The Volokh Conspiracy
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Today in Supreme Court History: July 28, 1880
7/28/1880: San Francisco prohibits operation of laundries in wooden buildings, "without having first obtained the consent of the board of supervisors." The Supreme Court found this ordinance unconstitutional in Yick Wo v. Hopkins (1886).
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Yick Wo v. Hopkins is a landmark decision for establishing that the application of a law can violate the Equal Protection Clause just as much as a law that is expressly discriminatory. San Francisco's ordinance was facially neutral, but the consent for laundries in wooden buildings was given to all White owners and none of the Chinese owners. It was clear to everyone that the way consent was handed out by the city revealed the true, discriminatory intent behind the ordinance.
This was a chance for one of those mostly forgotten 19th Century justices (except for this blog recognizing their birthday or something) for Justice Matthews to shine.
It was also one of the various opinions from that era that protected the rights of Asian Americans. Selectively, yes, but notably. See also the birthright citizenship opinion that now has received even more attention.
It also had this notable bit of dicta that received more attention during the years of the Warren Court and beyond:
The case of the political franchise of voting is one. Though not regarded strictly as a natural right, but as a privilege merely conceded by society according to its will under certain conditions, nevertheless it is regarded as a fundamental political right, because preservative of all rights.
The reach of this "privilege" (a term that has constitutional relevance) was a major matter of debate after the Civil War.
A couple of members of Congress, for instance, wrote a dissenting opinion to a congressional judgment that women did not have a right to vote. More broadly, voting rights of newly freed slaves and black people generally were a major issue during Reconstruction, eventually being protected by the 15th Amendment.
SCOTUS eventually firmly held that voting was a "fundamental right," though just how much protection that warranted is a complex issue. For instance, to note another issue separately discussed by the author of the supplied article, does Congress have a duty to enforce 14A, sec. 2?
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=5036471
For instance, to note another issue separately discussed by the author of the supplied article, does Congress have a duty to enforce 14A, sec. 2?
I believe that like in Trump v. Anderson (2024) regarding Section 3 of the 14th Amendment, Section 2 is to be enforced in whatever way Congress provides via its authority under Section 5.
I am not aware of any SCOTUS opinion that conclusively addressed the matter, but as a matter of constitutional practice, the enforcement of 14A, sec. 2 is a political question for Congress to decide. The question of its "duty" (however ignored) would remain.
As Justice Kennedy once noted:
The oath that all officials take to adhere to the Constitution is not confined to those spheres in which the Judiciary can correct or even comment upon what those officials say or do. Indeed, the very fact that an official may have broad discretion, discretion free from judicial scrutiny, makes it all the more imperative for him or her to adhere to the Constitution and to its meaning and its promise.
(Trump v. Hawaii)
Anyway, here is one thing written by the person cited
https://balkin.blogspot.com/2018/07/taking-section-two-of-fourteenth.html