The Volokh Conspiracy
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What Do Progressives Want for the Courts?
There's a tension between Progressives' efforts to delegitimize the courts and hopes the judiciary to constrain executive power.
Ramesh Ponnuru writing in the Washington Post:
the mood of bitter hostility toward the Supreme Court has been a general feature of Democratic politics for much of the past decade — and especially since its 2022 decision to allow states to prohibit abortion. That critique of the court is heartfelt for many progressives. But it has a flaw that is becoming more and more apparent in Trump's second term: The Democrats can't decide whether they want the institution to be stronger or weaker. . . .
Whatever merit progressive proposals to contract the power and prestige of the Supreme Court might have, they are not a plausible means of restoring it to its former role as the champion of liberal principles. A court with reduced jurisdiction, whose members fear removal by the political branches and whose decisions command little respect from the broader political culture: That's not an institution that can perform what Jackson recently called "the singular function of ensuring compliance with the Constitution" and "protecting people's rights."
A high regard for the court is particularly important now that progressives have (rightly) made it a priority to make Trump follow court orders. They can argue that the court is illegitimate or that Trump has a high duty to obey it. They seem unlikely to persuade the public that Trump has a solemn obligation to comply with an illegitimate court.
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A high regard for the court is particularly important now that progressives have (rightly) made it a priority to make Trump follow court orders.
Persuading the court to give orders in the first place would be a start.
https://bsky.app/profile/stevevladeck.bsky.social/post/3ltx5bf74hs2q
That speaks the lawfulness of Trumps actions to begin with.
Well yes, in the sense that whatever the Supreme Court says is the law, is the law.
But you saw, even Josh is struggling to make it make sense.
Now you trust Josh's hot takes? I guess you like the data & analysis that confirms your beliefs.
The fact that Trump is 15-0 and 2 still pending is a signal that it isn't SCOTUS that's gone off the rails, nor is it Trump. But these judge-shopped judges are exceeding their statutory authority and THEY are the ones being lawless.
But, as KJB so freely expresses it, it's not a matter of law or the constitution when it comes to a Leftist Doing What's Right and being on the Right Side of HERstory.
I trust Josh's willigness to justify anything that has any kind of (non-frivolous) argument to support the Trumpist view.
Not untrue, but it speaks more to the lawlessness of the lower courts. The real tension is between the lower courts and the constitution. Gross abuses of judicial power in aide of a coordinated agenda of political opposition tend to cause that. There are far too many federal judges who should not be federal judges.
The real tension is between the courts at all levels and the constitution, they're just tugging in slightly different directions. But only slightly.
The major parties are agreed on the topic of not letting the Constitution get in their way, they just disagree about the details of what it's not supposed to be allowed to get in the way of.
BrettLaw remains unadopted; must be a vast conspiracy in all levels and branches of government.
Awww, a Bluesky Skeet. How lame.
Bubble boy's opinion means nothing.
I show my sources. In this case, my source is a Georgetown law professor. If you disagree with how he counted the cases, you know where to go.
"Georgetown law professor"
So what? You are just making an appeal to authority.
He is as much of a tribal partisan as I am.
Appeal to authority would be if there was an opinion or argument at issue.
These are numbers - a factual assertion. Do you dispute that they are true?
Because otherwise, this looks like disingenuous chaff-throwing.
Bob, have you ever tried a case to the jury verdict? Pursued an appeal to finality?
It's numbers. If you think the numbers are wrong, show your work.
You appear to have seen a bluesky link and short-circuited to ad hominem with no further thought.
Not a great look.
Aw, is he horning in on your exclusive turf?
No - there I was accusing the source of lying, because Ngo is a proven liar.
Especially when it comes to his cottage industry of fearmongering about the Antifa threat.
Ad hominem is about arguments. Ngo has a credibility problem. And anyone who posts Ngo has a 'want to believe' problem.
Same as if someone posted Dinesh D'Souza after his openly false documentaries. Or China News Daily. Or RT. Or Jacobin.
I'll listen to their arguments. I will not take their factual assertions as true without additional evidence.
Precisely: you're attacking his credibility rather than addressing what he has to say. That's ad hom under any definition in existence other than one you may make up on the fly to try to wiggle out of this.
If he actually was lying about anything in particular, you could just show that. But you don't, and we all know exactly why.
"ad hom under any definition in existence" is some wishful thinking, chief. You'd think someone as pedantic as you would know this.
Ad hominem, short for argumentum ad hominem, refers to several types of arguments where the speaker attacks the character, motive, or some other attribute of the person making an argument rather than the substance of the argument itself.
Saying someone isn't credible isn't a fallacy. People legitimately do that all the time.
Murc’s Law is the commonly held fallacy that only Democrats have agency in American politics. Ponnuru is applying it to the Court. He sees the loss of respect for the Court and thinks the solution is for Democrats to somehow create respect for the Court out of thin air. The real solution is for the Court to behave respectably.
Ramesh Ponnuru might not be the best person to read to find an objective analysis about this.
A high regard for the court is particularly important now that progressives have (rightly) made it a priority to make Trump follow court orders.
SCOTUS is repeatedly enabling Trump. A "high regard" for it helps Trump. A high regard for the courts might be important, since the lower courts have played a role in checking Trump, but "the court" is on the other hand regularly enabling him.
That is Jackson's criticism repeatedly -- the lower courts should be left to do their jobs and SCOTUS is wrongly stopping them.
The purpose of the courts is not to check Trump or any other POTUS. The purpose of the courts is to rule on legal issues in a neutral fashion. The fact that SCOTUS has overruled the lower courts in such an overwhelming manner suggests that it is the lower courts behaving in a partisan manner.
This is the correct answer = The fact that SCOTUS has overruled the lower courts in such an overwhelming manner suggests that it is the lower courts behaving in a partisan manner.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cHxGUe1cjzM
The fact that SCOTUS has overruled the lower courts in such an overwhelming manner suggests that it is the lower courts behaving in a partisan manner.
No it doesn't. That's foolish. It makes as much sense to say that it suggests SCOTUS is behaving in a partisan manner.
In fact, it does more than suggest. We have lots of lower court judges - many more than nine, with Trump appointees among them - ruling against Trump. And then we have a nine-judge court where 5 or 6 judges routinely overturn those anti-Trump decisions.
Looks to me like that very strongly suggests the conservative majority are acting as partisans, not the other way around.
And one more thing. Let's suppose - highly implausibly - that in general Trump has the better of the argument 80% of the time. Then the probability an impartial court rules in his favor is about 3.5%. Make it 75% and that probability drops to 1.3%.
What does that suggest?
"And one more thing. Let's suppose - highly implausibly - that in general Trump has the better of the argument 80% of the time. Then the probability an impartial court rules in his favor is about 3.5%. Make it 75% and that probability drops to 1.3%."
I'm sorry but I don't understand. Can you please explain this? If he has the better argument 80% of the time wouldn't the probability that an impartial judge rules in his favor be 80%?
Sorry, Harvey, I wrote carelessly.
What I meant to say was that the probability an impartial court rules in his favor in fifteen out of fifteen cases is 3.5%.
Clearer now?
The fact that SCOTUS has overruled the lower courts in such an overwhelming manner suggests that it is the lower courts behaving in a partisan manner.
I'm not sure how the first part suggests the second part.
In fact if we gotta choose...which is more likely to be behaving in a partisan manner?
1. A 9-person group, whose conservative ideological valiance is not a secret, and whose partisanship has been a subject of open debate.
2. A large group of judges from all parts, ages, and appointed by all types of Presidents. Who have never been seen as a unified ideological or partisan bloc before.
Wow, and here Sacastr0 throws out the basic principles of our Justice System because he's not getting his preferred outcomes.
Kinda like what ya'll do with Democracy, Law, and Morality.
P.S. Your second point is quite the hilarious take. That's extremely disconnected from reality even for you Blue Anon Deep State whackos.
By Any Means Necessary, right Pantifa?
It’s not a second point, it’s offered as evidence of a single point.
Why are antisemitic white supremacists so dumb?
Unbelievable response. You really are a moron.
The group that has been vetted multiple times before reaching the top of their profession and whose word is generally the final word on the subject seems to be the proper answer.
Sure, but vetted for *what*?
1. vetted multiple times - as Martinned said, they're not vetted for being nonpartisan. So this is irrelevant to the thesis.
2. reaching the top of their profession - there's a threshold of intelligence required, to be sure. But as much of it is a relational game. Either way, your assertion that being partisan inhibits judicial success needs more work.
3. whose word is generally the final word on the subject - again, has nothing to do with whether that word is partisan or not.
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Note that I said 'if we gotta choose.' I don't think complaining about some generalized partisan bad faith in this or that institution is a useful exercise.
But you've picked it up, and are doing a terrible job executing.
S0 argues as if the district courts judges are non-partisan.
The reason lawfare and venue shopping works is that the partisan are brilliantly obvious.
I don't think so, Don.
His argument seems to assume, reasonably, that partisanship is distributed somewhat randomly among those judges. Maybe non-partisan on average.
Yeah, a random distribution is not required for sample bias to have an effect, just one with some distribution.
"all parts, ages, and appointed by all types of Presidents"
You are gaslighting us.
California , Mass. and Md. due to forum shopping, appointed mainly by Biden and Obama. The few that are not are Reagan dinosaurs or blueslip specials.
Not a Trump supporter in the bunch as far as I know.
Btw where were the 9 judges selected from? Weren't all of them selected from that large group of judges from all parts, ages, and appointed by all types of Presidents. Who have never been seen as a unified ideological or partisan bloc before?
What? No.
At least 6 of them were selected by a subset of those chosen specifically for ideology by the Federalist society.
And don't think the other 3 are any less vetted for ideology.
I can grab 3 balls from a diverse and random sample of colored balls, but if I'm only looking for yellow I'm not going to get a diverse sample out.
Where were they before they became SCOTUS justices? Were they not from that large group of judges from all parts, ages, and appointed by all types of President who have never been seen as a unified ideological or partisan bloc before? Did they suddenly becom partisan by ascending to SCOTUS? Or if there are partisan judges in that large group of judges from all parts, ages, and appointed by all types of Presidents. Who have never been seen as a unified ideological or partisan bloc before why can't we assume that the original district court judges are the partisan ones and there was judge shopping to get the original rulings before SCOTUS overturned them?
'But the sample started out so colorful, did the balls you picked somehow all transform into yellow ones?!'
If there are partisan j7dges in the large group of judges from all parts, ages, and appointed by all types of Presidents. Who have never been seen as a unified ideological or partisan bloc before why can't that be where the partisan decisions are being made? Occam's razor would say that the groups bringing the suits are more likely to judge shop from your group thus getting a partisan judge than it is that SCOTUS is making partisan rulings. After all they have literally hundreds of judges to choose from and need only file in a district most favorable to them. That they have been overturned time and time again by the court that has final say is not in their favor. Add in the fact that none of the votes have even been close with some being 8-1 or 7-2.
Quit abusing poor Occam; it's not useful in this discussion.
That they have been overturned time and time again by the court that has final say is not in their favor
It is actually utterly irrelevant to your thesis.
Your thesis:
That every or nearly every ruling against Trump by a lower court judge has been motivated not by legal analysis but by partisanship.
And that the Supreme Court is motivated purely by legal analysis, and not partisanship.
You have a lot of work to do.
No. My thesis was that it is not the role of judges to check a POTUS and his policies but is instead to rule based on the law and the Constitution. My secondary point of the SCOTUS rulings being likey less partisan is because these aren't all 5-4 or 6-3 rulings and several have been 7-2 and at least one 8-1 meaning not a purely partisan split.
You said this: "The fact that SCOTUS has overruled the lower courts in such an overwhelming manner suggests that it is the lower courts behaving in a partisan manner."
Now you're bringing in a new argument.
But no, the mere existence of 'several' decisions that weren't 6-3 does not mean the Court is nonpartisan.
No.
You mean none of the SCOTUS justices were judges before being nominated to the SCOTUS?
No, I don't mean that.
Then what did you mean? Because Sarcastr0's original claim was that
"A large group of judges from all parts, ages, and appointed by all types of Presidents. Who have never been seen as a unified ideological or partisan bloc before." Meant it was the SCOTUS that was partisan but it ignores that every current SCOTUS was a judge before being nominated to the SCOTUS. That means either the SCOTUS justices have the same presumption of nonpartisanship or both SCOTUS judges and the lower court justices can be partisan. In the justice's favor is that they were vetted at each level from district court to circuit court and finally SCOTUS whereas the district court judges were only vetted at the starter level and were appointed by the same POTUSs that supposedly appoint the SCOTUS justices and are at the very least likely to be more partisan than the justices because it's easier to appoint a partisan district judge than a SCOTUS justice because of yhe stakes involved.
I think Sarcastro explained very clearly that your analysis fails because Supreme Court justices aren't chosen at random from the lower court judge pool.
And district court judges are not selected at random from all of the attorneys available. They are even selected for the same reasons as the SCOTUS justices. They are just as likely to be partisan and what is likely to make their rulings more partisan is the fact that the plaintiffs didn't randomly select the districts that the filed in. On the contrary they filed in districts most likely to garner them a favorable ruling with judges who are likely partisan in their favor.
Let’s be honest — the progressive agenda is clear. They aim to weaken the independence of the courts and elevate majoritarian rule as the ultimate source of power, unbound by constitutional limits or institutional checks.
In their view, the Constitution is not a safeguard of liberty but an obstacle to the will of the majority. Courts that stand in the way of that will are likewise seen as barriers to be bypassed or dismantled. What better way to bring the judiciary to heel than by constantly threatening court packing and pushing so-called “reforms” designed to erode judicial independence — all while launching sustained attacks on the Court’s legitimacy and the integrity of its justices?
Consider the following:
1. Court Packing Proposals: Prominent progressive politicians, including Senator Ed Markey and Representatives Jerry Nadler and Hank Johnson, introduced the Judiciary Act of 2021, which proposed expanding the Supreme Court from 9 to 13 justices.[¹] President Biden convened a commission to study court reform in 2021 under pressure from his party’s progressive wing.[²]
2. Statements Framing the Court as Illegitimate: After the Dobbs decision, prominent progressives including Rep. Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez and Sen. Elizabeth Warren referred to the Court as “illegitimate.”[³][⁴] These remarks are not merely expressions of dissent — they signal a political strategy to delegitimize rulings that conflict with progressive priorities.
3. Threats to Judicial Independence: Senator Chuck Schumer stood on the steps of the Supreme Court in 2020 and declared: “You have released the whirlwind and you will pay the price,” addressing Justices Gorsuch and Kavanaugh by name over an abortion case. This was broadly criticized — even by the Chief Justice — as an inappropriate threat to judicial independence.[⁵]
4. Efforts to Strip Judicial Review or Limit Jurisdiction: Progressive legal scholars and some Democratic lawmakers have endorsed proposals to strip courts of jurisdiction over certain types of legislation — for instance, laws related to voting rights or reproductive health — so courts cannot review them.[⁶]
These efforts do not reflect simple reform. They reflect a deeper philosophy: that democratic majorities — if large enough — should not be bound by constitutional checks, including the courts. And the judiciary, if not brought into ideological alignment, is to be marginalized.
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Sources:
[1] “Democrats introduce bill to expand Supreme Court,” NBC News, April 15, 2021.
[2] “Biden’s Supreme Court commission releases report,” CNN, December 2021.
[3] “Ocasio-Cortez: Supreme Court rulings show it is ‘illegitimate’,” The Hill, June 2022.
[4] “Warren: SCOTUS ‘burned whatever legitimacy’ it had after Roe reversal,” NBC News, June 2022.
[5] “Chief Justice Roberts rebukes Schumer for comments,” NPR, March 2020.
[6] “The Case for Jurisdiction Stripping,” Harvard Law Review Blog, various progressive legal scholars.
⸻
While critics charge that the Court is ideologically conservative and politically biased, the actual record is more nuanced — and in many high-profile cases, the Court has respected precedent, limited itself to narrow rulings, or ruled against conservative expectations. Consider these examples:
⸻
1. ACA (Obamacare) Cases: Repeated Upholding of a Liberal Landmark Law
• NFIB v. Sebelius (2012): Chief Justice Roberts sided with the liberal wing to uphold the Affordable Care Act’s individual mandate under Congress’s taxing power, despite fierce conservative opposition.[¹]
• California v. Texas (2021): The Court again refused to strike down the ACA — in a 7-2 decision — for lack of standing. Even Trump-appointed Justices Kavanaugh and Barrett declined to overturn the law.[²]
Conclusion: The Court declined multiple opportunities to dismantle a key Democratic legislative achievement.
⸻
2. Respect for Stare Decisis (Until Rare Exceptions)
• Kisor v. Wilkie (2019): A 5-4 majority, including Justice Kagan writing the opinion and Justice Kavanaugh concurring, reaffirmed Auer deference (deference to administrative agencies interpreting their own regulations), showing the Court was not eager to overturn precedent on agency powers despite conservative critiques.[³]
• Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health (2022): Yes, this overruled Roe v. Wade, but the majority argued Roe itself deviated from constitutional text and precedent, and that stare decisis is not absolute — especially when precedent is seen as egregiously wrong or unworkable. Even so, the Court’s opinion went to great lengths to ground the ruling in history and legal method, not ideology.[⁴]
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3. Liberal Outcomes in Criminal Law and Indian Law
• McGirt v. Oklahoma (2020): A 5-4 decision written by Justice Gorsuch held that a large portion of eastern Oklahoma remains Native American land under treaty obligations — a decision expanding tribal sovereignty.[⁵]
• Torres v. Madrid (2021): In a 5-3 ruling, the Court held that a police shooting constituted a “seizure” under the Fourth Amendment. The majority included Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Kavanaugh — both Republican-appointed — ruling in favor of expanded constitutional protections against police force.[⁶]
⸻
4. Voting Rights Cases That Defied Partisan Expectations
• Allen v. Milligan (2023): In a major surprise, Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Kavanaugh joined the liberal justices in ruling that Alabama’s congressional map likely violated the Voting Rights Act by diluting Black voting power — a decision widely applauded by civil rights groups.[⁷]
Conclusion: Even in a politically charged area like redistricting, the Court reaffirmed established voting rights doctrine.
⸻
Summary:
While certain decisions — especially Dobbs — have provoked fierce partisan reactions, the Court’s overall record reveals a complex jurisprudence that often respects precedent, limits itself to legal interpretation, and does not consistently favor conservative outcomes. In fact, several major conservative legislative or political goals have been rejected or curtailed by the Court.
So rather than being a tool of right-wing politics, the Court has often acted as a constitutional check — in line with its traditional role — and its decisions reflect that balance more than ideological bias.
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Sources:
1. NFIB v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519 (2012).
2. California v. Texas, 593 U.S. ___ (2021).
3. Kisor v. Wilkie, 588 U.S. ___ (2019).
4. Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Organization, 597 U.S. ___ (2022).
5. McGirt v. Oklahoma, 591 U.S. ___ (2020).
6. Torres v. Madrid, 592 U.S. ___ (2021).
7. Allen v. Milligan, 599 U.S. ___ (2023).
In light of this record, the claim that the Supreme Court is simply a partisan tool of conservatism does not hold up. Time and again, the Court has upheld liberal legislation like the Affordable Care Act, reaffirmed key precedents when appropriate, and issued rulings that defy ideological expectations — from expanding tribal sovereignty to striking down racially discriminatory voting maps. Even in controversial cases like Dobbs, the majority grounded its decision in constitutional interpretation, not partisan preference. Far from acting as a political arm of the right, the Court has demonstrated an ongoing commitment to the rule of law and the limits of its constitutional role. Efforts to delegitimize or restructure it — from court-packing to jurisdiction stripping — should be recognized for what they are: attempts to weaken an institution precisely because it sometimes resists the will of transient majorities.
"President Biden convened a commission to study court reform in 2021 under pressure from his party’s progressive wing."
The point of the commission was to kick the can down the road. Anyway, reform regularly is about strengthening institutions as when the Catholic Church reformed itself in the face of the Protestant backlash or when it modernized in the 1960s.
"Statements Framing the Court as Illegitimate"
Criticism of a specific ruling? Like Republicans criticized Roe v. Wade? Kagan repeatedly noted it was not a "rare exception" for them to disrespect stare decisis in recent years. I suppose space restraints is why you left all of those dissents of her out.
SCOTUS sometimes having liberal results doesn't tell us much, especially 5-4 rulings turning on a conservative justice having an idiosyncratic specific concern about that area of law.
Scalia wrote some liberal opinions, too. He was overall still a conservative justice.
Some simplistic stereotype about how such and such is "simply" something is not useful. We should look at the thing as a whole. That is what diligent critics do.
"Even in controversial cases like Dobbs, the majority grounded its decision in constitutional interpretation, not partisan preference."
They selectively decided the opinion broadly, not following normal procedural practices to do so, and arbitrarily selectively singled out abortion as suggested by Thomas's concurrence.
"Let’s be honest — the progressive agenda is clear. They aim to weaken the independence of the courts and elevate majoritarian rule as the ultimate source of power, unbound by constitutional limits or institutional checks."
Conservatives regularly complain about courts blocking majoritarian rule etc. Progressives regularly --- let's be honest -- respect the independence of the courts. The two sides disagree on details. So, e.g., progressives think more gun regulations are allowable. THEN conservatives are not as big on majoritarian rule.
Thank you for these points. Allow me to rebut them, individually:
1. “The point of the Biden court commission was to kick the can down the road.”
Rebuttal:
That may be partially true — and in fact, it reinforces the original point. President Biden’s Presidential Commission on the Supreme Court of the United States was convened under clear pressure from progressive activists and lawmakers demanding structural changes, especially in the wake of Dobbs, Brnovich, and other rulings. The commission ultimately declined to recommend drastic reforms such as court-packing or term limits. But its very creation was a political gesture — one acknowledged by both supporters and critics — intended to diffuse pressure from progressive activists who called the Court “illegitimate.”
• Fact: The commission’s report stated clearly that there was “profound disagreement” on court-packing and that these reforms risked undermining judicial legitimacy.
• Interpretation: If the commission was a delay tactic, it was a response to a reform campaign that sought to fundamentally restructure the judiciary based on dissatisfaction with outcomes — precisely the concern raised.
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2. “Criticism of a specific ruling? Like Republicans criticizing Roe?”
Rebuttal:
Criticizing a ruling is not the issue. What’s different is the scale, language, and coordination of efforts by elected progressives to delegitimize the institution itself, not merely a decision.
• Example: In 2022, Rep. Ocasio-Cortez, Sen. Warren, and others did not simply criticize Dobbs — they called the entire Court illegitimate.
• Contrast: In decades of conservative criticism of Roe, few elected Republicans ever called the Court itself illegitimate — even when they believed the ruling to be badly reasoned. The focus remained on legal disagreement, not institutional sabotage.
• Important distinction: Dissent is not delegitimization. But coordinated messaging to undermine trust in the Court — tied to concurrent campaigns for structural reform — is something different.
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3. “Kagan dissents show disrespect for stare decisis by conservatives.”
Rebuttal:
It’s true that Justice Kagan has criticized the majority’s handling of stare decisis. And in some cases — particularly Dobbs — her concern reflects a deep legal and philosophical divide. But it’s inaccurate to portray this as a recent or one-sided phenomenon.
• The Court has always overruled precedent, often with strong dissents. Brown v. Board overruled Plessy. Lawrence v. Texas overruled Bowers. Janus overruled Abood. Precedent is respected, but not unbreakable.
• In Dobbs, the Court outlined a multi-factor stare decisis test and argued that Roe was egregiously wrong and had proven unworkable.
• That’s not to say the reasoning was flawless — but it was consistent with prior justifications for overturning precedent (as even liberal justices have done).
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4. “Scalia wrote liberal rulings — that doesn’t mean he wasn’t conservative.”
Rebuttal:
Exactly — and this point helps illustrate the core argument: the Court is more legally complex than it is politically partisan. When we point to liberal outcomes in recent rulings (Allen v. Milligan, McGirt v. Oklahoma, etc.), it’s not to deny that justices have ideological leanings — but to rebut the claim that the current Court is a predictable partisan instrument.
• Milligan (2023): Roberts and Kavanaugh sided with liberals in a major Voting Rights Act case.
• McGirt (2020): Gorsuch sided with liberals to affirm tribal sovereignty.
These are not just “idiosyncrasies” — they reflect genuine legal independence that defies simple conservative/liberal framing.
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5. “Dobbs was selectively broad; Thomas suggested even more rollbacks.”
Rebuttal:
Thomas’s concurrence was not the opinion of the Court. The majority explicitly stated Dobbs applied only to abortion, which it distinguished from other privacy-based rights because it involved fetal life.
• Majority Opinion (Alito): “Nothing in this opinion should be understood to cast doubt on precedents that do not concern abortion.”
• That’s not arbitrary — it reflects long-standing legal arguments about the unique nature of abortion as involving competing rights (mother and unborn child), unlike contraception or same-sex marriage.
Note: That critics are uncomfortable with this legal reasoning does not make it illegitimate or partisan.
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6. “Progressives respect court independence; conservatives also complain about courts.”
Rebuttal:
Both sides criticize the courts. But recent progressive efforts involve a coordinated campaign to delegitimize and structurally alter the Court precisely because of ideological disagreement — something not mirrored in recent conservative practice.
• Examples of progressive proposals:
• Expand the number of justices (Judiciary Act of 2021)
• Impose term limits via statute (likely unconstitutional)
• Strip courts of jurisdiction on certain issues
• Pack lower courts with ideologically aligned judges
• No recent conservative equivalent exists to this scale or intensity. Even when conservatives disagreed with decisions like Obergefell or NFIB v. Sebelius, they did not pursue court-packing or mass delegitimization.
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7. “We should look at the institution as a whole.”
Rebuttal:
Agreed — and that’s exactly the point. When looking at the Court as a whole:
• It issues both conservative and liberal rulings.
• It overrules precedent with caution, not recklessness.
• It remains one of the few institutions in U.S. government still respected by broad segments of the public — though trust is declining under political pressure.
Calls for sweeping reform, court-packing, or branding it “illegitimate” when decisions go against one side do more to damage public trust than any ruling itself.
Dobbs v. Jackson Women's Health Organization, 597 U.S. 215 (2022), is the only case since World War II where SCOTUS has overruled a precedent which had recognized an individual right as being a fundamental personal liberty.
Individual liberty should be a one way ratchet.
It is amazing how many people suddenly decide commissions are some kind of fast-moving achievement engine.
Strawman.
Some self reflection questions 4u:
- Do you believe you contribute to the conversation here?
- Do you believe your comments serve a purpose?
- Do you believe your comments are persuasive or engaging, or primarily the subject of ridicule?
Every accusation…
Is this copied from the updated Grok or ChatGPT?
"Let’s be honest — the progressive agenda is clear. They aim to weaken the independence of the courts and elevate majoritarian rule as the ultimate source of power, unbound by constitutional limits or institutional checks."
Not at all. That would be a consistent stance, albeit foolish.
They want to weaken the independence of the courts from the left, and elevate left-wing rule as the ultimate source of power, with the Constitution interpreted as mandating everything the left favors, and prohibiting everything the left opposes, regardless of who wins elections.
This looks majoritarian when the left wins elections, and anti-majoritarian when the left loses elections. But it's really nothing more complicated than "Heads we win, tails you lose."
Brett's utter blindness to his own deal continues to astound.
He's not the one who is blind.
Nice cheerleading, but lets dig in a bit.
Brett's assertion is that the left has a nefarious agenda. An agenda wherein the Constitution will instantiate all the things it wants.
He offers no evidence for this.
Meanwhile, he comments over and over how the Constitution actually instantiates all the things HE wants, and everyone knows it.
I'm not sure what you are accusing me of - like everyone, I have my opinions about the Constitution both substantively and how to interpret it.
But unlike Brett, I don't think there's a conspiracy to cover up the broad support for my views.
So what's your beef?
That you're the one who is blind. I'm not cheerleading. He didn't suggest a conspiracy to cover up any views. That's something you injected here, unfairly, to make him sound more kook-ish.
If you can't accept that the various things Bellmore has posted over the years aren't some kind of evidence that the left has a particular agenda, I can't help you. I don't necessarily agree with all of them, but it's gaslighting to deny that he has. It's a personal judgment whether it's nefarious. Bellmore is entitled that opinion. I somewhat share it.
It's not like the other side doesn't believe groups can have nefarious agendas, cc: Project 2025. I can't recall his name right now, but there was an infamous article written in 2016 laying out an aggressive liberal agenda for the judiciary if Hillary Clinton won the presidency and was able to reshape the judiciary, especially the Supreme Court. Not my imagination, even though I can't remember the author's name. (Maybe someone can help me out.)
The left sure does have its conspiracies, but
1) those fringes are not the rug, as they are with the GOP.
2) you provide a terrible example - Project 2025 was published, and the President is following it.
there was an infamous article written in 2016
Some article from 9 years ago? Do you see what weak-sauce you're bringing in an attempt to bothsides?
My point is that Brett asserted a conspiracy that exactly maps onto what he keeps insisting should happen, but for his personal views.
And waiving your hand to say Brett's established his conspiracy theories may be one of the most embarrassing reversals of legitimacy I've seen on here.
You've done it again, using the word "conspiracy" to describe Bellmore's position, a totally unfair description, a word he did not use above. He's never alleged any secret cabal. I think he would agree with me that the liberal (Resistance) federal district court judges do not need any secret journo-list kind of coordination to make some of the absurd decisions they have this year.
Mark Tushnet is the author of the infamous article I couldn't think of earlier. So you're going to tell me liberals don't want to see the courts expand rights for LGBTQ people, re-expand minority voting rights, and restore reproductive rights? More gaslighting from you.
https://balkin.blogspot.com/2016/05/abandoning-defensive-crouch-liberal.html
Abandoning defensive crouch liberal constitutionalism. What many want to see happen if Hillary has a chance to appoint judges and Supreme Court justices.
It's really something that when the side you defend actually says it out loud, we're not supposed to believe it. It was just last year Democrats were insisting the Senate filibuster be abolished so they could expand (pack) the Supreme Court, because of Dobbs.
You really are a dishonest person. Name one "conspiracy" of his that's unfounded and I'll be happy to condemn it.
If you can't accept that the various things Bellmore has posted over the years aren't some kind of evidence that the left has a particular agenda, I can't help you.
"A particular agenda" covers a lot of ground. A set of policy preferences - not uniformly shared on the left, BTW - is an agenda. In that sense all political parties have an agenda.
As to a more extreme and nefarious agenda - the kind that Brett has in mind - well, no, I don't accept it, partly because Brett's "evidence" is often false or distorted, not to mention a good part of it exists only in his brain.
Consider:
They want to weaken the independence of the courts from the left, and elevate left-wing rule as the ultimate source of power, with the Constitution interpreted as mandating everything the left favors, and prohibiting everything the left opposes, regardless of who wins elections.
And I would say, with stronger evidence, that the right wants to do all those things. Ever heard of Merrick Garland and the broader confirmation roadblocks McConnell put up the last two years of Obama's administration. And Trump has outsourced nominations to the Federalist Society, not exactly a non-partisan organization.
Further, he consistently defies the courts. If that's not weakening them, and the Constitution, what is?
Now Brett will tell you the Federalist Society, etc. Are all fine and non-partisan, because they are, after all, right about everything. But that's horseshit - Brettlaw.
If you can say that, why can't Bellmore?
Oh yeah that's right it's because you think you're correct.
He can. I'd say the difference is that I recognize, usually, that my opponents have some sort of argument and, really the more important distinction, I think they honestly believe their arguments, whereas Bellmore doesn't.
He believes, AFAICT, that his views are so obviously correct that anyone who disagrees is arguing in bad faith, and has some hidden agenda.
Indeed. Consistency is one of those contemptible bourgeois values.
As Trotsky put it :
You do not understand this, holy men? We shall explain it to you. The terror of Tsarism was directed against the proletariat. . . . Our Extraordinary Commissions shoot landlords, capitalists, and generals . . . . Do you grasp this distinction? For us Communists it is quite sufficient.
There is literally nothing honest about your post; it makes exactly the opposite point it's trying to make, and claiming that Dobbs is about stare decisis is bananapants crazy.
Your comment suggests that my post is “literally” dishonest and makes the “opposite point” it claims to — but you don’t actually engage with the substance of what was said. Let’s clarify the key point, particularly about Dobbs and stare decisis.
You call the idea that Dobbs was “about stare decisis” “bananapants crazy,” but stare decisis was central to the case — both in the majority’s reasoning and in the dissents.
Majority Opinion (Alito): "We have long recognized that stare decisis is not an inexorable command..."
The Court used the traditional multi-factor test to justify overturning Roe, including:
The quality of reasoning in Roe and Casey
Their workability
The effect on other legal doctrines
Reliance interests
Whether one agrees with the Court’s conclusion or not, the opinion explicitly and extensively analyzes stare decisis. To deny that is to ignore the text of the decision itself.
You are free to believe the majority applied those principles incorrectly — that’s a valid legal or moral critique. But to claim it wasn’t about stare decisis at all is simply incorrect. Both sides — Alito in the majority and Kagan in dissent — centered their arguments on whether Roe should be upheld or overturned based on the standards of precedent.
This kind of sweeping dismissal (“literally nothing honest”) doesn’t move the conversation forward. If you think the reasoning in Dobbs was flawed, say why. If you believe the precedent should have been upheld, explain how it met the Court’s stare decisis standards. But asserting that any mention of stare decisis is “crazy” is itself a denial of the basic legal structure of the case.
You said that progressives want to "weaken the independence of the courts and elevate majoritarian rule as the ultimate source of power, unbound by constitutional limits or institutional checks," when in fact the constant complaint we've heard about progressives is that they want unelected judges to overrule the people (and, of course, the MAGA mandate).
Like 99% of the population, and 99.9% of the population who aren't law professors, progressives want the courts to be countermajoritarian when their adversaries are in charge, and majoritarian when they themselves are in charge. And vice versa for conservatives. (n.b., by using the term "conservative" I am not conceding that there is anything conservative about MAGA; it's just shorthand.) So one can cherrypick issues on which progressives want majoritarian rule and pretend those run the gamut, but that's (wait for it) dishonest. Do progressives want majoritarian rule on Roe? On trans issues? On gay marriage (well, now they do, but not when it was a hot legal issue.)
For every cherrypicked example you cited in support of your thesis about what liberals supposedly think of the courts, I can cite at least the same number which reflect conservatives holding those positions. (TBC, I am not talking about who is right or wrong. I am saying that conservatives delegitimize courts, try to strip them of jurisdiction, etc., when they're unhappy about what the courts do, just as much as progressives do when they are unhappy.
As for Dobbs specifically, one can argue whether it was a good decision or a bad one. But what one cannot do — without the aforementioned bananapants — is cite Dobbs as an example of "respect for stare decisis."
You argue that both progressives and conservatives instrumentalize the courts — wanting majoritarian rule when it favors them and countermajoritarianism when it doesn’t. That’s an important observation, and at the level of partisan incentives, you’re right. Political actors of all stripes seek outcomes.
But my point wasn’t about inconsistent partisan outcomes. It was about institutional posture — the kind of reforms or rhetoric deployed when the courts frustrate those outcomes.
There’s a difference between disagreeing with court decisions (which everyone does) and pursuing structural changes to the Court because of those disagreements. In just the last few years, we’ve seen:
• Serious legislative proposals to pack the Court (Judiciary Act of 2021)
• Campaigns by elected officials labeling the Court illegitimate (post-Dobbs)
• Calls for jurisdiction stripping and term limits (often proposed via statute, raising constitutional issues)
• An official Presidential commission convened largely in response to progressive demands for reform
This goes beyond “normal” partisan frustration. It reflects a strategic shift: if the Court won’t deliver certain outcomes, its authority or structure must be altered. That’s different from criticizing decisions or even calling for constitutional amendments. It’s a readiness to erode the Court’s independence to rebalance political power.
Yes, conservatives have attacked court rulings they dislike (Obergefell, NFIB v. Sebelius, Roe). But in recent decades, the dominant conservative legal strategy has been one of institutional capture through jurisprudence: originalism, textualism, and building a pipeline of ideologically consistent judges.
You mention conservatives stripping jurisdiction — fair point. But even there, those efforts (e.g., over Pledge of Allegiance cases or abortion) were mostly symbolic and did not gain serious legislative traction. They also weren’t paired with calls to expand the Court or delegitimize its rulings wholesale.
The structural reform energy — right now — is coming from the left.
You’re right to say Dobbs is a valid case to criticize for its approach to stare decisis — but it’s just not accurate to say stare decisis played no role. The majority opinion in Dobbs engaged extensively with that doctrine:
• It cited the Court’s multi-factor test for overturning precedent
• It discussed the supposed unworkability and weak reasoning of Roe and Casey
• It cited prior examples where precedent was overturned (Plessy, Lochner, Bowers)
You can absolutely argue that the application of stare decisis in Dobbs was outcome-driven, or insufficiently justified. But to say Dobbs had “nothing to do with stare decisis” is not a critique — it’s a misreading of the opinion itself. Even the dissent acknowledged the doctrinal framing and chose to challenge it on those grounds.
Your point that each side can point to examples of the other’s inconsistency is valid — in fact, it proves the need for constitutional guardrails rather than outcome-based jurisprudence. But the original argument wasn’t “progressives are always anti-court” or “conservatives never complain.” It was that progressive legal strategy today increasingly involves attacking the Court as illegitimate and pushing for structural change when it doesn’t deliver results.
That is not symmetrical — at least not in this political moment.
So yes, both sides care about power. But the means by which they respond to judicial losses is not always the same. Right now, there is a disproportionate willingness on the left to erode judicial independence in pursuit of short-term gains. That’s not just “using the courts” — it’s threatening the institution itself.
You don’t have to love the current Court to think that’s a bad idea.
In Dobbs, the majority opinion by Justice Alito devotes significant space to applying this framework. Specifically, the Court argues that:
1. Roe was egregiously wrong from the start — it had “no grounding in the constitutional text, history, or tradition.”
2. Casey failed to resolve the issue or settle the controversy — and introduced the “undue burden” standard, which the majority found unworkable.
3. Reliance interests were overstated — the majority argued that the kind of forward-looking life planning asserted in Casey was too “intangible” and “generalized” to weigh heavily.
4. Subsequent doctrine had not solidified Roe’s logic — the Court claimed that the privacy/substantive due process framework had become more contested, not more settled.
Whether you agree with that analysis or not, it is a textbook stare decisis inquiry. The Court cited Planned Parenthood v. Casey, Janus v. AFSCME, Brown, Lawrence, and other precedents where it had applied the same test.
Justices Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan in dissent didn’t ignore stare decisis — they centered their dissent around it. They accused the majority of applying the doctrine inconsistently, especially because Casey had already upheld Roe under the same doctrine in 1992.
They wrote:
“The Court reverses course today for one reason and one reason only: because the composition of this Court has changed… Stare decisis is a doctrine of humility. The Court now shows none.”
So again — both sides acknowledged stare decisis was the doctrinal frame. They disagreed over how it should be applied and whether Roe and Casey met the bar for retaining precedent.
Saying Dobbs had “nothing to do with stare decisis” is like saying Brown had nothing to do with equal protection. The entire legal structure of the decision — majority and dissent alike — was built around whether the Court should uphold or overturn precedent. One can argue that the majority applied the doctrine poorly, inconsistently, or ideologically. But denying that the doctrine was applied at all is simply false as a matter of legal reasoning and structure.
Everybody knows perfectly well what progressives want from courts: to enshrine progressive policies and block conservative policies. Any ruling that does so is "legitimate", while any ruling that does not is "illegitimate". Any ruling for Trump is "illegitimate", while any ruling against him is "legitimate".
I mean, that's a pretty good heuristic, given Trump's predilections.
SCOTUS beclowned itself with Trump v. United States, 603 U.S. 593 (2024). A totally result-oriented opinion, cut from whole judicial cloth. (Like the Court's invention of qualified immunity for damages suits under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.)
I hope that Trump goes the way of Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857), Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896), and Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944), and I hope its repudiation doesn't take nearly as long as the others.
You “beclown” yourself with every post
Frank “thats a Clown post, Bro!”
NG, you were simply wrong in your legal analysis re: Trump v CASA. And the section 3 case, and Jack Smith, and a number of cases.
Your reputation remains unsullied. 😉
Two things I've learned over the past several decades:
Leftists:
- have no shame
- lack self awareness
- aren't bound by principles, only outcomes
- anti-human and anti-free will
You're projecting (or trolling).
The only thing you are not guilty of is being a phenomenal legal analyst.
I've always said he's the Jim Cramer of legal analysts.
You’ve compared Trump v. United States, 603 U.S. 593 (2024), to some of the most infamous decisions in Supreme Court history — Dred Scott, Plessy, and Korematsu. That’s a serious accusation. But to be persuasive, such comparisons should rest on more than frustration with the outcome.
The idea of some form of executive immunity is not new — it is deeply rooted in precedent and constitutional structure.
In Nixon v. Fitzgerald (457 U.S. 731 (1982)), the Court held that a president is absolutely immune from civil damages for official acts.
In United States v. Nixon (1974), while the Court required Nixon to turn over tapes, it still recognized executive privilege as a legitimate constitutional principle.
In Trump v. Vance (2020), the Court confirmed that the president is not absolutely immune from state subpoenas — but emphasized that this did not resolve criminal immunity for official acts.
So, Trump v. United States did not invent immunity — it extended it into a criminal context where precedent was thin, yes, but not nonexistent.
Contrary to some commentary, the Court did not say that the president is “above the law.”
The majority said:
“The President enjoys no immunity for his unofficial acts, and not everything the President does is official.”
The Court ruled that when a president performs core constitutional duties (e.g., exercising prosecutorial discretion, engaging in foreign policy, or communicating with Justice Department officials), courts must presume immunity from prosecution, subject to further analysis.
Critics can reasonably argue the standard is too deferential. But that’s a far cry from saying the president is immune from everything, or that this is comparable to Dred Scott, which denied citizenship to Black Americans and inflamed a civil war.
You mention qualified immunity under § 1983. That doctrine has been heavily criticized — including by justices like Thomas. But again, it was not invented out of nowhere:
The Court developed it from common-law immunities recognized at the time § 1983 was enacted (1871).
The modern version may be flawed or too expansive, but it’s still built on judicial precedent and doctrinal evolution.
Saying it was “cut from whole cloth” ignores the incremental way it developed, just as Trump v. United States builds on decades of executive immunity case law. The idea that presidents have immunity for official acts traces back at least to Nixon v. Fitzgerald (1982), which recognized absolute civil immunity for official conduct. Later cases like Clinton v. Jones and Trump v. Vance further shaped the boundaries. While Trump v. United States extended that reasoning into the criminal context, it did so by drawing on this existing legal foundation — not by inventing an entirely new doctrine from nothing.
People mostly engage in a willful misreading of Trump v United States, for contemporary partisan reasons, to disparage it.
It merely, finally codifies what many of us understood was the law, as articulated by Attorney General William Barr when he released the Mueller report: presidential acts are not subject to criminal law, which is why Trump could not be charged with obstruction of justice like The Resistance™ (and Andrew Weissmann) was demanding. Impeachment and removal remains available for any such offense.
You are confusing the issue of whether a sitting president can be prosecuted with the question of whether a former president is immune from prosecution.
Richard Nixon, who was named as an unindicted co-conspirator with the Watergate defendants, escaped indictment only because Leon Jaworski believed that a president, while serving in office, is immune from prosecution.
If that immunity extended to the post-presidential tenure, there would have been no need for the pardon issued by Gerald Ford.
It is an accurate one; it's destined to go down in the constitutional anticanon with those cases.
1. It was based solely on (bad) policy considerations, even though issued by the same people who pompously lecture about how the court's duty is to follow the law regardless of consequences.
2. It had no textual support. (Which is, of course, supposed to be the end of the analysis.)
3. It had no historical support.
4. It had no precedential support. (Whatever the wisdom of Nixon v. Fitzgerald, it repeatedly distinguished the civil immunity it was conferring from criminal immunity.) Executive privilege has literally nothing to do with immunity; like all privileges, it's an evidentiary rule, not an immunity. And Trump v. Vance has no bearing whatsoever on presidential immunity, and also rejected Trump's arguments. Citing that case appears to be an attempt to insinuate that if a litigant once mentioned an argument (which it didn't even do, but set that aside!), and it was rejected, this constitutes precedent in favor of that rejected argument.
Not in the real world it isn't.
A. "There's no criminal immunity."
B. "There's no criminal immunity."
C. "There's no criminal immunity."
D: "There is criminal immunity."
Michael D: "See, the last ruling built on the others, so it wasn't invented out of nowhere!"
By your standards, Obergefell "built on" Baker v. Nelson.
You’re accusing the Court of doing exactly what critics often claim not to do: using policy concerns to override the text. But this opinion doesn’t make a policy-based exception — it builds a constitutional rule based on the structure of the separation of powers.
• The opinion doesn’t say, “immunity is needed for practical reasons.”
• It says, constitutional structure requires presumptive immunity for official acts to preserve the independence of the presidency under Article II.
Even if one disagrees, that’s a constitutional argument, not a policy preference. And it’s consistent with how the Court has always balanced powers among branches (see Nixon v. Fitzgerald, United States v. Nixon).
You’re right that the Constitution doesn’t explicitly mention presidential immunity from criminal prosecution. But many foundational doctrines in constitutional law have no explicit textual basis:
• Judicial review (Marbury v. Madison) is not in the text.
• Executive privilege isn’t in the text either — yet United States v. Nixon affirmed its limited constitutional grounding.
• State sovereign immunity in Alden v. Maine and Seminole Tribe has no direct textual anchor in Article I.
The Court routinely infers structural principles from the Constitution. Immunity for core executive acts falls squarely into that tradition — it’s not judicial activism, it’s consistent with the Court’s institutional role in preserving separation of powers.
There’s no history of prosecuting a sitting or former president for official acts — not because it was forbidden, but because it was unprecedented. And in constitutional law, absence of historical practice often becomes presumptive norm, especially when dealing with structural principles.
More important:
• Early presidents were understood to have broad discretion in executing their duties.
• There is no evidence the framers contemplated criminal prosecution for official acts undertaken while in office — especially those intertwined with core Article II powers.
Does that mean immunity is required? No. But it means the history does not clearly cut against the Court’s reasoning.
You cite Nixon v. Fitzgerald and correctly note that it dealt with civil damages. But that case made a more general point:
“The President’s unique status under the Constitution distinguishes him from other executive officials… exposing him to liability would distract from his duties.”
This principle — that the president must be protected from post hoc judicial intrusion into official conduct — is directly relevant to criminal prosecution.
• Fitzgerald clearly recognized the risk to presidential independence from even civil litigation.
• It’s reasonable (if not mandatory) to extend that concern to criminal law, which is far more coercive.
Yes, Fitzgerald distinguished criminal cases — but it did not resolve them. Trump v. United States is the first time the issue reached the Court.
You’re correct: executive privilege is an evidentiary doctrine — but that doesn’t make it irrelevant. In U.S. v. Nixon, the Court recognized it as a constitutionally grounded principle — again, drawn from structural considerations, not textual command.
• Trump v. Vance didn’t concern presidential immunity from prosecution — it addressed subpoena compliance.
• But it showed that courts have narrowly and carefully defined how criminal law interacts with a sitting president.
• Vance did not reject the idea of presidential immunity — it assumed the president was not immune from certain subpoenas, but said criminal process must be handled with care.
In other words, Trump v. Vance confirms that courts must consider separation-of-powers implications when applying criminal procedures to presidents — just as Trump v. United States did.
You offered this:
A. “There’s no criminal immunity.”
B. “There’s no criminal immunity.”
C. “There’s no criminal immunity.”
D. “There is criminal immunity.”
Michael D: “See, the last ruling built on the others!”
That’s clever, but misleading. The Court didn’t say: “There was no immunity, now there is.” It said:
• We’ve never addressed this question directly before.
• Our prior decisions (Fitzgerald, Nixon, Vance) point to a broader principle: presidential independence requires limits on judicial intrusion into official acts.
• This is a new application of that principle — not a reversal of prior holdings.
It’s not that the Court changed its mind — it answered a question that had not been squarely asked. That’s development of doctrine, not contradiction.
Let’s keep some perspective:
• Dred Scott denied the citizenship of Black Americans and held that Congress could not ban slavery in the territories.
• Plessy upheld state-enforced racial segregation.
• Korematsu sanctioned the mass internment of Japanese Americans during WWII.
These cases struck at the core of human liberty and equality. Trump v. United States, whether right or wrong, involved a contested separation-of-powers question — not a repudiation of fundamental rights.
To place it in the “constitutional anticanon” is not only legally exaggerated — it’s morally disproportionate.
You can argue Trump v. United States got the balance wrong. But to say it was unmoored from text, history, and precedent is not supported by the record. It was built — rightly or wrongly — on the same structural reasoning that underpins many of the Court’s most enduring constitutional doctrines. And while it raises real questions about accountability, it is not a judicial monstrosity of the Dred Scott order.
I find myself in the uncomfortable position of partially agreeing with not guilty.
Trump v United States was a poor decision. But not guilty self refutes on the whole cloth thing by noting (a small part of) the court’s previous form on inventing immunities.
We must recall however that many of the same folk who were correctly complaining about text free Presidential immunity, were in the same breath insisting on text free exceptions to the pardon power (self pardons.)
In Trump v United States SCOTUS was adopting impeccable sarcastroian jurisprudence - never mind the actual written law or lack of it, pay attention to the “practical upshots.”
Mr Wolf above has it right. Lefties believe in the shining sword of the independent court holding the executive to its limited powers, when the executive is their opponent. When the executive is their pal, it’s back to “practical upshots.”
The righties have a tendency to accept “practical upshots” jurisprudence when it cuts their way, while insisting that as a rule judges should be bound by the text.
In the end it comes down to the eternal question. Is hypocrisy a worse sin than openly and avowedly advocating wickedness ?
I agree with not guilty’s insistence (today) on discarding the contemptible “practical upshots” method. May he (or she etc) stay constant to the text, and join me in throwing rotten tomatoes at Sarcastro and his coven.
Qualified immunity from suit for damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 -- the text of which admits no immunities, originated in 1967. Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 555 (1967). Congress can and should repeal it, or at least narrow its scope significantly.
But it was indeed cut from whole judicial cloth. The Court there distinguished the absolute immunity afforded to judges at common law from the police officers' claim:
Ibid. SCOTUS should properly have left the question to Congress.
They seem unlikely to persuade the public that Trump has a solemn obligation to comply with an illegitimate court.
Leave aside that Trump has yet to encounter any occasion when the Court required him to do anything he did not prefer to do. What is the likelihood to persuade the public that an illegitimate Court will similarly empower a different Executive pursuing policies the illegitimate majority disapproves?
Ponnuru writes this nonsense:
Whatever merit progressive proposals to contract the power and prestige of the Supreme Court might have, they are not a plausible means of restoring it to its former role as the champion of liberal principles.
One modest progressive proposal to contract the power and prestige of the Supreme Court has been to require its members to honor an already-existing code of ethics, and to enforce results. If justices serve during good behavior, they ought not to serve during bad behavior. There is a lack of effective formal means outside the Court sufficient to distinguish which is which. Congress could supply that means by law, and is already empowered by the Constitution to do it.
I had skipped past that sentence from Ponnuru too swiftly to savor its full delights.
Whatever merit progressive proposals to contract the power and prestige of the Supreme Court might have, they are not a plausible means of restoring it to its former role .....
....as the champion of honest obedience to the text ?
...as the champion of the constitution's bounds on a strictly limited government ?
Nah.
.....as the champion of liberal principles.
🙂
I'm guessing Ponnuru did not mean partisan principles, but referred instead to classically liberal principles. I am unsurprised you read his remark as partisan.
Another progressive means to contract the power and prestige of the Supreme Court, while increasing its perceived legitimacy, would reform certiorari. That should not be a power to limit case consideration only to points justices agree in advance to consider. There needs to be a requirement to stop dissecting cases, to bar pre-hearing from consideration any but policy questions a corrupt Court majority might want to overturn or effect.
Instead, get back to Cases and Controversies, taken full-strength. And as a further reinforcement, require the Court to give a full hearing, and write an opinion, on the merits of every case it agrees to hear. Congress should require the Court's jurisdiction over procedure to be limited only to cases which have already been shown sufficiently meritorious for one of the litigants to win on the merits. Then, with that shown, a review of procedure can take place to see whether the merits decision decides the case, or whether the procedures were insufficiently fair to permit that result.
It may seem both logical and more efficient to do what the Court is doing now, to consider procedures first, and make consideration of anything else subject matter for another case. Unfortunately, that has led to abuse, at the cost of the Court's legitimacy. After Trump v. United States, it ought to be obvious that to continue empowering the Court with that much discretion about what it wants to decide is folly.
It makes a mockery of the notion of appellate jurisdiction. If appellate jurisdiction is to mean anything, it must mean the appellate courts, including the Supreme Court, are stuck with the entire case decided below, and must consider all of it, and opine on all of it, before a decision is complete.
You know how, whenever you say something dumb about law, you retreat to, "I'm not a lawyer, so I don't claim to understand all of the nuances"? You might want to preemptively go there now.
I have no clear idea what your proposal means (and I doubt you do either) — what on earth is "jurisdiction over procedure" — or what problem you think it would solve (and how). If it's an atempt to attack the shadow docket it fails.
Nieporent — Always in the market for professional legal correction. Thanks in advance for helping out.
Could you please start by reviewing for me the history of the modern Court's doctrine with regard to certiorary? Tell me what went on before, and when it changed, and on what basis the changes happened. Stuff like that.
I am under the impression that ceriorari is an ancient writ, encompassing a court prerogative to review the record of a case, or to decline to do so. I do not think it has always been used alike, with regard to defining SCOTUS's discretion about what arguments, discussing what subjects, SCOTUS is willing to hear.
I remain unclear who defines those questions, and whether a Rule of 4 decision to grant cert can also as a practical matter decide the scope of arguments before the Court, or whether attorneys for the parties have power to put before the Court issues the Court (4 members, or a majority) would prefer to bypass.
That explanation ought to help you convince me that the shadow docket notion is a handy part of the present Court's procedural tool chest, and whether it is safe to use however they want without putting Court legitimacy in question.
I think we need more assertions here couched as 'lets be honest' and 'everybody knows.'
Nothing says good faith like preemptively accusing those who disagree with you of dishonesty.
And the OP invites speculation on what progressives think; around here that means we're going to get silly and over-the-top pretty quick.
Hmm. Does this mean you're going to stop telling me that you know what I "really" think ?
I mean, above you flip off of Brett's telepathic assertion about the left into a Stalin quote.
So if you're objecting to my calling you a shitty partisan bomb-thrower, you should stop making posts like that.
Oh my, we've angered The Great Sarcastr0.
Let's go sacrifice some virgins, (ironically that may include you-know-wh0) to appease Sarcastr0 (pbuh)
It’s interesting, on a recent thread Lex admitted his hatred of blacks comes from the fact that his mom left his dad for a black man that could satisfy her in ways his dad couldn’t and his hatred of Jews comes from the Jewish lawyer that won his mom a huge award over his dad when his dad’s humiliating lifestyle of sucking off guys in public rest stop bathrooms was exposed. It’s of course likely he’s a virgin and so this every accusation is a confession makes total sense.
lmao, that's desperate even for a Chinese bug.
The pot calls the kettle black once again.
S0's modus operandi is to tell commenters what they think by being dishonest about what they have written. He has made that style into an art.
One thing Don Nico hates is criticizing antisemitic white supremacists.
And Don Nico's m.o. is to pretend to be above it all, while engaging in hit-and-run comments.
Sarcastro : “…Stalin quote…”
That was a Trotsky quote. Trotsky was the one with an ice pick in his head. Stalin was the one who ordered it put there.
“Who ? Whom ?” was Lenin’s two word summing up of his philosophy. Trotsky certainly got the point.
Keep calibrating your vibe-meter.
"So you are saying"
This doesn’t need to be hard. Of course conservatives prefer a judicial philosophy where things are stuck in the past of particulars of that day and of course progressives want to emphasize more general principles that can evolve with society.
>of course progressives want to emphasize more general principles that can evolve with society.
So not the Rule of Law, but the Rule of Man (that evolves with society as Leftists seem it).
Sickening.
Speaking for all the non-lawyers here, nothing makes us more uneasy than a justice system that arbitrarily changes its mind. If we are a "nation of laws, not of men", any hint that individual political opinions of judges have bent the course of justice puts the entire proposition of an independent judiciary at hazard.
I naively thought that justice was largely blind in the US, until I read Barnett and Blackman's excellent "100 Supreme Court Cases Everyone Should Know". Now I know better, that even the Supreme Court has been swinging widely on even the most basic of issues such as how to properly interpret the English language. You'd think after some 249 years that would no longer be an open question.
The answer here is MORE judicial modesty, not less. It should be hard -- damn hard! -- to change directions by the time a law has been debated, voted, signed, implemented, and finally challenged.
The one thing I rarely have seen is a Supreme Court opinion that basically just admits that an issue cannot be settled because Congress did not sufficiently define its intent. Instead, we get all kinds of square pegs pounded into round holes, and that benefits no one, it just twists the law further into an unrecognizable Rube Goldbergish mess.
Now I know better, that even the Supreme Court has been swinging widely on even the most basic of issues such as how to properly interpret the English language. You'd think after some 249 years that would no longer be an open question.
DaveM — When you suggest that is a solvable legal problem, that proves you do not know better. It proves instead that you—like almost all judges and lawyers—do not know the first thing about the complexity of historical reasoning—which is as straightforward as the paradoxes generated by science fiction accounts of time travel, and for similar reasons.
Here is a hint. Before you can begin to think what words meant 249 years ago, you must first forget completely and systematically every occurrence since then which affects word meanings now. That is not something anyone is equipped to do without specialized training, which lawyers and judges do not get.
Ramesh Ponnuru is an American conservative thinker, political pundit, and journalist. An editor of National Review magazine.
He wrote "The Party of Death: The Democrats, the Media, the Courts, and the Disregard for Human Life."
His judgment on progressives might be a bit slanted.
==
The op-ed has, as I noted, a "flaw" (to use his framing) -- the idea raised is that Democrats ironically want both to use the Supreme Court to restrain Trump but also criticize it, which helps to delegitimize the institution, which is allegedly counterproductive.
But the Supreme Court is doing little to restrain. Some scholars, furthermore, note that traditionally, the Supreme Court has not been very progressive. The Warren Court is an outlier.
The progressives don't, full stop, say the Supreme Court did "too little." They argue a valid application of the law requires certain results. Conservatives say the same thing. It's a debate over legal analysis, deep down, moving past the shouting.
Senator Whitehouse argues SCOTUS is beholden to special economic interests. Support for term limits (the top options are either an amendment or something that will kick in 2029) or ethical rules also will not overall "delegitimize" it.
Reform, correctly done, improves institutions.
Prof. Steve Vladeck, a progressive, argues the shadow docket is being used in an arbitrary way that lacks legitimacy.
Anyway, the Supreme Court is over and over again overruling lower courts and otherwise enabling Trump. The op-ed's message is somewhat hard to take seriously on that level.
"What Do Progressives Want for the Courts?"
Simple, they want what MAGA, trad conservatives, trad liberals and everyone else wants, victory in every political and cultural case that comes before SCOTUS.
Back on your 'everyone is an asshole like me but lying about it' kick, eh?
Or, alternatively, its a blindingly correct observation that only assholes like you reject.
There's a tension between Progressives' efforts to delegitimize the courts and hopes the judiciary to constrain executive power.
I can't accept this premise without additional support. I don't see criticism of the courts as being efforts to "delegitimize" the courts as an institution. I see criticism being about specific judges and justices that issue rulings and opinions based on their conservative political beliefs rather than a politically and ideologically neutral point of view. There is plenty to argue about as to whether these progressives, liberals, Democrats, or others on the left are correct in their criticism. There is plenty to argue about as to whether or to what extent judges and justices appointed by Democratic Presidents do the same thing* from the other side.
If courts want to maintain or (regain) legitimacy in the eyes of the electorate, then what we need is to reform the process of selecting judges to reduce that kind of bias.
* Whataboutism (or the related tu quoque fallacy) is when pointing at the other side is a distraction, and it is usually made it bad faith, and it also is often a false equivalence on top of that. Bringing it up as part of a discussion over how to deal with that behavior from all sides is necessary.
Progressives can consistently claim the Supreme Court is illegitimate and should be ignored without also claiming that the District Court judges handing out injunctions are illegitimate and should be ignored. For example, removing appellate jurisdiction over interlocutory appeals would make them happy this spring and summer. In the spring of 2023, not so much.
the District Court judges
Again, how many are you talking here? You're not going to be able to make that lift, so you waive your hands.
If you waive your hands in court, what do you have left to pound the table with?