Today in Supreme Court History: June 9, 1970

6/9/1970: Justice Harry Blackmun (no relation) takes oath.

Justice Harry Blackmun

 

Comments

[Dan Schiavetta]

Carey v. Population Services Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 (decided June 9, 1977): statute prohibiting sale of non-prescription contraceptives, and contraceptives to minors, violated Due Process right to privacy/liberty (you can see Brennan's hard work here -- cobbling together a majority but with fractured opinions)

Randon v. Toby, 52 U.S. 493 (decided June 9, 1851): fact that loan was used to buy slaves which had been illegally imported from Africa to Texas did not make it an "illegal contract" such that plaintiff could not sue on the loan; Court compared this argument to a man who won't pay his tailor because the importer had smuggled the cloth

Williams v. Pennsylvania, 579 U.S. 1 (decided June 9, 2016): judge must recuse himself in death penalty appeal because he was the D.A. who brought the prosecution

Commonwealth of Puerto Rico v. Sanchez Valle, 579 U.S. --- (decided June 9, 2016): Double Jeopardy bars prosecutions of the same conduct (illegal gun sale) by Puerto Rico and by the federal government; unlike a State, P.R. is not a separate "sovereign"

CTS Corp. v. Waldburger, 573 U.S. 1 (decided June 9, 2014): "superfund" law (CERCLA) preempts state statutes of limitations but not state statutes of repose (North Carolina law barring actions brought more than 10 years after last culpable act applied to dismiss suit against polluter who had sold the property 24 years previously)

Omaha & C.B.S.R. Co. v. Interstate Commerce Comm'n, 230 U.S. 324 (decided June 9, 1913): street railroads (run not on land owned by the railroad company but on public street as an aid to street traffic) did not fit definition of "railroad" in the ICC Act of 1887 and therefore ICC had no power to set rates

United States v. Lovasco, 431 U.S. 783 (decided June 9, 1977): speedy trial requirement of Sixth Amendment does not apply to time between crime and indictment (here, 18 months) even if delay is unexplained (opinion written by Marshall!)

Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74 (decided June 9, 1980): owner of private property to which public is invited cannot restrict free speech (here, shopping center in which students had set up table protesting "a United Nations resolution against zionism") (this must have been the infamous Resolution 242, equating zionism with racism)

[apedad]

Williams v. Pennsylvania

Facts of the case
Terrance Williams was convicted and sentenced to death for the robbery and murder of Amos Norwood. The Supreme Court affirmed Williams’ conviction and sentence, and he filed three petitions under the Post-Conviction Relief Act, all of which were denied and the denials affirmed by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court. Williams also petitioned for federal habeas relief, which was denied. On his fourth petition for relief under the Post-Conviction Relief Act, the state court determined that Williams had sufficiently demonstrated that there was governmental interference in his trial and granted the relief. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court reversed the lower court’s decision and lifted the stay of execution.

The Chief Justice of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court at that point was Ronald Castille, who had been the District Attorney for Philadelphia throughout Williams’ trial, sentencing, and appeal, and who had personally authorized his office to seek the death penalty in this case. Prior to having his case heard by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, Williams moved to have Chief Justice Castille recuse himself from this case. Chief Justice Castille refused to do so and ultimately joined the opinion that reversed the lower court’s grant of habeas relief and lifted the stay of execution.

Question
Are the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments violated when a state supreme court justice declines to recuse himself from a capital case in which he was the district attorney who approved the decision to seek the death penalty?

Are the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments violated by the participation of a potentially biased jurist in a multi-member tribunal in a capital case, regardless of whether that jurist’s vote is ultimately decisive?

Conclusion
The Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments were violated when a judge who was previously involved in the case as a prosecutor declined to recuse himself, regardless of whether that judge’s decision as part of a multi-member tribunal was dispositive. Justice Anthony M. Kennedy delivered the opinion of the 5-3 majority. The Court held that there was an impermissible of risk of bias that violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment when a judge was previously involved in the case as a prosecutor who participated in crucial decisions about the case. Especially in the case of a former prosecutor, who likely made critical strategy decisions, the risk of improper, even if inadvertent, bias toward the position the prosecutor advocated for as a member of the adversarial process is so serious as to be unconstitutional. In this case, there is no doubt that the judge was involved in a critical decision as a prosecutor because he played a vital role in deciding to seek the death penalty, which is one of the most significant decisions a prosecutor can make. Additionally, because the deliberations of an appellate panel are confidential, it does not matter whether the potentially biased judge’s decision was dispositive, because it can be assumed that it at the very least influenced the outcome. Even the appearance of such influence undermines the crucial neutrality of the tribunal.

In his dissent, Chief Justice John G. Roberts wrote that the Due Process Clause is only violated when the judge is actually biased by his previous involvement in the case. In this case, there was no evidence that the judge in question had actually been involved in, or formed a decision on, the decision about whether the seek the death penalty, and therefore there was no “objective risk of actual bias” such that it was fundamentally unfair for him to hear the case. Justice Samuel A. Alito, Jr. joined in the dissent.

Justice Clarence Thomas wrote a separate dissent in which he argued that the rule in question should be less strict when the matter before the judge was different from what the judge worked on when he was involved in the case. In this case, the criminal conviction was not at issue; instead, the matter is a question of post-conviction relief, which is wholly different from what the judge was involved with as a prosecutor on the case. Justice Thomas argued that historical practice and precedent construe judicial disqualification narrowly and therefore did not require a judge who was involved in a criminal case to recuse himself from the post-conviction proceedings, which are a separate civil matter. Justice Thomas also noted that any concerns about potential bias should be addressed by state legislatures, not the Court.
(Oyez)

I highlighted this case because of the current debate about judge recusals.

[DaivdBehar]

This is a denial of reality unless the defendant was falsely convicted. Nitpicking should be criminalized, because it is in bad faith. It is lying and denial.

[DaivdBehar]

Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74 (decided June 9, 1980): owner of private property to which public is invited cannot restrict free speech (here, shopping center in which students had set up table protesting "a United Nations resolution against Zionism") (this must have been the infamous Resolution 242, equating Zionism with racism)

Now, Eugene, explain the difference between a website open to the public and a shopping center for the purpose of expressing political dissent. Also you, David.

[John F. Carr]

From _Randon v. Toby_: "Had this case been conducted on the principles of pleading and practice, known and established by the common law, a short declaration in assumpsit, a plea of non-assumpsit, and non-assumpsit infra sex annos, would have been sufficient to prepare the case for trial on its true merits. But, unfortunately, the District Court has adopted the system of pleading and code of practice of the State courts; and the record before us exhibits a most astonishing congeries of petitions and answers, amendments, demurrers, and exceptions,-a wrangle in writing extending over more than twenty pages, and continued nearly two years,-in which the true merits of the case are overwhelmed and concealed under a mass of worthless pleadings and exceptions, presenting some fifty points, the most of which are wholly irrelevant, and serve only to perplex the court, and impede the due administration of justice."

On the merits, after noting that being a negro is prima facie evidence of being a slave: "If the defendant had shown that the negroes had sued out their freedom in the courts of Texas, it would have been a good defence. In every sale of personal property there is an implied warranty of title, for a breach of which a vendee may sue his vendor and recover the price paid; and on a suit for such price may plead want of consideration or eviction by a better title."

[David Nieporent]

Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74 (decided June 9, 1980): owner of private property to which public is invited cannot restrict free speech (here, shopping center in which students had set up table protesting "a United Nations resolution against zionism") (this must have been the infamous Resolution 242, equating zionism with racism)

242 (and its companion, 338) is about Israel withdrawing from territories captured in the Six Day War. Those are Security Council resolutions.

Zionism is Racism was a General Assembly resolution, 3379.

[Dan Schiavetta]

My memory was off.

Ironically, some of the original zionists were anti semites. Chesterton was an example. He supported Jews going to Israel because he wanted them out of England.

[Lockean Liberal]

Wait, you mean the Judge Harry Blackmun isn't related to Josh Blackman even though their last names are spelled and pronounced differently ? What a coincidence.... I mean... wait..... what's the opposite of coincidence....

[Syd Henderson]

Blackmun must have changed his name to avoid being associated with the notorious Blackman clan.

[Rev. Arthur L. Kirkland]

Blackman likely was a perfectly good name when former Justice Blackman was in a position to change his name.

[DaivdBehar]

Are you being funny? Funny how? How are you being funny?

[ReaderY]

Imagine that! The voluminous pleadings in the case extended in their totality to a humongous TWENTY PAGES!

How outrageously, absurdly lengthy!