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Supreme Court Will Hear Case on Whether there is a "Legislative" Exception to the Takings Clause
The case will consider whether the government is exempt from takings liability for imposing exactions as a condition of development rights in situations where the exaction is imposed by legislation. Unlike many Supreme Court cases, this one can be resolved very easily by applying a basic principle of constitutional law.

In addition to Devillier v. United States (which I discussed here), the Supreme Court yesterday decided to hear another Takings Clause case: Sheetz v. County of El Dorado. Here's the question presented in the case:
Whether a building-permit exaction is exempt from the unconstitutional-conditions doctrine as applied in Nollan v. California Coastal Commission and Dolan v. City of Tigard, Oregon simply because it is authorized by legislation.
In Nollan, Dolan, and some later cases, the Supreme Court has ruled that state and local governments sometimes violate the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment (which requires payment of "just compensation" when the government takes private property) when they impose exactions as a condition of letting property owners develop their land. Some lower courts - including the California Court of Appeal in this case - have held there is no Takings Clause liability for land-use exactions in cases where the requirement was imposed by legislation, rather than by executive officials or regulatory agencies.
Exaction takings cases pose many difficulties. Supreme Court precedent in this field is far from a model of clarity. In many situations, it is - under current precedent - genuinely hard to figure out whether taking has occurred or not.
But the issue raised by this case should be an easy one: there is not and cannot be any "legislative exception" to Takings Clause liability in cases where such liability would otherwise exist. The whole point of the Bill of Rights - including the Takings Clause - is to limit legislative impositions, no less than executive ones. As the Supreme Court emphasized in its famous First Amendment decision in West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette (1943), "The very purpose of a Bill of Rights was to withdraw certain subjects from the vicissitudes of political controversy, to place them beyond the reach of majorities and officials and to establish them as legal principles to be applied by the courts." Neither the Takings Clause generally nor exaction takings specifically are exceptions to this general principle.
The Cato Institute amicus brief urging the Court to hear this case goes over this key point in detail (unlike in some other recent takings cases, I was not involved in writing the Cato brief in this one). It also explains why we cannot rely on the democratic process to effectively protect property owners' rights in exaction/development cases. I would add that many of the beneficiaries of new development are people who are priced out of a given area by restrictions on construction, but could potentially move there if developers are allowed to build new housing. That's the kind of group that often has little or no influence over local government political processes.
But the Court need not even consider such political economy issues. They can just rely on the basic principle that the whole point of constitutional rights is to impose constraints on the political process - including legislatures.
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States and local governments have an inherent right to regulate development within their purview (zoning laws). As such, if they say "In order to do X, you must do Y" what makes it a takings and not an negotiated transaction? No developer is required to develop their land, and no one upon land purchase has full control over what they do (zoning laws, drainage rules, etc).
The only alternative to allowing legislated tradeoffs for developments (e.g. governments only have the ability to say "You can do this" or "You cannot do this" without any give and take that considers local needs) would be the government just outright denying such developments in all instances, as that is a worse outcome from their perspective.
"States and local governments have an inherent right to regulate development within their purview (zoning laws)."
Governments do not have rights.
Another interesting philosophical point that, unfortunately, has very little bearing on whether zoning regulations are per se unconstitutional.
Spoiler alert: they are not.
That is not an accurate statement of American law.
As a sloppy synonym for power, sure.
Yes.
Somin's position on this (and other related points) has been that essentially all regulations are 5A takings. While interesting from a libertarian theory perspective, it is nuts from the perspective of living in the real world.
Also, taken to its logical conclusion, Somin's position here would lead to the worst type of crony capitalism, where well-connected developers use government money to build pet government projects inside their own larger projects.
How would that differ from the crony capitalism we presently have?
The government has turned car manufacturers from industries to government agents, pursuing government policy goals (i.e EV being a money pit and car makers STILL doubling down on it)
If you think crony capitalism is already a problem, adding more is not the solution.
re: “States and local governments have an inherent right to regulate development…”
Start with a false premise and it’s no surprise that you reach an invalid conclusion. State and local government do not have any such “inherent right”. If they did, there would be no conceivable limit to what they limits or conditions they could arbitrarily impose. I want to say that it's back-door authoritarianism but it's not even back-door.
States and local governments have an inherent right to regulate development within their purview (zoning laws).
It always helps to pop the conclusion in early, as a stipulation.
States and local governments have an "inherent right" to regulate development within their purview in the same way that they have an "inherent right" to regulate speech, firearms, business generally and the conduct of the criminal law in their jurisdiction.
In each case, in the US, whatever the scope of such "inherent rights" of government, it is constrained by the federal constitution.
Somin’s advocacy this time contains a principle which will readily be seized upon to put an end to zoning. That is so obvious that it ought to be treated as the point of the case.
A less radical approach would be to restrict zoning by principled rules to bar arbitrary or individualized exactions. Make whatever obligations developers must satisfy explicit in the zoning law itself, and not subject to arbitrary enforcement in any cases where the property and projects meet zoning requirements.
Then revisit the notion of a zoning variance. Allow variances at the discretion of the zoning authority, but with that discretion restricted by a rule that a variance may never be used to effect a change in usage from that prescribed for the zone in question.
Thus, in a case where a parcel and project cannot satisfy some condition of the zone, such as a setback requirement for instance, the zoning authority may grant a variance if to do it does not have the effect of liberalizing the usage prescribed for the zone, or of further restricting the prescribed usage. Or, the zoning authority may withhold a variance pending the outcome of negotiations which may cover other topics without limit.
So long as the prescribed usage remains sacrosanct, it should go without challenge that the zoning authority has unfettered power to grant or deny variances for any reason or for no reason. To change prescribed usages must require a change in the zoning law, made subject to the usual constraints on administrative lawmaking.
That should sufficiently open the way to negotiated discretion in zoning cases, without depriving anyone of an existing property right. The court's decision in the case should restate the principle that the law protects property rights as they are, not whatever speculative property rights a developer might claim if prescribed usages were changed.
Zoning as currently implemented may be bad policy, at least in some forms. But there’s nothing unconstitutional about it. The Constitution isn’t a Roshach test – its interpretation isn’t simply a reflection of the interpreter’s own mind, and it doesn’t contain whatever content the viewer wishes to put into it.
If libertariarians want libertarian principles enacted, they need to persuade the people and their elected representatives of the value of those principles, just like the espousers of any other ideologies. Feeling strongly that their cause is the just one doesn’t permit them to simply override elected representatives.
The Supreme Court upheld zoning a century ago.
The law doesn't seem to work the way Prof. Somin says. The Supreme Court held that assessors who as an administrative matter raise property tax assessments when a property changes hands (welcome stranger assessments) violate the equal protection clause, but statutory schemes (like Prop. 13) that do the same aren't considered to raise Constitutional questions.
So, by going around the Federalist principle you can go around the 'who is allowed' principle. What you can't do, you can't do , period.
"You know, I wouldn't do this on my own, but since the Federal gov't says I can, I will "
"So, by going around the Federalist principle you can go around the ‘who is allowed’ principle."
Or perhaps the author isn't going around the "who is allowed" principle, but simply answering "who is allowed" with nobody.
In theory, there are no exceptions to the US Constitution. It's protections are absolute.
Unless it involves taking stuff without due process.
Or infringing on arms.
Or shutting up those icky right wing people on social media.
Etc.
Sure, but it's a fringe theory.
"I would add that many of the beneficiaries of new development are people who are priced out of a given area by restrictions on construction, but could potentially move there if developers are allowed to build new housing. That's the kind of group that often has little or no influence over local government political processes."
Let me get this straight: You think it's a flaw in democracy that democratically elected representatives represent the people who actually live in their area, rather than the people who would end up living in their area if they deliberately ignored the wishes and interests of their actual constituents?
That's consistent with your writings, but, man, is that ever a twisted take on democracy!
It's a functional understanding the notes an issue with unrestricted local democracy, in that it allows people to choose to externalize a bunch of stuff and ignore it.
'Yeah, this place is essentially a void no one can move to, but that's our freedom to choose, baby!' is looking at one group and saying they're all that matter.
Democracy for democracy's sake gets you a lot of tyranny.
We've been seeing a lot of that since 2021.
We've seen a lot of populism being leaned on to overcome institutional authority, and we've seen a lot of institutional authority being used to overcome popular sentiment.
It has also ever been thus, end ever been a tactic used by everyone in the political arena.
Brett is, in my opinion, using a particularly blind and empty form of populism to try and invalidate another, in my opinion more inclusive and robust, form of populism.
The institutional aspect of how zoning boards actually operate isn't part of the OP or Brett's comment, but is another dimension of this debate.
I’m not seeing how anything is being externalized here.
Democracy is, famously, the least worst form of government. Responsiveness to the opinion of the people being governed is what makes it that least worst form.
Somin wants the rulers to be responsive, not to the population they actually rule over, but instead the population they might bring into existence by ignoring what the people they actually rule over want.
As Bertolt Brecht said, ““Some party hack decreed that the people had lost the government’s confidence and could only regain it with redoubled effort. If that is the case, would it not be be simpler, if the government simply dissolved the people and elected another?”
That really is what Somin advocates: Letting governments dissolve the people and elect a new one more to their liking.
I would just like to know how the ATF can arbitrarily change their mind on guns...resulting in essentially requiring people to turn in or destroy their firearms and accessories. How does that not trigger the takings clause?
It falls under the "but, guns!" clause of the Constitution. You need special glasses that are issued to judges to see it.
Biden is a disgusting piece of shit. I hope his fake doctor wife gets a tumor in her uterus and his criminal felon son dies of cancer like his worthless brother did.
Oh boy. Do not look deeply into Trump or his relatives.
World's quickest entry to the 'blocked' list. (It's obviously a new ID for one of the prior posters, and I have my own suspicions re who it is.)
Prof. Somin, you are probably aware of a now deceased prominent local lawyer and developer named Til Hazel, who was one of the driving forces behind GMU's acquisition of a law school in the 1970s. You may not be aware that the Hazel/Peterson Cos. were once a party to one of the nation's most controversial ''legislative takings'' involving the Manassas National Battlefield Park. This dispute involved a taking by Congress rather than a state or local government, but it resulted in a lawsuit over compensation, which I worked on as a young lawyer. You can read about it here: https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/local/1990/12/21/us-to-pay-81-million-in-battlefield-settlement/30c5f77b-66e8-47d3-80c0-ee6ccb4b6afb/
Scotusblog says:
In these circumstances I think the fee being legislative actually makes it *worse*. If it were done by the executive they could make an individualized determination of whether that money was necessary to actually mitigate traffic in this instance (as required by Dolan v. City of Tigard.)
"Will you be the queen of my double-wide?"
Or if you go with a modular home rather than a mobile home, there are no size limits.
https://www.championhomes.com/modular-homes
LOVE this reference to SCOTUS case from 1943:
"The very purpose of a Bill of Rights was to withdraw certain subjects from the vicissitudes of political controversy, to place them beyond the reach of majorities and officials and to establish them as legal principles to be applied by the courts."
Very similar to Scalia in Heller (2008):
"The Constitution leaves the District of Columbia a variety of tools for combating that problem, including some measures regulating handguns... But the enshrinement of constitutional rights necessarily takes certain policy choices off the table."
That is a very 20th-century way of looking at it.
Definitely not what the authors and proponents of the Bill had in mind.
“not…?”
I’d say that is EXACTLY what the authors of the Bill of Rights had in mind. By placing them in the Constitution, they knew it would take far more than just the whim of a bare majority to violate them.
Professor Somin's gotta read some Cooley.
So government has to provide compensation to property owners if it wants to enact Civil Rights bills? Cities have to compensate if they want to enforce fire codes?
The idea that owning property gives you the right to make any use of it you want has never been part of our constitution.
Our constitution.
Which may or may not be Professor Somin's.
The fee in Sheetz is a kind of tax. The County of El Dorado is in effect taxing residents who wish to construct improvements on their property.
Whether one agrees with this kind of tax or not, whether it is excessive or not, whether it is exacted fairly or not, a tax is not a taking. The constitutional standards under which such a tax should be judged are not the standards of the Takings Clause.