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Women-Only Naked Spa Lacks First Amendment Right to Exclude Transgender Patrons with Penises
So the Ninth Circuit held today, by a 2-1 vote. I tentatively think the majority got it right as a matter of First Amendment law and statutory interpretation, though I think such statutes ought to be written to include some privacy exceptions as to gender identity and not just sex.
From Olympus Spa v. Armstrong, decided today by Ninth Circuit Judge Margaret McKeown, joined by Judge Ronald M. Gould:
In 2020, the HRC [Human Rights Commission], the agency tasked with enforcing WLAD [Washington Law Against Discrimination], received a complaint from a transgender woman. The complaint alleged that Olympus Spa "denied [her] services and stated that transgender women without surgery are not welcome because it could make other customers and staff uncomfortable." Specifically, the Spa excluded preoperative transgender women who have not yet received gender confirmation surgery affecting their genitalia….
WLAD is a wide-reaching law that prohibits discrimination in a variety of areas, including employment, real estate, public accommodations, credit, and insurance. The public accommodations section covers discrimination in the "right to the full enjoyment of any of the accommodations, advantages, facilities, or privileges of any place of public resort, accommodation, assemblage, or amusement." WLAD proscribes discrimination based not only on race but also categories including "age, sex, sexual orientation, and disability." … WLAD … [defines] "sexual orientation" … to mean:
heterosexuality, homosexuality, bisexuality, and gender expression or identity. As used in this definition, "gender expression or identity" means having or being perceived as having a gender identity, self-image, appearance, behavior, or expression, whether or not that gender identity, self-image, appearance, behavior, or expression is different from that traditionally associated with the sex assigned to that person at birth.
WLAD's governing regulations permit the maintenance of certain "gender-segregated facilities," such as "restrooms, locker rooms, dressing rooms," and similar spaces, so long as the facility does not remove or otherwise take action against a person for reasons "[]related to their gender expression or gender identity." … The Spa does not dispute that WLAD's proscription of discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation applies to its conduct here. Nor could it…. The statutory language is undoubtedly expansive, and its definition of sexual orientation is bespoke. But it is also unambiguous, and it applies to the Spa's entrance policy….
The court rejected the SPA's free speech claim:
[T]he HRC required the Spa to adopt new language "affirm[ing] equal access, service, and treatment for all customers 'without regard to … sexual orientation or gender identity.'" … [But t]he mandated alterations were "plainly incidental to the [challenged law's] regulation of conduct, and 'it has never been deemed an abridgement of freedom of speech or press to make a course of conduct illegal merely because the conduct was in part initiated, evidenced, or carried out by means of language, either spoken, written, or printed.'" Rumsfeld v. FAIR (2006) (quoting Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co. (1949)).
{The Spa alleged that the HRC "required that Olympus Spa remove language from its website that has a viewpoint that 'biological women' are females and distinct from males." But the Spa has not pointed to any specific statements that were on the website before the enforcement action and removed during its pendency, beyond the statement that "[b]iological women are welcome" to enter the Spa. As alleged, the HRC's action went no further than requiring that the Spa's entrance policy comply with WLAD and that the Spa's website accurately convey that policy. The action did not otherwise infringe on the Spa's freedom to publish its views on the nature of gender.}
The court rejected the Spa's Free Exercise Clause claim, applying Employment Division v. Smith (1990), under which religious objectors aren't generally constitutionally entitled to exemptions from religion-neutral, generally applicable laws. And the court rejected the Spa's freedom of association claim:
The Constitution protects the freedom of association as "a fundamental element of personal liberty" and "an indispensable means of preserving other individual liberties." That right protects both "intimate association," that is, the "choices to enter into and maintain certain intimate human relationships," and "expressive association," which is "a right to associate for the purpose of engaging in those activities protected by the First Amendment—speech, assembly, petition for the redress of grievances, and the exercise of religion." These are fundamental and important rights but none of them are implicated here.
To begin, the Spa is not an intimate association. The bottom line is that payment of the entrance fee is the price of admission. And any woman, except a transgender woman who has not yet received gender confirmation surgery affecting her genitalia, who can pay the fee can be admitted. Intimate associations are "distinguished by such attributes as relative smallness, a high degree of selectivity in decisions to begin and maintain the affiliation, and seclusion from others in critical aspects of the relationship." Business enterprises serving the general public typically lack these qualities.
The Spa's customers and employees do not share "deep attachments and commitments." Although the Spa might not be a "large business enterprise," it is nevertheless a business, open to all women except preoperative transgender women. Other than its exclusion of preoperative transgender women, the Spa exhibits no selectivity, let alone a "high degree of selectivity," in admission. Patrons "are not members of any organized association; they are patrons of the same business establishment." Like the dance hall in City of Dallas v. Stanglin (1989), the Spa admits "all [women] who are willing to pay." …
[T]he Spa notes that women might feel physically vulnerable while at the Spa. Without a doubt, nude spas raise unique privacy concerns absent in most other public spaces, but nudity alone does not transform a public place of business into an intimate association. The Spa analogizes the relationship between spa patrons to the intimate roommate relationship, pointing to language in Roommate.com observing that "a girl may not want to walk around in her towel in front of a boy." Fair Hous. Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommate.com (9th Cir. 2012). Although "modesty or security concerns," which could drive the selection of one's roommate, may also influence a patron's decision to visit the Spa, the similarities stop there. The roommate relationship is "selective" and "implicates significant privacy and safety considerations" because the choice of roommate necessarily "intrudes into the home." In contrast, patrons purchase commercial services at the Spa without regard to the identities of other patrons and do not themselves control admission to the Spa. Because "much of the activity central to the formation and maintenance of [the Spa] involves the participation of strangers," Roommate.com is inapposite. And to the extent the Spa seeks to invoke the privacy rights of its patrons, it has not made such a claim under the First Amendment or otherwise.
The Spa is also not an expressive association because the Spa and its patrons do not engage in expressive activity…. While expressive association does not protect only "advocacy groups," "a group must engage in some form of expression, whether it be public or private."
The Spa's effort to transform the act of visiting a spa into the sharing of "ideals and beliefs" within an expressive association would stretch the freedom of association beyond all existing bounds. The Spa alleges its "mission is to restore and rejuvenate women's physical health as well as spiritual health," and that its services are more expressive than traditional commercial activities because the services "are very interactive and hands on as well as lengthy." That broad description would turn virtually every commercial gym or massage establishment into an expressive association….
In contrast, in Boy Scouts of America v. Dale (2000), the Court concluded that the Boy Scouts engaged in expressive activity because it is "an association that seeks to transmit … a system of values." …
The panel noted, without elaboration, that "the Spa may have other avenues to challenge the enforcement action," but concluded that, "whatever recourse it may have, that relief cannot come from the First Amendment."
Judge Kenneth Lee dissented:
Korean spas are not like spas at the Four Seasons or Ritz Carlton with their soothing ambient music and lavender aroma in private lounges. Steeped in centuries-old tradition, Korean spas require their patrons to be fully naked, as they sit in communal saunas and undergo deep-tissue scrubbing of their entire bodies in an open area filled with other unclothed patrons. Given this intimate environment, Korean spas separate patrons as well as employees by their sex.
The State of Washington, however, threatened prosecution against Olympus Spa, a female-only Korean spa, because it denied entry to a pre-operative transgender female—i.e., a biological male who identifies as female but has not undergone sex-reassignment surgery. Now, under edict from the state, women—and even girls as young as 13 years old—must be nude alongside patrons with exposed male genitalia as they receive treatment. And female spa employees must provide full-body massages to naked pre- operative transgender women with intact male sexual organs….
Olympus Spa—an immigrant-founded business run by a Korean family—also deserves better. The Spa's owners pleaded with the Washington Human Rights Commission that they wanted to provide privacy to women and girls, some of whom had complained years ago about seeing a naked person with male genitalia there. They also begged the government not to force them to violate their Christian belief in modesty between men and women. Those pleas fell on deaf ears.
One would think that the Washington Human Rights Commission would be sympathetic to the Spa's owners—members of a racial minority group who want to share their cultural heritage and provide a safe space for women and girls. Instead, it threatened prosecution for defying the state's contorted reading of its anti- discrimination law.
Judge Lee concluded that, properly interpreted, the WLAD doesn't prohibit Olympus's policy; his main argument was that "gender identity is protected [by WLAD] only if it serves as a proxy for sexual orientation:
We … must read "gender expression or identity" in context as part of the definition of "sexual orientation." In 2006, the Washington legislature added "sexual orientation" to WLAD as a protected class. From then on, Washington forbade discrimination on the basis of "race, creed, color, national origin, citizenship or immigration status, sex, honorably discharged veteran or military status, sexual orientation, or … disability." The legislature, however, did not include "gender expression or identity" as an independently protected class. The legislature also chose not to include "gender expression or identity" within the definition of "sex." "Sex" remained defined as "gender." Rather, the legislature included "gender expression or identity" only in the definition of "sexual orientation."
So why include "gender expression or identity" in the definition of "sexual orientation"? It guards against discrimination where gender identity serves as a proxy for sexual orientation. For instance, suppose a transgender woman (i.e., a biological male who identifies as a female) is in a relationship with a biological male. An employer who harbors anti-gay views fires the transgender woman but claims that he did not discriminate based on sexual orientation because the transgender woman is in a relationship with a man. By including "gender expression and identity" in the definition of sexual orientation, the law tells businesses that such gamesmanship will not fly. It, however, does not create a separate and standalone protected class for gender identity or transgender status.
The majority disagreed with the dissent's interpretation, concluding that the definition of "sexual orientation" does indeed mean that the WLAD bans discrimination based on gender identity.
Judge Lee also concluded that Bostock v. Clayton County (2020), which "held that discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation or transgender status must logically be discrimination based on 'sex' under Title VII," didn't apply:
Unlike WLAD, Title VII does not define "sex." … Because Congress did not include any definitions, the Court interpreted sex discrimination broadly to include transgender status based on a logical syllogism that the undefined term "sex" must implicate sexual orientation and gender identity.
Here, on the other hand, we are not left in the dark on how to interpret the term "sex" or to guess if the statute covers sexual orientation or gender identity. The state legislature has already given us the answers. WLAD explicitly prohibits discrimination based on "sexual orientation" and defines "sex" and "sexual orientation" differently. WLAD also expressly includes "gender expression or identity" under the definition of "sexual orientation" (but not under "sex"), confirming that "gender identity" is distinct from "sex."
Finally, Judge Lee argued:
Washington is not just legally wrong in misconstruing its anti-discrimination law. It is also wrong in how it overzealously pursued its case against the interests of protected class members—the women and girls of the state, and the Korean owners of Olympus Spa, an immigrant-founded small business.
In 1973, the state amended WLAD to include "sex" as a forbidden basis for discriminatory treatment. Over the years, the Washington Supreme Court construed the statute broadly to protect women and girls. See, e.g., MacLean v. First Northwest Indus. (Wash. 1981) (holding that "ladies' night" with half-price tickets for women at an NBA game was a lawful way to increase attendance of female fans). Our court, too, has recognized that our laws provide privacy for females: For example, we noted that in shared "bathrooms and common areas, a girl may not want to walk around in her towel in front of a boy." Roommate.com.
But Washington has now rolled back the clock in protecting women and girls by bizarrely citing the very law that safeguarded their rights for decades. Now, women and girls as young as 13 years old must lay naked alongside individuals with exposed male genitalia as they receive treatment at Korean spas. And for the female employees at the Spa, they must provide full-body deep-tissue massage to naked persons with intact male sexual organs—or else lose their livelihood.
The state also unjustly hounded Olympus Spa's Korean owners. The Washington Human Rights Commission threatened them with prosecution on questionable legal grounds. As the owners explained, they wanted to share their ethnic heritage to the larger community, but they also felt obligated to ensure privacy for their female patrons and employees. That did not matter to the Commission. Nor did the Commission care about the owners' fear of losing clients and ultimately their small business that they had worked so hard to build.
The Washington Human Rights Commission threatened prosecution against a protected class—racial minority members who want to share their cultural traditions—to favor a group that is not even a protected class under the statute. To be clear, transgender persons, like all people, deserve to be treated with respect and dignity. But showing respect does not mean the government can distort the law and impose its will on the people the law was intended to protect.
Ultimately, this case is not just about the fate of a family-owned business. It is about power—which groups have it and which do not. And Asian Americans in Washington have historically lacked political clout. Washington barred Chinese people from voting as soon as it became a territory in 1853. Other restrictions (such as preventing them from testifying against whites) followed. Even in the post-civil rights era, the University of Washington has faced repeated allegations of discrimination against Asian Americans. {See, e.g., Hannah Fry, Rejected by 16 colleges, hired by Google. Now he's suing some of the schools for anti-Asian discrimination, L.A. Times, Apr. 4, 2025 (detailing how Stanley Zhong—who "had a 4.42 grade- point average, a nearly perfect SAT score, had bested adults in competitive coding competitions and started his own electronic signing service all while still in high school"—was rejected by, among others, University of Washington); Heath Foster and Ruth Schubert, Two UW law school applicants, two paths: one got in, one didn't, Seattle Post-Intelligencer, Oct. 15, 1998 (noting disparity in LSAT scores).} And the Washington Human Rights Commission's bullheaded investigation of Olympus Spa makes plain who has political power (and who does not) today.
Make no mistake about it: the Washington Human Rights Commission has wielded its power to advance its own political agenda. The homepage of its website includes statements about national politics that have little to do with the Commission's duties under state law: It declares that "President Trump is misleading the American people on diversity, equity, and inclusion and accessibility initiatives." The agency then links to a press release from a group of politicians attacking "President Trump's executive orders" as "unnecessary and disingenuous" and condemning him for "baseless and offensive claims." All this political palaver—from an agency tasked with impartially investigating and neutrally enforcing the state's anti-discrimination laws on behalf of all Washington citizens. It is no wonder then that the Washington Human Rights Commission exerted the full force of state power to bully members of a politically weak minority group….
Neal H. Luna and David Ward of the Washington AG's office represent defendants.
