. Prosecutable either way.
if you can sue Exxon for putting a drunk at the helm of the Valdez, you can sue Moody's for using a fucked up statistical model to calculate risk.
Anyway, even if they don't have the money, they'll be out of business and we can get some new agencies that will be a tad more careful about the accuracy of their recommendations.
Taking my cue from FASB (which, frankly, has rarely if ever led me astray), I've determined that my diet will work so much faster and more efficiently if I simply sand all the numbers off of my scale.
Then, I can get up in the morning, stand on the scale, and decide what my intrinsic weight will be for that day.
This is gonna be great.