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The Increasingly Dangerous Variants of the "Most-Favored-Nation" Theory of Religious Liberty, Part II: The Origins of MFN
The present doctrinal development begins with Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye v. Hialeah (1993), in which the Court invalidated a ban on animal sacrifice. The Court had previously held that there was no right to religious exemptions from neutral laws. But this law wasn't neutral. It targeted an unpopular religion of Caribbean immigrants. The laws, the Court concluded, were "drafted with care to forbid few killings but those occasioned by animal sacrifice." The state said that it had a legitimate interest in preventing cruelty to animals. The Court retorted that the city "devalues religious reasons for killing by judging them to be of lesser import than nonreligious reasons."
In Hialeah, animals could be killed, sometimes painfully, for all sorts of nonreligious reasons. Live rabbits were used to train greyhounds. The city's laws, the Court said, "fail to prohibit nonreligious conduct that endangers these interests in a similar or greater degree than Santeria sacrifice does." That showed an impermissible purpose. "The record in this case compels the conclusion that suppression of the central element of the Santeria worship service was the object of [Hialeah's] ordinances."
The claim in Lukumi built on language in Smith distinguishing earlier cases in which it had overturned state refusals of unemployment benefit to claimants who refused work for religious reasons. Where there is "a system of 'individualized governmental assessment of the reasons for the relevant conduct,'" the Smith court had declared, government "'may not refuse to extend that system to cases of 'religious hardship' without compelling reason.'" When Justice Scalia wrote that, he probably did not intend to lay down a sweeping new rule. Michael McConnell is right that this language had "one function only: to enable the Court to reach the conclusion it desired in Smith without openly overruling any prior decisions."
Lukumi is the source of the underinclusiveness rule that the Court adopted in Tandon. But the Tandon rule does not readily follow from Lukumi, which did not specify the standard it was applying. As James Oleske has shown in considerable detail, "the Court viewed Lukumi as an extreme case and deliberately left unclear the appropriate methodology for deciding closer cases." Lukumi does not adopt any form of MFN. It is a precursor of MFN, not an example of it.
The Lukumi Court was divided on evidentiary questions, but it agreed that hostility toward some unpopular religion was the trigger for strict scrutiny. Justice Kennedy, writing for the majority, concluded that the record of its enactment "discloses animosity to Santeria adherents and their religious practices."
As the Court later explained, the question under Lukumi was whether a law "had the object of stifling or punishing free exercise." A single secular exemption could hardly suffice to prove that religion was singled out. The question of what to do if presented with such an exemption was not before the Court.
Impermissible purpose was indispensable to Lukumi's analysis. Its most fundamental difference from Tandon is that no such purpose was found in the California Covid regulation. That difference is clear in the remedies that the Court provided. In Tandon, the Court required a religious exemption comparable to the secular ones. In Lukumi, Oleske observes, "the remedy in the case went far beyond the granting of a religious exemption to ensure parity. Instead, the Lukumi Court completely voided Hialeah's ordinances after determining that they were 'designed to persecute or oppress a religion or its practices.'" That is appropriate when the state has acted with an improper purpose, such as racism or the endorsement of a religion.
So how did the Lukumi rule change?
The most basic form of MFN, using the existence of a single secular exception to trigger strict scrutiny, was first adopted by Justice Alito when he was a Third Circuit judge, in Fraternal Order of Police v. Newark (1999). Call this MFN-1.
In Newark, the city did not permit police officers to grow beards. However, it exempted those with pseudo folliculitis barbae (PFB), a medical condition that makes shaving impossible. Two Sunni Muslim officers, whose religion requires men to grow beards, claimed that they were being unconstitutionally discriminated against. Alito agreed: a law discriminates when it "creates a categorical exemption for individuals with a secular objection but not for individuals with a religious objection." The police department impermissibly "has made a value judgment that secular (i.e., medical) motivations for wearing a beard are important enough to overcome its general interest in uniformity but that religious motivations are not."
There are crucial differences from Lukumi. The Hialeah ordinances were "drafted with care to forbid few killings but those occasioned by religious sacrifice." The claimants in Newark did not allege that the no-beards rule itself was adopted for the purpose of harming Muslims. The "hostility" was manifested only in the failure to make an exception for them. The remedy was to create that exception, rather than to invalidate the underlying rule.
The test is still discriminatory purpose, but in Newark the failure to accommodate religion, while any comparable secular interest is accommodated, is taken as conclusive evidence of that forbidden purpose. No further evidence is necessary, even though there is no evidence of intention to harm, nor any plausible way to construe the statutory scheme as having the object of harming minorities.
The best justification for the result in Newark would be that, comparator or not, the state interest was not especially pressing and would not have been appreciably jeopardized by religious accommodation. The medical exemption would then be understood as evidence supporting a finding of selective sympathy and indifference—which would be discriminatory. That of course would mean overruling Smith and directly balancing the interests. More generally, MFN-1 can be useful, but that usefulness is evidentiary, helping to determine whether religion has been devalued, and its usefulness is intertwined with the larger question of Smith.
Later forms of MFN are not so easily defended.
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The word "hostility" in _Newark_ appears only in a a footnote quoting from _Bowen v. Roy_. The "hostility" line in that case comes from a section written by Chief Justice Burger and joined by only two other justices; it is not the opinion of the court. That case in turn cites _Thomas v. Review Board of Indiana Employment Security Div._, in which the word "hostility" does not appear.
As I've pointed out before, the Newark case did not hold that every secular exception triggered a MFN exception for religion. The Newark police rules had a medical exception but also had an undercover exception. While the former rendered unjustified (according to Alito) a no-religious-exception rule, the latter did not.
That's because the former was incompatible with the alleged reason for the rule — uniformity — while the latter was not.
I agree. As Kagan conceded in South Bay United Pentecostal Church v. Newsom (quoting from Lukumi
Thus, while Koppelman is likely correct that Lukumi originally stood for the proposition that hostility towards religion was the trigger for strict scrutiny, MFN-1 dictates that strict scrutiny is triggered when (modifying Koppelman's words a bit) "the state interest [...] would not have been appreciably more jeopardized by religious accommodation than it was by the secular exemption."
Later forms of MFN are not so easily defended.
But then, advocates of later forms of MFN aren't interested so much in defending them as imposing them, providing arguments akin to apologetics, that is, convincing only to the already convinced and using piety as an excuse and cover for intellectual dishonesty.
I'm not seeing how the stated justification for Newark would require overruling Smith. Neither am I seeing the "balancing" of any interests. If the shaving requirement was not critical enough such that a medical exception was allowed, there's no reason why a religious exception should not be allowed either. Doesn't matter if it's beards or employment, generally.
This doesn't strike me as difficult. If there are grounds for a secular exception, one cannot refuse a religiously grounded exception without implying that it is less worthy of consideration and so discriminating against it. Religious reasons for not getting vaccinated are not less justifiable than medical reasons.
" Religious reasons for not getting vaccinated are not less justifiable than medical reasons. "
If an allergy would cause a vaccination to be fatal for some people, enabling a relevant citizen to avoid vaccination requires a superstition-based exemption?
Competent citizens neither advance nor accept superstition-based arguments in reasoned debate, particularly with respect to public affairs.
Grow up, clingers. Or just await replacement. By your betters.
Kirkland are you just stupid because there's no way you can have any law experience. Jesus you might be the worst person with logic I've read.
One person wishes to be excused from vaccination because the vaccine would kill that person.
Society excuses that person from vaccination.
Another person wishes to be excused from vaccination because of superstition.
Some people contend that the superstition-based claim should -- make that must, and because the death-related claimant was excused -- prevail in this circumstance.
Does that seem logical to you?
Yes, they are. The point of a vaccination requirement is to protect health. If someone is medically counterindicated from getting vaccinated, that contributes towards the same health goal. But a religious exemption does not.
You would think this is obvious, but, sadly, it's not.
" You would think this is obvious, but, sadly, it's not. "
Not at this blog or among conservatives in general.
The state does not have absolute authority over individual health. It cannot force you to undergo a life-saving medical procedure if you object to it on religious grounds, for example. The health of the public at large is not advanced by contraindication exceptions.
The state also has a duty to protect religious rights. It cannot simply decide to prioritize health above all else without a compelling reason, hence the strict scrutiny.
Grimes — It is not forthright to leave contagion out of your reasoning in defense of religious practice. Why do religionists ever get legal protection for practices known to spread deadly contagion? Seems like the only reason contagion-spreading practices ought to be permitted would be that omitting them would also prove deadly. For that reason, it seems to me that if aggrieved religionists come to court to complain that some less-necessary practice is being permitted, while religious practices are constrained, the remedy is to constrain the less-necessary practice, not to license religionists to spread contagion.
But that's the thing, Stephen. The conservative agenda, at least as articulated frequently by this commentariat, is fundamentally anarchic. If religion offers a loophole in the social contract, then it should be widened in the name of "liberty."
It's easy for folks to feel smart when one's political philosophy has an unwavering guiding principle (government is inherently illegitimate) and an unshakable article of faith (the free market inevitably advances society). Neither assumption is valid. Neither assumption is rooted in actual libertarianism. One can comfortably hold these ideas when one is free riding the society others built with a more sophisticated blueprint.
If you want to make a claim that religious objections should be allowed to prevail over public health measures, full stop, you can do that. Or try. But that's not the point under discussion. The point under discussion is the "most favored nation" theory that if you allow any secular exception at all, you must allow a religious exception. That, however, makes no sense. If you allow concerts and theatrical productions, sure, there seems to be no justification for forbidding church services. But if you put in place a public health measure, like a vaccination requirement, intended to keep people from getting sick or dying, then exempting people who will get sick or die from the vaccine makes obvious sense. That is not the kind of reason for an exemption that applies to religious claims.
I don't practice Santeria, I ain't got no crystal ball, but it doesn't seem like the current crop of justices likes the Smith precedent.
Scalia was assuming a land filled with neutral secular laws from which some pesky religious minorities wanted exemptions. They would have to seek those exemptions from the political process, not from courts.
How is this neutral? You can get an exemption if you have political influence and sympathy, but not if you lack those things in the political system.
No wonder Congress passed a Religious Freedom Restoration Act by overwhelming bipartisan vote - a law proudly signed by Bill Clinton. Congressional Republicans and Democrats, plus Clinton, saw that this purported "neutrality" allowed the government to step on smaller or unpopular religions - either deliberately or accidentally ("oops, did we restrict your religious practice? Oh, well, can't be helped).
The Supreme Court wouldn't allow Congress to have RFRA - only the Supreme Court can overrule Supreme Court decisions, after all.
So maybe it's time they overruled the Smith decision.
The Supreme Court has upheld RFRA as applied to federal law (see for example the Hobby Lobby case).
Your point about unpopular religious beliefs is well taken. But, what about an anti-discrimination law that requires a limo provider to serve a same-sex wedding against her religious or secular objections to same-sex marriage? Do you think the state is motivated by stepping on an unpopular religious belief, or perhaps it honestly believes that not discriminating against gays is a worthy goal?
All I can say to that, if you apply RFRA standards, is that it would come down to whether antidiscrimination laws *are* a worthy goal - more than that, a compelling interest - and whether denying the religious exemption is the least restrictive means of achieving that interest.
That would probably depend on some analysis of the limo market and how many gay-friendly limo services are out there, etc.
Should we apply RFRA standards?
If the Supreme Court gets rid of Smith as I suggested, then something very like the RFRA standards would probably be the replacement.
To me, that's MFN on steroids and not a good idea.
Smith, if rigorously applied, means that religious exemptions are based on a regime of legislatively-granted exemptions for some religions but not for others, and the legislative authority doesn't have to justify its arbitrariness.
No wonder the justices are trying to move away from rigorously-applying Smith - by expanding the idea of religious discrimination in order to trigger a stricter review of the restriction in question.
Why not throw Scalia's foolish ideas overboard and just say he was wrong, that it's *in itself* discriminatory to base religious exemptions on who has more legislative lobbying power or is less subject to prejudice?
What would be the harm in doing a stricter scrutiny of laws burdening religion? Maybe more Rastafarians could avoid prosecution, and maybe fewer bakers will be bankrupted. Oh, well.
An exemption for Jews, but not for Rastafarians, would violate the Free Exercise Clause under Smith.
In the Oregon Evidence Code, 40.260 Rule 506, the legislature granted a clergy-penitent privilege to clergy of churches whose "discipline or tenets" include secret confession. An example of what I mean, since such churches seemed to have the political influence to get this exemption for themselves.
But the Indian religion Smith belonged to didn't have the influence to get their peyote exemption.
Why one exemption and not the other? Scalia says there's no need to justify all this.
I see that Oregon also has an exemption from many medical regulations for "The practice of the religion of persons who endeavor to prevent or cure disease or suffering by prayer or other spiritual means in accordance with the tenets of any church." - 677.060(8)
I think this law was pre-Smith (correct me if I'm wrong). The churches which believe in spiritual healing got an exemption but the peyote church didn't.
The exemption for clergy communications applies equally to all religions, as does the exemption from medical regulations, as does the lack of an exemption for sacramental use of illicit drugs.
Certainly, religions that use sacramental peyote are disparately impacted, and perhaps that's because they don't have as much political power (but, do churches who use spiritual healing really have that much political power). But if we establish your rule, then either religious exemptions must not be allowed to any law or religious exemptions must apply to every law (save the very few that can overcome strict scrutiny).
I was illustrating the point that the choice isn't between neutral secular laws or religious exemptions, the choice is between such exemptions as the legislature (and maybe executive) choose to dole out, or this *plus* cases where the courts recognize a lack of compelling interest.
"The exemption for clergy communications applies equally to all religions"
So would an exemption for peyote use. Of course, not all religions use peyote, just as not all religions employ confidential clergy communications.
"your rule"
...was signed into law by President Clinton in 1993, and when that was curtailed, it was applied to federal law, local zoning, and state prisons.
"religious exemptions must apply to every law (save the very few that can overcome strict scrutiny)."
Well, then, why not test this by looking at the record of land-use and prisoner litigation, and religious exemptions from federal law, which are all governed by "my" rule and have been for years?
Has it had the bad effects you suggest?
It has also allowed a more narrowly tailored version to apply to states — RLUIPA.
Query whether ADA accommodations trigger MFN "comparable" exemptions? If a public employer is required by law to accommodate an employee with a deviation in uniform, does that mean religious people automatically get to modify their uniforms? In what ways?
My problem with this doctrine is that the employer's obligation is unknowable at the outset. And that it can change without any impermissible act by the employer. On Day 1 no employees require accommodation. On Day 99, as required by other law, the employer hires and accommodates an employee with a disability. On Day 100 religious employees suddenly have a brand new right they didn't have when hired.
If you're a law and economics type, this should deeply concern you. There's no way for the parties to price their relationship ex ante and behave economically rationally.
I believe there are already laws requiring religious accomodations for employees both public and private.
My most provocative example is gender comfirmation surgery. If the state allows exceptions to laws against “genital mutilation” for transgender gender confirmation surgery, must it allow them for religiously based cisgender gender confirmation surgery?
More fundamentally, if a secular belief that gender confirmation surgery is essential to ones secular gender identity is permitted to justify an exception, why shouldn’t a religious belief that gender confirmation surgery is essential to ones religious gender identity justify it as well?
I think it could be argued that characterizing secular gender identity confirmation as fundamental to oneself while regarding religious gender confirmation using terminology like “mutilation” while completely disregarding its role in personal identity, is probably Alito’s best argument that are laws on the books motivated by nothing but anti-religious animosity. Using hate terminology like “mutilation” in the religious case while using positive terminology like “confirmation” in the secular case for what are objectively similar kinds of surgery - religious gender confirmation surgery, being cisgender, is if anything objectively less intrusive and less “mutilating” than secular gender confirmation surgery - is if anything something of a tell that what is going on here is pure anti-religious animosity.
Again from an Alito point of view, It’s a failure to understand or respect that religious people also have gender identities and also sometimes need survery to confirm them. It privileges the secular over the religious plain and simple, treating objectively similar practices radically differently based solely on whether the motivation behind the practice is religious or secular in nature.
What is cisgender gender confirmation surgery?
What the law calls “genital mutilation.”
https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/USCODE-2011-title18/html/USCODE-2011-title18-partI-chap7-sec116.htm
I have no idea how female genital mutilation in any way can be characterized as "cisgender gender confirmation surgery." I can't even think of any surgery that can be so characterized.
You need it to confirm, to make your body consistent with, your identity from a religious point of view. Your identity isn’t complete without it.
WTF? No one has ever argued, because it would be ridiculous, that slicing the clitoris is needed for a cisgender woman's body to be consistent with her identity as a woman.
Liposuction for guys with man-boobs?
I disagree with the hypothetical. Whatever other flaws in the approach there may be, this simply isn’t one of them. If private employers’ religious and disability accommmodation obligations were equalized, employers would be obligated to accommodate a religious claim from Day 1, the day the religious claimant was hired, if they would be obligated to accommodate a similar claim made by a diabled person, regardless of whether or not there actually is or ever was a disabled person making a similar claim. This idea of waiting until a disabled person gets hired and makes a similar claim just isn’t there. The employer’s obligation to the religious claimant would arise immediately. If the employer refuses and the religious claimant sues, the judge would evaluate under the same standards that would be used if the employer had refused a disabled claimant making a similar claim.
If the employer decides to voluntarily give more than the required accommodation, the employer simply gives it to everyone who has a basis for accommodation. Again there is no surprise. The employer decides to give voluntary accommodations at the time the employer makes that decision, and that’s when the equal obligation arises. There is again no wait.
It’s true that if the employer negotiates a voluntary accommodation with one person he has to also give it to others considered to be in a similar class, but there’s no surprise in that. The employer comes in knowing that and factors it into the negotiation. Many business laws and customary practices work that way. You might as well say that unions unfairly surprise employers because if the employer negotiates a wage increase with one employee, he “suddenly” has to give it to everybody in the employee’s class. Same with regulated monopolies where prices or tarriffs are set by classes and can’t be individually negotiated. It’s just how the system works. Businesses have worked with such regulatory systems for a long time. They may not like them. The fact that rules etc. have to be applied to everyone in a class may be a pain. But it is hardly a surprise.
This is a fair critique. My hypothetical wasn't great.
But are you saying that from Day 1, the (public) employer needs to offer a religious employee any accommodation that any hypothetical disabled person might one day ask for, as a matter of MFN? Does the accommodation need to tie to some kind of established religious practice? How do courts conduct that inquiry without interrogating whether the religious person is acting on a "genuinely held belief"?
Will points in two separate comments. This one is on Police v. Newark.
I take the view that the Muslim police officers should have ultimately won because, exactly as Professor Koppelman said, the City of Newark’s interest in their police officers all being clean-shaven is simply not an especially important interest. But one can get there without completely overruling Smith.
As I see it, the presence of exceptions, rather than completely deciding the case in favor of religion, should simply bring one back to pre-Smith. If the law with its exceptions passes pre-Smith. then the state can enforce it.
Professor Volokh has suggested that the pre-Smith compelling interest analysis actually favored the state somewhat more than compelling interest analyses on other comstitutional provisions, and is perhaps more like current intermediate scrutiny. One example for that is that the Supreme Court upheld the military’s rule prohibiting headgear as applied to a Jewish officer wearing a yarmulke. If the City had to argue under pre-Smith, it would obviously argue that beards to a police force are like yarmulkes to the military.
What I’d say here is that the military has traditionally gotten a great deal of deference on a number of constitutional issues when it claims something is needed for combat effectiveness. But I think it’s sui generis in that respect, and civilian institutions simply do not get the same level of deference. And only a rather extreme level of deference could lead to considering the interest in facial appearance a compelling interest.
But I think medical exceptions generally pass pre-Smith compelling interest, and hence wouldn’t be sufficient to also give religion an exception.
Second comment. Over the years I’ve strongly disagreed with the court’s animosity jurisprudence, in which the justices declare that the only reason people could possibly disagree with something is raw hate. As I’ve pointed out, slavery defenders like John Calhoun regularly argued, and sincerely believed, the only possible reason anybody could be opposed to slavery was sheer cussed hate for people different from themselves. In more recent years animosity jurisprudence has been associated with the court’s left. Justice Kennedy, the in Lawrence v. Texas, said that hate was the only possible reason anybody could object to homosexual conduct. And there has always been at least a justice or two on the court arguing that the only possible reason anybody could oppose abortion is raw hatred of women.
The problem here is that zealots seems to be always quick to see hate as the only possible reason anyone could disagree with them. The fact that slavery defenders sincerely believed this about abolitionists ought by itself to be a reason to hesitate to reach this very convenient conclusion. But slavery was such a long time ago.
Justice Alito provides what is in many ways the service of allowing people on the left to see how people on the right perceive them. Justice Alito is as quick to ascribe hate to those who object to religion as Justice Ginsberg was for those who opposed her cherished and deeply believed obvious truthes. He is quick to see a conspiracy to finagle things so religion loses. He just doesn’t see the possibility that people may be acting from honest motives. Thus to Alito Lukumi Bablo Aye is not the extreme case. It is the general case.
As I’ve pointed out in the past, being too quick to see animosity in other people is an all too common trait when you believe in something really strongly and zealously, when you identify with it, and other people disagree with it.
In my view, court should not use anomosity jurisprudence. Most of the times I’ve said this I’ve been defending conservatives from liberals who I think are too quick to ascribe hateful motives to them. I’ve said, for example, that everybody likes to be with people like themselves in some aspects of life; and people who want to work with people more like themselves aren’t inherently more (or less) hateful and evil than people who want to work with them. Courts should focus on claims of social harm rather than claims of invidiousness or hateful motives, and anti-preference laws generally should, in my view, be subject to rational basis review. Similarly, there are clearly reasons to oppse abortion that are not hate based.
So let me put the shoe on the other foot for once. There are reasons to oppose some of the things religious people do that are not inherently hate based. There are reasons to support law that make life very inconvenient for religious people that are not hate based. There are reasons to give exceptions for secular purposes but not religious ones that are not hate based.
I think the Free Exercise Clause is a textual constitutional right that addresses more than mere identity. “Exercise” means conduct. For this reason, I think a broad interpretation of Smith goes too far and support rolling Smith back.
But I think animosity jurisprudence is not the way to do it. Anomosity jurosprudence rewards the most zealous, those quickest to assume the worst of their fellows. When constitutional jurisprudence permits those who can’t or won’t see reason in others to have their way, it rewards the willfully blind for their blindness. It promotes strife and prevents compromise. It’s no way to get a republic with a long-term future. Animosity jurisprudence is the intellectual descendent of John Calhoun. It is inherently divisive in its nature. It supports acts of raw power, impositions of will. If one comez in convinced other people are acting out of hate, one doesn’t have to respect them or consider their needs or truth or value of what they have to say.
I would ditch animosity jurisprudence entirely, or at the very least cabin it severely. I agree with the result in Lukumi Bablo Aye. But I would not reach that result by the animosity route. As the path Alito has followed illustrates, once one allows the intellectual laziness of asuming bad motives in ones opponents, things can go downhill very quickly.
So Professor Koppelman, I feel your pain in having to deal with Alito simply assuming that anything thet makes life harder for religious people must comr from hateful motives. But in all candor, Alito got this from Ginsberg, who was just as intellectually lazy about people who opposed things she felt really strongly about.
And evetybody, ultimately, got it from Calhoun, the intellectual architect of animosity thinking. We have to keep remembering that was this was an intellectual position deployed specificly by slaveholders for the specific purpose of defending slavery.
Sorry, in 5th paragraph, people who want to work with people more like themselves aren’t inherently any more (or less) hateful and evil than people who want to sleep with them.