Nanjing Intermediate Court: False AI-Generated Statement that a Lawyer Was Sentenced to Three Years' Imprisonment Constituted Defamation …
The court distinguished between ordinary search suggestions and AI-generated answers. While search suggestions such as "related searches" were not found infringing, the court found that the relevant "AI Smart Answer" content was generated through Baidu's AI processing and synthesis of text and images.
The case is significant because the court still found Baidu liable despite its arguments regarding AI hallucination and technological limitations.
[T]here's a far worse outcome from this that cannot be undone by courts, elections, or policy reversals. These new tariffs and their justifications have only served to further destroy the relationships with allies and trading partners that we had previously taken as given. The costs of this will outlast every tariff schedule, court ruling, and this administration. They won't show up on BLS reports, BEA analyses, or Fed surveys. But they will be felt by every single American for years to come….
Canada, the European Union, the United Kingdom, and Mexico now face 10 percent tariffs for their alleged forced labor practices. Canada and Mexico are, of course, also parties to the USMCA, a trade agreement that this very president negotiated, signed, and called "a colossal victory" only to then walk away from. That same week, the President hit Canada with an additional 50 percent tariff on goods ranging from "wine to hockey sticks to cement" regardless of whether or not those goods qualify under the USMCA.
So in the span of a week, the White House effectively told Canada, our closest trading partner and ally, that America's word means nothing and then told them that they are complicit in forced labor.
An ordinary tariff is a tax. Trading partners are annoyed, sometimes retaliate, and sometimes negotiate. These tariffs are different. We didn't just tax Japanese goods. We announced to the world, as an official finding of the United States government, that Japan is profiting from slavery and needs to be punished for it. Norway, Switzerland, Australia, the United Kingdom, and South Korea are guilty of this, too. Then we set a penalty that just so happens to approximate the Section 122 tariffs that just expired.
Foreign officials must now contend with an even clearer reality: not only is an agreement with the United States not worth the paper it's printed on, but we will accuse you of horrendous practices if it means that an administration can re-impose tariffs. Our trading partners saw that the findings of investigations will be written to fit the desires of an administration instead of the facts on the ground. They learned that not only is America protectionist but that they will publish a serious moral accusation against a friend when doing so is politically convenient.
This changes how other countries will deal with us going forward.
Hebert goes on to explain how, as a result of this decline in US reputation and trustworthiness, foreign trading partners will be less willing to make agreements with us. Similarly, businesses and investors there will be less willing to trade with the United States, lest their commitments be disrupted whenever the current occupant of the White House feels like it.
I would add there is an additional way in which courts are limited in their ability to fix this problem: the judicial process moves relatively slowly. And a great deal of damage can be inflicted in the meantime. During the course of the IEEPA litigation, I had multiple conversations with business people that went something like this:
Business Owner: It's great you're challenging the tariffs. But when is your case finally going to be resolved?
Ilya: It's actually moving at a fast pace, by the standards of the federal judiciary.
Business Owner: That's no consolation to me. I'm losing money every day!
The US Court of International Trade, the Federal Circuit, and the Supreme Court all indeed considered decided the case substantially faster than usual practice. Nonetheless, the litigation took over ten months, during which the government collected some $166 billion in illegal tariff payments, and the US and world economies suffered serious damage. And we are still not done with the process of refunding the illegal tariff payments.
In addition to lost sales caused by higher prices, businesses and investors were hurt by the uncertainty over what the tariff schedule would be going forward, which made it difficult to plan ahead. And that uncertainty may well continue so long as there is fear that the president can impose massive new tariffs whenever he feels like it, after which it may takes months of litigation to overturn them. This is another cost of undermining the rule of law by letting one man's whims dictate the tariff schedule, and thereby control a massive part of the economy.
Nonetheless, the courts and Congress are not as helpless in the face of this problem as Hebert suggests. First, the very fact that illegal tariff power grabs get invalidated (even if too slowly) creates some stability. If people know any such imposition will likely only last a few months, that affects expectations and planning. Uncertainty can be further reduced if the courts continue to rule the right way, and write strong opinions signalling that future tariffs will face tight judicial scrutiny.
Second, as I have emphasized previously, courts can reduce the damage caused by illegal tariffs if they refuse to stay initial rulings blocking them. In that event, illegal tariffs will only be in effect for a few weeks, as opposed to many months. Moreover, refusing to stay initial injunctions sends a signal that the initial ruling is likely to be sustained on appeal, further reducing uncertainty.
When the Federal Circuit stayed the initial ruling against the IEEPA tariffs, that enabled the Trump administration to collect some $166 billion in illegal tariff payments, and greatly increased the harm caused by the illegal policy. Courts should learn from that mistake, and not repeat it (though the Federal Circuit, sadly, did choose to repeat it in the Section 122 case).
Congress could do still more. Ideally, it should just repeal all those statutes that give the president discretionary authority to impose tariffs: Section 122, Section 232, Section 301, and so on. All should go! Basic Economics 101 shows that tariffs are almost never a good way to address problems. While Trump has pushed these authorities far beyond their proper legal bounds, they are pernicious even when used as Congress intended, and the statutory text permits.
Repeal is far from impossible, politically. Trump's tariffs have become highly unpopular. More generally, survey data and experience going back to the nineteenth century show that public opinion can be turned against tariffs when reminded that they increase prices. For those reasons, the majority opinion is likely to support a serious effort to abolish the statutes that make them possible. Though it may be more difficult to overcome the resistance of interest groups that benefit from protectionism. It can't happen while Trump is still in the White House, able to veto repeal legislation. But a more trade-friendly president could well be elected in 2028.
Even if discretionary tariffs are abolished, Congress would still retain the ability to impose tariffs by enacting new laws. It could also still simply ban importation of some types of goods (as it currently does with those produced by forced labor). But US trade would no longer be at the mercy of any one person's whims.
If complete abolition of discretionary tariffs is impossible, Congress could at least reform any remaining delegations of tariff authority to 1) confine them to a narrow set of circumstances, and 2) eliminate judicial deference to executive determinations that the required circumstances actually exist. Make the government bear the burden of proof.
Even if all this were done, a malicious, ignorant, or stupid president could still try to impose illegal tariffs. But businesses and trading partners could confident that his efforts would have no legal effect, and would be swiftly invalidated by courts. He could still make bogus accusations of complicity in forced labor. But allies and trading partners would know his rants will likely have little effect. A rogue executive could still do some damage to US trade policy and credibility. But far, far less than is possible today.
From the opinion Thursday in Williams v. State, by Indiana Court of Appeals Judge Felix, joined by Chief Judge Tavitas and Judge Bradford:
Although "[t]rial records are rarely if ever perfect," Ben-Yisrayl v. State, 753 N.E.2d 649, 662 (Ind. 2001), the Transcript in this case is far from the best.
The Transcript contains various types of errors. There are numerous typos that change the meaning of the testimony, question, or objection. See, e.g., Tr. Vol. II at 137:18, 144:10, 147:10; Tr. Vol. III at 6:13. In some instances, witnesses' and trial attorneys' names are reported incorrectly. Tr. Vol. II at 220:5; Tr. Vol. III at 142:15–20, 143:15, 162:4–5.
At one point in the Transcript, a motion, presumably made by the State, is attributed to the trial court. Tr. Vol. II at 107–08. At another point, an objection, presumably made by Williams, is attributed to the Bailiff. Tr. Vol. II at 177:15. At yet another point, the State's closing argument is attributed to the trial court. Tr. Vol. III at 228:1.
There appears to be an academic consensus that the Supreme Court's decision in Louisiana in Callais is incorrect. But does this tell us more about the decision or about the legal academy? Brian Fitzpatrick raises this question in a SCOTUSBlog essay "The Case for Callais."
Fitzpatrick's essay begins:
This publication has been inundated with essays by academics critical of Louisiana v. Callais, but has not published a single one in defense of it. So I decided to take it on in my column. After all, I am pretty sure Justice Antonin Scalia would have approved of the decision.
As you will see, I didn't find the assignment particularly difficult. Which raises a question: why has no one else been willing to defend a 6-3 decision of the Supreme Court?
On Thursday, I noted an interesting footnote in Senior Circuit Judge Ray Randolph's dissent in Hospital Menonita de Guayama v. NLRB (an interesting decision in its own right), suggesting that the Supreme Court's decision ending Chevron deference in Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimandofailed to account for the fact that Chevron had not been an APA case, but was rather governed by the judicial review provisions of the Clean Air Act. But is this so?
An astute reader pointed me to another footnote--this one from a law review article by Professor John Duffy--suggesting that at the time Chevron v. NRDC was decided, the issue from the Court was, in fact, governed by the APA. In FN19, Professor Duffy writes:
Some scholarship suggests that the Chevron case itself was not subject to section 706 because subsection (d) of section 307 of the Clean Air Act (42 U.S.C. § 7607(d)) contains an explicit exemption making section 706 inapplicable. See, e.g., Jack M. Beermann, Chevron Is a Rorschach Test Ink Blot, 32 J.L. &POL. 305, 307–08, 307 n.8 (2017) (stating that "[j]udicial review of EPA rules under the Clean Air Act is governed by 42 U.S.C. § 7607(d) and not by APA § 706"). The relevant provision, however, exempts from section 706 only EPA actions listed in section 307(d)(1), which at the relevant time included fourteen categories of EPA actions, none of which covered the EPA rulemaking being reviewed in the Chevron litigation. See 42 U.S.C. § 7607(d)(1)(A)–(N) (1982). In fact, at the time it was promulgating the final rule challenged in Chevron, the EPA itself analyzed the applicability of subsection (d) of section 307 and correctly determined that rules being promulgated were "not subject to Section 307(d)." Requirements for Preparation, Adoption and Submittal of Implementation Plans, 46 Fed. Reg. 50766, 50770 (Oct. 14, 1981) (codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 51–52).
So perhaps Judge Randolph spoke too soon.
This is an interesting dispute, but it does not have much bearing on Loper Bright Enterprises. Judge Randolph's point was raised by the petitioners (see, e.g,, the oral argument transcript at p. 87), and the substance of judicial review under 42 U.S.C. § 7607 is not materially different from that under APA § 706 (though there are important procedural differences for rulemakings).
While Chevron made no reference to the APA, the Chevron doctrine was understood to apply to APA cases, so whether the doctrine comports with the APA mattered--a point Judge Randolph concedes. The Court's decision in Loper Bright rejected the Chevron methodology--in particular the requirement that courts defer to reasonable agency interpretations of ambiguous statutory language--not its interpretation of the Clean Air Act or its conclusion that the EPA regulation at issue was permissible.
In my last post, I did a brief overview of the new lawsuit challenging Trump's massive new Section 301 lawsuits filed by the Liberty Justice Center on behalf of two small businesses. LJC is the public interest law firm I worked with on V.O.S. Selections v. Trump, the IEEPA tariff case decided by the Supreme Court in February. There is now a second lawsuit challenging the tariffs, Learning Resources, Inc. v. United States. Their complaint is available here.
This case was filed by a group of several businesses, with Learning Resources, Inc., as the lead plaintiff. Learning Resources, which is a toy manufacturer, is the same firm whose case was consolidated with ours in the IEEPA litigation, and eventually gave its name to the Supreme Court decision. In that instance, their case was dismissed on jurisdictional grounds (it was, the justices decided, filed in the wrong court) and ours prevailed. In the present case, everyone agrees the only possible venue is the US Court of International Trade (CIT), where we filed our IEEPA case, and which also recently ruled against Trump's Section 122 tariffs (in another case brought by LJC). Trump's tariffs are making the CIT's workload great again!
As in the IEEPA litigation, Learning Resources is represented by prominent appellate litigator Pratik Shah, and others at Akin Gump.
The issues raised in the Learning Resources complaint are very similar to those in the LJC case. They too argue that the Section 301 tariffs violate statutory requirements, and that if Section 301 did grant the president the power to impose these massive tariffs, it would violate the constitutional nondelegation doctrine. But, unlike the LJC complaint, this one does not invoke the major questions doctrine. It also does not seek a class action certification. Thus, relief granted by the court would likely be limited to the specific plaintiff firms.
I think it likely that CIT will consolidate these two cases and consider them together. There may well be more Section 301 cases filed by businesses, public interest groups, and possibly state governments. We shall see.
A Delaware trial court has denied Google's motion to dismiss, and concluded that, if the facts as alleged by Starbuck were true, he would have a legal basis for recovery.
[A.] In Delaware Superior Court Judge Meghan Adams today in Starbuck v. Google LLC, Starbuck alleged that Google AI had stated that
"Starbuck had been accused of sexual assault and sexual harassment by multiple women."
"Starbuck's nanny accused him of abuse and neglect."
"Starbuck had been accused of rape of a minor."
"Starbuck had stolen valor by claiming he was served in the military when he had not."
"Starbuck had engaged in abusive behavior toward multiple women, including a fictitious ex-wife."
"Starbuck was involved in the January 6, 2021 riot on the Capitol."
"Starbuck had been accused of stalking and harassment by multiple women, including his fictitious ex-wife, leading to restraining orders and criminal charges."
"Starbuck had been criminally convicted for violating a restraining order."
"Starbuck posed an unacceptable level of risk to children due to his (fictitious) 'confirmed criminal record.'"
"'… Robby Starbuck sexually abused a young woman when she was a teenager in the early 2000s, while she was in a youth group Starbuck was associated with.'"
"Starbuck had worked in the adult film industry and had used his power and influence therein to pressure performers into uncomfortable scenes, engaged in financial exploitation, and had been accused of a non-consensual sexual act with a woman."
"Starbuck had a criminal record that included a 2001 conviction for assault as well as other charges including drug use and disorderly conduct."
"Starbuck shot a man in the leg with a 9mm handgun, was charged with a felony, and pled guilty to reckless endangerment."
(Note that "Google does not contend the Outputs are true.")
Google moved to dismiss, which under Delaware's Rule 12(b)(6) requires that Google show that, even the facts as pleaded by the plaintiff were conceivably true, the plaintiff would still lack a legal claim. Note that Delaware civil procedure doesn't follow federal procedure in requiring a showing of plausibility of the pleaded facts—it only requires a showing the pleaded facts are conceivable: "Our governing 'conceivability' standard is more akin to 'possibility,' while the federal 'plausibility' standard falls somewhere beyond mere 'possibility' but short of 'probability.'"
[B.] The court concluded that Starbuck "pleads sufficient facts indicating the Outputs were published to third parties," relying in part on Google AI's own statements about what happened:
Today, the Liberty Justice Center filed Burlap & Barrel, Inc. v. Greer, the first case challenging Donald Trump's massive new Section 301 tariffs. The complaint is available here. LJC is the same group that I worked with on V.O.S. Selections v. Trump, the IEEPA tariff case decided by the Supreme Court in February. LJC also filed one of the two cases challenging Trump's Section 122 tariffs, which prevailed in the US Court of International Trade in May (it is now on appeal).
The current case is before the US Court of International Trade. LJC's clients are two small businesses who import goods from many of the countries covered by the new tariffs.
I am not directly involved in the Section 301 case. But I completely support it, and commend LJC for getting it in so quickly. I know from personal experience how hard it can be to do this on short notice.
Commentators such as Peter Harrell, Scott Lincicome, Gregory Shaffer and Jeremiah May, and myself have previously laid out a variety of reasons why the Section 301 tariffs are illegal. I summarized them in my post yesterday. The LJC complaint makes many of these same points. To briefly summarize it argues:
1. The Section 301 tariffs violate many of the procedural and substantive requirements of the statute; Trump is trying to turn a law intended to target specific trade practices into a tool for waging a massive worldwide trade war against virtually all our trading partners, using "forced labor" as a pretext.
2. This runs afoul of the major questions doctrine (MQD), which requires Congress to "speak clearly" when authorizing the executive to make "decisions of vast economic and political significance." If it is unclear whether Section 301 grants Trump the sweeping authority he claims, MQD requires resolving the ambiguity against the administration.
3. If Section 301 somehow does grant Trump the authority he claims, the law is unconstitutional under the nondelegation doctrine, which limits delegation of congressional power (here, the tariff authority) to the executive.
4. The constitutional avoidance canon requires interpreting Section 301 to reject the administration's position. This canon requires courts to interpret federal laws to avoid constitutional problems whenever it is "fairly possible" to do so. Here, doing so is needed to avoid a massive nondelegation issue.
Not surprisingly, I agree with all four of these arguments, and I will likely have more to say about them later.
Another notable aspect of the lawsuit is that the plaintiffs are seeking class action certification. If it is granted, and they prevail on the merits, the ruling will completely block the Section 301 tariffs with respect to virtually all importers, not just LJC's two clients.
I think it likely there will be additional lawsuits challenging the Section 301 tariffs. I hope to write more about these issues soon.
UPDATE: LJC has a helpful statement summarizing the case here.
The court orders the litigant to explain why she shouldn't be so barred, and notes that hallucinated citations are "a growing problem in Florida's appellate courts."
From Gouldy v. Chiasson, decided Wednesday by the Florida Court of Appeal (Judge Robert Gross, joined by Judges Melanie May and Spencer Levine):
This appeal arises from a frivolous underlying lawsuit Gouldy brought against Chiasson, an attorney, in connection with Chiasson's actions in representing appellees Amanda Munyan and Michael Peak in a related probate matter involving Gouldy.
We affirm the appeal in all respects and issue a separate order to show cause as to why Gouldy should not be barred from further pro se filings in this court. Gouldy's excessively long pro se brief contains frivolous arguments, misrepresentations of the record, a phantom case, and fake quotes from actual cases….
This case demonstrates a growing problem in Florida's appellate courts. The recent change in jurisdiction has given intermediate appellate courts jurisdiction to hear appeals from county court cases. The result has been that the amount of pro se appeals has significantly increased. Initially, the appellate courts were able to expeditiously handle the county court appeals.
Recently, however, it appears that many pro se litigants, in both county and circuit courts, are using artificial intelligence platforms to generate appellate briefs and motions. While the prose in these filings is generally readable, many AI-generated submissions contain phantom authority, misstatements of the record, and fabricated quotations.
Plaintiff has identified herself as Kimberly Davis in all filings in this case, while Defendant argues that Plaintiff's legal name is Matthew Grinage. As such, Defendant argues that Plaintiff does not comply with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 10(a). Defendant provides documentation, including her application for employment with Defendant's restaurant, where she used her legal name, Matthew Grinage. The parties do not dispute that Plaintiff has not yet completed a formal legal name change process.
In her brief, Plaintiff argues generic allegations that the use of her legal name causes her "distress, mental anguish, and harm." Plaintiff argues that, if she does not use her chosen name, she will suffer serious and lasting effects to her mental health.
Rule 10 states that the "title of the complaint must name all parties." The core intent of Rule 10(a) is to assure public access, transparency, and accountability in judicial proceedings. Following historical practices of publicness, proper access to litigants' names is important. Rule 10, along with Rule 17, reinforces that court proceedings must remain open and accessible to the public, demands clarity in how parties are identified and ensures the public record accurately reflects the identity of who is before the court and why.
From yesterday's Report and Recommendation by Magistrate Judge Jeff Armistead in Doe v. Portland Ass'n of Teachers, Doe's allegations:
Doe was born in Israel and takes his Jewish religious faith and ethnic heritage seriously. For Doe, the State of Israel is essential and integral to his devout religious faith. Although Doe immigrated to the United States, he maintains close ties to Israel and his family there. In the 2023-24 school year, Doe worked for PPS [Portland Public Schools] as a high school math teacher.
When he started working for PPS, he chose not to become a dues-paying member of PAT [Portland Association of Teachers], exercising his First Amendment right not to support union political speech and public sector collective bargaining. Nevertheless, because Doe is a PPS teacher, PAT is his exclusive representative by way of Oregon's Public Employee Collective Bargaining Act (PECBA) and the collective bargaining agreement (CBA) PAT has with PPS….
Curricula. Doe alleges that PAT collaborates with Oregon Educators for Palestine (OEP) in its publications, including by co-publishing a guide called "Teach Palestine!" The guide references resources for teaching about Palestine, "encourages teachers to use their classroom to teach anti-Isreal views[,] and includes detailed curricula recommendations for pre-K through high school." Among the recommended resources in the "Teach Palestine!" guide is "Teaching While Muslim," which includes the statement "75 years ago, a lot of decision makers around the world decided to take away Palestinian land to make a country called Israel. Israel would be a country where rules were mostly fair for Jewish people with White skin" and encouragement to make signs that include the slogan "Free Palestine."
The "Teach Palestine!" resource guide also includes "Let's Go to Palestine." That lesson—directed at elementary school—includes the statement "Palestine is currently under a brutal occupation by Israel. We pray for a truly free Palestine so that the Palestinians can prosper and we can all visit freely." Also recommended in the guide is "Handala's Return," which includes the statement: "A group of bullies called Zionists wanted our land so they stole it by force and hurt many people." The "Know Your Rights!" guide, also co-published by PAT and OEP, includes references to CBA provisions that protect teachers in teaching what are, according to Doe, anti-Israel views.
