The Volokh Conspiracy
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Thoughts on the Supreme Court's Reinstatement of the Preliminary Injunction Against the Texas Social Media Law
The ruling is not a final decision on the merits. But it likely signals that at least five Supreme Court justices believe the law is unconstitutional.

As Eugene Volokh notes, the Supreme Court today reinstated a trial court preliminary injunction blocking enforcement of Texas' social media law. This reverses a 2-1 Fifth Circuit court of appeals ruling lifting the injunction and ensures that the law cannot go into effect as the appeals process proceeds. Among other things, the law in question bars major social media sites like Facebook and Twitter from imposing almost any content-based restrictions on the material users are allowed to post on their sites.
Eugene and Will Baude have useful commentary about various aspects of this ruling. I would add the point that, while this is not a final decision on the merits, it strongly suggests that at least five Supreme Court justices believe the law is unconstitutional, violating the First Amendment.
One of the criteria for granting a preliminary injunction in federal court is that the plaintiff must prove they are likely to succeed on the merits. The five justices who voted to reinstate the preliminary injunction - Chief Justice Roberts, Breyer, Sotomayor, Kavanaugh, and Barrett - are well aware of this fact. They almost certainly would not have voted as they did unless they believe the law is indeed likely to be unconstitutional.
Obviously, they also must have concluded that the case meets the other standards for a preliminary injunction. As Judge Robert Pitman explained in the trial court ruling granting the injunction, these are that the plaintiff must show "he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief, that the balance of equities tips in his favor, and that an injunction is in the public interest."
It's also possible that one or more of the dissenting justices also might ultimately conclude that the law is unconstitutional. Justice Elena Kagan dissented without opinion. Thus, we don't know which factor she believes the plaintiffs failed to prevail on. It could be she thinks they are wrong on the merits. But it could also be she concluded they fall short on one of the other three requirements.
Justice Samuel Alito wrote a dissent joined by Clarence Thomas and Neil Gorsuch. That dissent does indeed focus on likelihood of success. But significantly, it does not conclude that Texas is actually likely to prevail, merely that the plaintiffs haven't met their burden because "I have not formed a definitive view on the novel legal questions that arise from Texas's decision to address the 'changing social and economic' conditions it perceives." Alito suggests, therefore, that he is uncertain about the right outcome here. Thus, it is possible that one or more of these justices could also rule in favor of the plaintiffs if the Court ever decides to address this issue on the merits.
Such a vote in favor of the plaintiffs is unlikely in the case of Justice Clarence Thomas, who has previously expressed sympathy for the argument that the government can treat social media firms as "common carriers" required to post virtually any content without discrimination. But it is more plausible for Alito and Gorsuch, neither of whom joined Thomas' 2021 concurring opinion expressing that view.
I have previously argued that the Texas law and others like it do indeed violate the First Amendment, and would pose a grave threat to freedom of speech if upheld (see also here for my critique of the common carrier theory). I agree with Judge Pitman's analysis in his ruling against the Texas law, and with the recent Eleventh Circuit appellate ruling against Florida's similar legislation. The Eleventh Circuit decision was authored by Judge Kevin Newsom, a conservative Trump appointee.
While today's Supreme Court ruling is far from the end of the litigation over these issues, it sends a strong signal that the Court is likely to strike down laws like those enacted by Texas and Florida, should they ever take a case addressing these matters. And there is a good chance the issue will indeed eventually get to the Supreme Court, if lower appellate courts end up being divided on it. It's an obviously important cutting-edge constitutional question, and the justices are unlikely to allow a circuit split on it to persist for long.
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Just a test comment.
You've reached a new low by testing to see whether comments is working.
If this is a satire of the commentariat, it's pretty on point.
Why is that a "new low"? We've seen multiple examples right here of articles posted with the comment setting accidentally turned off and not turned on until someone complains, usually in the comments of a different article. If an author is not sure that setting is correct (and given the ever-changing interface, I can be sympathetic to the potential confusion), a test comment seems like an entirely appropriate way to confirm your own work.
a test comment seems like an entirely appropriate way to confirm your own work.
Or to confirm that no one is paying attention to your post.
Now you have to allow me a test comment.
I suspect there will be more than 5.
I think that governments can require social media companies to divide their businesses into two separately regulated components, a common-carrier type business where they accept all comers, and a publisher type business where they present their own curated content. The two business components can have an intermixed presentation. But the states and Congress can define lines of separation between the two, for example requiring the social media company to identify and distinguish advertisements, endorsed and promoted content, etc. which the company controls, from disclaimed common carrier carrier content over which it has no control.
So I believe that, in principle, common carrier requirements are constitutional, and do not interfere with the social media company’s right to present its own content on its platform in addition to its users content. I also think that government can set limits on how much endorsed content vs. common carrier content can appear, with a minimum common carrier content requirement.
There are many ways the distinction could be addressed. For example the two kinds of content could appear simultaneously, e.g. in separate zones on the same screen.
You've said this before, and it's just so obviously wrong as to be silly. The government cannot, consistent with the 1st Amendment, force a non-common carrier to be a common carrier. And the government, cannot, consistent with the 5th amendment, just order a company that is protected by the 1A to create a brand new line of business that won't be.
I also think it is unreasonable for a company to have all the advantages of not being a publisher for purposes of federal law (no liability for content), and then be able to turn around and claim that it is a publisher and has all the rights of a publisher for purposes of state law.
To have all the rights of a publisher with none of the responsibilities is an unreasonable grant of raw power over others with no right of others to redress wrongs. It’s a completely unreasonable state of the law.
Either be a publisher and be liable for what a publisher is liable for, or don’t be a publisher and accept genuine lack of control over content and common carrier status, as all other non-publishers have to accept. One or the other. If you get the advantages of either status, you ought to have to accept the limitations and responsibilities.
Well, that's not well-phrased, but I know what you mean, so I'll respond: that's a policy argument. Congress disagreed with you.
If you want to repeal § 230, you would not be alone in supporting that. But § 230 exists and controls the issue.
I've read Alito's dissent but I haven't been able to find the majority opinion. Is there one or is the simple announcement of the vote all we get?
I suppose given the non-opinion opinion of the 5th circuit it's not worth the time of the SCOTUS clerks to bother to write a rebuttal. The district court's ruling is pretty comprehensive, so a "what he said" concurrence is probably sufficient.
There is no opinion. This was merely an order on the docket.
Thanks. Per the NYT: "The court’s brief order was unsigned and gave no reasons, which is typical when the justices act on emergency applications."
But Alito felt compelled to write a dissent and give the vote tally. Is that typical?
It's typical of shadow docket cases.