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Could the Supreme Court Decide Moore v. Harper on Statutory Grounds?
An amicus brief by Professor Derek Muller suggests the justices need not confront the "Independent State Legislature" doctrine head on.
In December the Supreme Court will hear argument in Moore v. Harper, in which the justices have been asked to determine whether state courts may revise and redraw congressional districts to ensure compliance with state constitutional requirements. The petitioners argue such actions by state courts infringe upon the authority of state legislatures under Article I, section 4 of the Constitution. This argument, relying on what is often referred to as the "independent state legislature doctrine," has sparked concern that (Republican) state legislatures could adopt restrictive voting laws and extreme gerrymanders, even where doing so could transgress state constitutions (or, at the very least, state court interpretatins of state constitutional requirements).
Article I, section 4 reads as follows:
The Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof; but the Congress may at any time by Law make or alter such Regulations, except as to the Places of chusing Senators.
(There is also similar language concerning the selection of electors in Article II, section 1.)
Most of the debate over (and briefing in) Moore v. Harper focuses on the first part of Article I, section 4, and the reference to the power of the state legislature. Less attention as been focused on the remaining text, which grants power to Congress, and how this may hold the key to resolving Moore v. Harper and perhaps avoiding the need for the Court to resolve whether there is an independent state legislature doctrine and, if so, what it would entail.
Iowa law professor Derek Muller makes this argument in an amicus brief he has filed in Moore, in which he suggests that the easiest way to resolve Moore is to focus on how Congress has already exercised its Article I, section 4 power.
Here is the summary of his argument:
The petition for certiorari in this case presents the question whether the phrase "Legislature thereof" in the Elections Clause of the Constitution bars state courts from regulating the contours of Congressional redistricting pursuant to state constitutions. But Congress has spoken, too. It has regulated the manner of drawing congressional districts by federal statute. See 2 U.S.C. § 2c. Congressional redistricting in a State now takes place pursuant to this federal statutory directive, which contemplates a role for state courts applying state constitutions. This case, therefore, can and should be resolved by analyzing § 2c as a proper exercise of Congress's power under Article I, § 4 of the Constitution. The lower court did not address that question, which would obviate the need to address the broader issue raised by the petition. The North Carolina Supreme Court's decision should be affirmed on this alternative ground.
Muller has more to say about the brief at the Election Law Blog.
Resolving Moore on these grounds would enable the Court to avoid resolving a weighty constitutional issue unnecessarily, which the Court usually prefers to do. Among other things, it would enable the Court to sidestep the thorny question of how to understand the proper relationship between state legislatures and state courts in the context of election law. While there are serious questions as to whether Article I, section 4 should be understood to allow state legislatures to act independently of state constitutional constraints, there are also serious questions as to whether state constitutions were understood to empower state courts to enforce such limitations on state legislatures (as Muller discusses in this post). After all, Baker v. Carr and its state analogs can hardly be said to reflect originalist impulses.
If the Court resolves Moore on statutory grounds, as Muller suggests, the result may be anticlimactic, but that might be a feature, not a bug.
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If the court wanted to sidestep the issue, wouldn’t the easier path have been to simply not grant certiorari?
Can we not call it a doctrine? A doctrine is well-established. Res judicata is a doctrine. ISL is at best a theory.
That's too generous. At best it's a hypothesis.
"We love democracy, and The People mandated such power be wielded only by democracy. But we dislike democracy when The People choose wrongly. We must disable democracy so we can have democracy so we can disable democracy so we can have democracy...[fotzzzzzzz!!]"
The android's head tilted sideways and its flashing light went out. A little smoke came from its ears.
Captain Kirk straightened up and smiled. He had destroyed yet another idiotic robot using relentless, mercilous logic.
You know that the NC judges whose actions are under review are also democratically elected, right?
So "democratically" elected judges are then free to make undemocratic decisions?
Making sure legislative maps produce legislatures with a partisan makeup that generally reflects the partisan make-up of the Court is democratic.
And in Rucho the Court actually conceded that extreme gerrymandering is incompatible with democratic principles.
What exactly about their decision was undemocratic?
Same logic as I, not having the authority to jail or fine my neighbor for transgressing laws I wrote without his consent, can delegate that absent authority to government, where it suddenly appears as if by quantum tunneling magic.
Government is the idea that we hire thugs and thieves to protect ourselves from thugs and thieves.
And if I were a thug or a thief seeking to delegitimize the laws and throttle the government standing between me and whatever rape, murder or mayhem I cared to inflict on my neighbors, I too would be making exactly this argument.
spoken like a true believer of the “peaceful protests” of 2020 that left hundreds injured or dead, billions in damages and thousands of lives destroyed.
And that to your ilk was all fine.
Jan 6th wasn't THAT bad. Though it had ambitions...
I’m listening to a course on this! Turns out there have been some thoughts on this since Hobbes.
Look into the social contract and how it deals with free agents and why.
Bottom line, you have stumbled into a philosophy wherein all government of all sizes is illegitimate.
any examination of rights systems, utility, necessity, efficiency, all indicate individual consent of the governed is bad and dumb.
Don’t go sovereign citizen; it gets weird pretty quick.
Not clear what your complaint is, Krayt, given that the objective of ISL advocates is to undermine democracy, or rather to continue undermining it.
No, no. You're not getting it. State legislatures are always presumed to be elected by the "will of the people." So, when they enact laws that make it harder to vote them out, it must have been the "will of the people" to make it that way! Democracy in action!
I sure as heck do not love democracy.
Voting equals nothing more than deciding the level of tyranny that will be imposed on others and yourself.
Any action, other than self defense and the defense of others, by government that is not voluntary is tyranny.
Government can only be the substitution of a common force for individual forces and this common force is to do only what the individual forces have a natural and lawful right to do: to protect persons and liberties; to maintain the right of each.
“Voting … that is not voluntary is tyranny.”
That is what your point boils down to, once you remove the extraneous bits. Can you elaborate? It seems like a contradiction since voting is voluntary.
Either you purposely misunderstand or failed to make myself clear. I do not mean to imply the act of voting is involuntary.
The act of voting is an act of imposing your ideas on others.
Of course, that would apply to *any* legislature. It’s just that at this moment it’s only the MAGA lege’s who want to.
Lotta weight on two words, “by law”.
Branch v. Smith "we affirm the injunction on the basis of the District Court's principal stated ground that the state-court plan had not been precleared". Court didn't actually consider that the "state-court" had jurisdiction, it was just an assumption.
Courts and unelected bureaucrats should not have the power to alter election law, nor redraw legislative maps.
But what if the election law or the maps violate state or Federal constitutions? Or are citizens supposed to resort to 2A solutions?
The timing and similarity of our comments is eerie.
Checks and balances would be the court requiring a new map being made by the Legislature.
The court making it on their own usurps power from the Legislature.
No unelected state official should ever be able to change election rules on their own power, no matter how much an emergency they may claim.
Once again: the state judges here were elected.
For different purposes.how do you not recognize that...wait, marxist preferences by any means necessary. Got it.
DMN is a huge Marxist, you figured it out!
What do you think the word "marxist" even means?
Not addressing the fundamental issue. What if the legislation violates the state or Federal constitution?
For example, suppose the state constitution says "all citizens of the state who are eligible to vote shall have equal opportunity to vote" and the legislature passes a bill which states that all counties which voted for party A shall have only one polling station, open on election day only, while all counties which voted for party B shall have as many polling stations as the state director of voting deems necessary and shall be open for the 7 days up to and including election day.
This is clearly a violation of the state constitution, yet according to you, nothing shall be done about it.
Presumably because atm you think that your party is the Party B in the hypothetical, and you're fine with that.
No no no. It's a jurisdictional matter. The State Constitution governs State Elections and requires State Laws which include all branches of State government to enact. Article 1 sec 4 of THE LAW OF THE LAND specifically grants the power to the State Legislature but those "Regulations" are subject to Congress' Laws which by extension involve federal courts. I can provide more proof directly from the Constitution but wish to avoid making really long posts.
That leaves the fox guarding the henhouse. If a majority of the people don't like the partisan gerrymander, how can they vote the bums out?
Is it by using all the guns?
The court can demand a new one be made, but not make one themselves.
So, the state courts can order the farmer to do a better job of guarding the chickens, but then, it can’t do anything about it when he doesn’t. The chickens themselves are supposed to hold the farmer accountable, I guess. That about sum it up?
The key issue is deciding what "a better job" means.
This is the losing side bleating we don't like democracy anymore.
See California for the shoe on the other foot.
It's not a doctrine.
A federal appellate judge taught us the rule, doctrine, principle hierarchy decades ago. I forget most of it. But I can still recognize that this is not a doctrine, except in the wishful thinking of sloppy advocates and partisan hacks.
A nice turn of phrase, there, Rev. I'll have to keep that one at the ready for my next meeting!
The Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof; but the Congress may at any time by Law make or alter such Regulations, except as to the Places of chusing Senators.
The second bit gives Congress the power to make or alter regulations governing the times, places and manner of holding elections, overriding any regulations made by the state legislatures.
But it does not give Congress the power to require state legislatures, when exercising their own Art 1.4 power, to act in any particular way or by any particular means.
So if Congress itself imposes an election regulation, that trumps state regulations. But if Congress imposes a regulation on how states should make state regulations about elections, that's outwith Congress' Art 1.4 power. If Congress wants to make election rules, it has to make them itself.
Art 1.4 does not contain any Congressional commandeering power over state legislatures. It's just an overtrumping power.
So if Congress itself imposes an election regulation, that trumps state regulations. But if Congress imposes a regulation on how states should make state regulations about elections, that’s outwith Congress’ Art 1.4 power. If Congress wants to make election rules, it has to make them itself.
That doesn't make much sense to me. It basically would make much of the Voting Rights Act unconstitutional. (That might sound good to some Justices, though.) It also doesn't fit with how the Supremacy Clause is usually applied elsewhere, as far as I can tell. The whole point of the Supremacy Clause is that states cannot enact laws that contradict federal law.
The VRA is an exercise of 14th/15th amendment power, not (or not just) Elections Clause power.
An excellent distinction! Either Congress makes an election Law or the State makes an election Law. There’s no third position where Congress gets to say that an individual State’s Law isn’t any good and therefore must be overturned. Any law Congress passes applies to every State. The federal Government isn’t a “super-legislature”, it is a separate — but co-equal — branch.
I suggest that a federal law to the effect that every State must pass election laws that conform to their own constitution would be more than enough to empower state supreme courts to have the right of review.
I think this argument has flaws.
It’s one thing to say Congress can override state legislatures and enact national standards for registering, conducting elections, and districting, simply preempting state legislative rules.
It’s another to say that Congress can dictate the allocation of legislative power within a state on matters left to the state legislature’s discretion. Could Congress say that state supreme courts will henceforth exercise a state’s entire legislative power on election matters? I don’t think so. Then what gives it the power to allocate to state supreme courts any legislative power at all?
I think that the federal constitution’s framers contemplated that states would have state constitutions limiting or guiding state legislative power, and it’s just as legitimate for state supreme courts to interpret the state constitution’s limits on state legislative power as it is for the federal supreme court to interpret the federal constitution’s limits on Congress’ power.
Perhaps there are limits to that. Perhaps a state constitution can’t entirely take away the state legislature’s power over congressional elections or Presidential and Vice-Presidential elector appointments.
But state constitutions have long imposed rules on districtings with requirements like using whole counties (or at least contiguous areas), rules that 1-person-1-vote considerations often trump but whoch remain when they don’t.
The “doctrine” here that syate constitutions cannot impose any rules at all on how legislatures conduct districting has no warrant in constitutional tect or history nor in longstanding practice.
It’s a pure power grab by people desperate to avoid being voted out of office and hence desperate to avoid being bound by anti-gerrymandering rules of a sort long regarded as reasonable and appropriate limitations on the politically kleptomanic tendencies of incumbents.
Could Congress say that state supreme courts will henceforth exercise a state’s entire legislative power on election matters? I don’t think so. Then what gives it the power to allocate to state supreme courts any legislative power at all?
The core conflicts, as I see them, under the ISL theory, are how to hold state legislatures accountable for following the federal and their own state constitutions. The strongest form of this ISL would seem to allow state legislatures carte blanche to violate the 14th, 15th, and 19th Amendments, since no court could impose any effective remedy if they did. If all a court could do was to send the issue back to the legislature for a do-over, then what actually happens if they keep passing laws that violate the federal or state constitutions? Or just refuse to act? How are elections supposed to be run in a constitutional way then?
That is the problem with the case against the state courts having maps drawn. I really just lets the current dominant parties of state legislatures get away with violating their own constitutions by enacting laws that give them advantages in holding power.
But of course, ISL is not the only alternative to Congress getting to dictate how states run their internal affairs, so ISL being flawed, which I agree with, doesn’t mean Congress has this power. It’s a false dichotomy.
As I see things, many conservative legal minds seem to want the separation of powers to be absolute much more than it was designed to be. That causes the checks on each branch's power from other branches to become weak, or even non-existent, though. This is most clear when it comes to the ability of the judiciary to check the other branches. It is already the weakest, in its inherent powers, when it comes to providing checks against the other branches. It has no inherent ability to make the other branches follow its rulings. It has no one employed by it to enforce any of its orders, nor can it do anything to fund itself. If legislatures and executives simply choose to ignore courts, then the courts are powerless to do anything about it.
The ISL advocates seem to want to make that explicit when it comes to states running elections. ISL theory would give state legislatures every incentive to simply ignore their own state courts and implement whatever election laws they want, no matter how undemocratic they are, since no one would be able to replace those unconstitutional laws with anything else.
Now, in other areas, a court or executive not being able to impose 'law' without a legislature acting, is a reasonable way to separate powers, because the people still have the ability to hold the legislators accountable for violating constitutions. But when it comes to violating voting rights, that doesn't work. It turns the current legislature into the sovereign over elections, rather than the people themselves.
Easiest way to solve this: stop using single-member districts and adopt multi-member districts which are much larger with legislators chosen using the principle of proportional representation (PR).
Expand the House to about 1100 members so 3 is the minimum from the least populated states. PR renders Gerrymandering an exercise in useless futility when all parties gain seats in proportion to the votes and if those voters are pushed to another district, it raises the portion of seats in that other district allocated to the party Gerrmandered out of another district. In the end, the numbers generally come out the same.
Members of Congress elected under the current system have used their authority over "time, place, and manner" to literally outlaw doing this. Because why would they be confident they'd be the winners under such a system?
Personally, I'd keep districts, but award voting weights to all the candidates in proportion to their vote share. (Which any candidates under 10% vote share being limited to voting remotely, rather than getting an office in DC.)
"Personally, I’d keep districts, but award voting weights to all the candidates in proportion to their vote share."
The beauty of having districts is that ballot stuffing in one district has no effect on the result in other districts which do not suffer from ballot stuffing. The cheatin' is confined (though not for statewide elections.) Your scheme would mean that the ballot stuffers of Philadelphia would reap a rich reward for their ballot stuffing, way beyond the benefit of winning a Philadelphia district (which they'd win anyway.)
This after all is the whole point of the National Popular Vote. Ballot stuffing in California and four or five large cities around the country can decide the whole thing.
This is why they build ships with watertight compartments. You want to contain the leaks.
While in theory there is no Federal common law, a state Court of Common Law can create judge-made law or common law. Isn't the judiciary part of the legislative apparatus (or legislature) of a state?
I'm not sure you need to go as far as musing about the judiciary and the common law.Just consider the state executve branch. In most States the Governor is part of the legislative apparatus, because the Governor usually has a veto. That doesn't quite make the Governor a legislator, but it's at least legislation-adjacent. So conceptually there's no difficulty in accepting that parts of the state government other than the legislative branch can have some role in the legislative process.
But "Isn’t the judiciary part of the legislative apparatus (or legislature) of a state?" reveals the fly in the ointment. Because the "legislative process" and the "legislature" are not the same thing.
The legislature is the official lawmaking institution and neither the Governor nor the courts are part of it. Likewise the legislature remains the legislature when it is performing non-legislative activities, such as confirming nominees. Just as the Governor remains the Governor when he or she is performing non-executive activities - such as vetoing legislation.
It’s hilarious calling it an independent theory. The executive of a State can demand the return of a fugitive from another state. The State Legislature or State judicial branch cannot overrule such a demand nor force the demand if an executive doesn’t make such a demand. That appears to me to be the Constitution granting a power to the executive branch of a State independently so why would the Legislature of a State be treated differently when specifically and indepently named in the Constitution grant of power? Could a State Executive or State judicial branch have vetoed or overruled the choice of a Senator from a State made by the Legislature thereof under Article 1 Sec 3? No but the Senate itself could by a 2/3 vote under A1S5. Can the exec or jud branch veto or overrule the ratification of an Amendment? I don’t think so. The 17th Amendment permits the exec of a State to fill vacancies in the Senate: Provided the Legislature thereof has empowered them to do so “until the People fill the vacancies by election as the Legislature may direct.” The only mention of State judicial Officers contained in the Constitution is in Article 6 where they shall be bound by Oath or affirmation to support the Constitution that otherwise doesn’t acknowledge their existence. In State Elections are a State Constitutional matter controlled by State Laws subject to the other branches. If you understand the US Constitution those other State branches are insignificant and barely mentioned because they are nearly irrelevent to federal Constitution.
This Constitutional confusion has a source. Congress set the date for federal elections under A1S4 power. States long ago decided that most if not all of their in state Elections will be held on the same day and ballots as a cost saving measure vs having separate elections with separate ballots. This put the federal elections that are supposed to be governed by the US Constitution, Congress’ Laws and Article 3 Courts on the same ballots as the State Elections that are governed by the State Constitutions which require State Laws subject to veto by the executive branch and review by the judicial branch of the State. The parties then use State referendums as a motivator to get their voters to fill out ballots to pass the State referendums and then why not go ahead and vote for the federal elections that are conviently located on the same piece of paper. How many federal officials are in office because large numbers of people in a State wanted, oh let’s say marijuana legalized in their State or other items of interest like “anti gerrymandering non-partisan districting commissions” or mail in voting etc? That number is most likely incalculable. The fastest remedy would be for Congress to mandate under Article 1 section 4 power that the federal elections be held on singular ballots separate from State Elections. Election challenges on the separate elections going properly to the separate judicial branches that have jurisdiction over said elections.
What an interesting idea.
Professor Muller is correct if you believe cl. 2 of §4 of Article I (“but the Congress may at any time by Law make or alter such Regulations,”). But, is Professor Muller is incorrect if you believe Cl 1 of the same (“”[t]he Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof[]”)?
How could this be? Could there be a paradox lurking in the Constitution?
The assertion that the State legislatures function by authority outside of, beyond, their State lawmaking function, must mean that the cl 1 gives them Constitutional authority (see Hawke v. Smith). But, the cl.2 gives authority to Congress to act by Law, “Congress may … by Law make or alter such Regulations,” (the “such Regulations refers to the first clause). And, the authority of Congress is always inferior to that of the Constitution .
If the Constitution gives its authority, by mandate of the first clause of §4, to the State legislatures; there is an unavoidable and irreconcilable conflict of authorities between the Constitution-endowed State legislatures and the Constitution’s proclamation in the second clause of §4 that Congress by Law may “make or alter such Regulations” that had been made by the legislatures.
Consequently, why go the Muller route by being statutory when there is such a simple solution — a paradox in the plenary power interpretation and that would be a direct affront to the Constitution.