The Volokh Conspiracy

Mostly law professors | Sometimes contrarian | Often libertarian | Always independent | Est. 2002

The Volokh Conspiracy

Free Speech

Procedural Twist in Kash Patel's Libel Suit Against Substacker Jim Stewartson (Filed in 2023)

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From today's decision by Chief Judge Andrew Gordon (D. Nev.) in Patel v. Stewartson (for more on the $100K compensatory damages + $100K punitives default judgment, see this post):

Kashyap Patel and the Kash Foundation, Inc. sued Jim Stewartson for allegedly defamatory statements Stewartson made on Twitter (now, X) and Substack between June 2021 and May 2023…. Stewartson did not defend against the suit, and I entered default judgment against him. Stewartson now moves to set aside the default judgment … and to dismiss the case for lack of personal jurisdiction …. He argues that he was not properly served and that he does not have minimum contacts with Nevada.

The court concluded that Stewartson "has not met his burden to show strong and convincing evidence that he was not served as a result of the plaintiffs' substantial compliance with [the service rule] and his actual notice of the suit." But the court noted uncertainty about who bears the burden of proof as to personal jurisdiction in a default judgment case, and ordered supplemental briefing:

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Free Speech

Megan Thee Stallion's Request for Anti-"Cyberstalking" Injunction Against Online Defamer Denied as Prior Restraint

"Plaintiff is allegedly the target of hurtful, angry, offensive, humiliating, racial, and gender-based hate made in online posts by Defendant's followers. As tempting as it might be to force some civility into the matter by staunching Defendant's speech against Plaintiff through an injunction, doing so would ignore the protections of the First Amendment."

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Some excerpts from Judge Cecilia Altonaga (S.D. Fla.) long opinion today in Pete v. Cooper (for more on the earlier phases of the case, see this post):

This case arises out of defamation per se and related state-law claims, brought by Plaintiff, a Grammy-winning hip-hop artist known professionally as Megan Thee Stallion, against Defendant, an online personality who goes by Milagro Gramz or Mobz World. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant orchestrated a retaliatory smear campaign against her because of her role in the 2022 conviction of Daystar Peterson, a Canadian rapper and singer known as Tory Lanez, who, after a widely publicized trial, was found guilty of assaulting Plaintiff with a firearm…

A jury awarded plaintiff $75K for defamation, "promotion of an altered sexual depiction" in violation of a Florida statute, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. But plaintiff also asked the judge for a permanent injunction based on defendant's alleged "cyberstalking"

(1) barring Defendant from any direct, indirect, or third-party contact with Plaintiff; (2) requiring Defendant to remain at least 500 feet from Plaintiff, her home, and any location she is expected to be, and 1,000 feet from her musical performances; (3) prohibiting disclosure of Plaintiff's private personal identifying information; (4) forbidding the promotion, distribution, or transmission of the Deepfake Video or any other altered sexual depictions of Plaintiff; (5) barring defamatory statements regarding Plaintiff's testimony at Daystar Peterson's criminal trial, her mental and emotional state, alcohol use, or family; (6) prohibiting communications intended to incite third parties to threaten or harm Plaintiff, her team, or her family; (7) enjoining harassment, threats, assault, stalking, cyberstalking, impersonation, or other disturbing conduct; and (8) requiring removal of all statements and postings about the jury's Verdict.

No, the court said, partly on the grounds that the requested injunction would be an impermissible prior restraint:

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The Court Has No Interest In Overruling Smith

Fulton was the closest we'll get.

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This morning the Court granted cert in St. Mary Catholic Parish v. Roy. The petition presented three questions:

1. Whether proving a lack of general applicability under Employment Division v. Smith requires showing unfettered discretion or categorical exemptions for identical secular conduct.

2. Whether Carson v. Makin displaces the rule of Employment Division v. Smith only when the government explicitly excludes religious people and institutions.

3. Whether Employment Division v. Smith should be overruled.

The Court, however, only granted on Questions #1 and #2. This will likely be yet another repudiation of Colorado's hostility to religious liberty. Has any other state lost so many cases in a single area of constitutional law?

Yet, the Court denied cert on the third question presented. This is the latest in a string of cert petitions that have asked the Court to overrule Smith. And in each case, the Court declines to go down that road.

It appears that Fulton was the closest we will get to overruling Smith. Justices Thomas, Alito, and Gorsuch were prepared to overrule Smith. But that only counts to three.

Justice Kavanaugh has intimated that in light of Roman Catholic Diocese and Tandon, there is no need to overrule Smith. He might be right about that at the Supreme Court, but the lower courts can still distort Smith to rule against religious liberty. Indeed, lower courts are somehow still relying on Lemon, if not by name, to find Establishment Clause violations.

What about Justice Barrett? I suspect she thinks Smith was correctly decided, or at least the decision was correct enough that it should stay in place. That is the received wisdom at Notre Dame Law School. Professor Rick Garnett, her close friend, former colleague, steadfastly defends Smith.

In September 2025, Liz Foley and Mark Pinkert wrote a lengthy op-ed in the Wall Street Journal about how lower court judges were resisting the Supreme Court. The piece had one side reference to Smith:

Although the court has shored up Free Exercise Clause rights over the past five years, it has yet to overrule Employment Division v. Smith (1990), a disastrous decision that gives government officials and courts far too much flexibility to burden religion.

From this single sentence, Garnett felt compelled to write a letter to the editor to defend Smith.

As Ms. Foley and Mr. Pinkert remind us, religious liberty is more vulnerable when government power expands. Those who cherish our "first freedom" should support and advocate policies and laws that respect religious institutions' autonomy and believers' consciences. But when it comes to exemptions from nondiscriminatory government action, the original meaning of the First and Fourteenth Amendments, and the better understanding of the judicial role in our democracy, point toward political solutions, not judicial micromanagement.

Lori Windham from the Becket Fund (counsel in St. Mary) wrote a sur-reply to the WSJ:

Prof. Richard Garnett is a stalwart friend of religious liberty, but he's mistaken that judges would become micromanagers if the Supreme Court overturned Employment Division v. Smith (Letters, Sept. 16).

That 1990 decision was universally unpopular when Justice Antonin Scalia wrote it, and it remains so today. It's why the federal government and more than half the states have passed legislation to ensure that when a law burdens religious practice, believers get their day in court. Instead of the "anarchy" that Justice Scalia and Prof. Garnett envisioned, this has yielded carefully considered judicial decisions in which religious claimants sometimes win and sometimes lose.

Between Garnett and the Becket Fund, Justice Barrett seems to agree with the former.

Litigants can and should keep preserving the question of whether Smith should be overruled, but I do not see a prospect to five, or even four votes.

Supreme Court

Jack Goldsmith on the NYT and the Leaked Supreme Court "Shadow Papers"

A critique of the New York Times "unfortunately tendentious reporting about the memoranda."

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Over at Executive Functions, Jack Goldsmith offers a sharp critique of the way that the New York Times presented and spun the content of the leaked Supreme Court memos concerning whether to stay the Obama Administration's Clean Power Plan.

From the beginning of his post:

The CPP order was unusual, but not because the Court temporarily decided a very important issue via an interim order with no explanation. That had happened quite a lot, even outside the death penalty and election contexts. See for example these two interim orders from 2014 on abortion and same-sex marriage.

The CPP order was novel at the time, I believe, because it temporarily shut down a presidential program even before the court below had a chance to rule on the issue. (The Court did something similar last year in enjoining President Trump's Alien Enemies Act deportations.) Viewed from the perspective of 2026, this order fairly marks the beginning of the Court's modern active engagement with presidential initiatives via interim orders, as Kantor and Liptak suggest.

The CPP memoranda implicate lots of meaty legal and institutional issues which I will analyze in due course. But for now I simply want to flag what I view as unfortunately tendentious reporting about the memoranda, especially but not exclusively about the Chief Justice.

In the remainder of the post, Goldsmith flags some of the many ways in which the NYT's reports spin or frame the memos in a manner that seems to align as much, if not more, with the reporters' priors than with the evidence at hand. Several of his points aligned made by Will Baude. Fortunately, the stories included copies of the memos themselves and much of the other relevant material (such as the briefs submitted to the Court) is a matter of public record so people can judge for themselves.

AI in Court

"It Will Be Your Name and License on the Line, Not ChatGPT's"

A lawyer's duties "do not disappear solely because an attorney chooses to outsource his labor to AI."

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From Judge Kai Scott (E.D. Pa.) today in Bunce v. Visual Tech. Innovations, Inc.:

… Plaintiff … sought reasonable travel costs for a cancelled deposition. In response, Mr. Rajan filed an omnibus motion seeking sanctions and objecting to the Plaintiff's travel costs. Plaintiff responded accordingly, highlighting that although Mr. Rajan was sanctioned previously "for his use of made-up cases and other authorities that did not support his propositions[… ] Rajan has once again used a made-up case and cited to other authorities that don't support his propositions[.]" In his Reply, Mr. Rajan only briefly addressed this issue in a footnote.

On March 11, 2026, this Court Ordered Mr. Rajan to pay Plaintiff all reasonable travel costs, denying his omnibus motion and ordering him to show cause as to why his citations in his omnibus motion did not violate Rule 11(b) or this Court's Standing Order Re: Artificial Intelligence ("AI"). Mr. Rajan filed a response to the Court's Order to Show Cause in which he again responded to the claims of improperly using AI….

Contrary to his assertions, it was patently unreasonable for Mr. Rajan to file his omnibus motion with erroneous citations, at least one of which was made up. In his Response to the Court's Order to Show Cause, Mr. Rajan asserts that "[t]he question is whether a reasonable attorney, under the particular circumstances, would have acted similarly." He answers his own question in the affirmative, stating that a reasonable attorney would have filed the motion with the erroneous citations because the opposing party refused to confer with him on the matter of travel fees.

This is incorrect, both as a characterization of the governing law and what a reasonable attorney would do. As discussed above, the proper question is whether Mr. Rajan should have known that the citations in his filing were incorrect. He should have. As Rule 11 discusses, every attorney and pro se litigant must verify the veracity of their filings before submitting them to this Court. Full stop. It was not enough that Mr. Rajan felt like he had no other choice because opposing counsel refused to meet with him to discuss a matter that the Court already resolved.

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Supreme Court

"The Biggest Scandal Here Is In Fact the Leaks Themselves"

The leak of internal Supreme Court memos could affect how the Court operates.

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Over at Divided Argument, Will Baude comments on the NYT release of internal Supreme Court memos concerning whether to stay the Obama EPA's Clean Power Plan. I largely concur with Baude's assessment.

One point he makes is worth expanding upon. As I noted Saturday, the documents largely confirm what educated observers already suspected about the Court's decision.  Baude writes:

the biggest scandal here is in fact the leaks themselves. Supreme Court leaks like these — including copies of confidential work product — are becoming more common. In my view, this is a bad thing. It will damage the institutional culture of the Court and do little good. But Jodi Kantor is a super-powered investigative reporter, determined to break through some of the Court's norms of confidentiality, and I would bet on her succeeding. If so, we will have to become skilled at figuring out what these documents really tell us, and what they do not.

As Baude notes, leaks of internal documents will affect the Court's institutional culture, and perhaps in ways that those who cheer the leaks might not like.

The fact of the leak indicates to the justices that what they put down on paper and share with each other may not remain confidential. A memo to the other justices may end up in the newspaper (and, as Baude notes, be presented as more scandalous than the content justifies). This cannot help but make justices less likely to put their thoughts on paper--paper that will be seen (and potentially retained) not just by their colleagues, but by law clerks who may be less concerned about maintaining the sort of institutional culture necessary for careful deliberation. [Note in this regard that, as Josh Blackman flagged here, the NYT's Jodi Kantor previously reported that some clerks apparently retain "still-secret older case files," which suggests a possible source for the most recent leak.]

As the justices become increasingly concerned that committing their preliminary thoughts to paper creates the potential for leaks, they are likely to become less willing to commit their thoughts to paper. They may substitute less formal modes of communication, or share thoughts less widely. In short, they are likely to deliberate less amongst themselves and, as a consequence, more likely to rely more upon their jurisprudential instincts and priors in making decisions. If I am right, this could have the inevitable (and perhaps undesirable) effect of more decisions in which the justices divide along predictable ideological lines. Thus insofar as the source(s) of these leaks do not like the Court's orientation, their leaks might help produce a Court even less to their liking.

An Unusual GVR With Three Dissenting Votes

I've seen votes to grant instead of GVR, but I can't recall votes to deny instead of a GVR.

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Today the Supreme Court issued an order in Smith v. Scott, a qualified immunity case.

The petition for a writ of certiorari is granted. The judgment is vacated, and the case is remanded to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit for further consideration in light of Zorn v. Linton, 607 U. S. ___ (2026) (per curiam). Justice Sotomayor, Justice Kagan, and Justice Jackson would deny the petition for a writ of certiorari.

Smith had been floating around for a long time. It was first distributed to conference back in September 2025. Zorn, the case that caused the GVR, was first distributed to conference in November 2025, and was decided on March 23, 2026. Justice Sotomayor, Kagan, and Jackson dissented from that per curiam order.

The ordering here is unusual. Smith was in docket purgatory before Zorn, held while Zorn was being decided, and then about a month later, the Court GVR'd Smith with three dissents. The GVR did not happen right away, as per usual. The GVR took some time. There were some deliberations to be had. It is really unusual for a Justice to dissent from a GVR after an intervening precedent had been issued. Why shouldn't the lower court have an opportunity to apply the new precedent in the first instance? Isn't the usual criticism that the Supreme Court decides too much without giving the lower courts a shot? Perhaps it is even more unusual for the Court to GVR a case based on an un-argued per curiam decision--what some might call the "shadow docket."

I searched Westlaw for a case where one or more Justices would have denied the writ, following a GVR, but could not find anything. (Update: A few colleagues pointed out some cases that I had missed, though the practice is fairly rare.) It is common for Justices to vote to grant the writ to oppose a GVR. This split happened in Roman Catholic Diocese of Albany. But I can't recall a GVR accompanied by three Justices voting to deny. The GVR, by itself, does not settle the case. In theory at least, the matter could come back to the Court. But Justices Sotomayor, Kagan, and Jackson wanted to end this QI case right away. Or maybe this was some quiet protest of setting precedent on the emergency docket.

Not the most important news of the day, but I found it curious. Rest assured, no resignations are compelled by this order.

Free Speech

Cat out of the Bag? Just Shove It Back in!

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Apropos the "cat out of the bag" objection to sealing or pseudonymity, I thought I'd note last month's P.F. v. M.B. (by Queens County, N.Y. judge Scott Dunn), which offers an example of the contrary approach. I'm not saying the P.F. result is correct, but I thought it worth noting:

For a period of approximately one year, Plaintiff and Defendant M.B. allegedly were engaged in a serious romantic relationship while Defendant M.B. was married to … Defendant Calcetas …. Plaintiff also alleges that Defendants, in concert or one at the direction of the other, and without Plaintiff's consent, disseminated intimate photographs and videos of Plaintiff to Plaintiff's mother, business associates, and to a third party who had previously agreed to purchase Plaintiff's business. Defendants allegedly also used social media and emails to message and threaten Plaintiff, all of which allegedly caused damage to Plaintiff….

Plaintiff had sought pseudonymity from when she filed the case, in March 2023, and got it in August 2023; defendant M.B. had been named in the filings throughout that time. Then in April 2025, defendant counterclaimed, alleging unlawful disclosure of his intimate images, as well as "battery through poisoning/non-consensual drugging." And in July 2025, defendant moved to be pseudonymized in the file. No problem, said the court, in part because the pseudonymization would only be for future filings:

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Troubling News for Jews from the Michigan Democratic Party

Weeks after a Hezbollah-linked terrorist tried to murder dozens of Jewish children, the party nominates a Hezbollah sympathizer over an incumbent targeted because he's Jewish

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There have been troubling developments in both parties regarding antisemitism in the last few years, but I found this one especially perverse and disturbing. And of course, it shouldn't be just Jews who are worried about it, not only because everyone should oppose antisemitism, but because antisemitism on both left and right is based within the growing illiberal constituencies in both parties. In short, you don't have to be worried about antisemitism to wonder what the heck's going on when the Democrats nominate a supporter of a radical Islamist, Iran-allied anti-American terrorist group that has murdered hundreds of Americans, weeks after an immigrant tied to that group tried to murder dozens of American schoolchildren.

From the Jewish Insider's Josh Kraushaar:

The weekend ended with the news that Michigan Democratic delegates, at their statewide convention Sunday, nominated a Hezbollah supporter, Amir Makled, to the University of Michigan Board of Regents, choosing to oust a Jewish member, Jordan Acker, whose home and car were repeatedly vandalized with antisemitic graffiti and his family threatened.

Acker's offenses? He backed efforts to hold anti-Israel campus protesters at the University of Michigan accountable for assaulting police and engaging in intimidation of Jewish students, among other instances of student misconduct. He declined to support efforts to divest university funds from Israel, along with other members of the Board of Regents, as a radical faction of students had demanded.

Acker's non-Jewish Democratic ticketmate, Paul Brown, who also supported discipline against anti-Israel students, wasn't targeted and was renominated for election. But the Democratic delegates ousted Acker in exchange for Makled, who has posted on social media with comments praising Hezbollah's leaders and retweeted antisemitic messages from the conspiracy-theorizing influencer Candace Owens.

The results mark a new low for Michigan Democrats. Also over the weekend, Michigan Senate candidate Abdul El-Sayed told CNN that he believes the Israeli government is just as evil as Hamas.

Free Speech

"Once the [Rainbow Flag] Cat Is out of the Bag, the Ball Game Is Over"

No pseudonymity for teacher challenging removal of pride flags from classroom, because his identity had already been disclosed through public records requests.

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From Doe v. Little Miami School Dist., decided Thursday by Judge Matthew McFarland (S.D. Ohio):

Plaintiff is a teacher for Defendant Little Miami School District. For the past four years, Plaintiff has displayed a flag in his classroom that reads "Hate Has No Home Here" and bears several icons, including a rainbow Pride flag and transgender Pride flag. In January 2025, the Ohio Assembly passed H.B. 8, the Ohio Parent's Bill of Rights …. The statute provides parents the opportunity to review any instructional materials that include sexuality content which is defined as "any oral or written instruction, presentation, image, or description of sexual concepts or gender ideology, provided in a classroom setting." In October 2025, the Little Miami School Board passed a policy that adopted the statute.

In February 2026, Defendant David Wallace, president of the School Board, requested that Plaintiff remove his flag, but the principal stated that he would not order Plaintiff to remove it. Plaintiff then drafted an email defending the flag, and the Superintendent of Little Miami School District supported Plaintiff. On February 25, 2026, the School Board voted 4-1 in favor of the flag's removal, pursuant to H.B. 8 and the accompanying district policy. Plaintiff complied with this vote and removed the flag. …

Plaintiff now … seek[s] declaratory judgment that Defendants violated his First Amendment rights in ordering the flag's removal.

The court held plaintiff couldn't proceed pseudonymously:

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Internet

An Important Cert Petition Pending Before the Supreme Court on Section 230 Immunity

The briefing is completed on a cert petition presenting the urgent question of whether section 230 immunizes Twitter's knowing possession and distribution of child sex abuse materials.

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I previously blogged about a cert petition I helped to prepare regarding the scope of section 230 immunity. Last week, the final briefing was submitted to the Supreme Court. In my view, the briefing makes clear that the Court should grant cert on the important issue of whether section 230 immunizes Twitter's knowing possession and distribution of child pornography.

The issue arises through a provision in the Communications Decency Act, which encourages "Good Samaritan" acts to keep objectionable content off the internet. 47 U.S.C. §230(c). The Act states internet platforms are not liable for "good faith" acts to remove such content. Section §230(c)(2)(A). It clarifies that platforms may exercise that editorial control without being "treated as the publisher or speaker." Section 230(c)(1).

In the case at hand, the Ninth Circuit construed the Act to immunize an internet platform's knowing and deliberate decision to keep "child pornography" on the internet—a federal crime so damaging that Congress expressly allows victims to seek civil penalties. (The images are better described as "child sex abuse materials, or CSAM, but we have followed the current legal nomenclature.) In response to repeated alerts that child pornography depicting the minor petitioners (John Doe 1 and John Doe 2) was on its platform, Twitter asked for John Doe 1's ID—verifying that he was a minor. Twitter, in its own words, "reviewed the content" showing coerced sex acts by minors. But Twitter then decided "no action will be taken." The video proliferated—and Twitter profited—until a Department of Homeland Security official intervened.

The victims sued. Twitter claimed immunity. The Ninth Circuit agreed that Section 230 precludes federal civil penalties for that knowing sexual exploitation of children. And our cert petition presented the question of whether section 230's Good Samaritan immunity applies to the knowing possession and distribution of child pornography.

Twitter has now responded to our petition. In its brief in opposition, Twitter characterizes the case as involving its decision of whether to screen such content:

Child pornography is the most serious category of harmful content that platforms encounter—a fact no one disputes and Twitter does not minimize. But that is a difference of degree, not of legal kind. Courts have uniformly applied Section 230(c)(1) to bar claims that seek to treat a website as the publisher of a third party's obscenity, illegal pornography, or other arguably criminal content. See, e.g., Force v. Facebook, 934 F.3d at 59 (content that encouraged terrorism); Barnes v. Yahoo!, Inc., 570 F.3d at 1098 (nonconsensual nude images);  Dyroff v. Ultimate Software Grp., Inc., 934 F.3d at 1095 (content facilitating illegal drug sales). Indeed, a foundational premise of Section 230 is that websites hosting third-party content cannot be charged with screening all such content; to hold that offending content of any particular stripe  disables the statutory immunity would contravene that premise and expose websites to potential liability simply because their screening has been imperfect in some way.

Our reply argues strenuously that Twitter is mischaracterizing what it did—which was to distribute child pornography, even after it had specifically identified the material as child pornography and knew that the materials were being downloaded by tens of thousands of its customers:

Twitter never contests those knowing criminal acts. Instead, Twitter restates the questions presented, reframing this petition as just another petition about "not removing more quickly allegedly unlawful third-party conduct." Twitter reduces the petition to a dispute about how "swiftly" it acted. Twitter even claims the petition is a poor vehicle because its criminal wrongdoing did no harm.

Try as it might to paint this petition as one about some unknowing publisher, Twitter acted knowingly and deliberately. Those criminal acts led John Doe 1 to consider ending his life. Those criminal acts prompted a DHS official to intercede. Petitioners are still suffering from them. …

This petition is the straightforward vehicle to address the outermost limit of § 230  immunity. This case is not about what steps some internet company should take to monitor content that it is unwittingly hosting. It is about the company's own knowing and deliberate acts. Do federal laws prohibit Twitter from knowingly possessing, distributing, and profiting from child pornography—like everyone else? Or does § 230 put Twitter above the law?

Our cert petition was strongly supported by four excellent amicus briefs. Read More

What Other Leaked Documents From Long-Ago Are Coming?

We've moved past the phase of leaking current SCOTUS documents. Now past records are in the wild.

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I've been giving more thought to the Clean Power Plan leak. I keep coming back to the fact that this set of documents is a decade old. Obviously, one or more people have been sitting on these seven memos for a decade. These records could have been given to the New York Times at any time over the past five years or so--around when the "shadow docket" panic began. Why now?

Moreover, whoever decided to keep these seven memoranda a decade ago likely did not anticipate how singularly important the Clean Power plan ruling would become. Hindsight is always 20/20. The more likely scenario is this person retained many documents. I can only imagine that more documents may be coming from this source.

I do not think that the person who retained these documents is an outlier. It is far more likely that many people at the Court have retained confidential documents over the years. These records may have long collected dust in file cabinets and banker boxes, but are now likely being dusted off.

The Justices impose strict rules on how their papers may be released after their deaths. But do the Justices even know whether copies exist outside the building? I think the answer has to be no. In the wake of Dobbs, Justice Thomas said that the Justices could no longer trust each other and their staff. This decade-long leak has further eroded whatever trust remained in the building.

Speaking of Dobbs, remember that the version Politico reported on had the indicia of a printed draft with staples and other markings. If people purloined draft memoranda in 2016, then it stands to reason that similar actions were taken for draft opinions in 2022. There may be an unspoken tradition.

The usual reason why clerks and others maintain confidentiality is that they are afraid their reputation may take a hit if a leak is traced back to them. As Justice Scalia would say, any clerk who leaks information would face the end of their career. But it isn't clear that deterrent exists anymore. Whoever retained these documents a decade ago is probably far enough removed from the Court to no longer care about possible sanction from the Chief Justice's feckless investigation. Moreover, all statutes of limitations have run. Plus, there is no chance a D.C. federal grand jury would actually indict here. The defendant would likely be given a medal. Remember, the movement is being led by people intent on showing that the Supreme Court is a failed and illegitimate institution that must be reformed from the outside. If they are outed, it may boost their career. Back in 1972, Deepthroat went to Woodward and Bernstein to protect his identity. But what if Mark Felt simply wrote his own book about Watergate?

We are not out of the woods yet. We are just getting started.

Administrative Law

"Unserious Leaders Are Unsafe," Opines a Federal Judge About RFK, Jr.

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That's the opening line from yesterday's Oregon v. Kennedy, by Judge Mustafa Kasubhai (D. Or.) (the only federal judge I've seen who includes pronouns, in this instance "he/him," in his signature block; perhaps there are a few others, but very few). I'm not knowledgeable enough on the substance to speak to the administrative law issues here, I'm no fan of Kennedy, and it would certainly not surprise me that the Administration's actions here were inconsistent with federal law. But my tentative sense is that, whatever one might personally think about Kennedy's seriousness, judges' decisions are more credible when those decisions focus solely on the law, rather than deciding which of our leaders are serious.

In any event, some excerpts from the long opinion:

Unserious leaders are unsafe. There is nothing more serious than our leaders' dedication to the rule of law so that we might maintain the integrity of our constitutional democracy. This case highlights a leader's unserious regard for the rule of law. This case demonstrates how disregard for the rule of law does not merely result in an abstract infraction. Rather, and tragically, this case is one of a long list of examples of how a leader's wanton disregard for the rule of law causes very real harm to very real people.

This Court can and does judge the lawfulness of the process (or lack thereof) by which any policy choice might be made. Here, the Secretary of Health and Human Services, Robert F. Kennedy, Jr., unlawfully issued a declaration threatening to cut federal funding to medical providers who provided gender-affirming care to minors. If such a declaration could have been enacted lawfully, there might have been ample time and opportunity for medical providers, families, and children—all people and institutions of our great nation—to seek out other alternatives and options. Secretary Kennedy's utter failure to promulgate rules in accordance with statutory authority, but instead threaten to cease federal funding to medical providers almost immediately after the declaration, caused chaos and terror for all those people and institutions of our great nation. Secretary Kennedy's unlawful declaration harmed children. This case illustrates that when a leader acts without authority and in the absence of the rule of law, he acts with cruelty.

Plaintiffs filed this lawsuit alleging that Defendants violated the Administrative Procedure Act ("APA"), by issuing a declaration entitled "Safety, Effectiveness, and Professional Standards of Care for Sex-Rejecting Procedures on Children and Adolescents." Before the Court is Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment, and Defendants' Motion to Dismiss or, in the Alternative, for Summary Judgment, For the reasons below, Plaintiffs' motion is granted, and Defendants' motion is denied….

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Politics

Upcoming Speaking Engagements in Spain and Italy

I will be giving multiple talks in these two countries in late April and May.

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In late April and May, I will be doing multiple speaking engagements in Spain and Italy. Several of these events are open to the public, to varying degrees. I look forward to potentially meeting readers in those two countries!

Below is the list of the events, along with relevant links (listed times are in the local time zone). I will update with additional relevant information, if it becomes available.

April 24, 7:40-8:30 PM, LibertyCon Europe 2026 (sponsored by European Students for Liberty),  Madrid, Spain: "The Nationalist Threat to Economic Liberty." Panel on "Economic Freedom: Challenges and Perspectives." Registration and other information about this conference here. I think this event is only open to registered participants in the conference, and invited speakers.

April 26, 4:30-5:15 PM, LibertyCon Europe 2026 (sponsored by European Students for Liberty), Madrid, Spain: "Free Trade: Liberation from Trump's 'Liberation Day' Tariffs." Registration and other information about this conference here. I think this event is only open to registered participants in the conference, and invited speakers. But registration is easy.

May 12, 11::00 AM-1 PM, Unitelma Sapienza University of Rome, Rome, Italy: "Threats to Liberal Democracy in the United States - And How to Counter Them." This is primarily an online event. You can watch it here.

May 14-15, Common Core of European Administrative Law (COCEAL), Workshop on Welfare Rights, Bocconi University, Milan, Italy: "Constitutional Welfare Rights in the United States." This is an ongoing workshop continuing over two days. I am afraid it is open only to invited participants.

May 18, 6-7 PM, Bruno Leoni Institute, Residenza Vignale, Milan, Italy: "The Legal Battle Against Trump's Tariffs." This event, sponsored by Italy's leading libertarian/classical liberal think tank, is open to the public.

The Chief Justice Behind The Curtains

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Long-time readers may remember a series of posts I wrote circa 2020 about the conflicts between Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Kagan. One of my recurring themes was that the Chief Justice thought he was in control of the Court, but he clearly wasn't. Moreover, I suggested that the genesis of many of the leaks was due to frustration with the Court, and the Chief Justice's leadership in particular. Finally, I said that if the Chief could not right the ship, he should step down. To this day, people misunderstand my point. My call for resignation had nothing to do with any particular ruling or decision by Roberts that I disagreed with. If that was the litmus test, I would routinely call on the Court's progressives to call it quits. Rather, why would I tell Roberts--someone I agreed with about 90% of the time--to step down? The answer was a failure of leadership that was visible through publicly available information.

The leak in the Clean Power Plan case confirms much of how I've suspected the Chief manages his leadership of the Court.

Remember how John Roberts projects himself publicly. Roberts is an "institutionalist." He came to the Court wanting to reduce the number of 5-4 decisions. He didn't want the Court to seem partisan with teams on the right and teams on the left. He favored slow, incremental decisions.

Yet in the Clean Power Plan case, he tossed all of that caution to the wind. He led the charge to grant an unprecedented stay by a party line 5-4 vote. Justice Breyer offered a potential middle ground, which Roberts forcefully rejected as meaningless. Further, Justice Kagan's memorandum stated quite clearly how Roberts was venturing into novel territory. Roberts didn't care. And this wasn't a case where Justice Thomas or Scalia was pushing the Court to the right, and Roberts felt compelled to join so he could moderate. The Chief Justice was behind the wheel. Justice Kennedy said he was persuaded by the Chief in particular. Had Roberts done nothing, the stay would have been denied.

I don't think anyone could have anticipated what would happen with the emergency docket, but there was every good reason to recognize this ruling was novel. There is a reason I remember the exact moment in time when I read about the stay. For me, it was akin to asking "Where were you when President Kennedy was assassinated" or "Where were you when Reagan was shot." (I was not alive for either moment.) I remember the stay order with absolute clarity, because I immediately recognized how big a shift this was. Savvy judges on the D.C. Circuit, including then-Judge Kavanaugh, likely realized the impact as well. I would love to have asked Judge Silberman about this ruling. The Supreme Court told the nuclear D.C. Circuit "We don't trust you." If you want to mark the beginning of the rupture between the Supreme Court and the lower courts, this was likely it.

So then what do we make of the Chief Justice's purported institutionalism? It's not real. It was never real. When the Chief Justice says he is committed to the Supreme Court as an institution, that simply means he is committed to the Supreme Court as he sees it. The man cannot separate the two concepts. I'm sure John Marshall suffered from the same delusions of grandeur. Roberts is a judicial supremacist, and in particular, a SCOTUS supremacist. He could not brook the notion that lower court judges could settle this major question of national significance. It would have been untenable for Chief Judge Garland, the SCOTUS Susan Lucci (always on the short-list but never a winner), to have the final say. And the notion that the outgoing Obama Administration could lock in a policy without the Chief Justice having his say was also untenable. Roberts saved Obamacare so he earned this right to intervene. Thus, the modern shadow docket was born not to hurt a liberal president or help a conservative president. It was born to ensure the Supreme Court remained Supreme. Trump v. CASA, decided a decade later, was a manifestation of that philosophy.

When Roberts publicly rants about institutionalism, his colleagues have to roll their eyes. This is what we would call a loss of leadership. The other justices cannot take him seriously. It is unsurprising then there are so many leaks, even as the Chief purports to clamp down. In any other field, a CEO or head coach with this track record would have been long ago removed. But not on the Supreme Court.

Roberts should have stepped down in 2020. I think the Supreme Court would be much healthier today with anyone else at the helm--including Elena Kagan. Justices Thomas and Alito are the glue holding the Court together. They should stay as long as they can. The Chief Justice, by contrast, is still stuck in his own world. Maybe the Chief Justice should take a deep look in the mirror and realize that he bears a lot of the blame for the current crisis.

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