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Should Ketanji Brown Jackson Recuse in Harvard Admissions Case?
Does her position on Harvard University's Board of Overseers require or counsel her recusal once she is confirmed?
One of the most high profile cases on the Supreme Court's docket for next term is Students for Fair Admissions v. President & Fellows of Harvard College, a challenge to Harvard University's use of race in undergraduate admissions. The petitioners claim that Harvard is discriminating against Asian applicants and are asking the Court to hold that federal law prohibits any use of race in college admissions, while Harvard maintains its admissions practices are consistent with the Supreme Court's decision in Grutter v. Bollinger, and that this precedent should be upheld.
Assuming Judge Ketanji Brown Jackson is confirmed to the Supreme Court this spring, one of her first decisions will be whether to recuse in this case. Since 2016, Judge Jackson has been a member of Harvard's Board of Overseers, which (according to Harvard's website) is "one of Harvard's two governing boards" and "plays an integral role in the governance of the University" by fulfilling oversight and advisory functions. Judge Jackson's term on the Board ends this year, but she has been a member throughout the pendency of this litigation.
A Washington Post story delves into the question whether this relationship means that a Justice Jackson should recuse from the Students for Fair Admissions case. As the article notes, the justices are not bound by the code of judicial conduct, but generally follow the same standard in determining whether to recuse from a case. The qualification "generally" is important here, as justices are somewhat less likely to recuse in cases than their lower court colleagues because, unlike on lower courts (and unlike some state supreme courts), there is no way to substitute for a recused justice. Thus, a recusal has the same practical effect as a vote against the petitioner.
From the Post article:
Jackson's affiliation with Harvard is more current. She has served as a member of the oversight board, which provides "counsel to the University's leadership on priorities, plans, and strategic initiatives," since 2016. Her term ends May 26; the court will hear the affirmative action challenges to policies at Harvard and the University of North Carolina in the term that begins in October.
"Six years on the Board is a long time, so, to quote the federal recusal law, her 'impartiality' in the case — that is, in favor of Harvard, given her ties to the Board — 'might reasonably be questioned' here, meaning disqualification is required," according to Gabe Roth, executive director of Fix the Court, a nonpartisan group that advocates for reforms. . . .
A key question in assessing whether Jackson should participate in the case is whether she played any role in the formation of the admissions policy being challenged, according to New York University law professor Stephen Gillers.
The board Jackson sits on was named in the original lawsuit in 2014 but dismissed as a party the next year, before Jackson was elected. It is separate from the smaller Harvard Corporation board, which has fiduciary responsibility.
As the Post story notes, Judge Jackson appears to have been fairly quick to recuse in cases where there was an apparent or potential conflict of interest, including some that involved Harvard.
Among the more than 2,000 pages Jackson submitted to the Senate Judiciary Committee in advance of her confirmation hearings is a list of the dozen cases over eight years in which she took the initiative to recuse. . . .
In a separate pair of cases, she recused because of her role on the Harvard board even though the university itself was not a party in the lawsuits. She declined in 2016 to get involved in a challenge to the Department of Education's sexual assault guidelines for colleges and universities because the board she was serving on "was evaluating its own potential response to those guidelines." Two years later, she removed herself from resolving a lawsuit filed by a Harvard research librarian against the Environmental Protection Agency after the government failed to respond to a public records request.
In both instances, Jackson wrote in her Senate questionnaire, "I determined that my impartiality might reasonably be questioned and that this issue was incurable."
If Judge Jackson is inclined to apply this same cautious approach as a Supreme Court justice, that would suggest she will recuse. But will it matter?
A potential recusal in the Harvard case would seem like a big deal, but it is not clear that it would affect the outcome. Harvard prevailed below, so it will take the votes of at least five justices for the petitioners, Students for Fair Admissions, to prevail. If there are not five votes for reversal, Harvard will be able to maintain its current policies and the Grutter precedent will stand, as the lower court's opinion would be affirmed without the issuance of a precedential opinion in the case of a tie vote. (Indeed, standard court practice is for there to be no opinion at all in such cases.)
Under the assumption that a Justice Jackson is likely to join the other liberal justices in rejecting the petitioners' claims, her recusal would not make it any easier for the petitioners to prevail. As a legal matter, a 5-3 decision holds the same force as a 5-4 decision. A recusal would, however, make it less likely that the Court issues an opinion reaffirming or expounding upon Grutter. For while it would only take four votes to prevent reversal of the lower court opinion, it would take five for the Court to issue a precedential opinion upholding Harvard's current admissions practices.
Whether it will matter or not, this is a question certain to come up in the Senate Judiciary Committee's confirmation hearings, and it will be interesting to see whether Judge Jackson commits to handling the recusal question in this case in any particular way.
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"Should Ketanji Brown Jackson Recuse in Harvard Admissions Case?"
It's a serious question asked by serious people - which means there's a potential issue.
Ethics codes generally state people should remove themselves if there is a conflict of interests or the APPEARANCE of a conflict of interests.
That appears to be the case here.
Regardless whether Judge Brown Jackson has an actual conflict of interest, there's definitely a strong appearance of one and it should (and obviously will) be explored during her confirmation hearings.
A Code of Conduct should be added to the next Judiciary Act, with automatic suspensions for alleged violations.
The Judiciary Act should move the Supreme Court to the Midwest. It should make the number of Justices even. It should increase the number of Justices to 500, the size of a legislature, since it is making law. It should have a 20 year term. It should have mandatory retirement at 70. Preferably, it should exclude anyone who has passed 1L to keep out the hopeless dumbasses.
Davie, you may want to ask your doctors and/or have your mother ask them about quetiapine fumarate (Seroquel). It won't help with the authoritarian aspects of your autism but may help tamp down some of the more odd characteristics you exhibit.
Actually DB has a couple good points in this specific comment (20 yr term, increase # of justices).
Of course, maybe he just copy/pasted from his pre-insane days.
increase # of justices...to 500? No, this is just more craziness.
Yeah, not 500 but I wouldn't mind 15 - 25.
Only if SCOTUS adopts the 3-judge panel protocol used by the circuit courts and starts hearing a lot more cases.
Also, maybe in exchange for a new rule that hearing original jurisdiction cases is not discretionary.
Note: The smallest circuit court does the 3 judge panel thing with only 6 judges on the full court.
500 non-lawyers would bring some Wisdom of the Crowd to these relentlessly dumb asses.
Davie, ask your doctors and/or have your mother ask them about quetiapine fumarate (Seroquel). It won't help with the authoritarian aspects of your autism but may help tamp down some of the more odd characteristics you exhibit.
Hi, Queenie. Thanks for your loyal support. You are the only one stupid enough to reply to me. I appreciate it. Can I get your preferred pronoun for the letter?
"You are the only one stupid enough to reply to me. I appreciate it."
A sick, sick and very funny person, folks! Also, big Trump supporter!
Brown would be the most radical nominee ever. She would be a catastrophe for our nation. She should be resisted to the utmost. She is also a light weight.
"Boy, the food at this place is really terrible." The other one says, "Yeah, I know; and such small portions."
Suspensions for alleged violations? That would violate due process and hold the entire system hostage to anyone willing to make unprovable allegations.
But if you get rid of the "alleged" part, someone has to investigate and decide - and that merely moves the problem. Now you have a new Court superior to and supervising the old Court. So who watches them?
Congress has that duty now.
Yes, they do. But impeachment is not automatic. And it's not clear that a Code of Conduct would make them any more ready to act than they are under the current standards. If anything, a formal Code of Conduct would make Congress less likely to act because today, a judge can be impeached for parting his/her hair the wrong way - and they still don't hold judges accountable.
He's a crazy person. They should only be mocked until they get help and improve.
"Should Ketanji Brown Jackson Recuse in Harvard Admissions Case?"
Yes.
It's up to her.
I'm not in love with the way SCOTUS handles recusals- i.e., it's up to the justice's whim- but that is the rule, it's the rule that is applied when conservatives sometimes don't recuse when they should, and it's the rule that should apply to liberals as well.
I'm not sure that Congress can constitutionally impose recusal rules on SCOTUS, but it might be worth a try.
“If a rhinoceros were to enter this restaurant now, there is no denying he would have great power here. But I should be the first to rise and assure him that he had no authority whatever.”
I mean, it's up to the justice's sound judgment, not whim. Just because there's no enforcement mechanism doesn't mean that the justice has the right to do whatever s/he wants.
If it were a flagrant situation, I wonder what the other justices would do.
To be clear, I know the other justices can't force a recusal. But they could decide to DIG the case or collectively agree that they wouldn't let a conflicted judge be the deciding vote.
Judge Ketanji Brown-Jackson is not Justice Ketanji Brown-Jackson. This question seems very premature.
Professor Adler: Doesn't an issue have to 'ripen' first before acting? 🙂
If she becomes Justice Ketanji Brown-Jackson, may I suggest that she handle the recusal question, herself? She is a sitting Federal judge, for Pete's sake. She will know when to recuse herself and failing that, there is CJ Roberts who has the final say here. The bottom line is that I trust them to do the right thing, based on their evaluation of the totality of circumstances around the case.
CJ Roberts will not have final say here. Roberts' authority as Chief does not include the power to order other justices to recuse.
Technically, you're right. Pragmatically, I think otherwise. One public statement from the Chief Justice and it would be done.
It seems intensely unlikely that after decades of ignoring (publicly, at least) Justice Thomas' ethical issues, Chief Justice Roberts is going to admonish Judge/Justice/Justice-confirmed/Justice-whatever Jackson.
It likely would cause more problems for Justice Thomas than for anyone else.
REV. ARTHUR L. KIRKLAND
Why? The whole point of lifetime appointment is to guarantee independence - including from the other Justices (and, yes, that includes the Chief Justice).
Justices disagree with the Chief Justice all the time. That happens literally every time they issue a non-unanimous decision. By design, there are no consequences to that disagreement. Nor would (or should) there be for the hypothetical decision above.
It would have to be extraordinary, Rossami, for the Chief Justice to even utter a word publicly on the matter of a recusal for a fellow Justice.
I cannot think of a single instance of this ever happening, can you?
I think she should decline to give a specific answer to the committee, but that she should say the following:
1. Describe accurately her role in Harvard Admissions policy as a member of the Board of Overseers.
2. Describe the process she has followed in considering whether to recuse as a federal judge.
3. State that she will first do the same recusal analysis that she has done before, then consult the other justices on the court, particularly the Chief Justice, then make her decision.
As a practical matter, I think recusal is probably the right decision, but she should not commit to that in advance to the Senate (no nominee should precommit like that).
On what basis would she refuse to answer? The facts are specific to this case, and they are not part of the dispute before the court, so there is no prejudice.
Eight of the sitting justices graduated Ivy, a very insular society. Nobody asked Barrett to recuse from abortion and religious based cases. Gun-owning (NRA membering?) justices sit on 2A cases. Thomas sits on cases in which his wife is involved in some way or another. Justices with corporate relationships sit on corporation-related cases. Justices who are”tough on crime” sit on matters involving police abuse. But people are very concerned the black female Harvard grad — who will probably often put the “3” in “6-3” — will No Fair Bias! the Harvard case?
Get bent.
Silver linings: Banging on about this one case leaves less time for more overt racism (though there’ll be plenty to go around). And it’s another sign the gop considers the fate of Roe a fait accompli, which…
I would like to see more Justices from outside the Ivy League, OtisAH. We need diversity on the Court. One thing I really like about Judge Brown-Jackson is she was a trial court judge and a public defender; lots of practical experience in the legal system. She is a 'Working Mom', too: That, I respect a hell of a lot.
I'll be listening to the hearings with interest.
Why?
Why?
FTR, Barrett was asked about recusal, but recusal from ACA and 2020 election cases, not those related to her dominionist ideology.
That race card you played is so thin it has only one side. She should recuse because Harvard is being sued and she sits on the Harvard Board of Overseers. It's that simple. If Yale or Princeton were being sued, no one would be saying anything about recusal.
You're confusing issues with litigants. Harvard is a party to the case. Nobody reasonably thinks a justice has to recuse himself or herself merely because he or she has views on a particular topic, but a connection to a party is very different.
And you also misunderstand the situation. It's not that KBJ is a Harvard grad; it's that she sat on Harvard's board. She may have participated in decisionmaking relating to the case, or even to the Harvard policies at issue in the case.
Other than that -- Great Comment!
Note that she was not appointed to that board until after the case had been filed, and after the board had been removed from the lawsuit. Both of those factors lean against her participation in either decision making about the case, or relevant Harvard policies.
And if the facts turn out otherwise, her past practice indicates she would take those factors into account in her possible recusal decision.
According to its website, Judge Jackson joined the Harvard Board of Overseers in 2016. If they haven't discussed this lawsuit since then, they're not doing a lot of overseeing.
What statutes would have to change to allow Justice Jackson to recuse and have her slot filled by Justice Breyer?
Or would it merely be internal Supreme Court rules and norms?
I think Congress would have to pass legislation allowing a non SCOTUS justice to sit by designation. They have those statutes for the circuit courts both as to district judges sitting and judges from other circuits sitting. There isn't one regarding SCOTUS.
If confirmed, Jackson should recuse, as should all Supreme Court justices with personal or familial connections to cases before the Court.
On a related subject, there is this:
The petitioners claim that Harvard is discriminating against Asian applicants and are asking the Court to hold that federal law prohibits any use of race in college admissions, while Harvard maintains its admissions practices are consistent with the Supreme Court's decision in Grutter v. Bollinger, and that this precedent should be upheld.
Although perhaps a literal report of petitioners' advocacy, that from the OP somewhat misdescribes the substantive basis of petitioners' claim. The word, "meritocracy," may not appear in the court papers, but viewed substantively the petitioners' claim amounts to an apparently groundless assertion that meritocracy is a U.S. legal doctrine which courts should enforce.
The problem with saying race or ethnicity is being used to discriminate against Asian Americans at Harvard is that no such assertion can stand on its own, without some further justification, however tacit. But cases should not be decided on the basis of tacit arguments, which go unmentioned in decisions.
The case against unsupported use of the race/ethnicity argument is that by itself it is nonsense. Prevalence of Asian American undergraduates at Harvard is about 3 times their prevalence in American society at large. That striking overrepresentation of Asian Americans can hardly, on that basis alone, be counted a factor against their fair treatment. On the contrary, as matter of mathematics, it partly accounts for underrepresentation of other protected classes, notably including African Americans—who could thus claim a purely statistical case far superior to show unfair treatment.
So to justify a case in their favor, petitioners on behalf of Asian Americans need something more than a numerical account of Harvard's admissions results—which used alone would lopsidedly decide the case against them. The basis for that extra argument cannot be anything other than a claim that Asian Americans as a group have by some standards of admission shown themselves to be superior candidates—perhaps so superior that even their current statistical over-representation cannot be counted a full measure of their merit.
That may be. But a legal problem with it is that meritocracy is no part of the law. Given the posture of the case, it is almost inconceivable that a Court decision on behalf of the petitioners would forthrightly confess that a deciding element in the case was Court-mandated imposition of meritocracy—a bogus legal standard which lacks both statutory basis and precedent. Instead, what a Court majority on behalf of the plaintiffs would be forced to rule is that Harvard did wrong by even noticing the distribution of racial and ethnic groupings among its applicants. Thus, a case decided in large part on the basis of an unmentioned and unsupportable legal standard would deliver an opinion marred by false emphasis on something else. And that something would create an unjustified precedent mandating complete color-blindness in even private college admissions.
If there is a major questions doctrine active in the Court's considerations, the practical abolition of racially- and ethnically-based affirmative action in college admissions would seem to qualify. How can decisive reasoning which goes unmentioned in a decision qualify as an adequate basis for deciding a major legal question?
As usual, Lathrop vomits many paragraphs of empty argument to defend racist policies by trying to misdirect argument to a topic that he acknowledges the plaintiffs do not raise.
Michael P, "plaintiffs do not raise," is an opposite of, "plaintiffs raise tacitly."
You are full of beans.
No, it is just a way of saying "in Stephen Lathrop's fervid imagination".
As usual, Lathrop makes arguments about legal issues he doesn't understand that have been decisively refuted, that he blithely repeats as though it hadn't already been explained to him how wrong he is, factually, logically, and legally.
She won't because she's a Leftist activist with no principles.
Even if this is so, if her vote won't make any difference, why wouldn't she collect some cheap honor points for recusing ?
The circumstances in which her vote for Harvard might be decisive are rather unlikely - eg the Court decides 4-3 against Harvard with her recusing and a conservative Justice dead, indisposed or also recusing.
Moreover, unnecessarily nailing her colors to the mast on a "race" case, would narrow her room to tack when presented with a subsequent case where she does want to find some impermissible racism.
Assuming she's not an idiot, she would take the easy recusal.
why wouldn't she collect some cheap honor points for recusing ?
Come on, Lee. You're basically saying that if she recuses it will be for a lousy, manipulative, reason, and of course if she doesn't you will criticize that as well.
Not really giving her much of a chance, are you?
I'm a firm believer in the wisdom of the parable of the widow's mite. Generosity is only evidence of purity of heart if it really costs you. We will know her heart is pure when she recuses in an important case and thereby flips the result to the side she opposes. Her heart may be pure, but to recuse when it doesn't matter is no evidence of it.
And likewise for the other Justices.
Actually I wouldn't criticise her for not recusing. I don't approve of SCOTUS recusals, except perhaps in the case of material personal financial interests.
The idea that her having served in some capacity at Harvard would endanger faith in the impartiality of the Supreme Court, by leading the public to believe she might lean towards the Harvard side, but that the public cannot deduce that a nominee cheered by all the usual suspects as a champion might be leaning towards Harvard, on a central dogma of the current progressive left, is laughable.
As Adler points out, it could make a difference, though would take the unlikely (as you say) circumstance of two conservatives deciding (strategically?) to uphold the status quo for now, resulting in a 4-4 decision with no precedential effect.
Roberts might do that (he has before) and the three newer members have each demonstrated some level of...originality...in some of their decisions.
This is silly.
Of course she should recuse herself. Hard to see why it is even a question that should take anyone's time.
Of course her recusal will not make any difference. The Court has six votes to end any attempts at affirmative action and preferences based on race, except of course for preferences based on rich White folks, which are not only Constitutional but desirable policy because the White race has been so tormented, so discriminated against, and so persecuted that the only remedy for them is to continue to receive the preferential treatment it has enjoyed for about 230 years.
When I read the title of this post, and before I read the subtitle, I expected the post to argue that she should recuse because she personally benefited from "affirmative action" when she was admitted to Harvard as an undergraduate and then as a law student.
Can't wait to read her opinion, explaining how "affirmative action" is perfectly consistent with (is required by!) the Equal Protection Clause!
What is your position on affirmative action for movement conservative professors, of the type advanced repeatedly by The Volokh Conspiracy and Heterodox Academy?
I don't buy this SCOTUS recusal thing.
It makes some sense in lower courts, particularly where there's a personal interest. But SCOTUS is essentally a legislature pretending to be a court, and nobody expects Senators or members of the House to recuse simply because a matter comes up on which they have pre-existing political opinions.
Republicans are repeatedly appalled when one of "their" Justices goes over to the other side - handing victory to the other side by primly recusing would be no better. Democrats have never felt these sharp pains from judicial disloyalty as their guys and gals are 100% loyal to the party line. It hardly makes sense for a judge who always votes the party line, to recuse lest it be thought that they had less than an open mind.
The only reason would be to emit a vaporous pretence of apolitical propriety in a case in which your vote isn't going to matter, and so apply a tiny bit of pressure on the perennially weak sisters on the other side to recuse in a case where it does matter.
"as their guys and gals are 100% loyal to the party line. "
So, you're not a serious person. OK.
Breyer in the 10 Commandments case.
Kagan in Ramos, Kahler, etc.
All of them in Rumsfeld v. FAIR.
Etc.
I'll give you Breyer in the 10 Commandments, though his judgment was plainly about mitigating the potential adverse political effect of ruling the other way. (Roberts is not the only Robertsian Justice on the court.)
None of the others were decisive, tipping votes. As noted above, tactical displays of faux objectivity are perfectly consistent with toeing the party line.
As Lenin advised, while immediate and extreme violence is always the preferred policy; if the enemy is temporarily stronger, deceit may be a permissible tactic until the relative strengths are reversed.
The issue isn't that she has a "pre-existing political opinion". The issue is that she's personally involved in the leadership of one of the parties to the case.
I've noticed that discussion of KBJ's potential recusal routinely ignores one significant fact: the Court accepted cert before judgement in another case, Students for Fair Admissions v. University of North Carolina, that addresses the same substantive questions as the Harvard case. (Given the announcement of Breyer's retirement just days later, one might wonder whether the Court did this on purpose, knowing KBJ has been a frontrunner and her connection with Harvard is well documented.)
The existence of the second case is significant in the recusal discussion for two reasons. First, whether KBJ recuses or not, the full slate of 9 should be available to decide the same Harvard questions in North Carolina. It makes the entire discussion of the Harvard recusal essentially meaningless as it pertains to the ultimate merits decision. (Cf. Colorado Department of State v. Baca (2020), where Sotomayor recused herself from the per curiam decision that deferred to the reasoning of Chiafalo v. Washington (2020), the case asking identical questions. While the latter was decided 9-0, I suspect the court would follow the same procedure even with an equally divided court, either that or DIG it.)
But second, KBJ would be aware of this fact, and so her decision to recuse would be made knowing that despite there being no other justice to step in in her place, another case in front of the full court will answer the same questions. In light of this, my guess is that she would recuse because, given her past recusals she knows that on the balance it's the right move, the optics would be good for the court and for herself personally, and her recusal has ultimately no bearing on the court's ability to answer the relevant questions.