The Volokh Conspiracy
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An Unusual Supreme Court Split in Bittner v. United States
The Bank Secrecy Act divides the justices in an unusual way, and Justice Barrett authors her fourth opinion in an argued case.
Today the Supreme Court decided Bittner v. United States. Splitting 5-4, the Court concluded that the Bank Secrecy Act's $10,000 maximum penalty for the nonwillful failure to file a compliant report accrues on a per-report, not a per-account, basis. Justice Gorsuch wrote for the Court, joined by the Chief Justice and Justices Alito, and Kavanaugh in part, and Justice Jackson in full. Justice Barrett dissented, joined by Justices Thomas, Sotomayor and Kagan.
To say this is an unusual split among the justices is an understatement. The Court did not divide along clear ideological or methodological lines. There are conservative and liberal justices on both sides of the decision.
Justice Gorsuch's opinion for the Court begins as follows:
The Bank Secrecy Act and its implementing regulations require certain individuals to file annual reports with the federal government about their foreign bank accounts. The statute imposes a maximum $10,000 penalty for nonwillful violations of the law. But recently a question has arisen. Does someone who fails to file a timely or accurate annual report commit a single violation subject to a single $10,000 penalty? Or does that person commit separate violations and incur separate $10,000 penalties for each account not properly recorded within a single report?
The answer makes a difference, especially for immigrants who hold accounts abroad and Americans who make their lives outside the country. On one view, penalties accrue on a per-report basis. So, for example, a single late-filed report disclosing the existence of 10 accounts may yield a maximum fine of $10,000. On another view, penalties multiply on a per-account basis, so the same report can invite a fine of $100,000 even if the individual's foreign holdings or total net worth do not approach that amount. Because the Ninth Circuit read the law one way and the Fifth Circuit the other, we agreed to take this case.
His opinion concludes:
Best read, the BSA treats the failure to file a legally compliant report as one violation carrying a maximum penalty of $10,000, not a cascade of such penalties calculated on a per-account basis. Because the Fifth Circuit thought otherwise, we reverse its judgment and remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
The Chief Justice and Justices Alito and Kavanaugh joined all of Justice Gorsuch's opinion save for a subpart of the opinion that relied upon the rule of lenity. Only Justice Jackson joined that portion of the opinion.
Justice Barrett's dissent begins:
Alexandru Bittner, an American citizen, held as much as $16 million across more than 50 bank accounts in Romania, Switzerland, and Liechtenstein. He acknowledges that the Bank Secrecy Act (BSA) and its implementing regulations required him to report his interest in these accounts to the Federal Government annually. Bittner also admits that he failed to comply with that requirement for five consecutive years. Because he failed to report 272 accounts, the Government concluded that he violated the law 272 times and assessed a penalty for each violation. Bittner, on the other hand, argued that he violated the law just five times—once for each annual form that he failed to file.
The Court agrees with Bittner and holds that the failure to file a legally compliant form is a single violation, no matter how many accounts a citizen fails to report. I respectfully disagree. The most natural reading of the statute establishes that each failure to report a qualifying foreign account constitutes a separate reporting violation, so the Government can levy penalties on a per-account basis.
This dissent is Justice Barrett's fourth opinion in an argued case so far this term. She has issued two majority opinions and two dissents in argued cases when some justices have yet to issue a single one. This is more evidence that Justice Barrett is the Court's quickest opinion writer.
It is also interesting that this is another case in which Justices Gorsuch and Barrett have authored dueling opinions. As I noted last June, these two justices have disagreed more than one might have expected, authoring opinions disagreeing with each other's analyses in a surprising number of cases. Indeed, last term, Justice Gorsuch dissented from two-thirds of Justice Barrett's majority opinions. We will see if this division persists this term.
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A classic example of a case in which it is more important to decide one way or the other as opposed to any particular way. And since it’s a statutory case, if Congress believes the Court got it wrong, or simply wishes to change its mind, it can fix things itself.
A classic example of a case in which it is more important to decide one way or the other as opposed to any particular way.
Why?
So that courts and prosecutors will know how to approach these cases, so that cases will be handled consistently, and so that account holders and their lawyers will know what their obligations are, what they risk if they violate them, and whether it is worth their while to go to court or better to settle.
Justice Brandeis said it best: “In most matters, it is more important that the applicable rule of law be settled than that it be settled right.”
Maybe I misunderstood the point you were tryingto make. I took you to be saying this issue was particularly important to have resolved consistently. Whereas to me, it seems like the value of consistency on this issue is unusually unimportant compared to the value of getting the correct answer.
No; you understood his point correctly. You just disagree. (And you’re wrong, except of course from the perspective of the defendant in this particular case.)
The point of the US justice system isn’t justice, but convenience for lawyers and judges?
Why am I not surprised that you would say that.
Quite the opposite. I don’t think this was a case where it was important to resolve it in any particular way. What I think was important was to resolve it, period. Either rule would be fine; we just need to know one way or the other. Like driving on the left or on the right. It’s more important that we all know what side of the road to drive on than that we drive on any particular side.
.
!
I get weary of commentaries that focus on the presumed politics of the opinion writers rather than the merits of the case. If it is something striking, say Alito and Sotomayor switching sides on a criminal procedure case, I sort of get it. But by now we ought to be used to the idea that Kagan will sometimes vote “conservative” and Gorsuch will sometimes vote “liberal.” Judges generally take their oaths seriously and call them as they see them.
Hall of Fame umpire Bill Klem was out drinking with his umpiring crew after a game. One ump boasted: “I call ’em like I see ’em.” Another replied: “I call ’em like they are.” They both turned to Klem, who said: “They ain’t nothin’ ’til I call ’em.”
🙂
In Bittner, Gorsuch writes:
But this Court has long said that courts may consider the consistency of an agency’s views when we weigh the persuasiveness of any interpretation it proffers in court. Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U. S. 134, 140 (1944).
In Roman Catholic Diocese, Gorsuch (concurring) writes:
Not only did the South Bay concurrence address different circumstances than we now face, that opinion was mistaken from the start. To justify its result, the concurrence reached back 100 years in the U. S. Reports to grab hold of our decision in Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U. S. 11 (1905).
Since reading that passage in Roman Catholic Diocese I have wondered how far back in the U.S. Reports is too far for Gorsuch. His Bittner opinion, which reaches back 79 years in the U.S. Reports to grab hold of the Court’s decision in Skidmore, indicates that the line is somewhere between 79 years (good) and 100 years (bad).
Doesn’t anyone proofread Prof. Adler’s posts?
There have been multiple spelling errors in his last few posts that stick out.
I’m a lot more interested in the character of his content than the specific characters he uses to convey the content.
It’s a blog post not a law journal article, the whole point is not to have the overhead of proofreaders or editors.
But I’d hope he’s similarly lenient when grading papers where there isn’t time for to spell check and edit.
Many years ago I had TA that would mark me down for spelling on essay questions in an upper division economics course, I had to talk to him about that telling him that 2 or 3 spelling errors were costing me more points on a test than my content. He saw my point.
Barrett couldn’t be more off base. Her entire opinion rests on the proposition that a single “account” at a bank is a “relation,” and therefore a failure to file a report that includes multiple accounts is a violation for every account because the statute “require[s] a . . . citizen of the United States . . . to keep records, file reports, or keep records and file reports, when the . . . person makes a transaction or maintains “a relation” . . . with a foreign financial agency.” This interpretation defies common sense (as well as the rules of statutory construction that the sane Justices rely on in the opinion of the court); when I open an account at a bank, I establish a relationship with that bank. I do not establish another relationship with the same bank if I open another account; I just acquire a second account at the same bank with whom I already have a business relationship. It is unfathomable to me how a person of Justice Barrett’s intelligence could reach such a mindless conclusion, or how three other Justices could agree (although, in fact, I don’t have such high expectations from Justices Sotomayor or Kagan).
Congress should address this, perhaps by establishing a penalty including a percentage of the unreported asserts.
There is such a potential penalty… for willful violations. But these were not, and it makes no sense to penalize someone more for non-willful violations just because he has more money.
So, the guy makes an accident, an unwitting mistake…
And should be hit with a $2.7 Million dollar fine?
No.
One thing the current decisions mean is that purpose-based interpretation – what was the legislative purpose, as distinct from what does the text say – is far from dead.
5 votes for legislative history too!