How Should the District Court Evaluate the Motion to Dismiss the Charges Against Mayor Adams?

Under existing Second Circuit caselaw, the district court will almost certainly need to approve the motion to dismiss. But existing Circuit law fails to take into account the Crime Victims Rights Act. And there may be a "victim" who rights are being ignored: New York City.

Yesterday, I blogged about the Justice Department's pending motion to dismiss in the criminal case against Mayor Adams. My argument was that the dismissal motion was easy to justify, particularly given the new Administration's change in priorities for law enforcement. I also noted that the Department's dismissal motion would be subject district court review under a deferential "public interest" standard.  I also criticized those who argued that the dismissal motion was a negotiated quid pro quo between the Justice Department and Adams—a position that was unequivocally corroborated by a letter to the court from Adams's defense attorneys.

In another development yesterday, the district judge in S.D.N.Y. handling the matter (Judge Dale E. Ho) entered an order directing the parties (the Justice Department and Adams) to appear before him today to "address, inter alia, the reasons for the Government's motion, the scope and effect of Mayor Adams's 'consent in writing,' and the procedure for resolution of the motion."

In this post, I discuss what standard Judge Ho should apply in evaluating the pending dismissal motion, making three points: (1) existing Second Circuit case law is very deferential on issues relating to prosecutorial priorities, which would seem to dictate approval of the dismissal; (2) existing Second Circuit caselaw appears to improperly ignore the possibility that crime victims might exercise their congressionally protected right to be reasonable heard on dismissal motions; and (3) while some parts of the Adams prosecution appear to involve "victimless" crimes, at least one of the counts appears to involve a "victim"—specifically New York City, which has (allegedly) been defrauded of "matching funds" during the election process. If my analysis is correct, the judicial procedures for determining the dismissal will need to include the crime victim's right to confer and to be heard under the federal Crime Victims' Rights Act.

I. The Deferential Standard for Reviewing Dismissal Motions in the Second Circuit.

Turning first to the issue of what standard the district court applies in reviewing a motion to dismiss filed under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 48(a), let's start with the rule's text: "The government may, with leave of court, dismiss an indictment, information, or complaint" (emphasis added). The key issue that arises, of course, is how to interpret the "leave of court" requirement. The Advisory Committee Notes to the 1944 Amendment adding this language indicate that this requirement was a "change [in] existing law. The common-law rule that the public prosecutor may enter a nolle prosequi in his discretion, without any action by the court, prevails in the Federal courts."

Interesting history underlies the 1944 Amendment, usefully recounted by (now-Virginia law professor) Thomas Frampton. In his June 2020 Stanford Law Review Online article, entitled "Why Do Rule 48(a) Dismissals Require 'Leave of Court'?", Frampton recounts forty-year-old old dicta in the "sole Supreme Court case interpreting Rule 48(a)," Rinaldi v. United States, 434 U.S. 22 (1977) (per curiam). As Frampton explains, there the Court stated that the "leave of court" language was added to Rule 48(a) "without explanation," but "apparently" this verbiage had as its "principal object …. to protect a defendant against prosecutorial harassment." Frampton's article argues that this position is simply wrong: "In fact, the 'principal object' of Rule 48(a)'s 'leave of court' requirement was not to protect the interests of individual defendants, but rather to guard against dubious dismissals of criminal cases that would benefit powerful and well-connected defendants."

Perhaps the most famous case interpreting the "leave of court" requirement is the 2020 case involving Michael Flynn. There, the Justice Department moved to dismiss criminal charges against Flynn, and the district judge handling the matter, Judge Sullivan, appointed an amicus to argue against dismissal. I blogged about the case at that time--taking the position that the "victimless" crime alleged against Flynn was "a curious one for close judicial scrutiny of a Government motion to dismiss--closer scrutiny should be reserved for cases in which crime victims have a clear interest." Because what I wrote then appears to have some application to the Adams case, I recount some of my analysis about the Flynn case here.

In the Flynn case, the standard that the district judge was to apply in reviewing a motion to dismiss was generally understood to give considerable deference to prosecutors. For example, the D.C. Circuit (the appellate court which had authority over Judge Sullivan) had previously explained the limited role that trial judges have in reviewing motions to dismiss:

Rule 48(a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure requires a prosecutor to obtain "leave of court" before dismissing charges against a criminal defendant. Fed. R. Crim. P. 48(a). That language could conceivably be read to allow for considerable judicial involvement in the determination to dismiss criminal charges. But decisions to dismiss pending criminal charges—no less than decisions to initiate charges and to identify which charges to bring—lie squarely within the ken of prosecutorial discretion. See e.g., Newman, 382 F.2d at 480. To that end, the Supreme Court has declined to construe Rule 48(a)'s "leave of court" requirement to confer any substantial role for courts in the determination whether to dismiss charges. Rather, the "principal object of the 'leave of court' requirement" has been understood to be a narrow one—"to protect a defendant against prosecutorial harassment … when the [g]overnment moves to dismiss an indictment over the defendant's objection." Rinaldi v. United States, 434 U.S. 22, 29 n. 15  (1977).…

So understood, the "leave of court" authority gives no power to a district court to deny a prosecutor's Rule 48(a) motion to dismiss charges based on a disagreement with the prosecution's exercise of charging authority. For instance, a court cannot deny leave of court because of a view that the defendant should stand trial notwithstanding the prosecution's desire to dismiss the charges, or a view that any remaining charges fail adequately to redress the gravity of the defendant's alleged conduct.

United States v. Fokker Servs. B.V., 818 F.3d 733, 742 (D.C. Cir. 2016).

Ultimately, in a 2-1 panel decision in the Flynn case, the D.C. Circuit held that the district court could not even hold a hearing on the issue of dismissal. The panel held that "[t]his is not a case about whether 'a district judge may even hold a hearing on a Rule 48(a) motion.' Rather, it is about whether, after the government has explained why a prosecution is no longer in the public interest, the district judge may prolong the prosecution by … probing the government's motives. On that, both the Constitution and cases are clear: he may not."

I was critical of the D.C. Circuit's panel decision at the time. I blogged that "the majority's reading of Rule 48(a) essentially turns it into a dead letter. Rule 48(a) specifically envisions some role—albeit a limited one—for the district court in evaluating motions to dismiss. It is hard to understand how the mere holding of a hearing on whether to grant leave of court is such an extraordinary abuse of power to warrant granting a writ of mandamus."

Later, the D.C. Circuit en banc essentially agreed with my view, granting rehearing and ultimately holding that a writ of mandamus was not appropriate for superintending the district court's actions. The D.C. Circuit en banc held that all the legal questions could be reviewed on a later appeal from the district court. Thereafter, President Trump pardoned Flynn, and the case was ultimately dismissed as moot.

It appears that the law in the Second Circuit is generally the same as the D.C. Circuit, at least with regard to deference to prosecutors. Indeed, in a 2017 decision, the Second Circuit cited the Fokker decision repeatedly and favorably in rejecting a district court's efforts to involve itself in the the implementation of a deferred prosecution agreement. See United States v. HSBC Bank USA, N.A., 863 F.3d 125 (2d Cir. 2017).  And in a 2022 decision, United States v. Blasczcak (cited by Judge Ho in his order directing a hearing), the Second Circuit said much the same thing:

Rule [48(a)] was not promulgated to shift absolute power from the Executive to the Judicial Branch. Rather, it was intended as a power to check power. The Executive  remains the absolute judge of whether a prosecution should be initiated and the first and presumptively the best judge of whether a pending prosecution should be terminated. The exercise of its discretion with respect to the termination of pending prosecutions should not be judicially disturbed unless clearly contrary to manifest public interest. In this way, the essential function of each branch is synchronized to achieve a balance that serves both practical and constitutional values.

United States v. Blaszczak, 56 F.4th 230, 240 (2d Cir. 2022).

The Second Circuit's Blaszczak decision is worth discussing a bit more, because it is the controlling Circuit precedent that will dictate Judge Ho's decision on the pending dismissal motion. Simplifying the facts, Blaszczak and other defendants were convicted of converting government property, wire fraud, and related conspiracy crimes in connection with misappropriating confidential information from the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services. The Supreme Court then decided Kelly v. United States, limiting what constitutes "property" or a "thing of value" under the federal fraud and conversion statutes. The Supreme Court remanded Blaszczak's case for reconsideration. In the Second Circuit, the Government then agreed with Blaszczak's submission that Kelly controlled and that his convictions should be reversed or remanded to the district court for dismissal.

The Second Circuit agreed with the Government that the convictions should be overturned and the charges dismissed. In its opinion, the Second Circuit italicized a lengthy quotation as setting out the deferential standard of review:

The disposition of a government's motion to dismiss an indictment should be decided by determining whether the prosecutor acted in good faith at the time he moved for  dismissal. A motion that is not motivated by bad faith is not clearly contrary to manifest public interest, and it must be granted…. [T]he trial court has little discretion in considering a government motion to dismiss made pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 48(a). It must grant the motion absent a finding of bad faith or disservice to the public interest…. The disservice to the public interest must be found, if at all, in the motive of the prosecutor. Examples of disservice to the public interest include the prosecutor's acceptance of a bribe, personal dislike of the victim, and dissatisfaction with the jury impaneled.

Blaszczak, 56 F.4th at 240-41 (internal quotation omitted) (emphasis added by the Second Circuit).

Under the standard articulated in Blaszczak, it will be difficult for the district court to deny the motion to dismiss the charges against Mayor Adams. As I mentioned in my post yesterday, the Justice Department has explained its reasons for the motion to dismiss. One reason the Government gave focused on the issue of the pending criminal charges interfering with Mayor Adams's ability effectively enforce public safety and immigration laws:

[T]he Acting Deputy Attorney General … concluded that continuing these proceedings would interfere with the defendant's ability to govern in New York City, which poses unacceptable threats  to public safety, national security, and related federal immigration initiatives and policies. See, e.g., Executive Order14159, 90 Fed. Reg. 8443; Executive Order 14165, 90 Fed. Reg. 8467. The Acting Deputy Attorney General reached that conclusion after learning, among other things, that as a result of these proceedings, Adams has been denied access to sensitive information that the Acting Deputy Attorney General believes is necessary for Adams to govern and to help protect the City.

This is a statement of "motive of the prosecutor"—that is, a statement of the Government's reasons for the dismissal motion. Almost by definition, that reason could not be a disservice to the public interest. The need to avoid interfering with the Mayor's ability to govern does not remotely approach the kinds of things that would justify rejecting the motion to dismiss, e.g., bribery, dislike of a victim, etc.

Nor does the reason appear to be pretextual. No one can doubt that the current Administration has made public safety and immigration initiatives some of their highest priorities. And, as I blogged about late yesterday, Mayor Adam's distinguished defense team made exactly this argument about how the criminal case was interfering with Mayor Adam's. They made the argument in a presentation to the Justice Department and a follow-on letter, which you can read here (as Appendix A). Interestingly, the letter points out that Mayor Adams has had his security clearance revoked due to the pending charges—a fact that plainly seems to be an impediment to his ability to secure the City's public safety. And in moving to dismiss, the Department has merely agreed with that defense submission. To reject the Department's motion to dismiss, the district court would now have to conclude that agreeing with the defense argument was so unreasonable as to amount to some sort of "bad faith." At least to my mind, finding it was "bad faith" to agree with the defense submission here seems implausible.

In my post yesterday, I skipped over a second reason for the dismissal motion that the Government has offered, which is now worth a brief mention. In the motion to dismiss, the Government explained that:

the Acting Deputy Attorney General concluded that dismissal is necessary because of appearances of impropriety and risks of interference with the 2025 elections in New York  City, which implicate Executive Order 14147, 90 Fed. Reg. 8235. The Acting Deputy  Attorney General reached that conclusion based on, among other things, review of a website maintained by a former U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of New York and an op-ed published by that former U.S. Attorney.

Once again, this was an argument advanced by Mayor Adams's defense attorneys in their letter here (as Appendix A). I won't belabor the point, but it would seem to be possible for prosecutors to review the argument and find it plausible.

Of course, these issues of possible "bad faith" and "disservice to the public interest" will be explored at greater length in future hearings. In this short post, it is impossible to cover all the issues. And I realize that distinguished commentators, such as law professor Bennett Capers, have made a contrary argument. So my limited point for now is that, based on the applicable standard of review, those who believe that the Court should deny the motion to dismiss have very much an uphill battle under existing Second Circuit law. (Yesterday, a former AUSA sought to be appointed as an amicus to argue against the dismissal. I won't analyze his arguments in depth, but you can read his motion here.)

II. The Second Circuit Has Not Considered Crime Victims' Interests in Dismissal Motions.

Now, let me shift gears and make a point against existing Second Circuit law. I believe that controlling circuit precedent (Blaszczak) is flawed and too narrow: It fails to recognize that crime victims have a right to be heard in opposition to dismissal motions. I made this general point when I blogged about the Flynn prosecution in 2020 and adhere to the same position here.

While as a substantive matter federal prosecutors have some discretion in deciding whether to dismiss criminal charges, an important procedural issue arises against the backdrop of expanding crime victims' rights in the federal criminal justice process: Should a judge consider a crime victim's view on the dismissal? In 2004, Congress adopted the Crime Victims' Rights Act (CVRA), guaranteeing victims greater rights throughout the process. Effectively implementing those rights throughout the federal criminal justice process would seem to require extensive changes to the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. And so, in 2006, when I was serving as a federal district court judge in Utah, I wrote a law review article comprehensively reviewing the kinds of changes that appeared to be appropriate to a number of the federal criminal rules. For Rule 48(a) dismissals, I proposed an amendment requiring the district court to consider the views of any victim on a dismissal motion, with language to be added to the rule as follows:

Rule 48. Dismissal
(a) By the Government. The government may, with leave of court, dismiss an indictment, information, or complaint…. In deciding whether to grant the government's motion to dismiss, the court shall consider the views of any victims.

I submitted my proposals for changing the rules to the U.S. Supreme Court's Advisory Committee for the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. After reviewing my proposals, the Advisory Committee essentially decided to adopt none of them. With regard to my proposal to amend Rule 48(a), the Advisory Committee disagreed with my suggested revision, while agreeing that victims have interests at stake:

The Subcommittee recognized that victims will have a great interest in whether charges are dismissed. The CVRA does not, however, explicitly address dismissals, and it speaks only of not excluding the [victim] from, and providing the [victim with] … a right to be reasonably heard at public proceedings in the district court. If the government moves for dismissal there is ordinarily no public proceeding. … In light of the statutory statement in 18 U.S.C. § 3771(d)(6) that nothing in the CVRA "shall be construed to impair the prosecutorial discretion of the Attorney General," as well as the separation of powers issues raised by judicial review of the government's decision to terminate a prosecution, the Subcommittee was not persuaded that the rule should be amended to require the court to consider the victim's views on dismissal. When there is no public court proceeding, the victim's views will be taken into account through the right to confer with the government under 18 U.S.C. § 3771(a)(5).

In a law review article a few months later, I explained my disagreement with the Advisory Committee's views. In particular, given that the CVRA promises crime victims in the federal criminal justice system a right "to be treated with fairness" and as well as a right to be heard regarding "release" or "plea," it seemed to me that as a procedural matter, the victim's views should at least be in front of the court as it evaluates a motion to dismiss.

Since I offered these views more than a decade ago, a few judges have acted to ensure that crime victims' views are considered on Government dismissal motions. In 2006, a case presenting the issue arose in front of me (U.S. v. Heaton). I ruled that that it was inappropriate to grant a Government motion to dismiss in a victim-related case unless the Government provided me with information about the victim's view on the dismissal. Similarly, in 2014, Judge Barry Ted Moskowitz cited my decision, reaching essentially the same conclusion.

The most recent case to consider these issues was a case I argued to the Fifth Circuit in 2023: In re Ryan. There, in a case involving a secret (and illegal) deferred prosecution deal the Justice Department orchestrated with The Boeing Company, the Fifth Circuit explained a parallel between the judicial authority that exists when the Government makes a motion to dismiss pursuant to a Deferred Prosecution Agreement and when it asks for dismissal of charges as part of guilty plea negotiations:

The emphasis we note, therefore, is that in both circumstances—full dismissal of charges to resolve a criminal prosecution or partial dismissal of charges to resolve a prosecution by guilty plea—courts retain adjudicatory responsibility, including an obligation to apply the CVRA. Public perception and confidence in the criminal justice system assume that when criminal charges are submitted for judicial resolution, the courts vigilantly will enforce the public interest, including Congress' command that crime victims are heard and protected. …

…[I]n both cases—an accepted/rejected Rule 11 guilty plea or a granted/denied Rule 48(a) dismissal—the public interest, especially that of crime victims, rests crucially on court-approval. In short, the judicial role stays present and constant throughout, and courts must validate the public interest, above all, including rights that Congress has given to crime victims.

The Fifth Circuit also cited my earlier decision in Heaton with apparent approval, explaining that "in passing on any government motion under Rule 48(a) [to dismiss] … the court will expect to see the prosecutor recount that the victim has been consulted on the dismissal and what the victim's views were on the matter." In re Ryan, 88 F.4th 614, 627 (5th Cir. 2023) (citing United States v. Heaton, 458 F. Supp. 2d 1271, 1273 (D. Utah 2006)).

My point here touches on the rights of crime victims—i.e., that whatever approach district judges use to evaluate Government motions to dismiss will apply to all such motions across the country, including those where victims have substantial interests. Thus, for the reasons I wrote about long ago in my earlier law review article, I continue to believe that judges should always be required to consider a crime victim's views before dismissing a case. Current Second Circuit law does not appear to envision this possibility.

Now, to be sure, it may well be that most Government dismissal motions continue to be granted, even when a victim objects. But process is important. As a procedural matter, consideration of the victim's view ensures greater fairness—and certainly greater perceived fairness.

III. The Adams Indictment Appears to Include a "Victim": New York City

At this point, the reader who has stuck with me may wonder why I'm discussing crime victims' rights. Isn't the prosecution of Mayor Adams a public corruption case—a "victimless" crime?

Here's where things get really interesting. It appears that a "victim" exists in the Adams case: New York City. While I don't have complete command of all the facts, if I'm right, this view would be a change from how the case has been handled so far. From what I can tell reading the docket sheet, the Biden Administration initially treated the case as not involving any "victim." (Note: In my view, that Administration had a poor track record in identifying cases in which "victims" were present and failed to confer when the law required it—a point that Danielle Sassoon, among others, has suggested.) And, more recently, from what I can tell, the incoming Trump Administration has simply followed the path set out by the previous Administration.

But regardless of who made the determination, under the federal CVRA, a "victim" is any "person" who is "directly and proximately" harmed by a crime. (Under federal law, a "person" generally includes institutions. See The Dictionary Act, 1 U.S.C. § 1.) For a comprehensive law review article collecting the relevant case law on the definition, see my article—Defining "Victim" Through Harm: Crime Victim Status in the Crime Victims' Rights Act and Other Victims' Rights Enactments.

Turning to the Adams indictment, it alleges five counts, at least three of which (on initial read) do not appear to involve any "victim" under the CVRA. Counts 3 and 4 allege solicitation of a contribution by a foreign national, in violation of 52 U.S.C. §§ 30121 & 30109(d)(1)(A). It is not clear how such solicitation "directly and proximately harms" any individual or entity, although I would be open to hearing an argument about how candidates running against Adams might have been harmed. (Note: no such allegation is contained in the indictment.) Similarly, Count 5 alleges bribery, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 666(a)(1)(B). The essence of the allegation is that Adams received benefits to help Turkish officials get the "Turkish House" through municipal fire and safety regulations. Here again, it is not immediately clear who was a "victim" of that bribery, although I'd be interested in hearing contrary arguments. (Note again: no such arguments are contained in the indictment.)

But Count 2 (and perhaps the related, parallel conspiracy count, Count 1) do appear, on initial read, to have an institutional victim: the City of New York. Count 2 alleges that Adams committed wire fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1343, to obtain "matching funds." Specifically, Count 2 alleges that

From at least in or about 2018 through at least in or about 2024, in the Southern District of New York and elsewhere, ERIC ADAMS, the defendant, knowingly having devised and intending to devise a scheme and artifice to defraud, and for obtaining money and property by means of false and fraudulent pretenses, representations, and promises, transmitted and caused to be transmitted by means of wire, radio, and television communication in interstate and foreign commerce, writings, signs, signals, pictures, and sounds, for the purpose of executing such scheme and artifice, to wit, ADAMS  participated in a scheme to fraudulently obtain Matching Funds for the Adams Campaigns by falsely claiming that contributions qualified for Matching Funds when, in fact those contributions did not.

Indictment, ¶ 57 (emphasis added). Elsewhere in the indictment, the amount of the matching funds illegally obtained is alleged to be "over $10 million" based on "false certifications that the campaign complied with the law, when in fact Eric Adams … knowingly and repeatedly relied on illegal contributions." And the indictment further alleges that New York City has a "matching funds" program that distributes funds based on a candidate's compliance with the law.

As I read the indictment, then, it alleges that New York City was defrauded out of more than $10 million in funds—which would make New York City a "crime victim" under the Crime Victims' Rights Act. For example, the federal restitution statutes (which use a similar "victim" definition) have been commonly interpreted as extending rights to entities, including cities and municipalities. See, e.g., United States v. Ng Lap Seng, 934 F.3d 110, 116, 146 (2d Cir. 2019) (United Nations); United States v. Sawyer, 825 F.3d 287, 292-94 (6th Cir. 2016) (U.S. EPA); United States v. Mei Juan Zhang, 789 F.3d 214, 216-17 (1st Cir. 2015) (U.S. IRS); United States v. Butler, 694 F.3d 1177, 1184 (10th Cir. 2012) (Kansas); United States v. Bryant, 655 F.3d 232, 253 (3d Cir. 2011) (state medical school); United States v. Bengis, 631 F.3d 33, 40-1 (2d Cir. 2011) (South Africa); United States v. Leahy, 464 F.3d 773, 793 (7th Cir. 2007) (Chicago); United States v. Washington, 434 F.3d 1265, 1268-270 (11th Cir. 2006) (Ormond Beach police department); United States v. Ekanem, 383 F.3d 40, 42-3 (2d Cir. 2004) (USDA). Applying this conventional caselaw, New York City is a "victim" of Count 2 (and perhaps Count 1) of the crime alleged against Adams.

If I am correct that the City is a "victim" of the alleged crime, then the CVRA extends to the City various rights in the process. As relevant here, the City would have a CVRA right "to reasonably confer" with prosecutors before any dismissal. The City would also have a right to be treated with "fairness" throughout the process, which in my view encompasses the right to be heard about the proposed dismissal. And if the case were to reach the sentencing phase, the City would have a right to restitution to the tune of more than $10 million.

In this particular case, it is not immediately clear who would speak for "New York City"—the City's mayor or someone else. Perhaps Mayor Adams would respond that, though his defense attorneys, he has conferred for the City with the Government. But I don't think that such an argument (were it to be advanced) is correct.  Adams's defense attorneys are working on his behalf representing him in his personal capacity, as their recent letter makes clear. See Letter (indicating that defense attorneys were "acting on behalf of Mayor Adams"). Moreover, so far as I can tell, there was never any conferral about how the dismissal might work, including such controversial issues as the fact that the dismissal was without prejudice.

In addition, the CVRA precludes Mayor Adams—a criminal defendant—from asserting crime victims rights. See 18 U.S.C. § 3771(e)(2)(B) (a criminal defendant may not be a "representative" of a victim); 18 U.S.C. § 3771(d)(1) ("A person accused of the crime may not obtain any form of relief under this chapter").

Finally, I am not an expert on New York law, but as a matter of standard protocol, the New York City Law Department apparently would need to be voice for the City in court proceedings. At least, that appears to be the position of the Law Department! The Department's website says that it "represents the City, the Mayor, other elected officials, and the City's many agencies in all affirmative and defensive civil litigation."

Of course, a victim's right to be heard does not mean a victim's right to veto the dismissal. And, as discussed above, existing Second Circuit caselaw does not make clear how a victim's objection should be weighed by the district court. But it appears to me that New York City—as a separate entity—has a CVRA right to be heard in the future proceedings regarding whether the charges should be dismissed. (It remains an interesting question whether City taxpayers would likewise have a right to be heard as "victims." My initial instinct is no, because the prevailing caselaw is that taxpayers lack standing to challenge spending issues, as demonstrated in cases such as Flast v. Cohen.)

Final disclaimers: Once again, the above analysis makes certain factual assumptions based on the public record materials I've been able to review. It may be that additional facts might change my analysis. And in this post, as in my others yesterday, I take no position on whether the charges against Mayor Adams are well founded or should now be dismissed. Nor do I seek to wade into issues regarding immigration law enforcement. My point here is simply that crime "victims" rights may be at stake in the process. It is important to have crime victims' interests considered in all criminal cases, including this one.

Update: I've cleaned up a few typos in the initial post.