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Oral Argument in Devillier v. Texas Suggests Victory for Property Rights Likely
Both conservative and liberal justices seem to oppose letting states get away with violating the Takings Clause merely because Congress hasn't enacted a specific law enforcing it against them.

Today the Supreme Court heard oral argument in Devillier v. Texas, an important Takings Clause property rights case. Based on what was said, I think it very likely that the property owner will win, and that the outcome will be a significant victory for property rights generally. I previously wrote about this case here, and in an amicus brief I filed along with the Cato Institute.
The main issue at stake is whether state governments can evade liability for violating the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment merely because Congress has not enacted a statute specifically giving property owners the right to sue over such issues in federal court. In this case, the state of Texas flooded Mr. Devillier's ranch as a result of a highway project. When he filed a takings claim in state court, Texas removed the case to federal court under 28 U.S. Code Section 1441, which allows defendants to remove to federal court "any civil action brought in a State court of which the district courts of the United States have original jurisdiction." They then persuaded the US Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit to dismiss the case on the ground that it could not be brought in federal court because Congress hadn't enacted a statute allowing property owners to do so. If allowed to stand, this maneuver creates a Catch-22 under which states can evade takings liability by removing cases to federal court and then having them dismissed. Alternatively, a "rogue" state can simply choose not to allow such claims to be brought in its state courts in the first place.
As explained in our amicus brief and my first post about this case, the Supreme Court had already signaled such a Catch-22 barring takings claims from federal court is impermissible in its 2019 ruling in Knick v. Township of Scott. If today's oral argument is any indication, the justices are not going to allow Texas to bring back the Catch-22 in even more egregious form than the one it abolished in Knick.
Multiple justices suggested that they are not willing to accept the approach taken by the brief and cursory Fifth Circuit ruling. Chief Justice Roberts noted that Texas' position creates "a Catch-22… you say they have to proceed in -- in state court. They can't proceed in federal court. And as soon as they do, you remove it to federal court under 1983, where you say they can't proceed?" He added that sort of reasoning was "rejected in Knick."
Liberal Justice Elena Kagan asked Texas Solicitor General Aaron Neilson whether there is "an ongoing violation of the Constitution" in a case where the state has taken private property and refused to compensate the owner. Neilson had to concede there was, to which Kagan followed up by asking: "[s]o aren't courts supposed to do something about that?" Neilson didn't have a good answer.
Even Justice Sotomayor, usually the justice least sympathetic to Takings Clause rights, seemed frustrated by Texas' tactics, telling Neilson that "This seems to me like a totally made-up case because they [the property owners] did exactly what they had to do under Texas law. It's you who are telling me -- it's almost a bait and switch [because Texas removed the case to federal court and then claimed it had to be dismissed]."
Various justices raised the issue of "rogue states," which do not grant state court remedies for at least some Takings Clause violations. Under Texas' and the Fifth Circuit's reasoning, there would be no compensation available for property owners in such cases. And, as Devillier's counsel Robert McNamara noted, "the rogue state example is not a hypothetical. It's a real example because state after state has looked to federal law… as the thing that prevents the state from denying compensation. That's true in Oregon, as I mentioned, but also New Mexico, South Carolina, Nebraska, the list goes on of states that provide compensation under the Fifth Amendment because they understand the Fifth Amendment to require compensation."
As noted in our amicus brief, that the state of Louisiana - which, like Texas, is also in the Fifth Circuit - is another such "rogue" state. More generally, lots of state governments would be happy to avoid takings liability in many cases, if they could do so.
Both Texas and the federal government (represented by experienced Justice Department takings expert Edwin Kneedler) argued that even if compensation is not available, property owners could still seek relief by injunction. But, as Justice Kagan pointed out, the Takings Clause is different from many other constitutional rights because the text of the Fifth Amendment specifically mandates "just compensation." And the Supreme Court has repeatedly ruled that monetary compensation is the standard remedy for Takings Clause violations.
In many cases, compensation is the only possible remedy for the violation of the property owner's Takings Clause rights, as there is no way to address it by an injunction. For example, Justice Amy Coney Barrett noted that an injunction couldn't fix a "temporary taking" where the government has temporarily taken an owner's property, but then stopped. I would add the same is true of cases where the government has destroyed or damaged the owner's property - as in Devillier itself. Short of inventing a time travel device and going back in time, Texas cannot undo the flooding of Devillier's land. The only possible remedy for that violation of his rights is the payment of compensation.
Looking at the oral argument, I think it highly likely the Supreme Court will reverse the Fifth Circuit. At the very least, they will forbid the Catch-22 under which Texas' removed the case from state court and then got it dismissed in federal court. It is less clear whether they will go further than that and rule that takings claims can be brought directly in federal court, regardless of whether there is also a state court remedy available. But requiring property owners to go to state court first (if possible) would replicate for claims against states the regime the Court rejected in Knick, when it comes to local government. I think, but cannot be certain, that a majority of justices won't want to do that. And they shouldn't!
It's also not clear what the vote in the Supreme Court will be. Based on their comments at oral argument and votes in previous takings cases, I think all or nearly all the conservative justices will vote to reverse the Fifth Circuit (I am not fully certain about Justice Alito). Among the liberal justices, Kagan also seems likely to vote to reverse. Justice Sotomayor at least seems unwilling to accept the Catch-22 Texas is trying to exploit. But she may prefer a reversal on as narrow grounds as possible. It's not clear to me where Justice Ketanji Brown Jackson will end up. But she may be the justice most likely to vote to just affirm the Fifth Circuit.
Ultimately, the key issue in this case should be an easy one. As Justice Kagan put it, an uncompensated taking of private property is an "ongoing violation of the Constitution." And when that happens, the courts are "supposed to do something about that."
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Elena Kagan asked Texas Solicitor General Aaron Neilson whether there is "an ongoing violation of the Constitution" in a case where the state has taken private property and refused to compensate the owner. Neilson had to concede there was, to which Kagan followed up by asking: "[s]o aren't courts supposed to do something about that?" Neilson didn't have a good answer.
This. Rabba Kagan for the win.
This isn’t remotely my area of law, so there’s obviously something I’m missing, but why isn’t sec. 1983 the cause of action for Taking Clause claims?
You can't bring a 1983 claim against a state.
That answers Area Man's question for a claim seeking "just compensation." But if the plaintiff wanted an injunction of some kind, couldn't it sue officials in their official capacity under Section 1983?
An injunction telling them to pay the plaintiff money?
"Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress, except that in any action brought against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such officer’s judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable. For the purposes of this section, any Act of Congress applicable exclusively to the District of Columbia shall be considered to be a statute of the District of Columbia."
Doesn't appear to be limited to injunctions.
I rather suspect that individual defendants would claim -- and get from the courts -- official immunity to suits under that theory, unless the alleged taking was clearly outside of any official government policy.
Isn't the whole point of 1983 to subject them to liability for constitutional violations under the color of law?
But, yeah, the courts are pretty fond of handing out invented immunity to people working for the government.
There's no qualified immunity for officials sued only in their official capacity for forward looking relief like injunctions.
Correct.
That's indeed what the statute says. But what does it mean? It is well-established, whether rightly or wrongly in the first instance, that a state is not a "person" within the meaning of Section 1983. And if it were, even longer-established precedent would say that Section 1983 does not eliminate the states' Eleventh Amendment immunity. And this is true whether one seeks either damages or injunctive relief.
Individuals can be sued in their individual capacities for damages or injunctive relief, and state officials can be sued in their official capacities, but only for prospective injunctive relief. That injunctive relief might require expenditures of state funds to comply, but it cannot order payment of money for violations that have already happened.
Why DID they bother ratifying the 14th amendment, anyway?
That wouldn't work.
Ah, touché. I should have known that immediately. Thanks.
I think that the Supreme Court should do something to end this, and I'm glad to see that oral arguments indicate that they will. I value procedure as much as (if not more than) the next person, but empty procedure that is used as nothing more than a knowing and crass way to violate a person's rights and avoid the court is, and should be, anathema.
...that said, I can't help but notice that while the Supreme Court appears to be very concerned here, there was a distinct lack of concern about a recent similar scheme. I think it would be helpful if people can remember what they were saying about a certain Texas scheme (and its architect Jonathan Mitchell) not very long ago.
Whether it's abortion, property rights, or guns - the subject matter of the scheme shouldn't matter. Courts should always reject empty formalism when the entire purpose of the procedure is to frustrate meaningful judicial review.
I am going to be charitable here (and to be clear, I shouldn't be-- even our own uber-lifer Brett Freaking Bellmore said that Texas abortion statute was unconstitutional) and assume that the only reason the Court didn't strike that Texas statute down is because they knew they were going to overturn Roe 6 months later and thus didn't have the votes to uphold the substantive abortion right. And thus, it doesn't stand for any broader principle.
But I have to say, no matter how you feel about abortion, the Court's SB 8 ruling was really not its finest hour.
Weren't there some unique legal issues there, due to SB8 construction? = not Court's finest hour
They didn't have to uphold a substantive abortion right to strike down the Texas law. They could have struck it down on procedural grounds having nothing at all to do with abortion.
Indeed, striking it down on the basis of a fictional abortion right would have left that approach available to attack other constitutional rights; It was the approach that was the problem that needed to be dealt with, (And they've only delayed dealing with it...) not the impact on a fictional right.
EV had a post back when SB8 was a big thing about how the courts handled other private lawsuits that chilled the exercise of constitutional rights, including slapp laws, which provides accelerated dismissal and attorneys fees.
Congress could have addressed the issue similarly, removal to federal court, accelerated dismissal and attorneys fees.
But since abortion is so much more important than free speech that approach was considered a non-starter.
I'd be interested in some quantitative analysis here. Perhaps it will prove to be the case that there are more people who get pregnant and don't want to be than there are people who want to say something sufficiently unpopular to get into trouble. Perhaps not. But that would give us some basis to evaluate the claim.
loki13, will this decision be as big as Kelo?
It's bad enough that the 14th Amendment thinks it has to allow Congress to pass laws enforcing its provisions.
Why the #%^@% is that even needed?
But it's even worse to think that Congress has to pass laws to make the 5th Amendment enforceable.
An amendment can both be self-executing and permit Congressional enforcement to promote its object. The Fifteenth is a great example, which has a similar clause. Jim Crow states didn’t stop black voting directly because the text of the amendment prohibited that and is self-executing. They still managed it by various facially neutral means. Hence Congress passed the Voting Rights Act using the Fifteenth Amendment’s section 2 enforcement power to remedy that and promote the purpose of the Amendment.
I will note that this result is consistent with my proposed Trump v Anderson "brief" that amendments that do not have a clause "Congress shall have authority to enforce this article by appropriate legislation", or a similar grant of power to Cogress, are self executing. When Congress is given the power to enforce the amendment or a particular clause they are not self executing.
As a non-lawyer and non-American, this whole thing surprises me. I just assumed you could bring a case in federal court for any Constitutional violation, regardless of what Congress says. I thought that was the point of having the Constitution.
Yeah, any normal person would think so. Only lawyers and politicians think that's unreasonable.
...and police unions.
Going to law school is at least partially an exercise in thinking things through. You get asked to explain why you don't like something, and a lot (but not all!) of my issues with our legal system evaporated upon that scrutiny.
Every right having a remedy, and a private cause of action, would increase the power of the judiciary quite a bit, at the expense of both the other branches, and individuals.
It should surprise you. Going back till at least the civil war, it has been taken as a given that you can sue states for compensation under the Takings Clause, and the Supreme Court has repeatedly held as much. Texas came up with a truly bonkers theory, and a Fifth Circuit panel for some reason decided to bite (in an opinion that's a few sentences long, with zero reasoning and zero citation to any Supreme Court precedents).
Granted, so-called Bivens suits are a different category. That's where the plaintiff has been subjected to a completed constitutional violation--not an ongoing one, and he sues for compensatory damages. The Supreme Court has recognized a few circumstances where plaintiffs can get compensatory, backward looking damages, but the general rule is that you can't. As Kagan explained at oral argument, however, what's different about the Takings Clause is that if the government has taken your property and not paid you, the lack of compensation is itself an ongoing constitutional violation that courts have the power to remedy. It's not a "because your rights were violated, we're going to give you some money," it's "your right TO BE PAID is being violated."
Is the fifth circuit "conservative" or are they just determined to be wrong as a matter of principle?
SB8, sec 230, and now this?
Yes, Congress did pass the civil rights law of 1866, that effectively criminalized someone still holding slaves. And most of the south was under martial law leaving the US Army to enforce the freeing of the slaves.
Juneteenth is the Federal holiday which celebrates the actual freeing of the slaves:
"Juneteenth (officially Juneteenth National Independence Day) is a federal holiday in the United States commemorating the end of slavery. Its name is a portmanteau of "June" and "nineteenth", as it is celebrated on the anniversary of June 19, 1865, when as the American Civil War was ending, Major General Gordon Granger ordered the final enforcement of the Emancipation Proclamation in Texas."
That was 6 months before the 13th amendment was ratified. In addition the Supremacy Clause would void any state or local laws that enforced slavery once the 13th amendment was ratified.
It's cute that one can tell you've never bothered to read the CSC decision.