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Fifth Circuit to Hear Important Case on Remedies Under the Crime Victims' Rights Act
Tomorrow I will argue that families who lost relatives in the crashes of two Boeing 737 MAX aircraft should be able to confer with prosecutors about prosecuting Boeing for lying to the FAA.
Previously I blogged about my petition to the Fifth Circuit under the Crime Victims' Rights Act (CVRA). My petition argues the families who lost relatives in the crashes of two Boeing 737 MAX crashes should have been afforded their CVRA rights to confer with prosecutors about prosecuting Boeing for its admitted crime of lying to the FAA about the safety of the MAX. The Fifth Circuit has set oral argument on the case, and tomorrow I will argue to the Circuit that it should grant the petition. In this post, I briefly set out the procedural history of the case and link to important briefs on both sides of the case (some citations omitted) for those who are interested.
The case arises out of "the deadliest corporate crime in our nation's history," as the district court described it. During the development of the Boeing 737 MAX, Boeing lied to the FAA about new safety features of the aircraft. As a result of that deception, the FAA did not require pilot training on those new features--ultimately causing the crashes of two of the aircraft and producing the deaths of 346 passengers and crew.
Ultimately, the Justice Department began an investigation into Boeing crimes. And late in 2020 and early 2021, the Department reached a deferred prosecution agreement (DPA) with Boeing. Under the DPA, Boeing admitted that it criminally conspired to deceive the FAA. But, under the DPA, Boeing will not be prosecuted for its crimes in exchange for various concessions.
On January 7, 2021, the DPA was filed in the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Texas. The 346 families whose relatives were killed in the crashes were not informed about the deal--and never were given an opportunity to confer with prosecutors about it. Instead, they learned about the DPA through social media.
Eleven months later, after I agreed to represent some of the family members pro bono, the families filed a challenge to the DPA. The families argued that the DPA had been entered into in violation of their rights under CVRA, including their right to confer with prosecutors before any deal was finalized. After lengthy proceedings, on October 21, 2022, the district court found that the families represented "crime victims"--that is, their relatives who were killed as a result of Boeing's crimes. And the district court found that the families' CVRA rights, including the right to confer, had been violated. But several months later, on February 9, 2023, the district court concluded that it could not award any remedy to the families to enforce their rights.
I filed a petition for review in the Fifth Circuit, arguing that the district court erred in failing to protect the families' rights. Here is the introduction from my petition:
This case arises out of "the deadliest corporate crime in our nation's history." As the district court found, Boeing's conspiracy to defraud the FAA directly and proximately killed 346 people—leaving behind 346 grieving families. Congress gave those families rights under the Crime Victims' Rights Act. But the Government cared more about protecting Boeing's reputation than the families' rights. It misled the families as to whether a criminal investigation existed and then secretly cut a deferred prosecution deal without informing the families at all.
Among the rights that Congress protected was a victim's "reasonable right to confer" with prosecutors. 18 U.S.C. § 3771(a)(5). And in 2015, Congress reinforced this right, by mandating that a victim has "[t]he right to be informed in a timely manner of any . . . deferred prosecution agreement." 18 U.S.C. § 3771(a)(9). And Congress has broadly protected crime victims' rights "to be treated with fairness." 18 U.S.C. § 3771(a)(8).
The reason Congress established these rights is straightforward. As this Court explained in In re Dean, 527 F.3d 391 (5th Cir. 2008), "[i]n passing the Act, Congress made the policy decision—which we are bound to enforce—that the victims have a right to inform the plea negotiation process by conferring with prosecutors before a plea agreement is reached." Id. at 395 (emphasis added).
In this case, the victims' families were denied these promised rights—as the district court specifically found. But then, the district did nothing. In doing nothing, the district court failed to discharge its CVRA obligation that it "shall ensure that . . . crime victim[s] are afforded the rights described in [the CVRA]." 18 U.S.C. § 3771(b)(1) (emphasis added). Rather than follow the CVRA's plain language requiring it to "ensure" that the families were afforded their rights, the district court held that meaningless, post hoc "listening sessions" could substitute for the meaningful, pre-charging conferral that Congress mandated.
The district court abdicated its CVRA responsibility to "ensure" that the victims' families were afforded their rights. In the CVRA, Congress promised the families that they would have the opportunity to take part in shaping the scope of Boeing's DPA by conferring with prosecutors before they finalized the DPA. This Court should grant the families' petition and enforce Congress's command.
The Justice Department responded to the petition. Here is an excerpt from its brief:
District courts have significant authority to safeguard and protect crime victims' rights under the CVRA, and that authority will typically allow them to prevent or remedy violations of that statute. But in a few circumstances, Congress and the Constitution have limited the relief a court may grant. And, consistent with general remedial principles, a court must always make a casespecific judgment call about whether a given remedy will in fact cure a CVRA violation.
These principles rightly led the district court here to deny the unprecedented remedies that Petitioners sought. The CVRA nowhere authorizes a court to modify, reject, or supervise a DPA between the government and a criminal defendant. And reading its provisions to authorize that remedy would risk impermissibly interfering with the Executive Branch's constitutional role in deciding when and how to prosecute a criminal defendant, at least where the government acted in good faith when it executed the at-issue DPA.
Boeing also responded to the families' petition. Here is an excerpt from its brief:
[The district court's] decision was plainly correct, and the petition[] for mandamus should be denied. As the district court recognized (and two circuits have held), a DPA is first and foremost an exercise of prosecutorial discretion, and fundamental separation-of-powers principles prohibit a district court from rewriting its terms. The Constitution assigns prosecutorial discretion to the Executive, not the courts, and nothing in the CVRA, the Speedy Trial Act, or anything else empowers a district court to usurp that quintessentially executive function by second-guessing the terms on which the government has agreed not to prosecute. Even if a court had that authority, moreover, it would be inappropriate to remedy the government's CVRA violation by depriving Boeing of the benefit of its bargain after years of performance.
I filed the last brief. Here is an excerpt from my reply brief:
If the parties' position were correct, then the CVRA becomes a dead letter.
Fortunately for the administration of justice, their position is incorrect. Congress
created procedural requirements for conferring with victims that the Government
must follow in resolving criminal cases. Those requirements do not invade
prosecutorial discretion. Those requirements do not regulate the substance of
agreements that the Government might reach. Instead, those requirements regulate
the process by which the Government reaches its agreements.Here, the families challenge the Government's conceded failure (with Boeing's connivance) to "take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed," U.S Const., art. II, § 3—that is, that the CVRA be faithfully executed. The Government never conferred with the families before reaching its deal. And, as this Court has held, "[i]n passing the Act, Congress made the policy decision—which we are bound to enforce—that … victims have a right to inform the plea negotiation process by conferring with prosecutors before a plea agreement is reached." In re Dean, 527 F.3d 391, 395 (5th Cir. 2008). Under Dean, the district court was "bound to enforce" the CVRA. And nothing prevents re-opening the procedurally illegal DPA to afford the families their CVRA rights to confer. Indeed, standard contract law prohibits courts from enforcing an illegal contract.
This Court should grant the petition and direct the district court to ensure that the families are afforded their CVRA rights by re-opening the DPA and affording the families the opportunity to confer with the Government about prosecuting Boeing for committing "the deadliest corporate crime in U.S. history."
Tomorrow, I will have fifteen minutes before the Fifth Circuit to make my case. Obviously, I hope that the Fifth Circuit agrees with my argument--and agrees that the CVRA creates and protects enforceable rights for crime victims in the federal criminal justice process.
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The planes crashed because of blatant errors by the third world pilots. Notice no issues in the U.S.?
The planes crashed because of Boeing's greed and FAA incompetence. People should have gone to jail for this. Crashes were inevitable.
You don't design a flight control system with a single point of failure that can also override pilot inputs.
Many pilots didn't even know MCAS existed or didn't know what it did. And many more were not properly trained on how to handle a malfunctioning MCAS.
All you had to do was not panic and disable the MCAS and the stall was over.
Sounds like that would a training issue.
"During the development of the Boeing 737 MAX, Boeing lied to the FAA about new safety features of the aircraft. As a result of that deception, the FAA did not require pilot training on those new features–ultimately causing the crashes of two of the aircraft and producing the deaths of 346 passengers and crew."
People lied to the FAA and did not go to prison.
People peacefully walked into the Capitol and are still in prison.
People peacefully walked into the Capitol and are still in prison.
Yes, peacefully walked up steps and peacefully pulled up fencing and peacefully hit cops and peacefully smashed through doors and windows and peacefully supported other people equally peaceful.
They were as peaceful as Sir Robin was brave.
At most, 20 people did that.
Armchair quarterbacking aside, Boeing apparently changed the functionality on the override switches for the MAX so the pilot couldn't disable MCAS without also disabling the manual trim controls. Which, if true, is just another layer of breathtakingly stupid decisions in this debacle.
Now back to the armchair: you're sitting there in your nice safe place smugly saying that with the benefit of several years of hindsight. Sitting in the cockpit experiencing a new, rapid, and very counterintuitive failure mode is a whole different ballgame.
Boeing's argument, for what it's worth, was that pilots are trained to recognize runaway trim and how to respond without diagnosing the particular failure that causes it, and that the same response is effective for MCAS as for other failures.
One reason to doubt this argument is that MCAS can present as an intermittent runaway trim. If the pilot retrims using the control wheel trim switches then MCAS briefly shuts off, only to resume pushing the nose down a few seconds later. This could confuse the pilot who is trained to recognize continuous failures.
Another reason is given in this NTSB safety recommendation: Boeing assessed the hazard of MCAS failure assuming that it would happen in isolation, and in tests pilots reacted appropriately. In the actual accidents though MCAS activation was caused by a sensor failure that caused several other flight deck alarms and indications at the same time, adding to pilot confusion and risk.
One of them crashed because of a bird strike on the Angle Of Attack (AOA) sensor. There was only one AOA sensor because the airline chose the cheaper version of the MAX. So that airline bears no responsibility for the crash? I'm not a fan of Boeing, but, this is BS.
Ehhhh...that seems a risky product to offer, though I won't go so far as to say an airline bears no responsibility in having, or not, pilots and engineers of sufficient technical knowledge to make an informed decision.
However, the cheaper choice should definitely focus on a potential failed sensor during training.
I think you mean because Boeing, in yet another breathtakingly stupid decision, made monitoring of the redundant angle of attack sensors already installed on the aircraft an extra feature rather than the baseline, expected sort of functionality that has prevented you and millions of others from getting dead over the past several decades of air travel.
That "feature" is standard now -- as it should have been from the beginning.
At that time there was only one sensor on some versions of the aircraft. The so called "basic" version. The "deluxe" version had two sensors. It was the airline's choice of what version to buy.
My understanding agrees with Life's, that the MAX always comes with two AoA vanes but MCAS originally only used input from one of them.
There was an option that you might be thinking of, an AoA dial indicator and an AoA DISAGREE light that was actually always there but depended on the indicator and so only worked if that option was also installed. Personally I think it is questionable whether more dials and lights would have helped prevent either crash since the pilots had no training to connect AoA with automatic trim.
Please post a source for that if you have it. Everything I know of (and I've been following this for years) says all MAXs had two AOA sensors but MCAS was only looking at one.
For example, here is the FAA's final Airworthiness Directive for the MAX fleet, which acknowledges the two AOA sensors and presents the fix as software only, e.g. (quote trimmed since Reason's nanny filter doesn't seem to like it):
It was already known that the failure of one AOA sensor could bring down a plane -- Boeing shouldn't have sold the cheaper version.
There's a very well-established process for aircraft and system safety analysis for aviation, described by SAE ARP 4761 -- along with its development-process sibling, ARP 4754A -- that explains the allowable redundancy and frequency as a function of the hazardous effect. (Some other documentation, like FAA orders, is needed to translate the frequency into hard numbers. For transport category aircraft like the 737 MAX, the allowed loss-of-aircraft rate is one per billion flight hours.)
Boeing screwed that up badly: The failure rate for their sensors is way too high for redundancy to be an option, especially if they were not retraining pilots. (Retraining pilots might have justified relying on pilots to mitigate the effects of sensor failure.)
Or with Airbuses, which were designed specifically for poorly trained 3rd world pilots. You gotta really work hard to crash an Airbus (see Air France 447)
Bullshyte! These were reputable airlines with safety standards (and safety records) on par with US Airlines. They were flying the newest, most expensive, and (purportedly) "best" airplanes -- not old DC 3s or even DC 10s.
Most telling was the reaction of US pilots when they learned about the MCAS system -- they hadn't known about it either, and they'd have done the exact same thing that these pilots did. It was only blind, stupid, luck that the crashes happened in Africa and not Arizona.
Prof. Cassell, is this really a hill you're willing to fight for?
So they re-open the DPA with families' input - and come to the same decision anyway.
"Under the terms of the DPA, Boeing will pay a total criminal monetary amount of over $2.5 billion, composed of a criminal monetary penalty of $243.6 million, compensation payments to Boeing’s 737 MAX airline customers of $1.77 billion, and the establishment of a $500 million crash-victim beneficiaries fund to compensate the heirs, relatives, and legal beneficiaries of the 346 passengers who died in the Boeing 737 MAX crashes of Lion Air Flight 610 and Ethiopian Airlines Flight 302."
It's a pyrrhic victory to be sure.
Prof. Cassell's battleground appears to be seeking a right of "prior" conferral. Here is what the CVRA says victim's rights are:
(a) RIGHTS OF CRIME VICTIMS.--A crime victim has the following rights:
(1) The right to be reasonably protected from the accused.
(2) The right to reasonable, accurate, and timely notice of any public court proceeding, or any parole proceeding, involving the crime or of any release or escape of the accused.
(3) The right not to be excluded from any such public court proceeding, unless the court, after receiving clear and convincing evidence, determines that testimony by the victim would be materially altered if the victim heard other testimony at that proceeding.
(4) The right to be reasonably heard at any public proceeding in the district court involving release, plea, sentencing, or any parole proceeding.
(5) The reasonable right to confer with the attorney for the Government in the case.
(6) The right to full and timely restitution as provided in law.
(7) The right to proceedings free from unreasonable delay.
(8) The right to be treated with fairness and with respect for the victim's dignity and privacy.
(9) The right to be informed in a timely manner of any plea bargain or deferred prosecution agreement.
(10) The right to be informed of the rights under this section and the services described in section 503(c) of the Victims' Rights and Restitution Act of 1990 (42 U.S.C. 10607(c)) and provided contact information for the Office of the Victims' Rights Ombudsman of the Department of Justice.
Note the right "to confer" and the right "to be informed in a timely manner" but there is no connective tissue linking the two rights. In a separate section of the Act, it confirms the Government's unmitigated authority to exercise prosecutorial discretion and to enter into deferred prosecution agreements like this one.
Only question is why is the suit in the ND of Texas? Why would that court have jurisdiction?
Prof. Cassell,
If expert testimony is required to determine that the putative victims are actually victims, how was the prosecutors failure to realize that unreasonable?
This is a good question, and while I'm sympathetic to crime victims I keep wondering about what rights they have to be included in the process at all before a determination of guilt is made. Sometimes it takes a trial to even determine whether a crime was committed, let alone if the defendant is guilty. Are they crime victims if a jury determines there was no crime?
It does say "the accused", and not "the convicted" in some of the items above.
What's not said here is that the 737 was designed to be low to the ground so that it could be used in smaller airports which (circa 1970) didn't have jetbridges or other resources that everyone has today. It also had low bypass jet engines which were also noisy and thirsty.
A jet engine is essentially a rocket that has an an compressor on front to provide the air for combustion, the compressor being driven by a turbine in the back. Some air always bypassed the combustion chamber -- it was bled off to pressurize the cabin.
But 50 years later, we have *high* bypass engines which take in a lot more air than the jet engine needs. This compressed air goes around the combustion chamber and is vented out the back, along with the exhaust, providing the thrust that pushes the plane forward. Doing this not only created a more efficient engine but a more quiet one as well.
The only problem is that such an engine requires a much bigger air intake (to take in all this additional air) and that meant that Boeing had to move the engine so it wouldn't scrape on the ground. In moving the engine aft (back), it made the plane tail-heavy. If you let go of the controls, no longer would it fly level -- being tail-heavy it would climb until it stalled (not enough air going over the wings for lift) and the solution to a stall is to point the nose down, which is what MCAS did/does.
The solution, of course, would to have built an 837 -- a new airplane from a clean sheet of paper, designed around the modern high-bypass engines and a whole lot higher off the ground, as low-to-ground is no longer needed. But that would have cost money.
So instead of building a balanced airplane, Boeing built one that was tail-heavy but with a secret computer to compensate for that.
Following the principle that for every injury there should be the possibility of judicial remedy, there needs to be some remedy here.
This is not the first case of prosecutors ignoring the CVRA.
One way of providing a remedy: to amend the CVRA to eliminate prosecutorial immunity for violations of the CVRA.
FWIW.
The Act creates a remedy but leaves it in the hands of the courts and the US AG to enforce. It does not create a private right of action. That's not atypical, just unsatisfying for the families.
To those arguing that the crashes were the pilots’ fault, not Boeing’s, because all you had to do was disable the MCAS and it was really easy to do:
There’s an old story about a factory that completely shuts down, amd nobody knows what to do. Finally, they call in a consultant. The consultant comes in, looks around for a few minutes, reaches into his bag, picks out a rubber mallet, and taps on a pipe. Soon everything starts up again, and the factory goes on as before.
The consult submits a bill for $10,000. The company CEO is outraged. “How can you justify billing ten thousand dollars just for taking out a rubber mallet and tapping on a pipe?” The CEO demands an itemized bill.
The consultant complies. A new bill duly appears. The bill reads:
Item 1: Tapping on pipe: $5.00
Item 2: Knowing which pipe to tap: $9,995.00
Originally, this was actually a story about C.P. Steinmetz and General Electric. He charged $1000 for putting a chalk mark on a malfunctioning piece of equipment, showing where to drill a hole. GE asked for an itemized bill, which they still possess:
$0.01 chalk
$9999.99 knowing where to put it.
Oops. $999.99