The Volokh Conspiracy
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Today in Supreme Court History: November 14, 1922
11/14/1922: Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon argued.
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Hess v. Port Authority Trans-Hudson Corp., 513 U.S. 30 (decided November 14, 1994): Eleventh Amendment did not bar injured railroad workers’ suit in federal court against Port Authority, an entity wholly owned by New York and New Jersey and created under the Interstate Compact Clause (art. I, §10, clause 3); judgment against Port Authority would not be collectible against either state
Key v. Doyle, 434 U.S. 59 (decided November 14, 1977): District of Columbia statute restricting religious bequests was not a “statute of the United States” and therefore no direct appeal to the Court from decision of the District of Columbia Court of Appeals striking down the statute on First Amendment grounds (this is the highest local D.C. court, created in 1970, not the federal-system D.C. Circuit Court with which D.C. appeals had been entangled); appeal can only be heard via certiorari, which is denied (the Court was parsing the language of the former version of 28 U.S.C. §1257, which required the Court to hear highest-court decisions striking down “statutes of the United States”; in 1988 the statute was changed to permit appeals only by cert, all but eliminating the Court’s mandatory appellate jurisdiction)
Ward v. Village of Monroeville, Ohio, 409 U.S. 57 (decided November 14, 1972): Due Process violated when trial as to a traffic offense was held before mayor who was also responsible for village finances and therefore had an interest in imposing fines
There are still a lot of courts and court officers' retirement plans partially funded by the fines they collect.
I knew a guy who worked on a Navy base. There were no traffic fines. After too many guilty findings you couldn't drive on base any more. Some other bases ticket under the assimilative crimes act and you get as much fine or jail as for a state offense. The revenue doesn't go to the base commander so you can still be confident you got busted for offending the military's sense of order rather than to help fund a new bomber.
Interesting! So the law varies by base. Is the Commandant like a miniature Pope with absolute authority to make base rules?
Jeez, is there anybody who actually served anymore? it's usually called "Base Commander" so a Army or Marine Corpse Colonel, Navy Captain, or as they call them in the Air Force "Dave" (or Cindy, I'm joking about how laid back the Air Farce is/was, and that was before you could join the service as a "Bruce" with a penis and leave as a Caitlyn without one)
At Camp Lejeune it was one of the Military Police Officers (join the Marines and become a Cop?? WTF) who sat behind one of those ridiculous high desks stolen from a "Bowery Boys" set, no fines for minor traffic offenses, just had to listen to his lecture (I'd have rather paid) too many and you lost your Base driving privileges)
I was curious, so I looked up the case. The law voided religious bequests made less than 30 days before the person's death.
Yes. I didn’t put that in because my summary was already too long.
One can see the impetus behind such a law — it prevented churches (or preachers) from threatening a dying person with the flames of Hell unless they make a big donation. I wonder if there was a particular incident that prompted it.
According to the opinion, the law is rather old: "This provision originated in the Organic Act of 1801, 2 Stat. 103, ch. 15, § 1. It was amended by Congress as recently as 1965. 79 Stat. 688." So sounds more like just general worry about undue influence than a specific incident.
Thanks
RE: Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon
Facts of the case
Pennsylvania Coal Co. entered an agreement with H.J. Mahon in 1878 to gain full rights to mine the coal located beneath his surface-level property. However in 1921 the state of Pennsylvania passed the Kohler Act, which prohibited miners from extracting below-surface coal that supported surface-level buildings. When Pennsylvania Coal notified Mahon that it would mine coal beneath his property, Mahon filed suit in the Court of Common Pleas to prohibit mining in accordance with the Kohler Act. The court denied his suit but the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania reversed and allowed the ban on mining. Pennsylvania Coal contended that the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment protected its contractual rights to the coal.
Question
Did the Kohler Act restrict coal mining to an extent that violated the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment by depriving mine owners of coal without compensation?
Conclusion
Writing for an 8-1 Court, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes ruled that the Kohler Act violated the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment. He reasoned the state exceeded its police powers by significantly diminishing the value of the land estates without having a strong public interest reason to do so. The Court reasoned that "so far as private persons or communities have seen fit to take the risk of acquiring only surface rights, we cannot see that the fact that their risk has become a danger warrants the giving to them greater rights than they bought."
In dissent, Justice Brandeis argued for what is now called the nuisance exception: if a land use is itself noxious, dangerous, or causes a public nuisance, the legislature is free to regulate its use without compensation, even though the police power may cause great loss to the property owner. In this case, he reasoned, the police power applied insofar as the Kohler Act prohibited a noxious use of the subsidence of buildings. Brandeis further argued that the diminution-of-value test presented by the majority was flawed because value is relative and cannot be determined by a court of law. (oyez)
The facts above seem to be incorrect that PCC "gained full rights" and (at least according to wiki), "(i)n an 1878 deed, the Pennsylvania Coal Co. granted to H.J. Mahon the surface rights to a parcel of land, but retained the mining rights to the land, and Mahon accepted any risk from. . . ."
Well, I tend to think that "surface rights" should include the right to have the surface remain where it is instead of collapsing into a hole. At the point where you're modifying the surface how are you not impacting surface rights?
How the mine accomplished this would be entirely up to them, of course. But if owning mining rights minus surface rights allows destroying the surface, what remains of the latter?
Forgive me for being off topic.
A youngster who received “transition” care from Kaiser Permanente is suing on the theory that upon turning 18, a vitiated consent malpractice suit would lie. That seems established CA law, but this fact pattern may be new.
The British High Court ruled on similar facts that as matter of law, minors are not capable of informed consent in this realm, so law suits against doctors, hospitals are if anything won before filing.
The NHS closed their sole specialty clinic.