Guns, Felons, Religion, and Islam

From U.S. v. Thompson, decided Monday by Judge Karen Marston (E.D. Pa.):

On August 12, 2004, Thompson was sentenced to eight to twenty years' imprisonment after being convicted in the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County for Attempted Murder, Aggravated Assault, Carrying Firearms without a License, and Possession of an Instrument of Crime. He was paroled on August 15, 2011. While still on parole on December 20, 2022, Thompson allegedly possessed a Ruger, Security 9, 9mm semi-automatic pistol loaded with fifteen live rounds of ammunition….

He was prosecuted for being a felon in possession, and argued, among other things, that this violated his religious freedom "by substantially burdening his ability to adhere to the Quran's requirement that he carry arms during prayer as a practicing Muslim":

RFRA "guarantee[s] more generous protections for religious freedom than are available under the Supreme Court's present interpretation of the First Amendment," by "proscrib[ing] government conduct which 'substantially burdens a person's exercise of religion' unless the government can demonstrate, inter alia, that the burden is the 'least restrictive means of furthering a compelling government interest.'" …

Thompson identifies as a "devout Muslim" and "strict adherent" to the teachings of the Quran, "the central religious text in the practice of Islam [and] a revelation directly from Allah." According to Thompson, the Quran "requires him to carry arms" during prayer. (See Doc. No. 26-1 (a passage from the Quran attached to Thompson's motion, which purportedly states, "And when you are among them and lead them in prayer, let a group of them stand [in prayer] with you and let them carry their arms.").) He argues that § 922(g)(1) substantially burdens his ability to do so.

The court concluded that Thompson hadn't adequately alleged that he believes the Quran requires him to carry firearms:

Thompson's argument relies entirely on a single passage from the Quran, which, according to his supplied translation, instructs the carrying of "arms" and refusal to neglect "weapons" during prayer. But § 922(g)(1)'s prohibition is limited to the possession of a firearm. Thompson does not argue or otherwise show that he can follow the Quran's mandate to carry "arms" or "weapons" during prayer only through possession of a firearm. Indeed, he seems to concede that these words in the Quran encompass more than just firearms: "The Quran provides that during prayer, you should carry arms and not neglect your arms. Arms are generally accepted as weapons, including firearms."

In short, Thompson has not established that compliance with § 922(g)(1)—which, as the Government argues, does not prohibit Thompson from possessing other types of weapons, like a knife or a sword, during prayer—"seriously violates [his] religious belief." …

(For a similar argument in a different factual context, see Tony & Susan Alamo Found v. Secretary of Labor (1985), where the Court rejected a Free Exercise Clause challenge to federal minimum wage law; the challengers claimed that they had a religious objection to being paid "wages" for their work for a religious organization, but the Court reasoned that the challengers' own characterization of their religious beliefs didn't preclude applying the law: "Since the associates currently receive [board, lodging, and seminilar] benefits in exchange for working in the Foundation's businesses, application of the Act will work little or no change in their situation: the associates may simply continue to be paid in the form of benefits. The religious objection does not appear to be to receiving any specified amount of wages. Indeed, petitioners and the associates assert that the associates' standard of living far exceeds the minimum. Even if the Foundation were to pay wages in cash, or if the associates' beliefs precluded them from accepting the statutory amount, there is nothing in the Act to prevent the associates from returning the amounts to the Foundation, provided that they do so voluntarily. We therefore fail to perceive how application of the Act would interfere with the associates' right to freely exercise their religious beliefs.")

The court also concluded that, in any event, applying the felon in possession ban to Thompson would pass strict scrutiny:

Even if Thompson had established that § 922(g)(1) substantially burdened his religious belief that he is required to carry arms during prayer, the Court would find that the Government's prosecution of Thompson under § 922(g)(1) is the least restrictive means of furthering its compelling interest in promoting public safety and preventing violent crime through the uniform application of § 922(g)(1)….

[T]he Government has "a compelling interest in public safety and preventing crime through the uniform enforcement of gun control laws," including § 922(g)(1)…. The Court also agrees with the Government that exempting Thompson from prosecution under § 922(g)(1) based on his religious belief that he must carry (fire)arms would "seriously compromise [the Government's] ability to administer" § 922(g)(1). It would create an exception for any convicted felon who claims that possession of a firearm is necessary to adhere to his religious beliefs and thus render § 922(g)(1) effectively unenforceable.

For the same reason, the Court finds that prosecuting Thompson represents the least restrictive means to further the Government's compelling interest in the uniform enforcement of § 922(g)(1)…. [T]here are no statutory exceptions to § 922(g)(1), thus this is not a situation where "the existence of government-sanctioned exceptions to a scheme purporting to be the least restrictive one possible can show that other, less-restrictive alternatives could be envisaged."

Robert E. Eckert represents the government.