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Slurs When Discussing Rap, Duty of Fair Representation, and Union's Attempt to "Balance the Racial Sensitivities"
From Magistrate Judge Stewart Aaron's Report and Recommendation today in Kelly v. Comm. Workers of Am. (S.D.N.Y.), the factual allegations (assumed to be true for purposes of the motion to dismiss, though of course there hasn't been any finding yet about what the facts actually were):
Plaintiff, a Caucasian male, was employed by Verizon as a Field Technician from February 21, 2000 until May 19, 2021. During this time, Plaintiff was a member of the Union, which was the sole and exclusive bargaining agent of all Field Technicians employed by Verizon. Verizon and the Union are parties to a collective bargaining agreement (the "CBA") that governs the terms and conditions of Union members' employment. The CBA provides that Plaintiff could be terminated from his employment only for cause and includes a grievance and arbitration procedure which provides the exclusive means of enforcing the terms and conditions of the CBA.
On April 6, 2021, when working in the field, not on Verizon property, and during his lunch break, and while sitting on a park bench, Plaintiff took a personal call during which he discussed the news that rapper DMX had been hospitalized and, in discussing DMX's music, used the word "nigga." Unbeknownst to Plaintiff, he inadvertently had answered a call on his company cellular phone, and a Verizon employee who listened to his private call for approximately forty-five seconds overheard him use the word "nigga."
On April 23, 2021, Verizon suspended Plaintiff pending an investigation for discrimination and harassment. On May 10, 2021, Plaintiff was placed on a ten-day suspension pending dismissal and then was informed that he officially would be terminated by Verizon effective May 19, 2021, for violating Verizon's discrimination and harassment policy, the purpose of which was to maintain a respectful, safe and professional workplace, and a work environment free from abusive behavior.
Plaintiff alleges that many non-Caucasian employees routinely used words like "bitch," "cunt," "nigger," "nigga," "kike," and "spic" in the workplace without being reprimanded or disciplined in any way. Plaintiff also alleges that other employees violated Verizon's zero-tolerance policy against violence and never were disciplined for it.
Plaintiff grieved the termination of his employment. Plaintiff alleges that Union officials understood that Verizon's termination of Plaintiff's employment was without cause, but the Union refused to take Plaintiff's meritorious grievance to arbitration. Plaintiff further alleges that Dennis G. Trainor, the Union's Vice President, District 1, informed Plaintiff that the Union officials believed that arbitrating Plaintiff's grievance would have a negative effect upon the Union's reputation with its members and employees because it would be enforcing the rights of a white man who used the word "nigga" and, therefore, that race was a motivating factor in the Union's decision. Plaintiff also alleges that the Union has arbitrated the grievances of the very few African American employees whom Verizon chose to discipline for using the word "nigger" in the workplace….
The court allowed the case to go forward, denying the union's motion to dismiss:
Plaintiff alleges that Verizon breached its collective bargaining agreement with the Union by terminating his employment without cause (First Count); that the Union unlawfully discriminated against him with respect to the terms and conditions of his employment in violation of the National Labor Relations Act ("NLRA"), 29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (Second Count); and that the Union breached its duty of fair representation owed to Plaintiff (Third Count)….
"In order to provide individual employees with recourse when a union breaches its duty of fair representation in a grievance or arbitration proceeding, the Supreme Court has held that an employee may bring suit against both the union and the employer." Such a suit is known as "a hybrid § 301/duty of fair representation claim."
To prevail on a hybrid § 301/duty of fair representation claim, a plaintiff "must demonstrate both (1) that [his employer] breached its collective bargaining agreement and (2) that [the union] breached its duty of fair representation." The plaintiff "must further establish that any damages he suffered were caused by the union's breach." …
"[A] union breaches the duty of fair representation when its conduct toward a member of the bargaining unit is arbitrary, discriminatory, or in bad faith." "This duty applies to a union's representation of an employee during the grievance process following an employee's termination." "[A] union's actions are arbitrary only if, in light of the factual and legal landscape at the time of the union's actions, the union's behavior is so far outside a wide range of reasonableness as to be irrational." "A union acts discriminatorily where 'substantial evidence' indicates that it engaged in discrimination that was 'intentional, severe, and unrelated to legitimate union objectives.'" "A union acts in bad faith only if it acts fraudulently, deceitfully, or dishonestly."
"Although 'a union may not arbitrarily ignore a meritorious grievance or process it in perfunctory fashion,' members 'do not have an absolute right to have their grievances taken to arbitration.'" "[T]he duty of fair representation is not breached where the union fails to process a meritless grievance," "because 'a union must be allowed to exercise reasonable discretion as to how it can best satisfy the interests of the individual as well as the interests of the collective unit.'"
Plaintiff alleges that Union officials understood that Verizon's termination of Plaintiff was without cause, but that the Union refused to take his meritorious grievance to arbitration and that his race was a motivating factor in its decision. In particular, Plaintiff alleges that "Dennis G. Trainor, the Union's Vice President, District 1, informed Plaintiff that the Union officials believed that arbitrating Plaintiff's grievance would have a negative effect upon the Union's reputation with its members and employees because it would be enforcing the rights of a white man who used the word 'nigga.'" Plaintiff further alleges that the Union did arbitrate the grievances of "the very few African American employees" who were disciplined for using the n-word in the workplace.
The Union argues that "Plaintiff ignores the fact that he was terminated for using a commonly known racial slur" and that "[s]ince Plaintiff made race an issue when he used a racial slur, the Union had a lawful basis to balance the racial sensitivities involved." However, taking Plaintiff's allegations as true, he used the word in a non-pejorative way under circumstances that he contends did not violate Verizon's Code of Conduct and, therefore, did not constitute cause for his termination under the CBA.
Moreover, Plaintiff plausibly alleges that the Union's decision not to arbitrate his claim was not due to the Union's view that his claim lacked merit, but because the Union was worried about the optics of defending Plaintiff's conduct, which undoubtedly goes against longstanding social norms. Certainly, "many people, white and black alike, disapprove of a white person saying [the n-word] under virtually any circumstance." Burlington v. News Corp. (E.D. Pa. 2010) (quoting Randall Kennedy, Nigger: The Strange Career of a Troublesome Word (2003)). Nonetheless, a desire to conform with social norms does not automatically insulate the Union's decision. Cf. Burlington (finding employer could be liable under Title VII for enforcing or condoning the social norm that it is acceptable for African Americans to say n-word but not whites since doing so would require determination that it was "good" race-based social norm that justified departure from text of statute).
It may be, as Defendants assert, that further development of the record reveals that the Union reasonably determined that Plaintiff's claim lacked merit and/or that its decision not to arbitrate its claim was based on legitimate union objectives. However, taking Plaintiff's allegations as true, and drawing all reasonable inferences in his favor, the Court cannot say at this early stage of the proceeding that Plaintiff's claim that the Union acted discriminatorily in deciding not to take his grievance to arbitration is implausible.
"Establishing that the union's actions were sufficiently arbitrary, discriminatory or in bad faith, is only the first step toward proving a fair representation claim." Plaintiff also must demonstrate a causal connection between the union's wrongful conduct and his injury. Plaintiff alleges that, but for the Union's refusal the arbitrate Plaintiff's grievance, Plaintiff would have been restored to work and that the Union's breach caused him damages. These allegations are sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss….
Defendants also argue that Plaintiff fails to plausibly allege that Verizon breached the CBA, such that his hybrid § 301/duty of fair representation claim should be dismissed. Plaintiff alleges that Verizon breached the CBA by terminating his employment without cause because he did not violate Verizon's Code of Conduct. Verizon argues that Plaintiff admits to uttering a comment that "undoubtedly violated Verizon's zero-tolerance discrimination and harassment policy and provided sufficient 'cause' grounds for the company to terminate Plaintiff's employment." However, drawing all reasonable inferences in Plaintiff's favor, Plaintiff plausibly alleges that he did not violate the Code of Conduct and therefore, that his termination was without cause and constituted a breach of the CBA.
Corey Scott Stark represents plaintiff.
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Wait…”a Verizon employee who listened to his private call for 45 seconds”? Let’s forget this cultural garbage and go back to that.
Note that "[u]nbeknownst to Plaintiff, he inadvertently had answered a call on his company cellular phone"; I take it that this it the reason the employee of Verizon (the employer) was listening in.
Yeah, but what, do they screen every phone call made by every employee at all times? Nevermind, I take it that he wasn't having a conversation on his work phone.
I think the sentence is just poorly worded. Maybe:
He answered a call on his personal phone, and accidentally called/answered a call on his work phone at the same time. And, the Verizon employee listened while he was talking instead of hanging up, and the other employee just happened to be an AWFL.
I think EV worded it correctly and its meaning is clear. But it brings up two questions:
1. Is this an ethical business practice?
2. Is there something special about the company phones or does this mean they have the capability to listen to customers’ calls as well? If so, do they?
Reminds me of that "Curb Your Enthusiasm" episode ("The N Word" duh)
If I understand footnote 6 correctly, discriminatory enforcement of the contract would not violate the collective bargaining agreement. It would not be a breach of contract to fire a white man for saying "Belgium" without firing all the black men who say it.
In the case presented, an employee that a private employer does not wish to employ is demanding that he be defended by a union which does not wish to do so. Roosevelt-era big-government statute, though, may be interpreted to require both the private employer and the big-money union corporation to do that which they do not wish to do. At this point, it seems rather silly to have unions and private employers: a simple fascist government could do it more efficiently all by itself -- and, obviously, we want the most efficient government possible.
This is the most insipid form of speech suppression: both the union and the private employer, for whatever reason, wish to "just say no" to the type of language the employee used and wish to exhibit the dismissal of the employee as a signal of their virtue, yet the expression of both the private employer and the big-money labor corporation is stifled by a government which divines some "right" to continuous employment of selected winners.
The contracts entered into by the employer and the union require them to do what they would rather not do in this case. Federal law just gives additional teeth to what would otherwise be a state-law action over breach of contract.
In other words, you think the Civil Rights Act, which does precisely what you object to, is a form of fascism.
As Professor Volokh has pointed out many times, and I agree, “just saying no” to a business contract, i.e. refusing to do business with someone, is conduct, not speech, and is not protected by the Free Speech clause. That’s why discrimination laws in general are consistent with the First Amendment.
Antidiscrimination laws do a lot more than just govern saying no to proposed business contracts.
It isn't unusual. When I was in college, a guy in a study group that I belonged to, was an ex-cop. The reason that he was going to school was because his ex-wife wasn't happy with the divorce settlement and said that he threatened her with his service pistol. It was later proven that she had filed a false complaint. In the meantime he was fired from his job. The Union didn't want to look like they condoned domestic violence so they abandon him. The DA felt the same way so he didn't press charges for the false statement. No other police force would hire him, so he went back to school.
Good for him! I know we need Po-lice, glad we have them (Like Firefighters) but have to wonder about the intelligence of anyone entering that profession voluntarily.
If the allegations are true, the case has a very straightforward resolution under Bostock. What both Verizon and the Union found offensive is a white person behaving like a black one.
Under Bostock it is unlawful to fire or refuse to represent a biological male person for behaving like a female person. If other employees, union members, etc. find such behavior offensive they just have to stuff it.
A straightforward application of the same logic to a white person saying things that are considered OK for black people to say requires finding that the plaintiff was discriminated against because of his race, and the offense taken at his conduct constitutes intentional discriminatory animus.
Bostock has no relation to this case. I know you come up with these ideas in your head that you think are brilliant and then repeat them over and over and over and, for instance, over, but please stop. Fetuses are not foreigners, and Bostock does not apply to anything and everything on the planet, but rather only to a suit under Title VII of the CRA.
You’ve been wrong plenty of times before, yet you continue to just say I’m wrong based on nothing but your personal say-so, with a bunch of ad hominem insinuations thrown in. You harrumph regularly.
You’ve made it clear you really really don’t want Bostock to apply to this case. That’s hardly an argument that it doesn’t apply.
The plaintiff is arguing that in the underlying dispute with Verizon, Verizon only thinks the word “nigger” is harassing when white people say it, never when black people say it. I’m entitled to reframe his argument as a claim Verizon was offended not by the word “nigger” but by a white person saying the word “nigger.” Bostock held an employer cannot take offense at behavior that’s acceptable if done by the opposite sex, that doing so constitutes discrimination. When that happens, the real (or at least the legally relevant) reason for being offended is not because of the actual behavior but because of sex. I’m absolutely entitled to argue for an obvious extension of this principle from sex to race.
Verizon here claims the plaintiff breached his contract by eengaging in offensive behavior which entitled it to fire him. But if the cause of Verizon’s being offended was not the plaintiff’s behavior but actually plaintiff’s race, then plaintiff did not engage in any behavior that offensive within the meaning of a legally enforceable contract. Just as Verizon can’t fire a male employee because it feels offended by his dressing like a woman, it can’t fire a white employee because it’s offended by his talking like a black one. So if the argument is valid, then it follow’s pretty straightforwardly that Verizon’s firing the plaintiff was a breach of contract. It fired him because it was offended by his race, not his conduct. And the contract only permits firing him for engaging in offensive conduct. It doesn’t permit firing him for belonging to an ofrensive race.
Your hurrumphing only indicates you don’t like the argument. Of course you don’t. You wish it wsn’t so. You’d like people to believe it wasn’t so. But your emotional attachment to wanting it not to be so, and the various rhetorical tricks you’ve used regularly to try to get people to dismiss it out of hand without actually considering it, hardly translate into a rational argument. It only shows you’re afraid of what people might conclude if they move past the rhetorical tricks and actually do comsider it rationally.
This is all an interesting set of rambling observations that do not have anything to do with law. I am certainly impressed that you have the ability to evaluate a breach of contract claim without having seen the contract, though.
Once again: he did not bring a claim of discrimination. He brought a claim that he didn't violate the Verizon code of conduct. The code of conduct does not say anything about black or white. (He does bring a claim that the union violated the DFR based on race, but that is not a Bostock claim either.)
So can 1/2 N-word Barry Hussein Osama just say 1/2 of the N-word?? (he says the whole word on his auto-erotic biography)
Frank (half-Jew (the good half)
Another tiresome white guy seeking guidance on when he can say "n****r."
Well maybe white people wouldn’t say it as much if it wasn’t constantly shouted out in a very popular genre of music.
And of course we are constantly assured nigga isn’t the same as nigger so it’s ok for them to say it, but still not ok for whites.
The lyrics of one genre uses it constantly and the lyrics of another never uses it. I myself listen to hard bob jazz the doesn't have much in the way of lyrics.
Be interesting social experiment to monitor a random selection of hip hop fans at a music festival, and a random selection of country music fans at a country music festival and see who used either word the most often, the culturally diverse hip hop fans or the “racist” country music fans.
Nigger, please!
If you're looking for permission, I'm not the one to ask for it. If you're telling me I should spell out "n****r" when I refer to the word, go f**k yourself.
What kind of person would (1) scour the reporting system and the internet for opportunities to use a vile racial slur with plausible deniability or (2) follow such a person's blog to get a thrill from the habitual publication of vile racial slurs?
(1) A Federalist Society law professor
(2) Hi, guys!
Dup.
Apparently the dispute is alleged disparate treatment of employees of different races who used the same word.
Applying Bostock, it shouldn’t matter if an employee uses a slur referring to his own group, in an ironic manner, or if an employee of a different race uses the slur, there must be mathematical equality.
PS - It doesn't seem to be a workplace-friendly word. Use non-racial, nondemeaning language like "leftover human residue."
A rap song, with the most offensive parts cut out:
[bleep] [bleep] [bleep] [bleep] [bleep] [bleep] [bleep] [bleep] [bleep] [bleep] [bleep] [bleep] [bleep] [bleep] [bleep] [bleep] [bleep] [bleep] [bleep] [bleep] motherfucker
When you play a Rap Song backwards the Pigs (Redacted) You!!!!
Vat a Country!!!!!!!
Frank
Anyone want to guess how many times this white, male, right-wing blog has published vile racial slurs during the first seven months of this year?
__ Fewer than 5
__ 6-10
__ 11-20
__ 21-30
__ 31-50
__ More than 50
Tiebreaker: When will this number reach a level at which UCLA's patience will be exhausted?
Carry on, clingers. So far as your betters permit.
How often have you used the term "leftover human residue"?
Never, so far as I can recall.
In what does habitual use of vile racial slurs resemble describing the . . . oops, I can't use the proper term because Prof. Volokh forbids me to use it, imposing his censorship to protect the feelings of his right-wing fans . . . the downscale, poorly educated, roundly bigoted, population that remains in our can't-keep-up Republican backwaters after generations on the wrong side of bright flight?
Do you contend that describing the concentrating pool of dysfunction, bigotry, resentment, ignorance, superstition, failure, gullibility, and Trumpiness found in our rural and southern stretches -- a depleted human residue -- is in some way similar to repetitive launching of vile racial slurs? By all means, please elaborate!
Oh, I'm sorry, it was "depleted human residue," not "leftover human residue."
No, that's not offensive at all.
If "depleted human residue" offends you (hits home), ask Prof. Eugene Volokh to censor me. He forbids me to use "sl_ck-j_wed" to describe his bigoted, downscale, poorly educated right-wing fans; he might reward you for your loyalty and conservative bigotry by censoring me again.
Carry on, clingers.
While I agree with your assessment, it does not go far enough.
The allegation here is that people of one race are permitted to use a word without reprimand, but people of another race will be suspended if they do the same thing.
Sounds like racial discrimination to me.
"for violating Verizon's discrimination and harassment policy,"
Against whom did he discriminate? Whom did he harass?
But under Bostock if it’s OK for black people to say it, then it’s OK. Verizon can’t promulgate whites-only rules of behavior. If the alleged rule is a whites-only rule, it isn’t an actual rule. That means (2) was never violated. And that makes it a different case from (3). (3) concerns legitimate rules that are selectively enforced. This case is not about that. The plaintiff here is claiming his conduct does not violate the rule at all, they the conduct Verizon claims is offensive is not in fact offensive, Verizon is nust being bigoted. The rule on its face prohibits only offensive conduct, not conduct that Verizon discrimnates against. That means the footnoted case just doesn’t apply here.
Suppose the plaintiff was black, Verizon fired him for sitting in the front of the company bus, and the union refused to represent him because the white employees would vote the union officials out of office if they did. Would Verizon be allowed to argue that in its view sitting in the front of the bus is itself always inherently offensive, and the fact that it only happens to fire black employees for doing this cannot be raised as a defense becUse it is outside the scope of the arbitrator’s authority under the CBA? Would a federal court enforce such a contractual arbitration arrangement ? A court would have no difficulty finding that in such a case, the employee was not fired because Verizon actually regarded sitting in the front of the bus as in any way inherently offensive. Rather, the employee was fired because Verizon regarded the front of the bus as reserved for white people and off limits to blacks. Flip the races, and that’s exactly what the plaintiff is alleging happened in this case.
I had a company phone as my only phone for the last 20 years of my career. I don’t think my employer was monitoring my calls. Or texts or anything else.
Seems like more big brother bullshit to me.
It might be good public relations for them to publicly discriminate, but there’s no public relations exception to anti-discrimination law. If there’s a banned words list then great; let’s see it. But it has to be racially neutral and even-handedly applied. Otherwise you get the absurdity that can routinely be observed in university settings; black people screaming “NIGGA” back and forth to each other, then pretending to be upset if a white person does it. This is likely the next frontier in civil rights litigation, because the policies are either outright discriminatory or selectively applied.
But the plaintiff claims that they only enforce this policy against certain people.
Well don't forget the story of the guy who was falsely accused of having a racist greeting on his Ring Doorbell, and Amazon monitored his doorbell then cut off all access to his Amazon account, including Alexa which he was using for his door lock, garage door opener, and to run his entire household.
He's not suing under employment discrimination law. He's suing under labor law and for ordinary breach of contract.
Against Verizon, his claim is wrongful termination in violation of contract. His employment contract says termination is only for cause and there was no good cause. The claim would be the same if his manager woke up on the wrong side of bed and fired him, except we wouldn't be reading about it here because ordinary "bad boss" claims don't involve freedom of speech.
Against the union, his claim includes racial discrimination. The union is not his employer. The claim is more like legal malpractice.
1. The current suit, against the union, involves discrimination.
2. If the union represents him competently, it will raise a discrimination claim in addition to breach of contract.
3. Regarding the breach of contract claim. Suppose Verizon formulated a rule that no employees are ever allowed in the front of the bus, zero tolerance, but only enforced it when black people were found there. Supposed it always fired any black people found in the front of the bus, but never fired any white people. Suppose Verizon offered as a defense to a wrongful termination suit what it has offered here, that this is a rule of general application, the rule as stated is valid under the contract, and any claim of selective enforcement is outside the scope of the agreed arbitration, totally beside the point, and was contractually waived. Do you think such a defense would fly?
This isn't a wrongful termination suit. It's a grievance that the company violated the CBA.
But that’s because he contracted away his right to file suits of this nature to the union and to union arbitration. The grievance he wants arbitrated and he wants the union to represent him for is that Verizon breached its contract. That sounds like a breach of contract claim to me.