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Today in Supreme Court History: November 8, 1994
11/8/1994: U.S. v. Lopez argued.

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Greene v. Fisher, 565 U.S. 34 (decided November 8, 2011): "clearly established federal law" required for habeas does not include law established by Court in decision announced after state appeals on facts are exhausted
United States v. Olson, 546 U.S. 43 (decided November 8, 2005): FTCA claims extend only to torts for which state law holds private parties (not governmental entities) liable, and court must determine if state law provides private law analogies for the duties of governmental entities (here, mine inspectors)
U.S. Bancorp Mortgage Co. v. Bonner Mall Partnership, 513 U.S. 18 (decided November 8, 1994): federal courts don't automatically vacate judgments simply because a settlement has been reached; appeal dismissed as moot, so judgment stands (one imagines that the paying party didn't want to have a Satisfaction of Judgment filed because it might be seen as admitting liability)
RE: U.S. v. Lopez
Facts of the case
Alfonzo Lopez, a 12th grade high school student, carried a concealed weapon into his San Antonio, Texas high school. He was charged under Texas law with firearm possession on school premises. The next day, the state charges were dismissed after federal agents charged Lopez with violating a federal criminal statute, the Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990. The act forbids “any individual knowingly to possess a firearm at a place that [he] knows…is a school zone.” Lopez was found guilty following a bench trial and sentenced to six months’ imprisonment and two years’ supervised release.
Question
Is the 1990 Gun-Free School Zones Act, forbidding individuals from knowingly carrying a gun in a school zone, unconstitutional because it exceeds the power of Congress to legislate under the Commerce Clause?
Conclusion (5 - 4)
Yes. The possession of a gun in a local school zone is not an economic activity that might, through repetition elsewhere, have a substantial effect on interstate commerce. The law is a criminal statute that has nothing to do with “commerce” or any sort of economic activity. (Oyez)
PS.
Following the Lopez decision, Congress rewrote the Gun Free School Zones Act of 1990 in June 1995 with the necessary interstate-commerce “hook” used in other Federal Gun Laws. This includes an added requirement for prosecutors to prove during each prosecution case that the gun moved in or affected interstate or foreign commerce. The revised Federal Gun Free School Zones Act is currently in effect and has been upheld by several United States Appellate Courts. None of the convictions occurring under the revised law have been overturned as a result of the Lopez decision. (wiki)
It was a "magic words" decision; The Court was reminding Congress that they were required to recite the magic words asserting effects on commerce if they wanted to enact a criminal statute.
But it's my understanding they've been very careful indeed in who they bring charges against under the reenacted law, to avoid creating any good test cases.
Wow, really deterred the Uvalde murderer
It was never intended to do anything but render cities no-go zones for gun owners; The zone size combined with the average space between schools rendered it essentially impossible to go anywhere outside a rural area without violating the GFSZ act. You'd get pulled over for 30 in a 25 zone, and, wham, you're a felon because of a school on the other side of the block that you couldn't even see.
The one good thing we got out of the Lopez decision is that they didn't dare use it for that purpose, they had to restrict use of the act to genuine criminals in order to preserve it against review. It doesn't get used as a stand alone charge, so far as I know. Only when they've got you dead to rights on something else.
I believe the GFSZA specifically exempts anyone who possesses a valid license to carry issued by the state. At the time most states were no-issue or may-issue and valid licenses were hard to come by so it really didn't mean anything, even LEOSA didn't exist at the time.
The rise of shall-issue means more and more people are exempted, but most states still make schools a no-go zone. I believe there has also been some debate over whether a constitutional carry statute constitutes a "license" for the purposes of the GFSZA or not, and also whether "issued by the state" means any state, or just the one where the school zone in question is located.
As you note they have been careful to avoid charging anyone who would bring those questions before a court.
It also exempted you if you were on your own property which happened to be within the zone. It was litigated before Heller, but if they'd tried THAT, we might have gotten Heller earlier.
It was a “magic words” decision; The Court was reminding Congress that they were required to recite the magic words asserting effects on commerce if they wanted to enact a criminal statute.
Have you read the decision? It's not that at all, of course.
It's a gun decision at the Supreme court. Of course I've read it.
At the Court of Appeals level, "In reversing, the Court of Appeals held that, in light of what it characterized as insufficient congressional findings and legislative history,"; They forgot to speak the magic words.
At the Supreme court level, they objected to "piling inference on inference"; But why would they need to pile up inferences? "Second, § 922(q) contains no jurisdictional element that would ensure, through case-by-case inquiry, that the firearms possession in question has the requisite nexus with interstate commerce. "
They'd have had to infer it because Congress didn't speak the magic words.
The Court goes farther than that, saying that no set of legislative history would find sufficient federal nexus.
Which reads to me as explicitly no magic words.
And yet the law was amended to simply include the "magic words" and has stood ever since.
Perhaps the court tried to make it seem like more than a magic words case, but in effect it is that and nothing more.
the law was amended to simply include the “magic words” and has stood ever since
I don't find an additional element to the crime for a particular finding of federal nexus to be magic words.
Certainly not the Congressional finding language Brett seems to be contemplating.
It seems likely that any gun can be shown to have moved in or affected interstate commerce. The stretching done to remove the "whites only" sign from Ollie's Rib Restaurant is not nearly needed here.
Yeah, most guns have moved in, or had some de minimus effect on interstate commerce. Not all, but most.
Of course, it's a bit of a problem that the commerce cause only extends Congress' authority to the interstate commerce itself, not everything that might affect it. (Which is essentially everything, at the level we're talking here.)
Doesn't even have to have moved in commerce anymore, not after that Montana Firearms Freedom Act ruling (which came out of the 9th, but was based on Gonzales v. Raich)
Was appealed to SCOTUS, but denied cert.