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Federal District Court Rules Against Trump in Alien Enemies Act Case
The court ruled that Trump invoked the AEA illegally, blocks deportation of Venezuelan migrants who filed the case, and sets out standards for notifying them of their rights to challenge their deportation.

Yesterday, Judge Charlotte Sweeney of the federal District Court for the District of Colorado issued an important ruling against the Trump Administration, involving attempted deportations under the Alien Enemies Act of 1798. The Act can only be used to detain and deport immigrants in the event of a declared war, or an "invasion" or "predatory incursion" perpetrated by a "foreign nation or government." Judge Sweeney ruled (correctly) that none of these preconditions have been met. She also blocked deportation and transfer of the Venezuelan migrant plaintiffs detained in her district, and applied the Supreme Court's earlier ruling requiring that "AEA detainees must receive notice… they are subject to removal under the Act" and that "[t]he notice must be afforded within a reasonable time and in such a manner as will allow them to actually seek habeas relief in the proper venue before such removal occurs."
Here is an excerpt from her discussion of the requirements of the AEA:
Petitioners' first argument…., proceeds from a straightforward premise. The President's authority under the Proclamation is "vested" under the Act. TheAct demands, as a "statutory requirement," an "invasion or predatory incursion…." And because the Act's "text and history" use these terms "to refer to military actions indicative of an actual or impending war"—not "mass illegal migration" or "criminal activities"—the Act cannot sustain the Proclamation… The Court agrees with Petitioners….
The term 'invasion' was a legal term of art with a well-defined meaning at the Founding." J.G.G. v. Trump, No. 25-5067, 2025 WL 914682, at *8 (D.C. Cir. Mar. 26, 2025) (Henderson, J., concurring); see also id. (defining "invasion as a "'[h]ostile entrance upon the right or possessions of another; hostile encroachment,' such as when 'William the Conqueror invaded England'") (quoting Samuel Johnson, Invasion, sense 1, A DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (4th ed. 1773)); (reciting second dictionary defining "invasion as a "'hostile entrance into the possession of another; particularly the entrance of a hostile army into a country for the purpose of conquest or plunder, or the attack of a military force'") (quoting Noah Webster, Invasion, sense 1, AMERICAN DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (1828)).
The Court finds these at-the-Founding definitions persuasive in demonstrating what "invasion" does—and does not—mean as a matter of plain language. "Invasions" contemplate military action. J.G.G., 2025 WL 914682, at *9 ("The term 'invasion' was well known to the Fifth Congress and the American public circa 1798. The phrase echoes throughout the Constitution ratified by the people just nine years before. And in every instance, it is used in a military sense.") (Henderson, J., concurring). And at a bare minimum, "invasion" means more than the Proclamation's description of [the drug gang Tren de Aragua's] "infiltrat[ion]," "irregular warfare," and "hostile actions" against the United States….
Definitions of "predatory incursion" likewise reveal a mismatch between what the phrase means and what the Proclamation says. As with the analysis of earlier definitions of "invasion," the Court again finds Judge Henderson's research and analysis of Founding era definitions for "predatory" and "incursion"—which Petitioners cite, and to which they direct the Court—persuasive in its own analysis of Petitioners' TRO motion. See…. J.G.G., 2025 WL 914682, at *10 (Henderson, J., concurring). Explained in Judge Henderson's concurring statement to the D.C. Circuit's per curiam order denying emergency stays prior to the Supreme Court's ultimate intervention in Trump v. J. G. G., 2025 WL 1024097, at *1, the "predatory" nature of an "incursion" "includes a '[p]lundering,' such as the 'predatory war made by Scotland.'" 2025 WL 914682, at *10 (Henderson, J.,concurring) (original alteration and emphasis) (citing Samuel Johnson, Predatory, sense 1, A DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE (4th ed. 1773))….
Petitioners contend, as with its failures to identify an "invasion" or "predatory incursion," the Proclamation likewise fails to assert a "foreign nation or government" is "invading the United States…." The Court agrees with Petitioners. The Court discerns little reason to linger on this point, especially where, as Petitioners observe, the Proclamation finds TdA is "closely aligned with [and] infiltrated[] the Maduro regime." Invocation of the Alien Enemies Act Regarding the Invasion of the United States by Tren de Aragua, 90 FR 13033. The Proclamation does not find TdA itself is a foreign nation, country, or government. At bottom, the Proclamation fails to adequately find or assert TdA is a "foreign nation or government," § 21, sufficient to justify the Act's invocation.
Judge Sweeney's analysis of the meaning of "invasion"and "predatory incursion" largely tracks that of Judge Karen LeCraft Henderson of the DC Circuit, in her opinion for the DC Circuit, in a ruling reversed by the Supreme Court on appeal, for procedural reasons. I have made similar points in my own previous writings on the AEA and the meaning of "invasion." Judge Sweeney also follows the DC Circuit and the Supreme Court in rightly rejecting the argument that interpretation of the AEA is a "political question" not subject to judicial review.
But this ruling is the first to address the issue of whether TdA's actions qualify as those of a "foreign nation or government." Judge Sweeney rightly concludes they obviously don't. Her conclusion is further bolstered by US intelligence assessments indicating that TdA is not acting at the behest of the Venezuelan government.
Judge Sweeney also interpreted the Supreme Court's ruling on notice to detainees to require the following:
The Court orders the following regarding the notice Respondents and the government must provide Petitioners and the provisionally certified class of individuals they seek to represent: Respondents shall provide a twenty-one (21) day notice to individuals detained pursuant to the Act and Proclamation. Such notice must state the government intends to remove individuals pursuant to the Act and Proclamation. It must also provide notice of a right to seek judicial review, and inform individuals they may consult an attorney regarding their detainment and the government's intent to remove them. Such notice must be written in a language the individual understands.
That all seems right to me.
Litigation over AEA deportations is continuing in multiple courts, and this ruling is sure to be appealed. But Judge Sweeney has issued a well-reasoned ruling that I hope other judges will follow.
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3 2 1 to Josh's meltdown
Yay!
I mean, that's like predicting the sun will rise in the East.
" . . . 'hostile entrance into the possession of another; particularly the entrance of a hostile army into a country for the purpose of conquest or plunder, or the attack of a military force'")
"Particularly" clearly indicates there are other instances to consider.
Could we get a definition of what 'home invasion' means?
In particular when the invader is not in a military uniform.
Either you are being intentionally obtuse, or you're dumber than a post. I don't think that your understanding of "particularly" matches what the rest of society thinks it means, and what in Gahd's name does "home invasion" have to do with the topic at hand?
You invaded my privacy by opening the door without knocking first. Off to CECOT with you!
Sounds like the judge has it right.
Historical background (possibly relevant to legal analysis): the Alien Enemies Act (AEA) was a *consensus* measure passed at what was otherwise a time of serious partisan division between the majority Federalists and the minority Republicans. Federalists and Republicans both supported the AEA. Republicans would not have signed on if this had been an open-ended measure letting the President deport people in the absence of what common-sense would consider a state of war.
Imagine this kind of reasoning if Israel had our judges. Technically, the PA still claims authority over Gaza, so Hamas is just a bunch of guys in costumes. Therefore, because an invasion requires a government, Israel wasn't "invaded" on October 7 and in fact needed to give every Hamas member a habeas petition before sending them back. This sort of hyperformalism, if taken seriously, is the end of America. Any foreign power can dump their criminals, predators, and rapists in our back yard. So long as they're not formally labeled as an army, we're then stuck with them.
If we enforce the laws against illegal immigration, we're not "stuck" with illegal immigrants. We would have to get more serious about kicking out illegals, but we wouldn't have to use the "alien enemies" label.
Also, situations not requiring that Congress be bypassed, should be left to Congress, as the body which declares war.
A *real* predatory incursion would be bad enough that it wouldn't be practical to get Congressional guidance before deciding what to do. So the President could banish citizens of the enemy country by proclamation per the AEA.
But dumping criminals, etc., while it certainly might be a *casus belli,* wouldn't be something requiring Congress to be bypassed. And if it's not necessary to bypass Congress, I'd say it's necessary not to bypass Congress.
Just to expand on what you wrote, the AEA is not about illegal immigration at all. A lot of people are confused on this point. While some illegal aliens might also be swept up in Trump's dragnets, the entire purpose of the AEA was to allow the government to deport people who were here entirely legitimately, because of the fear that citizens of a foreign country with which we were at war might pose a national security threat. TdA are just common street criminals; they're not an attempt to overthrow the government or annex land for Venezuela.
Hamas is the government of Gaza, both by election and de facto. TdA is not the government of Venezuela under either of those rubrics.
And — to repeat what I said the other day — TdA doesn't even claim to be! Hamas at least holds itself out as the government of Gaza.
Trump tried to finesse this by claiming TdA was acting at the behest of the government of Venezuela, but if that were true and they constituted an invasion, then (a) he would be trying to deport every Venezuelan citizen in the U.S., not just TdA members; and (b) we would actually be at war with the country of Venezuela. Which even Trump has not tried to claim.
If President Trump actually believes that Venezuela or its government is perpetrating, attempting, or threatening an invasion or predatory incursion against the territory of the United States, why on earth has he not asked Congress to declare war on Venezuela?
That's not really a fair question, given that Congress has to a great extent abdicated its war-declaring power, cuckishly permitting the Pres (whether Dem or Rep) to usurp that power.
Of course the Pres wages war without Congress nowadays, so you've proved nothing.
Hyperformalism?
The law was meant to allow the US to quickly expel foreign nationals in the case of war with that country.
It wasn't meant to expel members of a gang that originated in LA.
That's MS-13, not TdA. But I agree with the rest of your point.
Wow. Never, in the history of this country, has it ever been even thought that it was the role of the judiciary to make the predicate findings for the invocation of the AEA. S.Ct precedent is in fact to the contrary as to deference to the President. Yet another judicial disgrace. It will not stand.
The question is not whether the Pres has the facts right. The issue is whether, taking the facts as the President finds them, there is a predatory incursion by a foreign *government* (not private gang).
The Ludecke case indicates that, once it's indisputable that a declared war has begun, it's for the policymaking branches, not the courts, to say when the war has ended.
It is not a matter for the courts to decide at any stage. They have no role here and are usurping the statutory and constitutional prerogatives of the president. This is an outrage.
There is hope that Trump will declare Riverdance sponsored a predatory incursion sponsored by Ireland, and all of its supporters who live in the USA will be deported.
Still waiting for that Enabling Act, huh?
Of course the courts have a role. If Congress puts conditions on emergency powers, the courts can step in if those conditions are not met. Even more so when there is no emergency or war.
I think even that concedes too much. SCOTUS certainly implied that if a peace treaty had actually been signed, it would no longer defer to the other branches. (Obviously only the other branches could actually enter into such a treaty, so it's still up to them. But those branches couldn't sign a treaty and then say, "But we still consider ourselves at war.")
I agree that one way to say a war has ended is to conclude a peace treaty, and that a peace treaty can't be construed as a not-peace treaty.
What if it is a proxy war? What then?
Congress declares war on Venezuela.
Of course, I'm not talking about the real world, but about the legal theory of the AEA and whether that legal theory allows Venezuelans (gang members or not) to be deported.
There is in fact no such SCOTUS precedent to the contrary, and never, in the history of this country, has it ever been even thought that the AEA could be used without a war. It has only been used three times ever (so "never, in the history of the country" isn't even doing any work), and in each of those cases, it was in the context of a declared war, so there was no dispute about its applicability.
Trump is the first president in history who just decided to make shit up and pretend it applied.
Ludecke’s summation of the judicial role seems to differ from your own special interpretation, crazy Dave:
"The act concerning alien enemies, which confers on the president very great discretionary powers respecting their persons," Marshall, C.J., in Brown v. United States, 8 Cranch 110, 12 U. S. 126, "appears to me to be as unlimited as the legislature could make it." Washington, J., in Lockington v. Smith, 15 Fed.Cas. No. 8448 at p. 760. The very nature of the President's power to order the removal of all enemy aliens rejects the notion that courts may pass judgment upon the exercise of his discretion. This view was expressed by Mr. Justice Iredell shortly after the Act was passed, Case of Fries, 9 Fed.Cas. No. 5126, and every judge before whom the question has since come has held that the statute barred judicial review. We would so read the Act if it came before us without the impressive gloss of history.
The power with which Congress vested the President had to be executed by him through others. He provided for the removal of such enemy aliens as were "deemed by the Attorney General" to be dangerous. But such a finding at the President's behest was likewise not to be subjected to the scrutiny of courts. For one thing, removal was contingent not upon a finding that in fact an alien was "dangerous." The President was careful to call for the removal of aliens "deemed by the Attorney General to be dangerous." But the short answer is that the Attorney General was the President's voice and conscience. A war power of the President not subject to judicial review is not transmuted into a judicially reviewable action because the President chooses to have that power exercised within narrower limits than Congress authorized.” [footnotes omitted]
IIRC: This discusses the standard of review for those who are actually alien enemies. There was no dispute that there was a declared war between the USA and Germany, triggering the Act. Ludecke, who admitted he was a German national, challenged the process by which he was selected as one of those alien enemies who would be removed. He also said the war was over with the defeat and destruction of National Socialist Germany.
He didn't claim that there had never been a state of war between the USA and Germany. He didn't deny being an alien enemy during the war (though he said the war was over).
The Pres selected Ludecke as one of those Germans who were to be kicked out, rather than allowed to stay in the USA under supervision. The Court said that was entirely up to the Pres, given the admitted circumstances of a declared war against Germany (with no peace treaty) and Ludecke's admitted German-ness.
It discusses the act and the predominant role of the president, not the judiciary, as understood basically since the founding. There is a problem in the judiciary. The S.Ct had better address it soon.
Trump wants to go beyond the AEA's Westphalian framework, which deals strictly with country-on-country wars, not gang wars.
The AEA was invoked three times, each time for a declared war: War of 1812, WWI, and WWII. There has been no occasion to consider the application of the "predatory incursion" clause, because once Congress declares war there's no need to consider other AEA clauses.
You don't seem to understand that you don't have the unilateral power to rewrite the statute any more than this latest judicial disgrace understands the limited role of the judiciary in this context.
Piss up the same rope as Joe.
Classy.
That's a lot of fancy words for "I'm wearing kneepads for anything Trump".
you don't have the unilateral power to rewrite the statute
Neither does Trump.
You completely misunderstand what you just quoted. What that says is that the courts won't second guess a lawful application of the AEA. So, for instance, you can't make the argument to a judge, "Yes, I'm a German [during WWII, obviously], but I'm a nice guy and I love the U.S. and I don't pose any danger so I shouldn't be imprisoned/deported." That call is the president's to make. But you absolutely can say, "The U.S. isn't at war with Liechtenstein so the AEA doesn't apply, so I can't be imprisoned/deported."
Rather seems you misunderstand the role of the judiciary here. The section I quoted above would be self-contradictory gibberish if we added your qualification: "but only where the president's findings are found by the courts to be a lawful application of the AEA will such findings not be subjected to the scrutiny of the courts." Doesn't make much sense with your spin now does it my crazy friend?
Riva, what do you think the Court meant in Ludecke when they wrote, "resort to the courts may be had only to challenge the construction and validity of the statute and to question the existence of the 'declared war'"? If resort to the courts could not be had to question the existence of the 'declared war', why would the Court say in Ludecke that it could?
They were speaking of the question raised in that very case and construed the act as not requiring a "declared war." In other words, they interpreted the statutory text. They did not mean that the President's particular findings were subject to judicial second guessing.
So when they said that resort could be had to the courts to question the existence of the 'declared war', they actually meant that resort could not be had to the courts to question the existence of the 'declared war'?
Sure, that makes perfect (non)sense.
In Ludecke, the war was 1) declared by Congress and 2) with Germany.
Let's say in 1945 President Truman thinks a Canadian kissed his daughter, so he declares "they're all bad people, so we're at war with Canada too."
Can the courts question the President's factual assertions to determine if the AEA can be applied to the Canadian who kissed his spawn?
Can the courts take judicial notice of the lack of Congressionally-declared war with Canada?
Or are have we always been at war with Oceania?
Riva, Justice Frankfurter wrote in Ludecke v. Watkins, 335 U.S. 160, 161-162 (1948):
Your omission of the interpretation and constitutionality exceptions is a silence which speaks loudly. SCOTUS, citing Ludecke, explicitly reaffirmed those exceptions a mere sixteen days ago:
https://www.supremecourt.gov/opinions/24pdf/24a931_2c83.pdf
What the statutory phrase "any invasion or predatory incursion is perpetrated, attempted, or threatened against the territory of the United States by any foreign nation or government" means calls for interpretation of 50 U.S.C. § 21. "Interpretation" means "The process of determining what something, esp. the law or a legal document, means; the ascertainment of meaning to be given to words or other manifestations of intention." Black's Law Dictionary, 9th Ed. (2009).
What procedural due process safeguards are applicable to a given situation is a question of constitutional law, requiring consideration of: (1) the private interest at stake; (2) the risk of erroneous deprivation of the interest through the procedures used and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, (3) the government's interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail. Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
IOW, Ludecke v. Watkins, 335 U.S. 160 (1948), offers no comfort here to the MAGA cult.
No, in this context, the judge here engaged in exactly the type of judicial review deemed by the Court to be improper under the AEA in Ludecke. Whatever constitutional matters might justify judicial review, this definitely wasn't it. It is the judge that is interfering with the constitutional and statutory prerogatives of the President, who is clearly acting within his authority.
So far, not a single judge has agreed with you. As my mother used to say, when we were behaving crazier than usual, "Look at that. Everyone's out of step but me."
Call me when a judge agrees with you. Until then, you just keep marching to your own drummer, 'cause that's how you roll.
It's hard to understand exactly what you mean when we have seen, in the last few months, many federal judges grossly exceeding their proper roles and unconstitutionally interfering with the Chief Executive on many different issues. But I agree, to the extent we have so much judicial misconduct, that there is a serious problem with the judiciary that needs to be addressed.
It's not actually hard to understand what "So far, not a single judge has agreed with you" means.
But I sure hope those officially-branded Trump kneepads(TM) are comfy.
What part of "questions of interpretation and constitutionality" do you fail to understand, Riva? Determining what process is due is a quintessential question of constitutionality. A failure to provide such safeguards would render 50 U.S.C. § 21 unconstitutional as applied.
Likewise, the meaning of "any invasion or predatory incursion is perpetrated, attempted, or threatened against the territory of the United States by any foreign nation or government" is the quintessence of interpretation.
Any "question as to whether the person restrained is in fact an alien enemy fourteen years of age or older may also be reviewed by the courts." Ludecke, 335 U.S. at 171, n.17.
Have you even read Ludecke, Riva? Yes or no?
Apparently you're the one who hasn't read Ludecke, hence your typical reactionary insult.
I would add that you also fail to understand how due process applies in the context of illegal aliens. “Due process does not invest any alien with a right to enter the United States, nor confer on those admitted the right to remain against the national will. Nothing in the Constitution requires admission or sufferance of aliens hostile to our scheme of government.” Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 222-223 (1953),
And, here's a hint to help you out, if you ever actually read the case. The Court of course can interpret statutory text, but that does not mean it is appropriate to engage in judicial second guessing of the president's findings.
So if the President says "I stubbed my toe and it's Venezuela's fault, so we're at war, therefore I can apply the AEA" ... a court can't "second guess" the "factual findings"?
If that's ridiculous (and it is, deliberately!), explain to us where your dividing line is. When can courts rule "that's bat and sheet crazy, no AEA for you!" in response to factually nonsensical claims by the President?
that does not mean it is appropriate to engage in judicial second guessing of the president's findings
I'm interested in your answer to Zarniwoop's hypothetical but...
As others have pointed out, judicial second guessing of the president's findings isn't even necessary in this case. Trump hasn't claimed that any of the AEA predicates are satisfied. He's claiming that he can invoke the AEA despite none of its predicates applying to the current situation. That's just a question of statutory interpretation. It's very easy -- and very appropriate -- for the courts to tell Trump that he's wrong about that.
No, in this context, the judge here
You mean SCOTUS? And this was 9-0 if I recall.
No one is on your side sad RivaGPT.
TL,DR: You've got your faux-gold Trump-branded kneepads on, so the judge is wrong.
The Alien Enemies Act was a bipartisan piece of legislation with limited reach. The federal government at the time had much less control over immigration. The law also provides due process protections for the noncitizens involved.
Stopping the Administration's broad overreach leaves open other avenues to deport noncitizens. They still have to practice due process to do so, which bothers some people, but so be it.
"The law also provides due process protections for the noncitizens involved."
Not according to the Ludecke case. The Pres decides which alien enemies get kicked out, which get to stay, and on what terms, and whether anyone complied with the terms.
That's an *extra* reason to be careful who gets designated as alien enemies. Because once you're legally deemed a citizen/subject of a foreign enemy, you're a member of the enemy nation and can be treated as hostile - permission to stay is a matter of pure Presidential grace. Therefore, observe proper definitions when expanding the number of alien enemies.
Not to mention the consequences for Congressional war power if the choice of war and peace is taken from them by an overly-broad Presidential definition of invasion or predatory incursion.
Your interpretation of that case was not as broad earlier in the thread. The opinion discussed shows that Trump does have total control over determining who is an "alien enemy" in the first place.
Anyways, recently, the Supreme Court in Trump v. J. G. G held that "Challenges to removal under the AEA, a statute which largely “‘preclude[s] judicial review,’” Ludecke v. Watkins, 335 U. S. 160, 163−164, (1948), must be brought in habeas."
("largely" doesn't mean "totally" precludes)
Furthermore, "we have held that an individual subject to detention and removal under that statute is entitled to “‘judicial review’” as to “questions of interpretation and constitutionality” of the Act as well as whether he or she “is in fact an alien enemy fourteen years of age or older."
The AEA also has a section entitled "Jurisdiction of United States courts and judges" dealing with a situation that warrants "a full examination and hearing on such complaint, and sufficient cause appearing," etc., which again is a form of due process.
"Your interpretation of that case was not as broad earlier in the thread."
Care to prove that?
You said above that "[The case] discusses the standard of review for those who are actually alien enemies."
and "The issue is whether, taking the facts as the President finds them, there is a predatory incursion by a foreign *government* (not private gang).
The Ludecke case indicates that, once it's indisputable that a declared war has begun, it's for the policymaking branches, not the courts, to say when the war has ended."
Now it's refuting my statement that "The law also provides due process protections for the noncitizens involved."
Noncitizens have due process -- they have the right to go to court to determine they are "actually alien enemies" or "taking the facts as the President finds them, there is a predatory incursion."
Perhaps I misinterpreted your remarks, as you've misinterpreted mine. I thought "the noncitizens involved" meant actual alien enemies (14 y. o. and up), not people whose status as alien enemies was in dispute and thus subject to judicial review.
And that explanation should satisfy you. If not, go piss up a rope.
Wait... what's your distinction between "actual alien enemies" and "people whose status as alien enemies is in dispute?" Isn't it just... whether the purported alien enemy acquiesces to being deemed an alien enemy or not?
The opportunity to dispute being an alien enemy and take advantage of the judicial review that's consequently available, is what due process is.
Correction: Trump does NOT have total
Note that Trump has already blinked on Abrego Garcia:
Abrego Garcia told Van Hollen that he was moved from the notorious Terrorism Confinement Center, or CECOT, to a facility in Santa Ana, roughly 37 miles (60 kilometers) away.
Yes, it's just a different prison. But if you expect to keep Garcia there the full 4 years you keep him in CECOT to keep trolling the left. If however, you expect to bring him back at some point, you move him to a nicer prison so he has fewer stories to tell when he's eventually free and able to talk to the media.
Trump hates to admit that he fracked up, but that's his administration admitting that he fracked up.
OP:
I look forward to more whinging from Life of Brian and/or C_XY that Judge Sweeney didn't devote 5 or 10 pages to present a highly detailed legal, factual, and historical analysis of a 30 second purely discretionary decision on notice.
Maybe Prof. Blackman will even write
sixseven (wait, are we at eight yet?) posts about that shocking failure to exhaustively justify a completely routine timing decision.