The Volokh Conspiracy
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Short Circuit: A Roundup of Recent Federal Court Decisions
Measles outbreaks, navigable rivers, and a winey circuit split.
Please enjoy the latest edition of Short Circuit, a weekly feature written by a bunch of people at the Institute for Justice.
This week on the Short Circuit podcast: the panel looks at the Sixth Circuit's look at a Cincinnati councilman's bribery conviction.
- Allegation: In 2013, Long Island, N.Y. school bus driver has medical emergency, crashes into parked car. (No students harmed.) He passes three breathalyzers, and a medic tells the officer he really needs to be taken to the hospital. He's arrested anyway, suffers renal failure, and nearly dies. Despite passing drug tests, he's charged with DUI. Jury: Which was false arrest/malicious prosecution. Pay him $515k. Second Circuit (unreported): And pay his lawyers $850k.
- What do you call it when DEA agents put up a video camera that records the exterior of your property 24/7—without a warrant for 50 days? Second Circuit: As long as you don't call it a "search," call it whatever you want.
- Following measles outbreak in 2018-19 (the worst in 25 years), New York—the epicenter of the outbreak—repeals its religious exemption for its vaccination requirement for students attending public, private, or parochial schools. Amish parents and schools challenge the law, alleging that it violates their right to direct the religious upbringing of their children. Second Circuit: The Supreme Court has upheld vaccination requirements for 120 years, this one isn't any different.
- D.C.-area property management companies use targeted advertising to promote their rental housing to people aged 50 or younger. Fifty-five-year-old D.C. resident doesn't see the advertising, which she says might have led her to rent one of the units. Instead, she bought a home. She files a class action alleging age discrimination. Fourth Circuit: Not being targeted by targeted advertising is not an injury in fact. No standing.
- Allegation: After the air conditioning breaks at a Virginia prison, pretrial detainee complains about the heat and suggests other inmates do so as well. For his trouble, he gets 125 days in solitary. He sues for First Amendment retaliation. Fourth Circuit: And that very much states a claim. Case un-dismissed.
- Third Circuit: New Jersey's alcohol regulations (which, among other things, allow retailers to ship wine to consumers only if the retailer has a physical location in New Jersey) absolutely discriminate against interstate commerce, but we're pretty sure the Supreme Court has said that's okay in this context.
- Allegation: Innocent man spends nearly two years in hellish jail conditions after being accused of murder by a jailhouse informant who was high on meth (or withdrawing). Fifth Circuit: This Jackson, Miss. detective (as well as all officers everywhere) had "fair warning" that it's unconstitutional to rely on such an accusation (which was amply contradicted by other evidence), manipulate a photo lineup, and withhold the other evidence from a grand jury. It is also noted that, while we can't do anything with it, the argument that the doctrine of qualified immunity is itself unlawful is preserved.
- Three female Texas former inmates allege they were groped and sexually harassed by a guard and bring claims under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. District court: No claims under the Eighth Amendment, but yes under the Fourteenth Amendment. Fifth Circuit: Nope, it was the Eighth Amendment.
- Harris County, Tex. sheriff's office employees allege a new overtime policy violates their civil rights in a long list of ways. One is that the cut in comp violates their freedom of association by denying them time "to enjoy private activities at their leisure." Fifth Circuit (unpublished): What? Dismissal affirmed.
- The latest Sixth Circuit news regarding a Rowan County, Ky. clerk who refused to issue marriage licenses to same-sex couples after Obergefell v. Hodges is that she and qualified immunity will not be exchanging nuptials.
- Allegation: Seeking to apprehend man who fired a gun in a Bottineau County, N.D. bar, officers mistakenly confront unrelated man who has a similar name (wrong middle name, wrong ethnicity, wrong build) and shoot him dead without warning. Eighth Circuit to his pro se mother: One can't bring constitutional claims against the feds. The tort claims are dismissed (without prejudice) for failure to exhaust administrative remedies.
- Des Moines, Iowa driver passes a police car and extends his middle finger for a stately eleven blocks as they tail him. At which point the officers arrest him (ostensibly for cutting off another car) and engage in the sort of manhandling you'd expect of cops who'd been on the receiving end of an eleven-block bird. First and Fourth Amendment litigation ensues. Eighth Circuit: And at the summary-judgment stage, we agree with the district court that the officers aren't entitled to qualified immunity. Might be they had absolutely no basis for the stop. (Some longform local journalism on the incident can be enjoyed here.)
- Ninth Circuit (over a partial dissent): Arizona's alcohol regulations (which, among other things, allow retailers to ship wine to consumers only if the retailer has a physical location in Arizona) absolutely do not discriminate against interstate commerce. (Longtime Short Circuit readers will remember a contrary Third Circuit opinion on exactly this question about 30 lines up from this one. This may be the first circuit split to break out within a single edition of Short Circuit.)
- Washington State man who is on supervised release is charged with assault and reincarcerated—without a jury trial. Man: Which I concede is fine under the Sixth Amendment. But Article III, Section 2, using slightly different wording, also guarantees jury trials, and there is no on-point precedent saying I can't invoke that. Ninth Circuit: There is now.
- Kirkland, Wash. church held a health insurance plan for its employees that excluded abortion coverage. Its carrier, however, then said the plan was no longer available. This was after the state passed the "Parity Act," requiring abortion coverage if an employer's plan covered maternity care, but before regulations clarifying the Act did not affect conscience-based objectors like the church. So, does the church have standing to challenge the Act because it indirectly made the original plan unavailable? Ninth Circuit (2021) (unpublished): Seems like it. Case undismissed. Ninth Circuit (2025): I guess not. There's other plans out there that exclude abortion. Just go get one. Dissent: They assumed there's standing from last time and no one briefed it this time. "Imagine everyone's surprise when they read the majority opinion."
- For more than 20 years, Montana, the United States, and hydroelectric dam owners have litigated about which government owns the riverbeds where the dams sit, and, thus, to whom the dam owners must pay rent. The case has gone from the Montana Supreme Court to SCOTUS and now to the Ninth Circuit. The question is whether the rivers (on a segment-by-segment basis) were "navigable in fact" at Montana's statehood in 1889. If yes, title goes to Montana; if no, the U.S. And the court says the feds have it.
- Powerful rare earth magnets make for a fun desk toy. They can also lead to necrosis in the intestines, sepsis, and death, when people (children) swallow them. To combat this, the CPSC limited the size and strength of magnets that could be sold. Tenth Circuit (2016): The CPSC ignored data showing that a rule might be unnecessary, so the rule is struck down. The CPSC went back to the drawing board and crafted a new rule. Tenth Circuit (2025): The new rule is fine, and following our recent precedent, the CPSC is constitutionally structured.
- Feds get a warrant to test DNA of a biker arrested at a Las Vegas, N.M. saloon to show he was illegally carrying a gun. Uh oh! The warrant was based largely on statements of an off-duty officer at the saloon that contradict what he said at the time of the arrest. District court: That violates the constitutional rule that warrants can't be based on intentionally false statements; DNA suppressed. Gov't: Surely, that rule doesn't apply to an off-duty officer? Tenth Circuit: It surely does, at least when he was involved in the investigation as this fellow was.
- And in en banc news, a D.C. Circuit panel decided to stay its mandate for at least 12 months in a case where it had earlier set aside a rule affecting an air tour management program. The panel said little about how in the meantime a majority of the full en banc court denied en banc review but nevertheless described the mic drop portion of the panel's opinion (that CEQ rules are not binding) as dicta.
Friends, here at IJ we believe that federal agents should not mistakenly SWAT raid an innocent family's home because agents couldn't be bothered to double check that they had the right address. Importantly, Congress shares this belief. In the wake of a series of wrong-house raids in 1973, it enacted legislation guaranteeing a remedy to victims of assault, battery, false arrest, and other intentional torts by federal law enforcement. So, we're happy to say that on April 29th the Supreme Court will hear Martin v. U.S. and consider whether lower courts have been ignoring Congress and inventing spurious reasons to kick righteous claims out of court. Click here for case info. And click here for our just-filed merits brief.
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The timing of the D.C. targeted advertising suit suggests it was brought in response to widely published reports that Facebook allowed targeting of ads to particular racial groups. At the time I thought that was legal. You can't refuse to rent to blacks. You can't say "no blacks need apply." You can buy ads in the Wall Street Journal to reach a white male audience.
Facebook disabled some ad targeting after the reports. Bad publicity worked.
Women and black people read the WSJ, albeit at much lower rates than white men. Facebook's demographic filtering would be much more effective than picking a widely distributed broadsheet. Even advertising in Ebony magazine or another very targeted magazine does not directly filter based on an individual's identity.
As I understand Facebook's methods it did not really filter based on race. The mighty Algorithm constructed groups of users who it saw as similar. Some groups were strongly correlated with race or income and were presented to advertisers as based on race or income. Most advertisers don't care if the "upper middle class white suburban men" bucket contains some black people too, as long as they click at the same rate as whites.
If you are supposed to tell Facebook your age then the age classification that was sued over in the Fourth Circuit case could be accurate. As accurate as the input data. Probably accurate for people over 50. The people who had to lie about being old enough to sign up for Facebook are in their 30s now.
If some day the feds want to troll for civil rights violations by local police, going around obeying all traffic laws but looking like you have cash or don't like cops ought to catch a few. I remember a TV news segment from the 1990s where reporters went out to catch Louisiana police lying about reasons for traffic stops. They drove down I-10 under the speed limit and got pulled over anyway. The cops wanted asset forfeiture money. Nothing came of being shamed on national TV.
There is a guy on YouTube from Illinois (he happens to be Black, I think it relevant) who has documented being stopped 6 or 7 times crossing Kansas on the way to pick up his daughter for a custody exchange. Each time they claim there is something wrong with his license plate; it's dirty, it's "obscured", the light is too dim, and each time, several of which is the same officer, claims "I smell the odor of marijuana" and tears the vehicle apart only to find nothing. Each time he is carrying about the same amount of cash, about $500 to pay for gas and food for the trip. I'd really like to see a case where something as subjective as what a person claims to smell is insufficient evidence to do a search.
I know Kansas targets out of state vehicles for searches due to what they claim is "transshipment".
"Oops, I transposed the digits."
See Vasquez v. Lewis, 834 F.3d 1132 (10th Cir. 2016). https://casetext.com/case/vasquez-v-lewis-9
In denying qualified immunity the Tenth Circuit noted that the same officer had been involved in essentially the same situation 15 years earlier. The court ruled against the traffic stop. Obviously Officer Jimerson didn't learn a lesson. There is no reason he should. By custom, police officers are not liable for routine Fourth Amendment violations not attracting substantial adverse publicity. The employer pays the bills and nobody prosecutes.
Journalism needs more stings like that. The decline of local journalism has made this rare/nonexistent.
Seems like state regulation of alcohol distribution in items 6 and 13, and how that plays with federal regulation of interstate commerce is different than for any other product due to second clause of the 21st amendment. My (IANAL) reading of the plain words is that it gives the state a very explicit role in the regulation of the sale of alcohol. My recollection is that there was a somewhat recent Supreme Court case that eviscerated this clause but perhaps it will be revived if this split is resolved by SCOTUS.
Harris County, Tex. sheriff's office employees allege a new overtime policy violates their civil rights in a long list of ways. One is that the cut in comp violates their freedom of association by denying them time "to enjoy private activities at their leisure." Fifth Circuit (unpublished): What? Dismissal affirmed.
I remember a case where a company gave out a free turkey to employees every Christmas or whatever. They stopped doing this, so the employees sued claiming it was part of their compensation, and won.
You don't remember shit: The union lost that case, which was Aeronca v. AFL-CIO.
Not that suing for turkeys is any more absurd than if it had been a cash bonus. Unions are allowed to try to protect their members from being nickel-and-dimed. The only issue with the claim is that their agreement pretty clearly didn't cover it (and the case shouldn't have gotten as far as it did because of this).
"The only issue ... and ..."
So not the "only" issue.
You may want to try reading that again.
#10: that bigoted idiot Davis losing in court again. Now I find most emotional distress claims absurd - preferring Chopper Reid's enlightened approach - but she really did FAFO and it's hard to be sympathetic.
Friends, here at IJ we believe that federal agents should not mistakenly SWAT raid an innocent family's home because agents couldn't be bothered to double check that they had the right address.
Prediction: Thomalito will vote against Martin, with Thomas piously advocating for the importance of following precedent.
I'm not sure I am seeing the circuit split here:
#6 "New Jersey's alcohol regulations (which, among other things, allow retailers to ship wine to consumers only if the retailer has a physical location in New Jersey) absolutely discriminate against interstate commerce, but we're pretty sure the Supreme Court has said that's okay in this context."
And
13 "Arizona's alcohol regulations (which, among other things, allow retailers to ship wine to consumers only if the retailer has a physical location in Arizona) absolutely do not discriminate against interstate commerce. (Longtime Short Circuit readers will remember a contrary Third Circuit opinion on exactly this question about 30 lines up from this one. This may be the first circuit split to break out within a single edition of Short Circuit.)"
Sure the reasoning is diametrically opposed, but the result in both cases is the same.
See my comment below. The 22nd Amendment empowers states to override federal law prohibiting “discrimination” against other states, just as it enpowers states to override any other otherwise applicable federal law regulating interstate commerce in alcohol.
The Second Circuit is just wrong. That kind of surveillance absolutely is supposed to need a warrant. But in fairness, it's not entirely their fault. The precedents leading the Second Circuit to that conclusion are unjustifiable and should be promptly overturned.
Separately, I don't often say this but 'Yay for the 5th Circuit' (re: #7).
Suppose, fanciful as it may sound, that someone didn’t want to just accept that on your word alone. What would you point them to in order to support your position?
Suppose, instead of pointing an automated camera, the police had parked an unmarked car on the other side of the street and had a person watching. Warrant required? If not, can you distinguish the cases?
The 22nd amendment, by its terms, prohibits the importation of intoxicating liquors into a state in violation of its laws. In doing so it explicitly overrides the Commerce Clause in its entirety regarding alcohol, making commerce in alcohol entirely a state and in no way a federal matter. By expressly authorizing a state to prohibit the importation of alcohol into it, it expressly permits a state to choose to make only domestic alcohol legal.
Saying a state regulation of alcohol violates the commerce clause, dormant or otherwise, is as nonsensical as saying a state law violates the Fugitive Slave Clause. Clauses that are expressly repealed by the clear text of later amendments have no force or effect. They no longer legally exist and courts have no authority to consider them.
It is one thing to temper the 22nd Amendment by saying that it wasn’t intended to override all previous constitutional amendments, so that for example it doesn’t permit states to limit bar owners to whites only. But at a minimum, it is very clear that the 22nd Amendment was intended to reverse the usual federal/state split on the subject of alcohol in ordinary commercial matters - importation, sale, etc. - so that where alcohol is involved, state law preempts federal law, not the other way around. Since the Dormant Commerce Clause is federal law on the subject of commerce, it is preempted by state law under the 22nd Amendment. Power over “Importation” of intoxicating liquors is a direct textual state power under the 22nd Amendment. State law on the subject therefore overrides all federal law under the Commerce Clause, including the Commerce Clause itself. This necessarily includes the dormant Commerce Clause.
I had a somewhat personal interest in the MT rivers case. One of the hydro dams in question is about a half mile from our house there. What must be understood was that the state of MT was attempting to double dip. The power company leased the land, built hydro dams, generated power from them, then roughly a hundred years later the state claimed that the rivers were navigable through those stretches, so belonged to a different part of the state government, and so the power company now owning the dams had to pay rent/royalties to the portion of the state government another portion of the state government (the Supreme Court) decided they owned.
The segment of the river that the state court had determined navigable had been bypassed by Lewis and Clark because there were no salmon above it. The MT court found navigate based on one steamboat managing to make it up to the (now) dam site. I should note that two addition hydro dams have been constructed over the segment that that sole riverboat had traversed. To me, it always seemed to have been a land grab by my state, and a revenue grab for the teacher’s union (by the MT constitution, the money was to go to education). It always seemed inconceivable to me, looking at these three dams, that the MT court could have found the river navigable - esp when salmon couldn’t navigate that stretch of the river, changing the course of the Lewis and Clark expedition, and allowing a British expedition to first explore the area several years later, possibly affecting the northern border of this country.