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The Supreme Court Will Hear Another Home Equity Theft Takings Case
This one addresses the issue of whether the owner of a home foreclosed for nonpayment of debt is entitled to "fair market value" compensation, or only whatever the government gets from auctioning off the property, minus the debt owed.

In Tyler v. Hennepin County (2023), a unanimous Supreme Court ruled that "home equity theft" is unconstitutional. If the government forecloses on a property for nonpayment of taxes or other debts, it can only keep as much of the value of the land as is necessary to repay the debt in question. The rest belongs to the property owner. Otherwise, the Court ruled, there would be a violation of the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment, which bars taking of private property without payment of "just compensation" (see my analysis of the ruling here).
After Tyler, I did not think the home equity theft issue would return to the Supreme Court anytime soon. But, yesterday, the Court decided to hear Pung v. Isabella County. In this case, Isabella County, Michigan seized the late Timothy Pung's house because he supposedly failed to pay some $2200 in taxes and fees (his estate claims he didn't actually owe this money). They then sold the property at auction for about $76,000; the County kept the $2200 it thought it was owed and transferred the remaining funds (about $73,800) to Pung's estate.
But the usual standard for takings compensation, according to longstanding Supreme Court precedent, is "fair market value" - the price a property would fetch if sold on the open market. And Pung's estate argues the fair market value here is actually $194,400 (the value at which the county itself assessed that value for property tax purposes).
If a seizure of home equity after foreclosure is a taking - as Tyler v. Hennepin County rightly held - then I think the estate is obviously right. The property taken is the residual value of the home (after delinquent taxes and other debts are repaid). And that may be more than the government got from the highest bidder at the auction.
To be sure, the highest bid at the auction is relevant evidence of fair market value. But it is not always the only evidence that must be considered. The government could potentially do a poor job of marketing the property, and end up accepting a below-market value price. That's especially likely if, as is usually the case, they have no incentive to maximize value, so long as they secure enough to repay the debt that supposedly justified the foreclosure in the first place.
Here, it seems clear the auction price was indeed subpar. We know that because the winning bidder quickly resold the property for $195,000 (very close to the Pung estate's $194,400 estimate of the fair market value). That suggests the County was either incompetent at marketing the property or just didn't care to make a serious effort.
The lower court ruling by the US Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit held there is no taking here. But it is largely based on previous circuit precedent, which offers little in the way of analysis on this point. Tyler makes clear that a property owner subject to tax foreclosure "must render unto Caesar what is Caesar's, but no more." Here, Caesar pretty obviously did take a lot more, even if he wasn't able to appropriate its full value for himself.
In addition to considering the Takings Clause issue, the Supreme Court will also weigh the question of whether this kind of home equity theft violates the Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment. The Court need not decide that issue if they rule in favor of Pung on the Takings Clause question. In Tyler, the Supreme Court similarly chose to rely on the Takings Clause, and did not to decide the Excessive Fines Clause issue. In a concurring opinion, Justice Neil Gorsuch (joined by Justice Ketanji Brown Jackson), argued that home equity theft does indeed violate the Excessive Fines Clause, as well as the Takings Clause.
I hope - and tentatively expect - that the Supreme Court will reverse the Sixth Circuit and rule that the Pung estate is entitled to fair market value compensation. I doubt the Court would have chosen to hear this case just to affirm the lower court decision. There is no split between circuits here of a kind that might lead the justices to take a case to resolve it.
Pung is somewhat unusual, in recent years, in being a major Takings Clause case that reached the Supreme Court, but was litigated by conventional private counsel, rather than by one of the major property rights public interest firms, such as the Institute for Justice and the Pacific Legal Foundation (which litigated Tyler). Philip L. Ellison, the Michigan attorney representing the Pung estate, wrote a strong cert petition that must have persuaded the justices to take the case.
Regardless of how the case got to the Court, the property rights community will surely support the victimized owner here. I myself intend to file an amicus brief, and I suspect I will not be alone in that.
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I was thrilled with the Tyler decision, but I'm not sure the petitioner is right in this case. It sounds like Pung got screwed (I mean, he's dead, but that's not what I'm referring to), but I don't see how courts can be used to second guess the outcome of every public auction. Unless Pung can show that the auction itself was conducted in bad faith in some way (whether true malfeasance — collusion between the government and the buyer — or just failure to sufficiently publicize it) I don't think he should have a claim. (Once again, I opine without reading the documents, so perhaps that is Pung's contention.)
The remedy, if you think the government is auctioning off your property for much less than its value, is for you to bid on it.
I don't understand the point or benefit of bidding on your own property. Maybe I don't understand how these things work.
Suppose you think the fair market value is $200K but the high bid (so far) is $100K (I'm assuming a live auction, not sealed bids). You bid $101K and keep forcing others to bid higher; when they stop, you've established fair market value. But you have to pay that bid for your own property. Then the government refunds you the difference. Still, by the time all is said and done, you've probably had to pay a fair amount of overhead to borrow the money to buy your own house.
Or if it's sealed bids, you have to bid what you think the fair market value is, hoping someone else bids more. If you win, you have the same overhead loss.
And if you could borrow the money for these bids, why not borrow the much smaller sum necessary to pay off the tax debt?
Seems to me this whole scenario can only arise when everything happens before you have a chance to do anything about it, whereupon your only remedy is to take the government to court.
Would an intermediate position be workable? Rather than, on the one hand, saying that it is simply the owner's problem if he gets (far?) less than FMV, or, on the other hand, saying that if the government gets less than FMV, it must make up the difference, would it make sense to impose a "due diligence" obligation on the government? Under such a system, the owner would not have to show as much as malfeasance/bad faith to succeed on a claim, but he could not prevail simply through testimony that the FMV was more than the government obtained through the sale. I don't know anything about this area of law (I know, it shows), so this might not make sense.
That's a really nice academic notion, but property auctions are cash and carry* and most people have <$10k in the bank. This particular individual couldn't even pay a ~$2200 tax bill to keep the house out of foreclosure.
* This is also why it seems to me an auction sale price is by definition not FMV: the universe of buyers is (at best) constrained to those with immediate cash in their jeans and the inclination to deploy that cash for a potentially material profit, in exchange for the risk and expense of buying and holding a property for later resale to a true FMV buyer who is likely leveraging bank financing and isn't expecting a big chunk of equity up front.
I hear what you are saying, and I would be sympathetic if a private party did what the government did here.
But here one hand of the government was saying the value was X - and taxing based on that. Then it auctions it off - to pay those taxes - for a fraction of X. I think I'd encourage the government to asses accurately and auction effectively by paying the auction amount or assessed value, whichever is greater.
You wouldnt second guess every public auction. Rather, there would have to be a condemnation process first before the auction, and ias part of the condemnation action (as in every condemnation action), fair market value would be determined and there would be payment made before the auction.
Not sure if this is feasible, it may not be... but if public tax auctions are determined to be a "taking" for public use (and im not sure they are, but if they are), the above is probably the only mechanism that can be followed
This seems like more of a process question.
Did the owner have sufficient notice and time to either pay the $2200 or sell the property themselves?
If so, then I don’t see them having much standing to complaint about the method of auction used by the government.
If not, then that’s the real complaint.
Better said than I did. But the remedy is the same: the government screwed up the auction and owes you the difference.
My understanding is that Michigan foreclosure statutes for unpaid property taxes is moderately more aggressive/favorable to the government than most other states. Less property owner protection than most other states.
I recall another case from late 1990's early 2000's with a property in the detroit area with similar facts that the michigan SC upheld.
I see this as going against the original home owner
The defendant had a debt. The defendant could have sold the house to pay the debt. They could have chosen to try to get "fair market value." They chose not to.
The house was seized to pay the debt. The house was sold. The debt was paid, the remnants of the proceeds were delivered to the original owner. Now the original owners argues "they should've gotten more, they should've gotten fair market value"...when they chose not to sell the property initially.
Homes and houses seized in foreclosures or for non-payment of taxes often are auctioned for less than "fair market value" due to the unknowns. The title often isn't entirely clear. The tenants can be difficult to remove. There are often unknown difficulties with the house that are explored on inspection. Given the choice, it is almost always preferable to buy a house from a willing seller, rather than one up for auction that was taken.
A policy that the government must provide a "fair market value" rather than the actual value obtained for a property seized for tax non-payment places far too high a risk burden on the government, and far too little on the debtor. Every time non-payment of taxes comes up, the debtor is incentivized to not sell the property. If they try to sell it, it takes work, and they might get below market price. Let the government take it and sell it. The government can do the work of selling it. If they get a good price, great! You didn't need to do any work. If they get a "below market price value"...you sue, and get the difference back.
For the government, every seizure represents a financial risk. The owner could owe $50,000 in back taxes and just not pay it. You can seize the property, and sell it for $500,000, giving the owner back $450,000. Only the owner will sue and say "No fair market was $600,000!" Lose the case, and instead of getting its back taxes back, the government instead loses another $50,000.
Why should government get the benefit of the doubt and not the property owner?
The property owner already had the option to sell. They get the choice.
When did the owner get the option? He was dead. The heirs didn't get a choice.
They certainly had a choice. The tax in question was applied in 2012. Foreclosure proceedings started in 2014. The heirs had the property, and were cognizant enough to have all sorts of legal proceedings.
Well, assuming the debt is valid, the property owner is a deadbeat. Don't repay your debts, lose the benefit of the doubt.
Arm- I agree that the various risk of purchasing of a foreclosed home reduces the fmv (possible dispute of title, etc that you mentioned). My experience is the drop in fmv is in the 10-20% range. However, this case seems egregious.
A few points.
1. I'll point you towards my $500,000 - $600,000 example. That's right in the range you cite. The precedent set is "every time" fmv isn't obtained the government owes the difference. But almost by default, foreclosed homes won't get fmv.
2. The percentages tend to be amplified at the lower end of the prices. A title conflict or need for significant repairs (ie, mold remediation) on a $600,000 house can cost the same in absolute terms as a title conflict on a $200,000 house. But as a percentage, those costs are far higher on the $200,000 house. If it's going to cost $50,000 in mold remediation, that's 25% of the value of the $200,000 house. But only 8.3% of the cost of a $600,000 house.
3. The cases taken here tend to be the outliers (ie, best case scenario). Not the "normal.
Arm - as I stated, most foreclosures have a 10-20% drop in value due to the unknowns. There is or should be some fiduciary responsibility not protect the property owners interest in the property. As I stated, this case seems egregious, almost as if the municipality took active steps to punish the homeowner.
I would point you towards the following publication. 10-20% seems too moderate. 20-30% on average seems more accurate. With sometimes higher drops for foreclosed homes.
https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0094119023000153
The government said the value was $194,400. When they seized the property they should have paid the balance after deducting the amount owed for taxes.
If the value was only $76,000 then taxes were being overcharged and he wouldn't have owed $2200 and there would have been no basis to seize the property to satisfy the tax debt.
In this particular case...no. See, the taxes paid for the particular levy for this particular year (2012) by the owner was..."zero". So, the assessed value doesn't really matter, so long as it was above zero.
I just don't see how the government can say "Your property is worth X and you owe taxes based upon that value and then turn around and say, "Now your property is worth Y because we don't want to pay you what it is really worth".
And if governments have to take the risk of not getting FMV at auction then they should find another way to collect the taxes owed without taking the property.
An assessed value is not a fair market value. The two are not the same.
https://www.experian.com/blogs/ask-experian/assessed-value-vs-market-value/
That link gives an example of the assessed value being 50% of fair market value. That is, yeah, it's different--it's different in the wrong direction!
If you apply that standard, if the government assessed it at $194400, the fair market value was $388800 and if they sold the property that's what they owe the heirs. If they could only sell the property for $76000, then they should have only assessed $38000 for tax purposes.
Assessed values can also be above fair market values.
https://www.loudoun.gov/FAQ.aspx?QID=798
I think Harvey has a point. Why not go back and see how much excess Pung paid in property tax because of the presumed overvaluation and credit him with that amount. Would it be surprising if Pung came out ahead that way?
Another way to address the issue is to require the government to make a serious effort to sell the house, thereby avoiding at least some of the issues with auctions.
The best way to do this by getting the county out of the real estate business and requiring them to hire a professional realtor, on the same terms as anyone else, to sell the property. Then there would be an argument that the final price was a good estimate of FMV.
Not necessarily! Steven Levitt, co-author of "Freakonomics", conducted a study in which he discovered that when realtors sell their own houses, they keep them on the market for a longer time than when they're selling someone else's. In the latter case, their incentive to get a higher price and higher commission is offset by their incentive to sell a greater number of houses per year. They apparently choose to increase the number of sales, even at the cost of a smaller commision per sale.
If I'm selling my own house through a realtor, I at least get the final decision on whether to accept or reject an offer. If my place is being sold for back taxes, I don't have that option—otherwise, I could drag my feet and refuse all offers so I could keep my place. And the county has no incentivize to maximize the price obtained through sale via realtor, any more than they've got an incentive to maximize the auction price.
In fact, what's to keep the realtor from accepting a ridiculously low bid from a silent partner or associate, and then splitting the profit from resale? That, at least, won't happen in a public auction.
"In fact, what's to keep the realtor from accepting a ridiculously low bid from a silent partner or associate, and then splitting the profit from resale? "
That would be considered fraud and is illegal.
" Why not go back and see how much excess Pung paid in property tax because of the presumed overvaluation and credit him with that amount. "
We did. The amount paid for this property tax was zero.
(This gets into a bit of nitty gritty, but the for the tax at issue, Pung was getting an exemption, because it was his primary residence. Pung died, so it was no longer "his" primary residence, so the tax started to be applied again. His heirs disagreed, said the exemption should still be applied, and for one of the years in question...that exemption wasn't applied. So there was a tax, the heirs didn't pay it for that year, and here we are)
I've just done a bit of digging, and it appears that under Michigan law, prospective buyers of tax-sale property can't enter it without the permission of the owner (whether or not it's occupied). That could depress the auction price considerably: if the owner doesn't cooperate, the potential bidder would have no way of knowing the condition of the interior. If Pung's executors didn't grant permission to inspect the place, then they bear considerable blame for the low auction price. Do we know that detail?
Unlike the earlier takings case case, this one does not involve the government granting itself a superior right to private parties. Any creditor with a judgment can have seized property sold at auction for less than it is "really" worth.
This seems like an argument worth following. Suppose a bank holds a mortgage on my house. I've paid most of the loan off, but then fail to make further payments, so the bank must foreclose to recover the balance of the loan. Does the bank have an obligation to seek the highest possible price when re-selling the place? If they sell it by public auction, does that satisfy any such requirement?
If a private lender doesn't have to take extraordinary measures to obtain the highest possible price in a foreclosure sale, I don't see why the government should be held to a higher standard in a tax sale. Presumably, there're requirements that have to be satisfied for it to be a legitimate public auction—there has to be adequate public notice of the sale, and sufficient time for prospective bidders to investigate the place and make a decision. But if Isabella County's satisfied such requirements in this case, they can't be held responsible for a lack of buyer interest.
Yes.
And, again, the property owner's remedy is to bid what he thinks the property is worth. Either he wins and gets to keep the house less the mortgage balance or tax bill (plus some transaction costs), or he loses and someone else pays that amount, and he gets their bid less the mortgage balance or tax bill (plus some transaction costs).
I must be dense. I don't understand the arithmetic here.
Suppose the house is worth $100,000. He owes $2000. He bids $2000 because that's what he owes. Everyone else bids near its $100K value. He loses. It's a silly scenario in the first place, since he could have just paid the debt and avoided the auction, but since he didn't, he must not have had the $2000, so he's not going to bid anything. If there is only one bidder, he's going to lowball it and get the property cheap, flip it, and take his time selling it "properly" and make a nice pile.
The only alternative is he borrows on the house's $98,000 equity plus what he owes, wins the bid, pays the debt, and pays himself the $98,000 leftover, minus transaction costs, and I can't see how that makes any sense either.
I don't see any way that it is ever plausible that the owner can bid on his own house for a debt that forces it to auction.
"I don't see any way that it is ever plausible that the owner can bid on his own house for a debt that forces it to auction."
Why not? If he's got the cash (perhaps borrowed against the house's equity, as you've suggested), why couldn't he bid what he thinks is the true market value of the house? He turns the cash over to the county, which takes out the amount of the back taxes, then turns the remaining cash over to the former owner, which is him.
Granted, it's foolish of him not to pay the damn property tax and avoid this whole tangle. He's incurring lots of transaction costs, in both time and money. He probably wouldn't be able to borrow the full value, so would have to come up with some fraction of it on his own—say, the amount of down payment he'd have to provide if he were buying it for the first time. But I can't see any reason why the county should or could refuse to accept his bid, provided he put down any necessary deposits or other proofs of ability to pay.
I said "plausible". If he could get the cash to bid full value, he could get the cash to pay the much smaller debt.
If everyone else bids near its $100k value, then there's no issue here in the first place! The $2k tax bill gets paid off, and he gets his $98,000 in equity back (less transaction costs¹). The problem is that he's claiming that the house's actual value is (say) $200k, but that nobody bid more than $100k. So he did get $98k back but he's claiming he's actually owed $198k.
If he thinks the house is worth $200k, though, and bids that much, then either he wins and retains all that equity, or he loses because the other bidders come up to that level, and he gets paid $198k.
¹I don't feel like repeating "less transaction costs" every time; just assume that's implicit in all of my comments.
I'm surprised to see a case out of Isabella County make it this far. But then I saw it was a 2015 tax auction. Since that time, the Michigan legislative has enacted a strict 90-day statute of limitations on claiming the surplus from any post-tax seizure auction (even though the auction doesn't happen until later). So far, all Michigan courts have upheld the statute in the face of due process arguments.
This is a takings argument, though, not a due process argument.
Tax forfeiture auction prices are also depressed (and not indicative of fair market value) by other factors, in addition to the necessity of a cash buyer mentioned above. Many title insurers will not insure sales involving tax forfeited properties, due the chance of statutory or constitutional non-compliance voiding the sale. Although the Michigan statute says statutory non-compliance cannot result in a failure of title (money damages only) the Michigan Supreme Court has held that constitutional non-compliance (lack of notice to the correct property owner) does result in title being returned to the taxpayer. Even if title could be insured, doing so is made more difficult by those counties in Michigan that require Freedom of Information Act request to release the evidence of the efforts to notify the correct taxpayer. Finally, the counties give only quit-claim deeds and refuse to pay for title insurance (The custom in Michigan is that the seller pays for the buyer's title insurance policy). So the comparison is what will you pay for X with a title commitment and a warranty deed from the seller versus what you will pay for X with an uninsured title and no warranties from the seller. The system almost guarantees that the auction price will be less than fair market value.
The FMV price used in assessing the property assumes conditions not present in either a mortgage or tax foreclosure, including: Conveyance of clean/warrantied title; right to inspect the premises prior to contracting and again at closing; water/septic tests; broom clean condition; etc.
I also suspect this may not result in a clear win for the former homeowner. While I see a constitutional problem with a collusive auction where the auction isn’t advertised or is advertised in as obscure a place as possible and gets bought cheap by a friend of the housing commissioner or something, as long as the city sells the property at a regular auction publicized in a normal way designed to attract bidders, the fact that the auction results in a price less than the former homeowner thinks fair does not strike me as the county’s problem.
As others have pointed out, all-cash as-is auctions with no representations, warranties, or insrance result in fewer buyers who take on more risk, and are likely to result in lower prices, than when a home is sold i the usual way whete an agent shows the home, representations are made about its condition, title is warranted, insurance is available, etc.
I don’t see that the constitution requires marketing a foreclosed house in a way that may leave it vacant for months.
Fair market value is a kindof imaginary thing. It seems unreasonable for the courts to get into the business of telling the government exactly how zealous it must be in getting the best sale price for seized property. I think we should just accept that the government will not have the incentive to get the best sale price, and if you don't want the government to seize your property and sell it with little effort, then you should pay your damn taxes, if necessary by selling your house yourself. The thing that was really problematic in Tyler v. Hennepin County was that the government position affirmatively incentivized the government to take and sell private property as a means of raising revenue for the government. And that is simply not the case here.
Determining "fair market value" is something courts do in literally every condemnation action around the country. If this is a taking, then governments will need to condemn the property before the auction, and as part of that condemnation, FMV will be determined and paid. The property will then be auctioned off. And having already paid FMV, government's will be incentivized to get the best sale price, including offering access etc. etc.
I'm not particularly familiar with the condemnation process. But from your description, I'm wondering if there is a problem here of courts sometimes deciding that FMV is higher than what the government can actually get even if the government is zealous about it. If so, that possibility would give the government an incentive not to take a $200k house over $2k of unpaid property taxes or something. And I don't think that's a good incentive to have. I want the government to be incentivised to collect the taxes it is lawfully owed, and I want property owners to be incentivised to pay their damn taxes. I'd much rather put the risk of someone's imagined FMV being different from the actual sale price on the irresponsible property owner who refused to pay their taxes than on the government responsibly collecting those taxes.
It would certainly shift incentives, and would probably cause local governments to pursue other mechanisms to incentivize tax paying (including higher fees for non-payment). Im not sure how much of a bad thing this is -- the whole tax foreclosure process is badly abused right now. I'd recommend reading the actual petitionat issue here if you think it is about an "irresponsible property owner who refused to pay their taxes" vs a "government responsibly collecting those taxes." Its essentially exactly the opposite.
(relatedly, tax collectors in many local governments make absurd amounts of money right now in part because of the whole tax foreclosure process https://www.ajc.com/news/local-govt--politics/491k-fulton-taxman-arthur-ferdinand-makes-more-than-the-president/qZ3pSxZEiIAy5PbdVykRVN/ )
Twenty five years ago or so, Michigan had a system that many states still use today. After a property owner failed to pay taxes due for a number of years (I believe it was five) a lien for the back taxes was sold at the tax sale. The price was fixed--the taxes due, plus certain penalties--though bidders could offer a bid for a reduced ownership interest if they ultimately took title, such as bidding a for a 1/2 interest, or even a vigintillion interest if you wanted to lock out other potential purchasers and see what happened at the next year tax sale. After purchasing the lien, the tax sale buyer had five years to notify the property owner (strictly enforced requiring service by the sheriff) that they had 6 months to redeem by paying the taxes and penalties to the tax sale lien purchaser. Only after expiration of the 6 month did the tax sale purchase own whatever the ownership interest they had bid. The state got none of the equity that the tax lien purchaser might ultimately receive. The system allowed local units of government to get the taxes that were owed, and some interest and penalties, but nothing more. Around the turn of the 21st century, the legislature changed to the current system, where the local units of government got the equity. And the Supreme Court is now stepping in for the 2nd time. I guess the takeaway is don't get greedy.
If property tax auctions are a taking (which is a big "if"), there will be tons of interesting questions as to when that taking occurs (at the expiration of right of redemption period, at placement of lien?), and how it applies to auctions of privately owned tax liens as most states have (private companies -- like railroads, utilities, etc.-- can be delegated condemnation power; though its not clear if that is what is happening in a private tax sale).
Plus given the new requirement that payment is made *before* a taking, there would have to be some condemnation process and payment before the auction. Will be interesting