The Volokh Conspiracy
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Second Amendment Roundup: Agency "Guidance," Interpretive Regulations, and Chevron
State and federal agencies express views that are thinly-veiled diktats.
State and federal agencies routinely issue "guidance" in the form of public statements and private letters that are actually veiled commands and threats of adverse consequences for failure to obey. Interpretive regulations, which supposedly only express an agency's opinion and are non-binding, may serve the same function. Such communications may be beyond the agency's legal authority or may be a way to circumvent required notice and comment procedures for formal legislative regulations. This type of coercion may violate rights under the Second Amendment and other constitutional rights, not to mention required administrative procedures.
This post assesses two cases pending in the Supreme Court in which agency guidance is being used to threaten Second Amendment rights. National Rifle Ass'n v. Vullo concerns how New York officials threatened commercial entities not to do business with the NRA in an effort to suppress Second Amendment advocacy. Garland v. Cargill involves the extent to which the executive branch may expand gun crimes beyond what Congress has enacted through supposedly non-mandatory interpretive regulations.
In addition, because agencies often insist that courts defer to their legal and factual conclusions, it is relevant to discuss the pending Loper and Relentless cases in which the Supreme Court will decide whether to tank the Chevron deference rule.
The issue presented in NRA v. Vullo is: "Does the First Amendment permit a government official to threaten regulated entities with adverse regulatory action if they do business with an advocacy organization, where she does so because she disapproves of its political views or because those views are unpopular?" NRA is represented by two First Amendment super-lawyers – David Cole of the ACLU Foundation and the Conspiracy's own Eugene Volokh.
Since the Second Circuit upheld dismissal of the complaint for failure to state a claim on which relief may be granted, the NRA's allegations must be taken as true. As recounted in NRA's brief, Maria Vullo, Superintendent of the New York State Department of Financial Services, wrote "guidance letters" to the heads of banks and insurance companies that it regulates. She urged them to cut ties with the NRA based on their legal obligation to consider "reputational risk." A failure to consider such risk can lead to multi-million-dollar fines.
The letters cited the NRA's "gun promotion" advocacy, not any legal infraction. In meetings with insurance executives, Vullo threatened enforcement action for alleged unrelated violations unless they discontinued doing business with the NRA. Vullo also issued a press release urging insurance companies and banks not to do business with the NRA.
Based on such "guidance," Vullo then strong-armed Lloyd's and two other insurers to sign consent orders requiring the payment of multimillion-dollar fines and requiring them to forego any insurance programs with the NRA.
Itself a prolific issuer of guidance documents, the United States filed an amicus curiae brief in support of neither party. The brief concedes that NRA stated a plausible claim that Vullo violated the First Amendment by coercing regulated entities to terminate their business with NRA in an effort to suppress NRA's advocacy.
But according to the amicus brief, the first four paragraphs of Vullo's letter presented no First Amendment issue, and instead simply attempted "to convince, not coerce, private parties to cut ties with [NRA] because of [NRA's] firearms advocacy." The letter decried recent shootings and noted the backlash against the NRA, which "promote[s] guns that lead to senseless violence." Attacking the NRA for its pro-gun "speech" supposedly did not threaten the letter recipients with sanctions.
It did not matter, the brief of the United States continues, that the letters were issued to regulated entities pursuant to the statutory authority of the Department of Financial Services to provide "guidance." Agencies need not "limit their public advocacy to discouraging illegal conduct or addressing subjects within the scope of their regulatory authority," but may condemn practices that they have no statutory or constitutional authority to regulate.
This is an extremely naïve view of reality. A weaponized agency tells its regulated subjects that the NRA and guns are bad and urges them to cut ties. This was not a political speech given by the governor to the general public that did not threaten sanctions. On the contrary, then-Governor Cuomo confirmed the threats by tweeting that "the NRA is an extremist organization," that businesses risked "'reputational risks' with any association with the NRA," and that New York was "forcing the NRA into financial jeopardy."
Turning to "guidance" documents at the federal level, the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms & Explosives (ATF) has long history of issuing what I'll call "advisories" that had better be followed unless you want to risk license revocation or criminal charges. These include private letters, classifications of firearms directed to manufacturers and importers, open letters to the public, the FFL Newsletter, and formal ATF Rulings. None of these documents have has the force of law, but can be ignored only at your peril absent a judicial ruling to the contrary.
Because of this coercive practice, Jeff Sessions, the first Attorney General appointed by President Trump, issued a Prohibition on Improper Guidance Documents (2017). Two of its provisions stated:
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- Guidance documents should identify themselves as guidance, disclaim any force or effect of law, and avoid language suggesting that the public has obligations that go beyond those set forth in the applicable statutes or legislative rules.
- Guidance documents should not be used for the purpose of coercing persons or entities outside the federal government into taking any action or refraining from taking any action beyond what is required by the terms of the applicable statute or regulation.
That was followed by Executive Order 13891 (2019), which formalized the above policies. President Biden revoked that order the day he took office on January 20, 2021.
Meanwhile, ATF promulgated a regulation of a type it had never issued before – expanding the definition of a "firearm" in the National Firearms Act (NFA) beyond the definitions enacted by Congress. It defined bump stocks as "machineguns," which it previously opined were not machineguns. Litigants were immediately off to the races.
In Guedes v. ATF, the D.C. Circuit affirmed the denial of a preliminary injunction against enforcement of the new rule. Strangely, ATF took the litigating position that it had promulgated an interpretive rule which was not entitled to Chevron deference, not a legislative rule, to which Chevron deference applied. The court found that the rule on its face was legislative, explicitly informing bump-stock owners that their devices "will be prohibited when this rule becomes effective."
When the government tells you that something is illegal – whether it's in a "guidance" letter, an informal ruling, or an interpretive rule – you'd better comply or lawyer-up.
The D.C. Circuit accorded deference to the rule, even though the NFA is a criminal statute which does not delegate power to ATF to expand. It found the definition of "machinegun" to be ambiguous but rejected application of the rule of lenity, which the Supreme Court applied to NFA definitions in U.S. v. Thompson/Center Arms (and which yours truly argued). But as will be seen, the rule of lenity remains alive and well.
In Garland v. Cargill, the Fifth Circuit en banc found that, on the merits, bump stocks are not machineguns, with some judges seeing the statute as sufficiently ambiguous to apply the rule of lenity. Not surprisingly, the Supreme Court granted certiorari.
In its brief, the United States tells the Supreme Court that "this case presents a pure question of statutory interpretation: Whether bump stocks satisfy the definition of 'machinegun'…." Now for the shocker: "ATF has set forth its position on that question in an interpretive rule, but the government does not contend that the rule has the force and effect of law or that ATF's interpretation is entitled to deference."
I've litigated cases adversely to ATF for decades, and don't recall any in which ATF didn't argue that it was entitled to "the divine right of deference" (the modern version of "the divine right of kings"). The brief here has the names of my old adversaries who made that argument countless times, Mark Stern and Michael Raab. Like Captain Renault in Casablanca, I'm shocked, shocked to find that ATF is not arguing for deference. But there are perhaps two reasons why.
First, as the government's brief says, "neither ATF's changes in position nor any asserted defects in its explanation for those changes have any bearing on the Court's resolution of the question presented." If deference is the rule, deference to which ATF opinion? The consistent opinion that lasted for years before the new rule, or the latest one invented for the rule?
Second, does Garland see the possible handwriting on the wall regarding the Chevron deference rule? That brings us to Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo and Relentless v. Dep't of Commerce, which were argued on January 17. An agency rule requires the herring industry to bear the costs of federal observers on fishing boats. The issue: "Whether the court should overrule Chevron v. Natural Resources Defense Council, or at least clarify that statutory silence concerning controversial powers expressly but narrowly granted elsewhere in the statute does not constitute an ambiguity requiring deference to the agency."
If the answer to that question is affirmative, that may condemn ATF's latest regulations on frames or receivers, pistol braces, and what it means to engage in the business of dealing in firearms. Congress was very specific in defining the statutory regime on these matters, and delegated no regulatory power for ATF to push the envelope.
The oral arguments are well worth listening to – Paul Clement argued for Loper, Roman Martinez argued for Relentless, and Solicitor General Elizabeth Prelogar argued both cases for the United States in what seemed to be a sinking ship.
As expected, Justices Gorsuch and Kavanaugh pressed hard against Chevron, which was stoutly defended by the three liberal justices. The Chief Justice and Justice Thomas asked the intriguing question of whether the courts must defer to agencies regarding constitutional issues, such as whether an activity constitutes interstate commerce. General Prelogar backed away from defending that radical extension of the doctrine.
The resolution of the above cases will affect the extent to which state and federal agencies infringe Second Amendment rights by use of implied and actual diktats. As usual, keep your fingers crossed.
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"neither ATF's changes in position nor any asserted defects in its explanation for those changes have any bearing on the Court's resolution of the question presented."
Translation: 'we know the idiots at ATF totally screwed the pooch on this one, but please God please, don't hold us accountable for it'.
Ironically, overruling Chevron is likely to push administrative agencies to issue more non-binding guidance in various forms, precisely because it will be harder for them to create coherent regulatory regimes pursuant to granted statutory authorities.
That practice, of course, will invite the Fifth Circuit to start tossing out sub-regulatory guidance, notwithstanding their expressly non-binding nature. That will, in turn, leave regulated actors to come up with their own interpretations of the statutes and regulations that do bind them, until they get sued.
Fantastic result.
Or maybe, if we're very lucky, it will result in legislators actually stepping up and legislating instead of standing on the sidelines while executive branch agencies flout constitutional norms (and even enumerated rights).
It is astonishing that Congress can produce multi-hundred, even multi-thousand page pieces of legislation and yet have to delegate all the details to the Executive. In a trillion dollar budget, those pork provisions must number in the millions.
Must!
Don’t other learning if your sense is true, stick with the vibes.
Rossami, this is impossible.
Not politically - literally.
Congress cannot figure every fact pattern or eventuality, nor does it have the bandwidth to spin up and amend laws as said eventualities come up.
That's why there have been administrative delegations since the Founding.
You want good policy? You want Congress, with it's political imprimatur, to provide the broad policy, mechanism of implementation, accountability, and oversight.
But implementation itself is not something Congress is equipped for.
Congress also did not attempt to legislate on the scale it does today. The government early on, and for a fairly long time was a fraction of what it is now. You're right, it is impossible to manage that scope, equally for the Executive and for Congress. Where exactly does that leave us?
It is not impossible to manage for the executive, though. Administrative agencies manage it all the time.
I remind you of the numerous times Barack Obama said he learned about some doing of his administration when he read about in the news. I've had even less confidence in the actual administration of the current and last presidents.
The bureaucracies, to an extent, manage themselves - but do so not under the directives of the nominal head appointed by the president. Given the civil service laws, and the SES layer, the "management" of the bureaucracy is exceedingly limited.
1) Barak Obama is not an administrative agency. There are many, many political appointees who seem more the point of failure in what you're describing than SES's.
2) Transparency and oversight is something both the President and Congress can attach to an agency as they feel needed.
3) I'm not saying administrative agencies are 100% perfect, I'm saying they are the only institution capable of implementing these programs (regulatory or spending).
That includes Congress and the free market, neither of whom have any hope of success, for different reasons (Congress is slow and high level, the market cannot operate when there is no clear demand curve either due to risk, or fairness concerns, or some other reason).
The president is the only one answerable to the people that elected him, the rest of the Executive branch is supposed to be answerable to him. If you really think that is how the Executive branch works, then you are beyond hopelessly naive.
Congress is filled with chickenshits who don't want to be accountable for anything - not what the institution was designed for, but again, we're talking reality.
Administrative agencies aren't even 50% of perfect. They operate pretty much as you would expect when there are rules and processes but no one ever gets fired even when the rules are broken or the processes are pointless. Much like cops with qualified immunity.
"Strangely, ATF took the litigating position that it had promulgated an interpretive rule which was not entitled to Chevron deference, not a legislative rule, to which Chevron deference applied."
It was my impression that the BATF were as surprised as anybody when the courts actually upheld the bump stock ban. It wasn't intended so much as an outrageous power grab, as an outrageous meaningless gesture, and then the courts just up and stuffed the power into their hands anyway.
Of course I blame Trump, and Congress, for the rule, not ATF, he decided to fix the bumpstock by rulemaking rather than legislation.
Congress of course didn't pass anything, Trump didn't really want them to pass anything either, because it wouldn't have been a clean bill.
There's nothing to blame Congress for here. They didn't do anything, and, that's what they should have done. Banning a stupid toy over an unrelated crime was obnoxious stupidity.
The people at fault here are,
1) Trump, for wanting to respond to a shooting with gun control. He let his bad instincts overwhelm his political sensibilities.
2) The NRA, for deciding it was time to throw more gun owners under the bus, and telling him to go ahead.
3) The BATF, for not telling Trump, "Look, the law flatly doesn't permit this, we're not supposed to obey unlawful orders."
The basic problem here is even HAVING a BATF. It's an agency whose very purpose is to infringe an explicit civil liberty.
It's like having a bureau of speech and press censorship, and religious regulation. And then being shocked that it keeps violating civil rights.
Reagan should have followed his original impulse way back when, and just shut the agency down.
Presumably even under your understanding of the right to keep and bear arms, there are some arms that can be regulated in some way. And yes, there are analogous organizations for speech, such as the FCC.
"there are some arms that can be regulated in some way."
Sure. But that would be the job of the CPSC.
I'm going to side with Dilan here.
The 'anything an infantryman might carry' school of thought is that we should be able to buy RPGs, hand grenades, claymores, and so on without restriction, cash and carry.
Suppose we adopt that view and gangs are doing drive-bys with RPGs like in the Scandinavian biker wars, school shooters are replaced by school grenadiers, drug houses are protected by claymores, and the government's only involvement is the CPSC making sure the RPG warheads work properly. I predict that public opinion for that interpretation of the 2A will vanish.
You're looking at a problem with drug dealing inner city gangs, and thinking that gun control is the answer? How's that drug control working out, successfully denied them drugs to sell yet?
Not selling them RPGs is working out pretty well, I think.
I would say that it hasn't; If the inner city gangs actually wanted RPG's, they'd have them from the Mexican cartels, via the same smuggling routes the drugs come in by.
You're just fooling yourself that this gun control is actually doing anything in regards to them.
It's mostly about controlling what the average joe has, not what gangbangers can get. The gang bangers aren't a threat to the government, the average joe might be under some scenarios.
Bellmore, maybe if drug smuggling did not exist, arms smuggling would be practical. But drug smuggling is far more economically efficient than arms smuggling, and less dangerous besides. No self-respecting drug lord would let his cartel underlings smuggle drugs for a minute, when there is so much more money to be made smuggling drugs at less risk.
What does "public opinion" of an interpretation have to do with the 2nd Amendment? Legally, nothing.
Politically, perhaps the public will one day repeal the 2nd Amendment, but that day still seems very far off today.
Well legally, speaking, I haven't seen any rulings, from the SC or lower courts, that people have a 2A right to buy RPG's. And I doubt I will see such a ruling, even in a court made up of Scalia and Thomas clones.
Heller reads: "It is not a right to keep and carry any weapon whatsoever in any manner whatsoever and for whatever purpose: ... Miller's holding that the sorts of weapons protected are those "in common use at the time" finds support in the historical tradition of prohibiting the carrying of dangerous and unusual weapons."
So I'm not seeing a lot of momentum for cash-n-carry purchases of claymores, grenades, and what have you. Perhaps someone will succeed under Bruen with the argument that the Minutemen could buy grenades. But it seems like a long, long shot (pun intended) to me.
"Miller’s holding that the sorts of weapons protected are those “in common use at the time”"
Scalia was really making things up when it came to Miller. What the Miller Court actually held was that "Certainly it is not within judicial notice that this weapon is any part of the ordinary military equipment, or that its use could contribute to the common defense."
It was civilian possession of ordinary military equipment that was protected, not ordinary civilian arms. The Court did observe that militia members were expected to show up with their own arms, but that was at a time when there wasn't any distinction between ordinary military and civilian arms. (That distinction only grew up as a result of 20th century gun control laws!)
Per the Court's reasoning, if Miller had possessed a standard military arm, he would have won.
Of course, it's worth remembering that the Miller case came after 'the switch in time that saved nine', and in reality Miller was going to lose on some basis no matter what any law or Constitution said. The fact that it was a trial in absentia at the Court just allowed the Court to give the government a win with the least possible constitutional damage.
You are talking about what you think the 2A should mean. Nothing the matter with that.
I am talking about what it actually means today, and is likely to actually mean in the future.
In the hopes of avoiding long discussions about what 'actually means' actually means, here is my definition:
If, today, you get caught with a crate of grenades in your trunk (and you don't have the right paperwork), you are going to jail, and the courts up through the SC are going to uphold your conviction.
You may think that has George Washington spinning in his grave, but you are going to be thinking that in your cell.
I' m talking about what the Miller Court actually held. Go read the case.
I have read it, and Mr. Crate-of-Grenades will still be in jail.
They did not ask if Miller was a militia member. They asked if a sawn off shotgun had military utility. Now it's your turn to assert that grenades lack such utility.
OK, strictly, they simply observed that they hadn't been given judicial notice that it had military utility. (The government, strangely enough, didn't take up Miller's defense in the absence of Miller or his counsel.) A couple of them would have had personal knowledge of their being used in WWI trench warfare.
But, as I said: That Miller would lose was a given, the only question was on what basis. And being tried in absentia allowed it to be by the narrowest, least damaging grounds possible.
"Now it’s your turn to assert that grenades lack such utility."
I think they absolutely have such utility.
And I also think Mr. Grenade goes to jail. Your view is 'the 2A protects grenades', based on looking at the wording.
The way I answer the question about what the 2A protects is to observe whether Mr. Grenade goes to jail and loses his appeals. When the answer is 'he stays in jail', I conclude 'the 2A doesn't protect grenades'.
I thought the FCC regulated the public airways, the limited spectrum available for radio and TV - not the content of speech delivered over those.
They do regulate content, e.g. obscenity and profanity when it is broadcast.
For another example, encryption over ham radio is restricted.
On the basis that a while back the government seized ownership of the airwaves.
What's the alternative? Having me free to broadcast whatever I want on, say, the same frequency as the TV station seems like a bad idea.
The government also enforces traffic laws, like which side of the interstate goes which direction. That kind of government regulation strikes me as reasonable.
Historically the broadcasters were actually resolving the problem themselves through private arrangements when the government acted, and then used seizing the airwaves as a pretext to control what could be said over them.
"the broadcasters were actually resolving the problem themselves through private arrangements"
That's all fine when NBC, CBS, and ABC have a nice gentleman's agreement. But then I come along and want to broadcast over them, and don't want to negotiate and just start broadcasting over them.
Yet I can send encrypted messages over phone lines or cellular systems.
"Because obscenity is not protected by the First Amendment, it is prohibited on cable, satellite and broadcast TV and radio. However, the same rules for indecency and profanity do not apply to cable, satellite TV and satellite radio because they are subscription services."
Apparently they don't have the same cable or satellite channels I have had access to.
Yet I can send encrypted messages over phone lines or cellular systems.
My somewhat informed guess, not if you invent a new encryption system yourself, and it works.
What that might or might not tell you about the government and the encryption systems already available to the public I leave for you to puzzle out.
I am betting you have no problem with restricting civil liberties you don't like, like abortion.
Oh, I'm sorry, which amendment was that, then? Because I know which one the 2nd amendment is.
I agree generally about the Trump Administration's critique of guidance (it shouldn't be a backdoor way of imposing regulations without notice and comment, and has been abused in some other regulatory contexts), but the bump stock ban seems to me to be a perfectly reasonable interpretation of the statute-- Congress was clearly trying to ban the function of rapid fire, not the form.
However, the gun rights movement is completely right about the NRA case. The government has no business targeting their counter-parties because they don't like NRA advocacy. The ACLU is supporting the NRA in this case.
re: "Congress was clearly trying to ..."
Looking at the legislative history of the NFA of 1934, it's not at all clear that Congress was trying to do that.
"but the bump stock ban seems to me to be a perfectly reasonable interpretation of the statute– Congress was clearly trying to ban the function of rapid fire, not the form."
The problem with that is that the actual text of the law specifically defined as machine guns firearms which fired more than one shot with a single action of the trigger. And bump stocks simply, unambiguously, don't do that. They just make it easy to pull the trigger repeatedly. In a manner that you can with practice learn to pull off just by holding the gun loosely!
Congress enacts the text of the law, not some vague, highly abstracted intent.
And the BATF has, for decades, clearly interpreted that statute as meaning what it actually says.
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The article says: "Strangely, ATF took the litigating position that it had promulgated an interpretive rule which was not entitled to Chevron deference, not a legislative rule, to which Chevron deference applied."
Setting aside the issue of the ATF litigating position, after long consideration of the issue, I have concluded that Chevron deference as it now exists (unless overruled by Loger Bright and/or Relentless), applies only to interpretative regulations (the regulation in Chevron was an interpretive regulation) and not to legislative regulations (which are the law rather than interpretations of the law).
I am not in the mainstream on that issue, but I think it is right.
You are right (I am also an atty), but, this Court is hellbent to destroy any government regulation they can.
Man, I wish. They're sure doing a lazy job of it, if that's what they were up to.